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ABSTRACT ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In this thesis I provide a historicised account of the work of Adam Smith in order to 
reveal the essential variety of viable ethico-political commitments in liberal political 
economy and International Political Economy (IPE).  Specifically, I draw on Quentin 
Skinner’s approach to intellectual history in order to engage with the thought of Smith.  I 
show how existing readings of Smith in IPE on the whole tend to fail some of Skinner’s 
most basic methodological principles for interpreting past texts, which is problematic for 
IPE scholars because it reveals the distinctly ‘economistic’ historiography of Smith that 
dominates the subject field.  I offer a way of escaping the limitations of the prevailing 
economistic historiography through providing a sustained engagement with his actual 
texts as read in context.  In so doing, I present a novel account of Smith for IPE which 
emphasises the crucial role of the concept of the ‘sympathy procedure’ in his work, 
through such a mechanism people learn how to express fellow-feeling within their 
market-bound relationships.  I argue that this recovery provides a critical lens through 
which to interrogate the ethics of liberal market governance today, one which animates 
an alternative to economistic understandings of market-oriented behaviour.  Following 
Skinner, I do not propose a direct ‘application’ of a Smithian perspective, but instead use 
it as part of a pragmatically inspired study to reveal the historical contingency of some 
of the most deeply held views about subjecthood as manifested under liberal market 
governance today.  This enables me in the empirical parts of my thesis to reflect on 
competing discourses of the global financial crisis at the regulatory and everyday level 
of global finance via a ‘sympathy perspective’.  I argue that through such an engagement 
Smith’s sympathy procedure can produce novel ways of subverting the ethics of global 
finance as currently constituted.   
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INTRODUCTION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Adam Smith and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
In discussions of the global financial crisis (GFC), appeals to the intellectual authority of 
Adam Smith abound.  Writing a few months before the crisis was at its most acute, 
former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan (2008) suggested that the 
past decade had witnessed ‘mounting global forces’ which were the ‘international 
version of Adam Smith’s invisible hand’.  Writing later in 2011, he claimed that 2008 
marked a ‘rare exception’ to how Smith’s invisible hand had ‘created relatively stable 
exchange rates, interest rates, prices, and wage rates’ worldwide (Greenspan 2011).  
Former Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Blinder (2010), in his response to 
the crisis, also appealed to the invisible hand as ‘one of history’s great ideas’.  Another 
former Chairman Paul Volcker (2010) invoked Smith, albeit in different terms, to lend 
support to his banking reforms:  Smith ‘advocated keeping banks small’, he claimed.  A 
leading figure in global financial reform and Nobel Laureate in Economics, Joseph 
Stiglitz (2010a), suggested that recent problems in the world economy are down to the 
fact that Smith’s invisible hand ‘did not hold’: ‘Few today would argue that bank 
managers, in their pursuit of their self-interest, had promoted the well-being of the 
global economy’, he wrote.  Another Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman (2010), argued that 
Smith ‘called for a ban on high-risk, high-interest lending, the 18th-century version of 
subprime’.  Yet another Nobel Laureate, Gary Becker (2011), in his discussion of 
‘government failure’ in the crisis, suggested that the ‘traditional case for private 
competitive markets goes back to Adam Smith’.  On a similar note, the influential 
economist writing on the crisis Robert Shiller (2009) claimed that Smith held the 
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‘standard “classical” theory’ that ‘people rationally pursue their own economic interests 
in free markets’.  Yet another influential economist, Nassim Taleb (2011), alluded to 
how Smith ‘was wary of the effect of limiting liability, a bedrock principle of the 
modern corporation’.  This roll call could continue, but clearly, in discussions of the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, what Adam Smith said appears to be of 
great significance. 
 
However, exactly what Smith did or did not say is subject to a considerable degree of 
dispute.  It is no exaggeration to suggest that there is a highly complex and extremely 
contested historiography of Smith (e.g. Kennedy 2005; Muller 1995; Tribe 1999).  This 
perhaps means that appeals to the intellectual authority of his name in the context of the 
GFC ought to be viewed as appeals to one ‘Adam Smith’ among many.  Indeed, despite 
some slight differences in emphasis, the accounts noted above by world-leading 
economists (or policy-makers trained as economists) actually present a very specific 
image of Smith.  It is a depiction of him which I claim is based on an ‘economistic’ 
historiography of his work.  What is more, crucially, this image drawn from an 
economistic historiography of Smith is used in support of a particular mode of analysis.  
It is a form of analysis which itself, put simply, takes a markedly ‘economistic’ view of 
the crisis.  In this thesis, by contrast, I attempt to provide a more robust historiographical 
reading of Smith, which then might be used to subvert such conspicuously economistic 
understandings of the GFC itself.  
 
In essence, I contend that historiographical study allows for a deeper understanding of 
the contested framework of ideas which exists at the heart of modern liberalism and 
liberal market governance.  ‘Economistic’ accounts of the GFC, represented in part 
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above, broadly speaking tend to focus on a conventional understanding of the crisis as a 
temporary breakdown in the otherwise smooth and unproblematic workings of the price 
structure in global finance.  Such accounts typically appeal to Smith’s intellectual 
authority for a description of how such market pricing dynamics at least ideally ought to 
work.  By contrast, in this thesis, I show how a historiographical recovery of Smith 
provides for a more robust invocation of his intellectual authority.  It is a renewal of 
Smith that draws attention to his understanding of market-oriented behaviour made up of 
‘sympathetic’ market relations.  Notably, the term ‘sympathy’ here is not the same as a 
modern-day definition in terms of feeling sorrow for someone’s suffering.  Rather, on 
Smith’s account, sympathy refers to a device for regulating moral instincts through the 
activation of fellow-feeling.  In turn, I argue, a sympathy perspective on markets 
provides a direct challenge to the ethics of liberal market governance as they are (in the 
main) currently constituted.  In the context of the GFC, it provides a telling focus on the 
economistic essence of the Anglo-American financial structure and its corrosive effects 
on sympathetic market relations. 
 
The remainder of this Introduction proceeds in four stages.  First, I situate my 
historiographical engagement with Smith within the contemporary International Political 
Economy (IPE) literature, via particular reference to the relationship between economics 
and IPE, on the one hand, and interest in the history of political economy and global 
financial governance, on the other.  Second, I detail precisely how I make a contribution 
to knowledge by providing IPE with a historicised account of Smith’s sympathy 
procedure.  Here, I flesh out the central arguments of my thesis and explain how an 
account of Smith’s sympathetic understanding of market-oriented behaviour might prove 
effective in efforts to ‘rethink’ the ethics of liberal market governance.  Third, I specify 
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the underlying research questions that drive my thesis and the way in which they have 
direct implications for research design and methodology, which are quite specific to my 
historiographical approach.  Finally, I provide an outline of the chapters of my thesis. 
 
An engagement with Adam Smith in contemporary IPE 
In various ways, IPE scholars tend to consciously position themselves against 
economics.  On the one hand, as a matter of normativity, IPE scholars, especially those 
on the self-styled ‘critical’ edge of IPE, frequently speak in terms of a presumed political 
project contained within economics (e.g. Cox 2000; Gill 2000a; Higgott 2002).  As a 
result, they often attempt to differentiate themselves from economics by intentionally 
setting their work against a supposed ‘neoliberal’ bias in economics.  On the other hand, 
as a matter of methodology, again largely from a ‘critical’ edge, IPE scholars commonly 
focus on the presumed ‘takeover’ by economics of all social science method (e.g. 
Gamble 1995; Murphy and Tooze 1991b; Strange 1994).  In response, they often attempt 
to differentiate themselves from economics by intentionally positioning their work 
against an ‘imperialistic’ economic method (which is also of course a focal point of 
dispute in discussions of the so-called ‘transatlantic divide’ in IPE (e.g. Cohen 2008)).  
However, what I find to be particularly noteworthy is that this oppositional relationship 
between economics and IPE has, up to now, not been thoroughly discussed as a matter 
of historiography.   
 
Viewed in this light, IPE scholars (‘critical’ or otherwise) seem to have a rather 
underdeveloped historiographical account of the subject field’s own lineages in political 
economy (for notable exceptions see, for instance, Clift and Rosamond 2009; Rosow 
1997; Watson 2005a), as compared to how economists (very self-confidently) deal with 
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their own disciplinary heritage (e.g. Fry 1992; Samuelson 1969).  In IPE, the 
consequences of this can be shown to be especially problematic in the case of Adam 
Smith.  Here, the underdeveloped nature of its own historiographical account of Smith 
means that IPE scholars actually tend to produce readings of his work almost directly 
imported from economics.  That is, with only a handful of exceptions (e.g. Dunn 2009; 
Gamble 1983; Underhill 1997; Watson 2005a), Smith is readily identified as the 
straightforward originator of the ‘liberal’ tradition of IPE (e.g. Balaam and Veseth 2008; 
Kirshner 2009; Miller 2008; Payne 2005; Pettman 1996; Ravenhill 2005) – or even an 
early precursor of ‘neoliberalism’ (e.g. Bukovansky 2006; Steger 2002; Swift 1993) – 
using a distinctly economistic interpretation of his work as it is found in economics.  
This is the well-known reading of Smith in IPE that, just like in the accounts of a 
number of former Federal Reserve Chairmen and Nobel Laureates noted above, holds 
his name almost synonymous with the ‘invisible hand’ of the market (e.g. Burchill 2005; 
Crane and Amawi 1997; Dunne 2005; Isaak 1995; Rupert and Solomon 2006; Woods 
2001). 
 
However, this image of Smith that interprets his work as the origin of assumptions about 
instrumental rationality and invisible hand dynamics can only arise from a rather 
superficial reading of (only a small part of) his Wealth of Nations (WN).  By contrast, 
‘intellectual history’ scholars, working mostly outside economics and IPE, take the 
broader context of Smith’s moral philosophy much more seriously by approaching his 
oeuvre ‘comprehensively, as an integrated whole’ (Recktenwald 1978: 56 emphasis in 
original).  In other words, they read WN through the perspective of his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (TMS) and take each book to be of equal importance.  In so doing, put 
briefly, they pick up on a fundamental concern in his texts for questions about the 
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cultivation of standards of moral behaviour in the emerging commercial society of his 
time (e.g. Fitzgibbons 1995; Fleischacker 2004; Force 2003; Rasmussen 2008; 
Teichgraeber 1986).  Of course this literature is very diverse, but it does contain more 
robust accounts of Smith’s work, particularly by giving due attention to his foundational 
concepts of ‘sympathy’ and the ‘impartial spectator’.  In short, sympathy refers to being 
simultaneously conscious of both the self and the other in ethical judgement, while the 
impartial spectator is a means of explaining how moral principles are formed.  These 
features of Smith’s work point to how he viewed standards of appropriate behaviour as 
ultimately malleable (Vaggi 2004).  Principally, in this regard, I would endorse Charles 
Griswold’s (1999: 165) argument that Smith was ‘consciously nonfoundationalist’ in his 
approach to moral sentiments, refusing to ground them in anything other than 
historically-conditioned and historically-specific social conditions. 
 
There are then (at least) two different ‘Adam Smiths’ that could potentially appear in 
IPE.  On the one hand, there is the image of him that tends to dominate at present, which 
presents him quite straightforwardly as the originator of the liberal tradition in IPE and 
associates him with assumptions about how instrumental rationality in market-oriented 
behaviour, guided by an ‘invisible hand’, leads to the good of society.  In a sense, the 
invisible hand here refers to some sort of natural force that serves to co-ordinate 
individual behaviour.  This is a depiction reliant on a distinctly economistic 
historiography of Smith.  On the other hand, there is an image of Smith that situates his 
liberal political economy within the broader context of his moral philosophy and, as he 
did, attaches great significance to his concept of sympathy.  This is a depiction reliant on 
a distinctly more robust ‘history of thought’ historiography of Smith, which at present 
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does not figure predominantly in IPE (for notable exceptions see, for instance, Glaze 
2008; Watson 2005a; 2012). 
 
In the context of studies of the GFC in IPE, this is noteworthy because the two images of 
Smith actually serve to sustain two parallel narrations of the process of constituting 
financial markets.  Echoing a number of former Federal Reserve Chairmen and Nobel 
Laureates, the first might appeal to an economistic account of Smith for an intellectual 
authority on how market pricing dynamics ought to work such that the crisis can be 
narrated as a temporary breakdown in the ordinary workings of global finance.  The 
second might appeal to a more historiographically robust account, drawing on his 
understanding of ‘sympathetic’ market relations, such that the crisis can be interrogated 
as an important signifier of the limitations of the ethics of liberal market governance as 
currently constituted.  It is the prospects for this latter image in which I am interested in 
this thesis. 
 
Contribution to knowledge  
My contribution in this thesis can thus be clearly stated: I provide a historicised recovery 
of Smith’s ‘sympathy procedure’ for IPE.  In light of existing debates indicated above, 
this is significant for at least two distinct reasons: (1) it provides IPE with a more 
historiographically robust account of Smith that does not rely on the aforementioned 
economistic historiography of him imported from economics; and (2) it provides IPE 
with a ‘sympathy perspective’ to extend discussions about rethinking finance in light of 
the GFC in ways that avoid replicating aforementioned economistic understandings of 
market-oriented behaviour.  I detail each in turn. 
 
 8 
Rethinking Smith 
My recovery of Smith’s sympathy procedure can be understood as part of an effort to 
address the overly economistic historiography of Smith in IPE.  This is a historiography, 
indicated above, which produces interpretations of him quite simply as the founder of 
the ‘liberal canon’.  As Stephen Rosow (1997: 44) suggests: 
 
IPE considers the history of liberalism as settled and secure, as unified and static.  
The IPE story constructs Adam Smith as the originating founder of liberalism.  
The contexts, circumstances, and intellectual forebears that molded Smith’s 
thought go unexamined … Thus, a crucial philosophical and political content of 
his theory remains obscured, carried through liberal IPE only as an echo. 
 
For Rosow (1997: 43), one of the consequences of this inadequacy is that IPE scholars 
tend to treat ‘liberalism’ as essentially economistic in nature, which constructs ‘artificial 
parameters’ around liberal politics that are actually much more contestable.  This is 
problematic, he contends, because through appeal to thinkers such as Smith, IPE 
scholars have a propensity to condense liberalism to a single economic meaning which 
reduces the interpretation of liberal civil society to ‘an echo of commercial practice … 
an echo of self-interest, egoism, private property, and the profit motive’ (Rosow 1997: 
43).  In endorsing this account, I certainly do not wish to present liberalism or indeed 
modern ‘neoliberalism’ as a homogenous whole.  As Phillip Cerny (2010: 156) rightly 
notes, ‘far from being a monolithic creed’ neoliberalism ‘is a flexible doctrine … 
continually evolving as both old and new actors redefine it and internalize it in their 
increasingly transnational political projects’. 
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More specifically, though, in seeking to recover a historiographically robust account of 
Smith, I help provide a way of avoiding an economistic reductionism of both liberalism 
and Smith in IPE.  I do so through appeal to an approach to intellectual history 
developed by Quentin Skinner (1969; 1974; 1988a; 1988b).  Often associated with the 
‘Cambridge School’ (on which see Bell 2001), in brief, Skinner’s method involves 
treating texts in a self-consciously historical manner and seeking to interpret them 
through reference to a careful examination of their socio-linguistic context.  Notably, the 
first image of Smith that follows an economistic historiography can be shown to fall foul 
of some of the most basic Skinnerian principles of interpreting past text.  By contrast, 
the account of Smith I bring to IPE takes the most successful readings from the history 
of thought historiography and conforms to Skinnerian interpretive principles. 
 
In essence, I use this approach to recover a suitably historicised interpretation of Smith.  
Through this act of recovery I produce a novel account of Smith’s ‘sympathy’ and its 
implications for conceptualising market-oriented behaviour in IPE.  In brief, his concept 
of sympathy can be thought of as an imaginative ‘procedure’ through which people 
come to assess the actions, circumstance, and suffering of others and themselves (Force 
2003; Peil 1999).  However, this is not simply an ‘other-directed’ ontology of the 
individual.  Rather, in accounting for individual agency, it refers to a continual balancing 
act and negotiation between an individual ‘self’ principally concerned, and broader 
societal norms and values, the ‘other’, which are potentially encountered and 
internalised through the activation of what Smith termed an ‘impartial spectator’ (e.g. 
TMS I.i.5.4).  From a sympathy perspective, then, the constitution of subjecthood is 
understood through reference to fundamental interactivity between an individual and a 
system in terms of ethico-political questions (Vaggi 2004).  This could be thought of in 
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terms of Smith providing a ‘relational self’ in TMS (Weinstein 2006: 82), as opposed to 
the atomised self imputed onto Smith by the economistic historiography of his work.  
Thus, on one level, my recovery of the sympathy procedure for IPE is original because it 
represents a crucial aspect of his thought that is currently almost completely overlooked 
by scholars operating with an economistic historiography of Smith (for notable 
exceptions see Blaney and Inayatullah 2010; Glaze 2008; Watson 2005a; 2012).  On 
another level, a second reason why a recovery of the sympathy procedure is significant 
is that it can provide IPE with a novel ‘sympathy perspective’ to extend discussions 
about rethinking finance in light of the GFC.   
 
Rethinking finance 
My recovery of Smith’s sympathy procedure can be used to interrogate the ethics of 
liberal market governance without replicating economistic understandings of market-
oriented behaviour.  However, following Skinner (1969), I do not approach Smith’s texts 
with ‘questions’ about the GFC to which I expect to find direct ‘answers’.  To do so 
would be to fall foul of some of his most basic interpretive principles for producing 
historicised/situated understanding; incidentally, of course, many of the economistic 
readings of Smith in IPE do readily extrapolate him out of context (e.g. Hite and Roberts 
2007; Isaak 1995; Miller 2008; Pettman 1996).  Rather, I adopt an approach to study that 
I term ‘pragmatic historiography’, which builds upon a number of calls in IPE to 
‘historicise’ the field (e.g. Amin and Palan 1996; Amoore et al. 2000; Germain 2000; 
Germain and Kenny 1998; Tooze 1997).  This is furthered by a presentation of a 
‘dialogic conversation’ on the GFC between key aspects of Smith’s ‘sympathetic 
liberalism’ suitably historicised, on the one hand, and the ‘economistic liberalism’ of 
liberal market governance today, on the other.  The aspects of liberal market governance 
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that I interrogate are those that are widely recognised as key topics of investigation for 
scholars in IPE and related subject areas studying the GFC: (1) ‘asset-based welfare’ 
(e.g. Finlayson 2009; French et al. 2011; Hay 2009; Langley 2006; 2007a; Watson 
2009b; 2010); (2) ‘credit risk’ (e.g. Froud and Johal 2008; Nesvetailova 2010; Warwick 
Commission 2009); and (3) ‘personal debt’ (e.g. Langley 2008a; 2008b; Montgomerie 
2006; 2009; Schwartz 2009). 
 
Empirically, I use my recovery of a sympathy perspective to reflect on these significant 
sites of finance implicated in the GFC at both the ‘regulatory’ and the ‘everyday’ levels 
of global finance (a distinction borrowed from Hobson and Seabrooke 2007).  My 
engagement with these discussions provides originality because a sympathy perspective 
on questions of market-oriented behaviour is fundamentally different from economistic 
understandings of such behaviour prevalent in liberal market governance itself.  A 
number of scholars have offered cutting critiques of the reductive accounts of agency 
that tend to be employed in IPE (e.g. Griffin 2007; Murphy and Tooze 1991b; Watson 
2005a) so my discussion opens up exciting lines of enquiry for IPE in terms of essential 
questions about how to conceptualise economic agency as anything other than 
instrumentally rational behaviour.  Put simply, the sympathy procedure brings questions 
of contestable interpersonal ethics right back into the heart of discussions of individual 
subjecthood, which I argue is of particular significance in the context of the GFC.  On 
this view, by recognising that market-oriented behaviour is subject to ethico-political 
intervention, doubt is cast on notions of individualised responsibility embedded within 
systems of asset-based welfare, disembodied accounts of risk in credit risk management, 
and depoliticised understandings of personal debt under liberal market governance. 
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Along these lines, my recovery of Smith’s sympathy procedure also represents an 
invitation for IPE scholars to consider questions about liberal subjecthood outside a 
typically Foucauldian influenced line of thought.  A growing number of IPE scholars 
have taken inspiration, both theoretically and methodologically, from Michel Foucault’s 
genealogy of liberal government to better understand the character of neoliberalism in 
the world economy and to cast critical scrutiny on its potentially constitutive effect on 
the individual subject (e.g. Aitken 2005; Amoore 2004; Best 2005; Langley 2008a; 
2008b; Vestergaard 2009).  On the one hand, I am in accord with this line of critique in a 
number of respects as it is applied to liberal forms of governance, especially in relation 
to global finance.  Indeed Jacqueline Best’s (2007: 92) suggestion that the ‘liberal 
individual is not born but is made’ is one that arguably chimes particularly well with the 
sympathy perspective that I showcase.   
 
However, on the other hand, although much of this work shares somewhat similar 
intentions to my endeavour, the interesting point from my perspective is that Foucault’s 
own genealogy of modern neoliberalism imposes upon Smith a generative role in 
producing the theories that subsequently produce the modern neoliberal subject.  For 
instance, in one of many similar invocations of Smith, Foucault (2008: 278) writes: 
 
So we are at the heart of the problematic of the invisible hand, which is the 
correlate of homo œconomicus if you like, or rather is that kind of bizarre 
mechanism which makes homo œconomicus function as an individual subject of 
interest within a totality which eludes him and which nevertheless founds the 
rationality of his egoistic choices. 
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As such, a great deal of Foucauldian IPE analysis, in replicating this basic genealogy, 
presents the exact image of an economistic Smith that I find so problematic in my 
critique of non-historicised IPE and that I show to be so defective using a Skinnerian 
historiographical method.  Ironically, then, not only do I position a more robust 
historicised account of Smith against an economistic ‘Smith’ in IPE, but I do so, in part, 
in a way that turns this more robust historiographical Smith against Foucault’s own 
critical genealogy of liberalism as it appears in IPE. 
 
Research questions and methodological considerations 
Theoretically and methodologically, to a large extent this thesis is inspired by the work 
of Quentin Skinner.  Strictly speaking, as I come to show, in the conventional sense 
Skinner (see, especially, 1969) does not so much provide a strict ‘method’ as a series of 
guiding interpretive principles to consider when approaching past texts and certain 
warnings about the tribulations of interpretive ‘mythologies’.  He does so by adopting an 
attitude that I refer to as ‘pragmatic historiography’.  Put simply, this stance accepts that 
past texts, such as Smith’s, are concerned with their own questions, and are not 
necessarily a source of direct ‘answers’ to questions of a later era.  However, rather than 
undermining the purpose of the study of intellectual history altogether, Skinner actually 
celebrates this as an invitation to understand such scholarly endeavour as a means of 
exposing something of the multiplicity of viable ethical and political commitments 
across time and space.  As Skinner (1969: 53 emphasis added) writes 
 
to learn from the past – and we cannot otherwise learn it at all – the distinction 
between what is necessary and what is the product merely of our own contingent 
arrangements, is to learn the key to self-awareness itself.     
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This stance is fleshed out and defended below, but it is a significant driver of the central 
research question of my thesis: How, and to what extent, can a historicised account of 
Smith’s sympathy procedure in IPE be used to subvert the ethics of liberal market 
governance?  
 
To ground this question – and provide this study with a tractable and immediate focus – 
I employ a two-pronged approach to the execution of the thesis as a whole.  The first is 
to adopt a Skinnerian historicised approach in a direct engagement with the work of 
Smith to provide an account of his sympathy procedure.  This exercise in conceptual 
genealogy offers an important means of interrogating the ethics of liberal thought, 
certainly as it comes to be understood by IPE scholars, from a historicised perspective.   
I thus use Skinnerian interpretive principles to analyse the paucity of the economistic 
image of Smith in IPE and then to provide a historicised account of his sympathy 
procedure.  I frame my study on the basis of reading Smith in a particular manner that 
remains attentive to his intentions in writing his work.  This provides for my more 
historiographically robust account of Smith.   
 
The second element, which is still essentially a continuation of historicised study, is to 
use my recovery of this aspect of Smith’s thought to provide a dialogic conversation 
between this sympathetic liberalism and the economistic liberalism that might be found 
in discussions of the GFC.  I thus use extensive discursive analysis of representations of 
and responses to the crisis at the ‘regulatory’ and ‘everyday’ level in order to examine 
the prospects for my account of the sympathy procedure.  As such, I analyse the GFC as 
a moment representative of prevalent trends in thinking about global financial 
governance.  I use close textual study of representations of the crisis (see methodological 
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appendix) in an attempt to investigate what a recovery of Smith’s sympathy procedure 
can offer IPE in terms of facilitating substantive forms of study. 
 
Thesis Structure 
In Chapter 1, I review the multiple calls in IPE to ‘historicise’ the subject field (e.g. 
Amin and Palan 1996; Amoore et al. 2000; Germain 2000; Germain and Kenny 1998; 
Tooze 1997).  I provide an examination of the different appeals from ‘thinner’ forms 
which ‘contextualise’, through ‘moderate’ forms that recognise the ‘situated’ position of 
the scholar, to ‘thicker’ forms that embrace the situated position of claims to knowledge 
as a way of suggesting the potential ‘transformatory’ purpose of scholarly endeavour by 
engaging in ‘reflexive’ and ‘critical’ IPE.  I also introduce Skinner’s work and situate it 
within these existing discussions of historicisation in IPE.  The central purpose of the 
chapter is to set out and defend what I term ‘pragmatic historiography’ as an approach to 
study, which can be understood through reference to Skinner’s ‘anthropological’ 
justification of the study of intellectual history.  It is an understanding of text drawing on 
ideas about the ‘performative utterance’ in the work of J. L. Austin (1975).  Such ideas 
are also central to interest in performative finance in IPE and related subject areas (e.g. 
Brassett and Clarke 2012; Clarke 2012; Clark et al. 2004; De Goede 2005a; Holmes 
2009; Langley 2010; MacKenzie 2005; 2006; 2007; Millo and MacKenzie 2009; Watson 
2009a) and thus offer a considerable point of intersection between work in the history of 
political economy and contemporary interest in aspects of finance in IPE.  Therefore, I 
make the case that intervention into debates about the history of political economy is 
itself foundational to what it means to be doing IPE, especially in light of interest in the 
performative aspects of political economy and knowledge about political economy. 
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I then use some of Skinner’s (1969) key interpretive principles in Chapter 2 to provide a 
schematic review of accounts of Smith in IPE.  This is organised around Skinnerian 
‘mythologies’ of interpretation.  I show how in terms of issues of ‘doctrine’ (concerning 
the ‘invisible hand’), ‘prolepsis’ (viewing Smith as the ‘father of economics’), and 
‘parochialism’ (reading concepts such as ‘laissez-faire’ and ‘capitalism’ back into his 
work), IPE interpretations of Smith, on the whole, can be shown to quite clearly fall foul 
of these Skinnerian mythologies.  Crucially, I argue that the paucity of IPE accounts of 
Smith in this regard actually indicates how IPE scholars tend to directly imitate a 
markedly ‘economistic’ historiography of Smith to be found in economics (e.g. Fry 
1992; Stigler 1976; Tobin 1996).  I also show that given this economistic historiography, 
IPE scholars have next to nothing to contribute to a number of debates about Smith in 
the specialist literature about locating his work in competing eighteenth-century 
discourses and the so-called ‘Adam Smith Problem’.  Even though, at times, these 
debates might produce interpretations which are suspect according to Skinnerian 
principles, in general terms this provides further evidence of the paucity of IPE accounts 
of Smith.  I therefore argue that IPE scholars tend to be ‘followers’ rather than ‘leaders’ 
on matters of Smith historiography, which as noted above is problematic given that in so 
many other ways IPE scholars seek to differentiate themselves from economics. 
 
In Chapter 3, I attempt to address this problem by constructing a reading of Smith which 
is more historiographically robust in that it more closely maps his intentions in writing 
his work and restores some of the authority of his texts.  I deliver a careful direct 
examination of Smith’s texts, appropriately located in their socio-linguistic context in 
order to provide the core of my recovery of his concept of sympathy.  I posit that 
Smith’s sympathy can be understood primarily as an imaginative procedure, intimately 
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linked to his ‘impartial spectator’ construct.  I observe how it provides IPE with a 
compelling account of how there are always contestable interpersonal ethics involved in 
the constitution of market-oriented behaviour.  This account of sympathy is essential 
because it is so fundamentally different from economistic understandings of market-
oriented behaviour prevalent in liberal market governance today.   
 
Then, further developing the idea of using pragmatic historiography, in Chapter 4 I 
begin my ‘dialogic conversation’ between Smith’s ‘sympathetic liberalism’ suitably 
historicised, on the one hand, and the ‘economistic liberalism’ of liberal market 
governance today, on the other.  I take inspiration from Smith by arranging this 
conversation around the themes he uses right at the beginning of TMS (I.i.1-3) to set out 
his concept of sympathy and juxtapose them with three significant sites of finance 
implicated in the GFC.  In turn, these are questions about the place of ‘asset-based 
welfare’, ‘credit risk’, and ‘personal debt’ in Anglo-American societies today.  This 
allows me to make the central suggestion that there is a potential crisis of ethics in 
contemporary liberalism at the heart of the GFC because contestable interpersonal ethics 
tend to be denied.  I posit that the consequences of this might be visible, when 
government programmes promoting asset-based welfare go unquestioned, when risk 
management is normalised to the everyday, and when creditor-debtor relations are 
depoliticised.   
 
In Chapter 5, I then build on these conceptual points to provide a more empirically-
focussed engagement, first at the ‘regulatory level’ of global finance.  I interrogate the 
proposition that the GFC can be understood as a crisis based on the denial of contestable 
interpersonal ethics at the regulatory level.  I illustrate how in the regulatory discourse: 
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(1) asset-based systems of welfare enjoy a largely unquestioned position, even though 
issues of access to homeownership and financial security fall right at the heart of the 
GFC; (2) credit risk management practices persist largely unchallenged and, in fact, 
along with the securitisation model, are further normalised based on continued faith in 
the ‘science’ and ‘perfectibility’ of risk management; and (3) the view of personal debt 
appears to continue to depoliticise creditor-debtor relations by insisting on the 
normalisation of financial services and working to articulate model financialised 
citizens.  I argue that Smith’s sympathetic liberalism indicates how this economistic 
constitution of financial market agency is ultimately flawed because to deny contestable 
interpersonal ethics is to deny people the ability to fully realise market-oriented forms of 
behaviour in the first place.  A sympathy perspective would insist that, as with all 
formations of market-oriented behaviour, financial market agency is inherently ethico-
political and continually contestable.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I ask whether interventions into the ‘everyday’ GFC discourse 
provide a challenge to the regulatory level of finance more congruent with a Smithian 
sympathy perspective.  Interest in IPE on ‘global civil society’ as a key source of ethical 
agency (e.g. Cox 1999; De Goede 2005b; Gill 2000b; Kaldor 2003; Scholte 2004), 
might lead to expectations that such interventions serve to challenge the regulatory 
representation of and response to the GFC.  I interrogate this proposition by asking 
whether they provide possibilities for understanding and responding to the crisis in 
distinctly deeper and more thoroughgoing Smithian sympathetic terms.  I illustrate: (1) 
how certain key interventions into the everyday discourse articulate a complex and 
variegated attitude with regard to systems of asset-based welfare, which at times offers a 
sharp critique of homeowner ideology and state restructuring towards individualised 
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notions of responsibility; (2) how elements of the everyday discourse present an 
interesting challenge to both existing understandings of credit risk management and uses 
of structured finance; and (3) how some sections of the everyday discourse provide an 
unforgiving repoliticisation of credit-debt relations by drawing attention to the sizable 
power of banks and other financial institutions in a financialised economy, the 
redistributive politics of credit-debt relations, and the underlying material or capacity 
struggles that personal debt might conceal.  By way of conclusion, I outline how these 
interventions help in efforts to ‘rethink’ the ethics of global finance, perhaps along more 
sympathetic lines. 
 
In summary, my central aim in this thesis is to provide a historicised account of Smith’s 
sympathy procedure for IPE.  This allows for a more historiographically robust recovery 
of Smith that does not rely on the economistic historiography of him that tends to 
dominate IPE.  It also presents possibilities for a ‘sympathy perspective’ to be developed 
in IPE to extend discussions about reforming finance in light of the GFC, while avoiding 
replicating economistic understandings of market-oriented behaviour.  The point is to 
escape the confines of market-oriented behaviour viewed and constituted solely in 
economistic terms.  A sympathy perspective is partially embodied in the everyday GFC 
discourse in this sense, which may offer up fruitful lines of enquiry for efforts to rethink 
finance along the lines of a ‘sympathetic finance’.  To be sure, not all of the everyday 
interventions into discussions on the GFC consciously seek to reform finance along the 
lines of recognising contestable interpersonal ethics.  However, there are agendas 
promoting de-linking, de-financialisation, and making financial chains more 
accountable that in important ways at least complement core themes of a sympathetic 
finance.  As I explain, practically speaking, this points to a fundamental overhaul of 
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institutional market design in finance to make it more knowable, and not just assume that 
markets are the outcome of some unknowable ‘invisible hand’.  Smith demonstrates why 
the sympathy procedure is important for understanding market-oriented behaviour and in 
turn the sympathy procedure demonstrates why contestable interpersonal ethics are 
central to the market form, in both the abstract and embodied institutional sense.   
 
I conclude this Introduction by noting that not all Nobel Laureates present quite the 
same economistic image of Smith in discussions of the GFC.  Writing on the day the 
Bank of England, in the face of deepening recession, took the unprecedented step of 
commencing a policy of quantitative easing in an attempt to stimulate economic activity 
in Britain, Amartya Sen (2009a) pointed to how Smith stood for ‘institutional diversity 
and motivational variety’.  These are regarded by Sen as admirable ideas in the context 
of the crisis, as opposed to what he sees as today’s structure of ‘monolithic markets and 
the singular dominance of the profit motive’.  On the one hand, I endorse his reading in 
the sense that he appears to link Smith with a desire to engage with the problem of the 
‘anti-ethicalism’ that he elsewhere identifies as prevalent in many contemporary 
understandings of market relations (Sen 1987: 31).  Yet, on the other hand, despite 
speaking of Smith’s view of the need for ‘other values and commitments such as mutual 
trust’ in markets, Sen (2009a emphasis added) at times still seems to present an image 
with distinct economistic undertones.  For instance, he claims that for Smith people 
‘seek trade because of self-interest – nothing more is needed’ (Sen 2009a) and that 
‘Smith discussed that to explain the motivation for economic exchange in the market, we 
do not have to invoke any objective other than the pursuit of self-interest’ (Sen 2010).  
As the contestation over Smith’s intellectual authority continues, so too, according to a 
sympathy perspective at least, do contestable interpersonal ethics in market relations. 
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CHAPTER 1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Pragmatic Historiography: How to Do Things with the History of IPE 
 
For it is the very fact that the classic texts are concerned with their own quite 
alien problems, and not the presumption that they are somehow concerned with 
our own problems as well, which seems to me to give not the lie but the key to 
the indispensable value of studying the history of ideas.  The classic texts, 
especially in social, ethical, and political thought, help to reveal – if we let them 
– not the essential sameness, but rather the essential variety of viable moral 
assumptions and political commitments (Skinner 1969: 52). 
 
In his influential History and Theory article ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History 
of Ideas’, Quentin Skinner makes this important statement about the purpose of studying 
intellectual history.  For him, that past texts are concerned with their own questions, and 
not necessarily a source of direct ‘answers’ to questions of a later era, can serve to 
expose the multiplicity of possible ethico-political commitments across time.  In other 
words, past texts do not simply contain ‘timeless’ truths that can be applied to 
understanding today’s world, yet the very act of seeking to interpret them can be thought 
of as an important part of coming to terms with the situated nature of scholarly 
endeavour.  This is no less true for the history of political economy and IPE, than it is for 
any other area of concern in the history of ideas (Rosow 1997).  Following Skinner, 
then, a foundational purpose of this thesis is to help provide a historicised account of 
Smith as part of a process which serves to reveal the essential variety of viable ethico-
political commitments in liberal IPE.   
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To that end, in this chapter I examine extant appeals in the IPE literature to ‘historicise’ 
the field.  I review the different approaches that advocates of historicised study have put 
forward and provide an account of what I term a ‘pragmatic historiography’ might entail.  
After discussing the various types of historicisation, I assess the extent to which IPE can 
and ought to draw from Skinner.  A key claim of this chapter is that although there are 
multiple forms of historicisation, Skinner’s is a particularly significant approach for IPE 
as it can trace its own lineage to the concept of the ‘performative utterance’, first 
appearing in J. L. Austin’s seminal How to Do Things with Words, which is found to 
have important synergies with both the history of political economy and contemporary 
developments at the forefront of IPE research.  The loose line of pragmatic thought in 
contemporary IPE, coupled with Skinner’s historicised approach to the study of 
intellectual history, provide compelling reasons to consider ‘pragmatic historiography’ a 
novel and valuable approach to IPE.  I then use this in later chapters of this thesis to 
recover a historicised account of the work of Smith.  
 
In IPE there are a multitude of possible meanings for the term ‘historicisation’, each 
with their own implications for how scholars could adopt a ‘historicised’ approach.  This 
variety ranges from, on the ‘thin’ side of a possible spectrum, an ‘awareness-of-history’ 
type grounding for the conventional subject matter of IPE found in some introductory 
texts to the field (e.g. O’Brien and Williams 2007; Strange 1994) right through to 
explicit calls for a ‘thick’ historicisation of IPE study that stress the situated position of 
the scholar and the necessarily reflexive aspects of knowledge production (e.g. Amoore 
et al. 2000; Germain and Kenny 1998).  The what, why and how of historicised study 
then are rather large questions for IPE scholars involving engagement with, among other 
things, foundational issues concerning the place of history in social study, the role of 
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ideas in everyday life and, ultimately, the purpose of scholarly endeavour. 
 
Without doubt I cannot contend with all these issues exhaustively in this chapter.  
Nevertheless I hope to make a number of specific claims about the possibilities of and 
reasons for using pragmatic historiography in this thesis.  First and foremost, through 
providing a systematic review of existing appeals to historicise IPE study, I contend that 
there are indeed a number of compelling reasons why IPE scholars ought to move 
towards the ‘thicker’ variety of possible historicised approaches to social study.  That is 
to say, I argue that contemporary IPE study could be much improved if, at the very least, 
a greater and more widespread effort is made to place the predominant concepts and 
categories used in the subject field more firmly in historicised perspective and, in 
addition, if this process of historicisation is continued as an ongoing part of IPE 
research.   
 
The second argument I wish to make is that, despite the existence of a whole host of 
direct appeals to historicise IPE in the literature, there are specific approaches that 
remain more robust than others in light of both recent moves in post-positivist 
philosophy of social science and longer term lineages in the study of political economy.  
In particular I argue that greater attention paid to the work of Skinner could equip IPE 
scholars with an especially forceful means of historicising the field.  Finally I further 
support my contention that Skinner’s historicised approach is uniquely important for IPE 
scholars by reflecting on its relationship with J. L. Austin’s concept of ‘performativity’, 
which I find to be central to both the history of political economy and contemporary 
research agendas in IPE.  I discuss this latter work, located primarily in those areas of 
IPE principally concerned with global finance and financialisation, in order to reveal the 
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significance of the relationship between the performative utterance, claims about 
political economy, and the study of IPE.  This allows me to defend the case for a strong 
historicisation of IPE. 
 
 
1.1 Mapping historicised approaches to IPE 
 
In this section I review extant arguments in the literature concerned with calling for a 
historicised approach to IPE.  Although this schematic is only really a heuristic device 
and remains preliminary, I attempt to organise them using the notions of ‘thin’, 
‘moderate’, and ‘thick’ variations.  Compared in such a way, I find that the most 
significant and convincing accounts of historicisation are those that suggest a ‘thicker’ 
historicised approach and these I use to develop my notion of pragmatic historiography. 
 
‘Thin’ historicisation: Contextual awareness  
The first type of historicisation in IPE is associated with how the field tends to construct 
its own disciplinary history.  Conventionally, at least in the sense of its 
institutionalisation as a formal academic subject field, IPE locates its ‘birth’ to the 1970s 
(Watson 2005a: 11).  Indeed John Ravenhill (2005: 15) claims that the emergence of IPE 
in the 1970s was a response to ‘real world’ changes and to trends in theorising within 
and outside International Relations (IR).  This is the familiar account of how 
‘[i]mportant historical and structural changes … affected the evolution of IPE’ (Higgott 
1994: 157) and how IPE was initially born out of concerns about ‘US post-war 
hegemony and its aftermath’ (Blyth and Spruyt 2003: 608).  These types of contributions 
historicise IPE in the sense that they attempt to locate the development of the subject 
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field as a whole in some kind of historical context.  Significantly, they also echo 
tendencies in IR in which the prevalent approach employed to explain theoretical 
developments is based on a form of external explanation in which scholars place a 
considerable degree of emphasis on the ways in which change in political conjunctures 
outside the subject field play a role in bringing about theoretical and conceptual change 
within it (Jørgensen 2000: 10).   
 
In this style, Robert O’Brien and Marc Williams’ Global Political Economy: Evolution 
and Dynamics (2007) is an interesting example of this form of thin historicisation.  They 
explicitly state that they are interested in the history of how modern IPE came into being 
and thus to consider the historical context of the present situation (O’Brien and Williams 
2007: 1).  Furthermore, they suggest that their approach is ‘historicist’ as it is sensitive to 
historical change and they stress how history is ‘both the context or framework within 
which meaning is located, and an ideological concept which is evident in various 
perspectives on political economy’ (O’Brien and Williams 2007: 37).  This means that 
‘[t]heories about how the world works arise in particular historical contexts and need to 
be linked to those contexts’ (O’Brien and Williams 2007: 37).   
 
Similarly, in his intellectual history of IPE, Benjamin Cohen is keen to place the 
development of the subject field firmly in historical context.  For Cohen (2008: 2), 
‘ideas and events are forever interacting and evolving’, which leads him to suggest that 
the intellectual history of the field is significant: ‘IPE is never complete … History does 
not mean closed’.  Thus when Cohen (2008: 7) discusses his intellectual ‘pioneers’ of 
IPE, he stresses that the social and historical contexts in which they wrote ‘matter’ 
because of the historical contingency involved in theoretical developments.  This 
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argument pointing to the importance of the historical contexts in which IPE scholars 
write is also reflected in George Crane and Abla Amawi’s (1997: 3) suggestion that 
theoretical evolution is a highly situated process – theoretical development for them is a 
product of historical context.   
 
Susan Strange (1994: 18) also pays some attention to the role of historical contingency 
when she argues that the social, political, and economic arrangements with which IPE is 
concerned are not ‘the fortuitous outcome of blind chance … [but] the result of human 
decisions taken in the context of man-made institutions and sets of self-set rules and 
customs’.  In stressing the importance of history, Strange (1994: 18) further suggests that 
‘[o]ne important lesson that is too often forgotten when the history of thought – political 
thought or economic thought – is divorced from the political and economic history of 
events, is that perceptions of the past always have a powerful influence on perceptions of 
present problems and future solutions’.  As such, for Strange (1994: 18), there is ‘no 
way’ that contemporary IPE can be understood ‘without making some effort to dig back 
to its roots, to peer behind the curtain of passing time into what went before’. 
 
However, Strange’s general approach to IPE – as with those illustrated by Cohen, Crane 
and Amawi, and O’Brien and Williams – can only be said to have quite a weak 
appreciation for the role of historical situation in IPE scholarship.  That is, although they 
recognise the importance of placing ideas and the authors of those ideas in historical 
context, such scholars cannot be said to be responding fully to the implications of this 
recognition.  In other words they do not allow the importance they attach to the role of 
history in theoretical development to be carried through into a historicised methodology 
for their own approach to studying IPE.  Rather, the tendency is to see history 
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(understood as a sequence of distinct past events) as important because it can be shown 
to have influenced particular scholars and modes of thought at a particular time and then 
to ‘move on’ from history to the more pressing concerns of ‘current’ IPE analysis.  For 
O’Brien and Williams (2007: 408), for instance, explanatory frameworks simply alter 
with ‘changing empirical realities and conceptual innovations’.   
 
The role given to history in this version of ‘thin’ historicism is thus well summarised in 
Strange’s (1994: 18) suggestion that ‘[c]onsequences today – for states, for corporations, 
for individuals – imply causes yesterday’.  In fact, although she eschewed positivism 
elsewhere and denied that the social sciences could hold out much hope for prediction, 
this reveals the rather undemanding positivist account of history which follows from 
Strange’s (1994: 10) contention that what can ‘count as theory’ has to explain a ‘causal 
connection’.  Certainly, at the very least, it implicitly assumes a separation of subject 
(the IPE scholar) and object (historical events in the world economy) as it leans towards 
a form of historical determinism with context shown to influence outcome as though an 
idea’s origin determines its content.   
 
This version of historicisation then might best be classed as a narrow form of 
‘contextualism’ in which key ideas and arguments are understood through reference to 
the historical circumstances in which they originate.  This is not to deny that it may well 
constitute an important corrective tool for IPE in response to the widespread problem of 
the particular histories of each of the three dominant ‘traditions’ often being ‘ignored’, 
along with ‘the social and political context of their emergence’ (Murphy and Tooze 
1991b: 23).  Nevertheless even though a scholar’s situated position is recognised, this 
act of recognition does not alter in any fundamental sense the approach taken to IPE 
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study.  As such, it is possible to suggest that this ‘thin’ form of historicisation might not 
constitute a genuine form of ‘historicisation’ at all: it attempts to incorporate into IPE a 
sense of history and a sense of historical specificity, but where that specificity refers to 
the comprehension of events rather than to the ideas which are used in order to frame 
attempts to derive such comprehension.  In other words, this form of historical IPE is 
limited to declaring that historical details ‘matter’ in trying to explain the underlying 
character of that which is being observed and falls short of genuine historicisation.   
 
This is especially apparent when considered in the light of Skinnerian notions of 
historicisation discussed below.  In fact, John MacLean (2000: 18) finds similar 
tendencies in IR because although there are a number of examples of scholars providing 
some contextualisation for classic political theory texts, it is much rarer to find studies of 
classic writers that ‘utilize contextualization as the basis for a continuous analytical 
framework which serves to structure the interpretation throughout’.  Outside of IR, 
though, he suggests that this has been achieved by scholars associated with the 
Cambridge School of intellectual history, including Skinner (MacLean 2000: 19). 
 
‘Moderate’ historicisation: Situating the scholar 
A ‘moderate’ form of historicisation, I suggest, takes the implications of a recognition of 
the situated position of the scholar as a central starting point for IPE analysis.  A key 
example of this form of moderate historicisation is the work of Louise Amoore et al. 
(2000: 54) who identify a ‘historical deficit’ in IPE in that scholars ‘seldom extend their 
scrutiny to the problem of how the researcher is situated in relation to … knowledge, or 
to the broader issue of connecting a particular claim to “know” to a prior understanding 
of “history”’.  For Amoore et al. (2000: 56), then, the process of ‘historicising IPE’ 
 29 
involves much more than just being sensitive to ‘history’ – it also entails that emphasis is 
put on the ‘historicity of knowledge’ itself.  It is not sufficient to simply ‘add history and 
stir’ because this still tends to use an ‘object’/‘context’ distinction while overlooking the 
third critical dimension of the scholar as ‘subject’, ‘agent’, and ‘context’ (Amoore et al. 
2000: 56).   
 
This leads Amoore et al. (2000: 54) to point out that a historicised approach is about 
‘more than simply institutionalising and contextualising IPE’, which might be the extent 
to which the contextualism discussed above attempts.  Ash Amin and Ronen Palan 
(1996: 212) would seemingly concur as they suggest that ‘the project of historicizing 
IPE has to go beyond the recognition of the powers of time and lineage.  The project has 
to recognize also the powers of culture and context in shaping markets, states and 
whatever else IPE might investigate’.  This means that, for them, a truly historicised 
approach constitutes more than merely providing historical referends ‘to validate or 
disprove a preconception’ as ‘[h]istoricizing IPE means seeing the present as a set of 
social practices situated in time and space’ (Amin and Palan 1996: 210; 212).   
 
Thus, the moderate historicised approach might focus on an ‘awareness of oneself as a 
participant in the historical construction of the social world’ (Amoore et al. 2000: 54).  
Indeed Amoore et al. (2000: 55) make the argument that a historicised IPE must account 
for the categories that are employed in analysis which ‘forces us to question how the 
subjective dimension of knowledge contributes to the social construction of our world’.  
In this way, the moderate form of historicisation presents a challenge to positivist modes 
of enquiry and draws from more ‘constructivist’ or ‘constitutive’ influences.  This is 
significant because Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (1991b: 18-19 emphasis in original) 
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characterise ‘orthodox IPE’ as strictly ‘positivist’ which ‘prevents the development of a 
reflexive practice, a practice of IPE that explains its own emergence and purpose’.  The 
moderate form of historicisation, by problematising the notion of reflexivity, thus 
challenges the core positivist assumption of orthodox IPE that ‘social action can be 
understood universally over time and space and therefore objectively’ (Murphy and 
Tooze 1991b: 19; Amoore et al. 2000: 54).   
 
However, in making these strong epistemological claims, moderate historicisation raises 
the significant issue of elucidating clearly the exact character of a historicised mode of 
enquiry for IPE.  Given that it challenges the general tendency in the social sciences to 
embrace a positivist methodology, a moderate historicisation might be said to share 
similarities with those strands of ‘critical theory’ which attempt to present alternative 
methods for understanding the social world (Germain 1996: 202).  Indeed the reflexivity 
present in critical theory, broadly understood, appears to hold significant sway for some 
IPE scholars (e.g. Abbott and Worth 2002; Cox 2000; Murphy and Tooze 1991a).  Craig 
Murphy and Douglas Nelson (2002: 187) indicate this link by making the suggesting 
that critical scholars are led ‘towards the epistemological foundations of history and to 
concern with reflectivist questions about the ways that a social science observer can 
shape history through her own work and the entire problem of effective persuasive 
communication that cannot be formalised easily’. 
 
Yet, the most significant difficulty that a moderate historicised approach confronts in 
light of the more formalised (usually understood as ‘rigorous’) standards that dominate 
IPE and social science more widely is contained within the very last part of their 
summary: historicised approaches ‘cannot be formalised easily’ which leads to a number 
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of difficulties when trying to build from them a coherent and widely available approach 
to IPE study.  Indeed Amoore et al. (2000: 57-58) appear to acknowledge this lack of 
coherency when they suggest that IPE, and social science more generally, is ‘caught’ 
between the ‘subjective activity of interpretation and creativity’ found in the arts, on the 
one hand, and the ‘objectivity’ of the sciences, on the other.  Thus, a moderate 
historicisation takes the situated nature of the scholar more seriously than a thin 
historical approach, but leaves extremely ambiguous the precise nature of how IPE 
scholars can utilise this form of historicisation as the basis for a continuous analytical 
agenda throughout their study. 
 
‘Thick’ historicisation: Historicisation as transformation 
If it is possible to characterise contextualism as limited historical awareness and more 
moderate historicisation as contextual awareness developed into a notion of reflexivity, 
then a ‘thick’ form of historicisation might be said to constitute those approaches to IPE 
that attempt to develop this reflexivity into a coherent account of the transformatory 
purpose of social inquiry.  The situated nature of the scholar is unavoidable, as 
recognised in the moderate form, but in the ‘thicker’ category of historicisation this 
condition is embraced and celebrated as a possible means of retrieving and developing 
alternatives to the present situation.  As Barry Gills (2003: 107 emphasis in original) 
puts it the ‘“reflective turn” should lead to an emphasis on transformative and 
emancipatory moments and conditions in global history, and to a critical self-awareness 
on the part of scholars … in constructing such knowledge’.  Thus, as with Amin and 
Palan (1996: 212), a thick historicisation is ‘deeply sensitive to the influences of context 
on issues examined within IPE, not only in the sense of recognizing the difference and 
diversity, but also the potential for transformation and change’.  It is this full recognition 
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of the implications of the situated nature of scholarly endeavour that make the thick 
form of historicisation seemingly the most forceful and coherent. 
 
A key proponent of this form is Randall Germain (2000: 68) who suggests that a 
historical mode of thought ‘takes its starting point to be the historicity and 
transformability of all human practice, including the way in which it is embedded in 
layers of patterned collective activity’.  This is part of Germain’s (1996: 220; see also 
Germain 1997) Braudellian perspective that he suggests provides a ‘sense of history’ 
which means that it is ‘impossible to discount the possibility of alternative world-
economies coming into being at some point in the future’.  As such, Germain (2000: 69) 
suggests that the foundations of historicised approaches are built around the 
‘transformative possibilities of human activity in its individual and collective 
manifestations’.  For Germain (2000: 70), then, the ‘social world is a historically 
constructed environment rather than a given one, and our representations of it provide a 
powerful point of entry into considering how and where its relationships might be 
challenged’.   
 
Others working with Germain, such as MacLean, have attempted to consider central IPE 
topics from a historicised perspective to reveal ways of challenging prevailing 
orthodoxies and recovering transformatory possibilities.  Indeed MacLean (2000: 60) 
argues that the concept of ‘globalisation’ needs to be historicised by ‘asking what kinds 
of conditions, necessary and contingent, were historically necessary for “globalization” 
to occur’.  This leads him to further argue that by taking the ‘deep ambiguity’ involved 
in intellectual history ‘as a central part of what initially needs to be taken into account, 
the possibility is opened up of reconstituting “philosophical roots” as more positive and 
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alternative “philosophical routes” to explaining globalization’ (MacLean 2000: 9 
emphasis in original).  Furthermore, for MacLean (2000: 64), ‘recognition of 
globalization, meaning partly the articulation of possible real alternatives, requires that 
the starting point for analysis is not the concept of globalization itself, but a reflexive 
appreciation by scholars of the possible forms of their own existing relationships with 
globalization’. 
 
This form of historicisation then has as a key element an engagement with 
‘philosophical roots’ and more widely disciplinary histories of political economy.  As 
Gerard Holden (2002: 254) points out there are ‘real’ theoretical issues at stake in 
disciplinary history, ‘not least of which are the questions of how, and to what ends, it 
should be pursued’.  Furthermore Holden (2002: 255) suggests that ‘[d]isciplinary 
history is seen by some scholars as part of a “critical” intellectual project: its task is, they 
argue, to expose misconceptions about the past and thereby to open the way to more 
emancipatory academic practices’.  Likewise, Richard Little (1999: 297) suggests that 
‘[d]isciplinary histories are well placed to tease out the often unrecognised ideological 
dimension in the work of academics’.   
 
The process of engaging with disciplinary history is also given transformatory purpose 
by those proposing a ‘constitutive’ IPE.  For example, Roger Tooze (1997: 208) suggests 
that: 
 
The key move for a constitutive IPE is to reveal that claims to legitimate 
knowledge based upon positivist methodology and empiricist epistemology … 
are socially constructed … By revealing the previously hidden elements of power 
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and interest in the production of knowledge and social practice, a constitutive 
IPE has the clear potential to delegitimize existing practices and their 
institutions. 
 
This leads Tooze (1997: 211) to argue that central concepts such as ‘rationality’ ought to 
be historicised.  Also in the spirit of constitutive IPE, Stephen Rosow (1997: 43 
emphasis added) notes the way in which current depictions of liberalism ‘marginalise 
alternative possibilities that demean economic liberalism’s privileged place or invite into 
IPE more robust forms of political liberalism’.  To recover these alternatives Rosow 
(1997: 46) uses a historicised approach and argues that the ‘eighteenth-century language 
of commercial society suggests a broader focus and a broader conception of social order 
than the economic liberal and utilitarian conceptions considered unproblematic by IPE’s 
definition of liberalism’.  William Tabb (1999: 31) sums up this process historicisation 
imperative superbly: 
 
The reason Adam Smith and other canonical writers are open to multiple and 
conflicting readings is that the interpretation of these texts is a struggle over the 
construction of the discipline.  The canon defines what a field is “legitimately” 
about.  Practitioners outside the mainstream needing to redirect the discussion 
can do worse than to reread important contributions and attempt to reorient their 
accepted meaning. 
 
Overall, therefore, it is possible to suggest that a thick form of historicisation has the 
potential to produce IPE scholarship that can take full account of the implications of 
recognising the contextual and situated nature of knowledge production.  By embracing 
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the uncertainty involved in post-positivist accounts of philosophy of social science – 
often correctly associated with some forms of constructivist and constitutive IPE, but not 
necessarily reducible to moral relativism and a rejection of theoretically informed 
empiricism – those that have called for this thicker form of historicisation have been 
able to show the political possibilities opened up by adopting a historicised approach.  
This transformatory potential is also found in the work of Quentin Skinner.       
 
 
1.2 Quentin Skinner’s historicised approach 
 
Skinnerian historicisation 
One of Quentin Skinner’s (1969: 3) central concerns is to consider which procedures 
allow for the interpretation of text.  Skinner’s approach is based on the idea that viewed 
pragmatically linguistic activities comprise at least two kinds of action: first, putting 
forward ‘locutionary’ meaning and, second, doing so with a ‘point’ or intended ‘force’ 
(Tully 1988: 8).  The former refers to the idea that a writer is saying or writing 
something with ‘propositional’ meaning.  The latter, of more importance for Skinner, 
refers to the idea that a writer will be doing something in writing – words, sentences and 
arguments will contain what J. L. Austin calls an ‘illocutionary force’ (Tully 1988: 8; see 
below).  Using this distinction Skinner (1988b: 283) argues that in order to understand a 
particular idea or concept it is necessary to grasp not just the meanings of the terms used 
to express it but also the ‘range of things that can be done with it’.  This leads him to 
suggest that successful interpretation is dependent on the recovery of a particular 
writer’s intentions (Skinner 1988a: 74-76).  In one key statement he suggests:  
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the key to excluding unhistorical meanings must lie in limiting our range of 
descriptions of any given text to those which the author himself might in 
principle have avowed, and … the key to understanding the actual historical 
meaning of a text must lie in recovering the complex intentions of the author in 
writing it (Skinner 1974: 283). 
 
Thus it is possible to identify two principal themes in Skinner’s method (Pocock 1985: 
4-5). The first is the importance of the ‘intention’ of a writer in the act of writing a 
particular text.  From this perspective, the task of recovering meaning is an attempt to 
recover intentions and there is usually some evidence for all writers which can be 
mobilised to this effect.  What is more, this implies that any particular writer inhabits a 
historically given world that is only apprehensible in the ways rendered available by 
historically given languages.  This leads John Pocock (1985: 5) to suggest that 
‘Skinner’s method, therefore, has impelled us toward the recovery of an author’s 
language no less than of his intentions’.   
 
The second – and closely related – theme of Skinner’s method revolves around the 
concept of ‘performance’.  In pursuing his studies, Skinner (1988b: 279) came to stress 
the importance of what a particular writer was doing when they wrote: as he puts it, 
‘texts are acts’.  Crucially, the types of utterance with which Skinner is concerned are 
those that can be viewed as arguments – not just strings of propositions.  The concept of 
intention is not undermined, therefore, but complemented by the notion of the act of 
writing as a performative ‘move’ (Pocock 1985: 5).  In this way ‘any act of 
communication always constitutes the taking up of some determinate position in relation 
to some pre-existing conversation or argument’ (Skinner 1988b: 274).  In all, then, 
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Skinner’s approach entails treating texts in a self-consciously historical manner by 
locating them in time and place and examining them in their linguistic context.  What is 
more, that Skinner views texts as performative acts is highly significant because it 
means that his approach contains very interesting points of intersection with interest in 
‘performativity’ in contemporary IPE discussed below. 
 
I now seek to show that Skinner’s ideas are valuable tools that can be used when 
approaching the study of past texts and for adopting as a potential pragmatic 
historiographical approach to IPE.  Although Skinner himself was primarily interested in 
the study of ideas in the history of political thought, the case can be made that his 
approach is available for use outside of this particular area of intellectual history (Bell 
2003).  My argument is that it can be productively used as a loose set of guidelines for 
reading historical texts without constituting a strictly defined ‘method’ of enquiry.  As 
such, the Skinnerian approach is available to be used in a partial sense – that is, it does 
not constitute a rigid method that has to be accepted in its entirety – whilst still 
remaining a coherent and valuable tool for the interpretation and use of past texts.  It 
must be stressed that in this section I am concerned with the adequacy of Skinner’s 
historicised approach as it can be employed in the interpretation and understanding of 
texts, not its possible uses as a direct approach to studying IPE.  However, that said, I 
will attempt to show in the final section that, given the prospect of the ‘performativity’ 
of knowledge about political economy, the relevant approach to the study of both text 
and the conventional subject matter of IPE may not be as distinct as might typically be 
assumed. 
 
Skinner has received a number of direct critiques from those assessing his contribution 
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to the study of intellectual history (e.g. Keane 1988; Mew 1971; Parekh and Berki 
1973).  However, by far the most devastating criticism that has been levelled at the 
Skinnerian approach – and the one that is most relevant for the way in which I wish to 
invoke it – is centred on one fundamental argument concerning the actual purpose of 
reading historical texts.  This is centred on Skinner’s (1969: 50) provocative argument: 
 
[T]he classic texts cannot be concerned with our questions and answers, but only 
with their own … [t]here is in consequence simply no hope of seeking the point 
of studying the history of ideas in the attempt to learn directly from the classic 
authors by focusing on their attempted answers to supposedly timeless questions.   
 
This key feature of the Skinnerian approach is directly based on Austin’s well-received 
theory that illocutionary force cannot easily ‘carry’ across large distances of time and 
space (Graham 1977: 109).  However, Skinner’s development of this argument has led 
some to suggest that it undermines the reading of historical texts entirely: if nothing can 
be extrapolated from them in order to illuminate contemporary debates, the value of 
their study is seemingly lost (Parekh and Berki 1973: 180).  As Joseph Femia (1988: 
158) puts it, if accepted in its entirety Skinner’s approach ‘would reduce the history of 
thought to little more than a sterile celebration of intellectual pedigree’.   
 
In response, Skinner convincingly defends his position against this charge by suggesting 
that it is a distorting caricature of his argument to present the implications of his work in 
such stark terms (Minogue 1988).  Put simply, Skinner (1988b: 283) does not disagree 
with ‘those who stress the long-standing character of many of our philosophical disputes 
… [His] objection is only to the practice of abstracting particular arguments from the 
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context of their occurrence in order to relocate them as “contributions” to such disputes’.  
Thus, he is able to defend his position by insisting that to deny that there are ‘perennial 
problems’ is not to deny that the fact that western traditions of thought have contained 
‘long continuities, and that these have been reflected in the stable employment of a 
number of key concepts and modes of argument’ (Skinner 1988b: 283).  Rather, 
intellectual history can be said to shed light on the changing applications of key 
concepts, which may have become ‘confused or misunderstood’, and in turn actually 
‘dissolve some of our current philosophical perplexities’ (Skinner 1988b: 288).   
 
More problematically, however, Nathan Tarcov’s (1988) powerful critique of Skinner’s 
approach focuses on his extended reply to these criticisms based on the idea that 
although the study of past texts cannot provide direct ‘answers’ to ‘ahistorical’ questions, 
it can reveal the variety of plausible moral and political assumptions that might be 
obscured in the contemporary period.  This is based on Skinner’s distinction between 
demanding from the history of thought a ‘solution’ to contemporary problems, which is 
imprudent in his view, and learning from it what cannot otherwise be learned at all, the 
difference between ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ commitments (Tarcov 1988: 194).  
Tarcov’s critique starts from this point to ask if, given that there is a distinction between 
the necessary and the contingent in Skinner’s terms here, is it not possible to separate the 
permanent from the transient in past texts?  On first glance, Skinner does not seem to 
have a reply to this criticism.  As such, Tarcov (1988: 194-195) finds this extremely 
problematic in the approach and contends that ‘Skinner’s warnings about the pitfalls of 
textualism are salutary in so far as they protect us from the assumptions that would 
prevent us from understanding texts, but detrimental in so far as they forbid us to learn 
from them’. 
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What I would suggest here is that the Skinnerian approach can be defended on the 
grounds that its important ideas about interpreting past text can be accepted as guiding 
principles, without the need to subscribe to steadfast assumptions that might appear to 
collapse into relativism.  They are guidelines to enable the reader to avoid overly 
‘textual’ or ‘contextual’ interpretations, not a barrier to all interpretation.  Although he 
does not explicitly state this point, I think it is discernible in some of Skinner’s 
responses to his critics.  For example, Skinner (1969: 7 emphasis added) suggests that 
his procedures should be used ‘to uncover the extent to which the current historical study 
… of ideas is contaminated by the unconscious application of paradigms whose 
familiarity to the historian disguises an essential inapplicability to the past’.  Indeed, 
Skinner’s focus on authorial intent ultimately speaks to the question of how much 
emphasis should be placed on certain features found in a study given the contingent 
relationship between text and context.  Inevitably, in practice, Skinner (1974: 281) 
acknowledges that a somewhat pragmatic approach might be necessary which relies on 
the notion that ‘the decisions we have to make about what to study must be our own 
decisions, arrived at by applying our own criteria for judging what is rational and 
significant’.  
 
Moreover, even though Skinner’s argument that language plays a limiting role on the 
author is a bold epistemological claim, it does not limit the reader’s ability to make 
claims to interpretation to the extent that a strong form of relativism would (Taylor 
1988).  This leads James Tully (1988: 23) to suggest that ‘Skinner is only in agreement 
with … hermeneutical convention in its negative form, as the rejection of the view that 
the practitioners’ language of description has no influence on the practice’.  What is 
more, Skinner (1988b: 250) makes clear he does not ‘deny the existence of a mind-
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independent world that furnishes us with observational evidence as the basis of our 
empirical beliefs’.  The point is, he continues, ‘there can be no observational evidence 
which is not to some degree shaped by our concepts and thus by the vocabulary we use 
to express them’ (1988b: 250).  Again, this seems to indicate that the Skinnerian 
approach can be used in a partial sense; it presents the reader with guidance concerning 
the importance of the linguistic context of a text, but it does not entail a relativism that 
might ultimately undermine reading the text in the first place.  Following Skinner’s 
somewhat pragmatic attitude, any ambiguity left between the two forms I essentially 
find to be creative: a space for potential further performative intervention on behalf of 
the interpreter.   
 
Skinnerian historicisation and IPE 
Although Skinner’s historicised approach may be important for the interpretation and 
understanding of text, this of course does not necessarily entail that such an approach 
will either be appropriate or successful when applied to IPE as social study more 
generally (see Germain and Kenny 1998 for a direct appeal to Skinnerian principles).  
Indeed as Gerard Holden (2002: 264) puts it: ‘a method initially applied to Renaissance 
and early modern Europe will need some amplification if it is to be used to deal with [a] 
more complex and professionalized academic environment’. 
 
Nevertheless, Skinner has been directly invoked in contemporary social study.  In fact, 
working loosely within IR, Duncan Bell suggests Skinner’s historicised approach is 
particularly relevant for social study outside his own original interests given its ability in 
part to transcend the agent-structure dilemma (see Clarke 2009 for my view on 
discussions of the interdependence between social structures and agential perception; see 
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also Cerny 1990).  Indeed Bell (2001: 13) suggests that Skinner’s particular originality 
lies in his idea that whatever reason an agent gives for adopting a certain course of 
action, they will need to be able to justify it through reference to a given set of language 
conventions, or a ‘political vocabulary’ in Pocock’s terms, which both constrains and 
enables the given agent.  Thus through a focus on conceptual change and the constitutive 
role played by language in shaping the normative architecture of any given society, 
Skinner’s approach allows scholars to gain a more sophisticated understanding of the 
role of language in both the reproduction of social norms and conventions and in the 
process of change itself (Bell 2001: 4).  For Bell (2001: 4), ‘such an understanding helps 
to highlight the limits and possibilities for challenging the current construction of social 
being’.   
 
This locates Skinner within a thick historicisation framework described above as his 
historicised approach can be considered as part of a process of discovering 
transformatory potential in the history of conceptual and disciplinary development.  
Indeed Skinner (1988b: 286) actually suggests that the ‘anthropological’ justification for 
studying intellectual history is based on the idea that it allows us to stand back from ‘our 
own prevailing assumptions and structures of thought’, which further enables us to 
recognise that ‘our own descriptions and conceptualizations are in no way uniquely 
privileged’.  In other words, through the study of intellectual history ‘we can hope to 
acquire a perspective from which to view our own form of life in a more self-critical 
way, enlarging our present horizons instead of fortifying local prejudices’ (Skinner 
1988b: 287).  As such, the process of reflecting on alternative possibilities allows 
scholars to be provided ‘with one of the best means of preventing our current moral and 
political theories from degenerating into uncritically accepted ideologies’ (Skinner 
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1988b: 287).  This anthropological justification for the study of intellectual history 
therefore directly complements those thick accounts of historicised IPE which look for 
historicisation as transformation.  Skinner’s approach thus has much to offer the 
contemporary scholar because it provides a focus on the role of history and conceptual 
change, as well as an account of how political legitimacy is embedded in the set of 
political vocabularies available at any given time (Bell 2001: 3).  His approach can 
therefore be said to have important implications for contemporary social study, which in 
the final section I will account for in relation to the concept of Austinian performativity 
in IPE. 
 
 
1.3 Performativity and political economy 
  
Austinian performativity 
J. L. Austin challenges the assumption that to ‘say’ something is always and simply to 
‘state’ something.  One of Austin’s (1975: 5 emphasis in original) central arguments is 
that utterances can be found such that ‘the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the 
doing of an action, which … would not normally be described as, or as “just”, saying 
something’.  He explains that to utter such sentences ‘is not to describe my doing of 
what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it’ 
(Austin 1975: 6 emphasis in original).  Austin (1975: 100) thus makes a distinction 
between the force of an utterance and the meaning of words.  The former refers to the 
illocutionary act being performed by the uttering of the utterance while the latter refers 
to meaning as equivalent to the ‘sense and reference’ (Austin 1975: 100).  To support 
this contention Austin (1975: 121 emphasis in original) makes a distinction between 
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various features of the actual act of uttering; he points to ‘the locutionary act … which 
has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has a certain force in saying something; [and] 
the perlocutionary act which is the achieving of certain effects by saying something’.  
This leads Austin (1975: 139 emphasis in original) to suggest that ‘[o]nce we realize that 
what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech-
situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is 
performing an act’.   
 
The relationship between uttering and performing is thus a central feature of Austin’s 
thought resting on his understanding of illocutionary force.  Some commentators have 
challenged Austin on the certain level of ambiguity contained within his distinction 
between the locutionary and the illocutionary part of an utterance based on its wider 
implications for issues of how to conceptualise language as the primary or essential 
‘bearer’ of truth-value (e.g. Strawson 1973).  In other words, Austin is criticised for 
holding a flawed ‘theory of truth’ given that he appears to imply that it is the actual act 
of stating which is true or false, not the propositions that make up the statement as would 
be more conventionally assumed (Searle 1973: 158).   
 
However, given that Austin holds an essentially pragmatic attitude here, such a line of 
criticism is largely beside the point. His central argument is that the uttering of a 
statement is the performing of an act, which can only be regarded in the pragmatic sense 
of successful or unsuccessful, not ‘true’ or ‘false’.  Indeed that language is a ‘many-sided 
phenomenon’ like this, according to Keith Graham (1977: 109), is Austin’s ‘extremely 
important contribution to our understanding of language’.  The important point for 
Graham (1977: 54; 85-86) is that Austin successfully ‘demonstrates that in various ways 
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the idea of people as agents is deeply embedded in the idea of them as language-
speakers’, which shows that ‘a sharp distinction between acting in the world and merely 
conceiving of it in a particular way is untenable’. 
 
These bold claims of course contain deep implications for social study.  As I have 
indicated, in terms of Skinner’s historicised approach to the study of text they illuminate 
questions about the potential limits/possibilities of meaning being able to ‘carry’ across 
time.  In addition, these same foundational premises of Austinian performativity have 
significant implications for recent developments in IPE research, particularly on the 
potential performativity of finance.  Thus, given that they underlie both of these strands 
of research, and point towards interesting lines of potential integration, in this final 
section I will suggest that the existing use of the Austinian notion of performativity in 
IPE adds greater weight to the contribution that Skinner’s historicised approach can 
make. 
 
Performative finance and IPE 
Recent years have seen a significant growth in interest in the concept of performativity 
within IPE and related subject fields (Brassett and Clarke 2012; Clarke 2012; Clark et al. 
2004; De Goede 2005a; Holmes 2009; Langley 2010; MacKenzie 2005; 2006; 2007; 
Millo and MacKenzie 2009; Watson 2009a).  The work of Donald MacKenzie (2007) is 
particularly influential here, who even entitles one of his co-edited books Do Economists 
Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics.  MacKenzie’s (2007: 54 emphasis 
in original) foundational argument is that: ‘[t]o claim that economics is performative is 
to argue that it does things, rather than simply describing (with greater or lesser degrees 
of accuracy) an external reality that is not affected by economics’.  This is a significant 
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way of conceiving knowledge about political economy because conventionally, 
following Milton Friedman (cited in MacKenzie 2006: 11), economic theory is viewed 
as ‘an “engine” to analyze [the world], not a photographic reproduction of it’.  
MacKenzie (2006: 12), however, suggests that financial economics in particular acts as 
an ‘engine’ in a sense not intended by Friedman: it is an ‘active force transforming its 
environment, not a camera passively recording it’.  Thus, for MacKenzie (2006: 16 
emphasis in original): ‘[t]he academic discipline of economics does not always stand 
outside the economy, analysing it as an external thing; sometimes it is an intrinsic part of 
economic processes’.  Those scholars interested in performative finance in IPE, of 
course, draw on similar ideas about the potential performativity of knowledge about 
political economy more broadly. 
 
In addition to Austin, such a perspective draws on the work of Michel Callon (1998a: 2) 
who seeks to defend the notion that ‘economics, in the broad sense of the term, 
performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it functions’.  
This in turn has inspired ethnographies of science and technology studies which start 
from the premise that ‘[t]echnologies reshape social action, rather than simply making 
existing forms of social action more efficient’ (Beunza et al. 2006: 722).  More firmly 
located in IPE research, Christopher Holmes (2009: 440) also invokes Callon’s notion of 
performativity to suggest that ‘the forces of supply and demand are not given, but 
constantly created by performances’.  This is the basis of his argument that the act of 
investment is not separable from the price of the asset itself – it is also ‘constitutive of it’ 
(Holmes 2009: 442). 
 
The focus on the importance of language and the notion that concept/knowledge 
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production is intertwined with its subject matter as a form of performative utterance can 
find its roots in Austin’s notion of performativity.  However, this is not to say that it is 
straightforward to make the link between Austin and contemporary interest in the 
performativity of knowledge about political economy.  In fact MacKenzie (2007: 69) is 
reluctant to rely solely on the Austinian version of performativity because, as he points 
out, a problem with analysing performative utterances using only a linguistic philosophy 
developed from Austin is that it is to treat them in some sense as ‘magic’.  This follows 
Bourdieu’s (cited in MacKenzie 2007: 69) critique of Austin’s notion of performativity, 
which he claims does not capture the way in which the ‘conditions of felicity’ of a 
performative utterance ‘are social conditions’.  That is to say the social context in which 
an utterance is performed is crucial in determining the success of any given 
performance, which MacKenzie (2007: 69) believes is not fully developed by Austin.  
This is perhaps why many recent scholars have moved away from Austin’s notion of 
‘self actualising’ statements, to a ‘thicker’ version of performativity developed from 
Judith Butler (1993: 2) and her idea that performativity operates through the ‘reiterative 
power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (see 
Brassett and Clarke 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, contemporary IPE can still successfully draw on the concept of Austinian 
performativity, especially if adequate attention is given to the contingent nature of the 
contextual conditions of the performative utterance.  Indeed Austin (1975: 31) explicitly 
draws attention to the situated nature of performative utterances because ‘[i]t is inherent 
in the nature of any procedure that the limits of its applicability, and therewith, of 
course, the “precise” definition of the procedure, will remain vague’.  In other words, 
Austin’s conceptualisation of the performative utterance might be said to contain a 
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degree of uncertainty surrounding their composition, and that uncertainty cannot be 
‘resolved’ away, but remains a situated historical specificity. 
 
Rather than viewing this as a flaw in his theory, however, it appears to open up space for 
a critical line of thinking about the construction of subjectivities which actually directly 
mirrors recent moves in IPE and related research agendas.  Just as Austin’s notion of 
performativity involves contingency and the local construction of knowledge and 
subjecthood, recent research agendas associated with political economy look to the 
essential ambiguity of key concepts and categories.  Taking inspiration from Callon, for 
instance, the ‘markets-as-cultures’ perspective ‘treats rationality as a community-based, 
context-dependent cultural form … [it] endeavours to identify context specific cognitive 
limits and socially constructed local forms of rationality’ (Abolafia 1998: 74).  Similarly, 
Rob Aitken (2005: 336) is concerned with developing ‘more historically situated 
accounts of finance and the spaces it fills’ by analysing the ‘cultural’ programs 
developed by the NYSE in the postwar period to broaden share-ownership among 
working and middle class populations.  As such, nascent work in a ‘cultural economy’ 
aims to interrogate the cultural construction of the economy by treating ‘the economic’ 
as a ‘site constituted in a range of practices, knowledge and discourses’ (Aitken 2005: 
339).  More recently, Paul Langley (2008a: 472) suggests that, rather than assuming 
‘unscrupulous’ or ‘predatory’ agency on behalf of sub-prime lenders in the run up to the 
recent financial crisis, a cultural economy perspective is ‘predisposed to ask how the 
historically specific agency of sub-prime lending came to be assembled’.   
 
Thus, a cultural economy, which analyses ‘how discourses of risk and new calculative 
technologies act upon and constitute different subject positions’, could be further 
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incorporated into IPE (Montgomerie 2009: 1-2).  Such a move might constitute a means 
of utilising and developing the concept of performativity to foster greater awareness in 
IPE of the importance of language and the notion that concept/knowledge production is 
intertwined with its subject matter along the lines that Austin’s insights seem to suggest.  
Johnna Montgomerie (2008: 248) in fact concludes that the ‘more established IPE 
critical literature could gain from moving away from its old debates with well-
established categories for analysing epochal change’ towards a conception of finance as 
‘confused, limited by constraints and constantly re-inventing itself’ as the 
financialisation literature suggests.  This draws on the work of scholars such as Julie 
Froud et al. (2007: 342) who suggest that in IPE ‘much classical work … emphasises the 
definite role of finance within coherent political projects and complementary 
institutional systems, whereas more recent revisionist work instead emphasises 
disruption, incompleteness and incoherence’.  For them, ‘financial institutions and actors 
are not coherent wholes with stable identities and shared interests’ (Froud et al. 2007: 
343).  Relatedly, from the perspective of those interested in analysing finance in such 
terms, the concept of ‘agencement’ has become particularly relevant (Pryke and du Gay 
2007: 342). 
 
In sum, it is possible to suggest that Austinian performativity reveals itself to contain a 
certain level of uncertainty surrounding its composition that complements many of the 
recent moves in the study of political economy, broadly conceived, which in turn has 
begun to influence contemporary IPE research agendas associated with encouraging 
cultural economy perspectives in the field.  Although only roughly sketched here, the 
overlaps between Austinian performatives and cultural economy perspectives seem to be 
significant as they reveal something of the fixity and flow of contingent social 
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conditions recognised to be a crucial problematic for contemporary IPE.  What I find 
important is not the notion that IPE needs a clarification of the concept of performativity 
as such, but rather, the way it allows for an emphasis on the contextual, cultural, and 
historical judgement required to understand and engage particular performative 
utterances, in particular times and places.  For these reasons, I suggest, the contingent 
and experimental approaches of pragmatism associated with Austin and Skinner are 
particularly fruitful for a historicised IPE.  These authors bring forward the important 
point that in recognising historicity an ethical responsibility arises. 
 
Performativity and pragmatic historiography 
On this account, given the unfixed nature of performative utterances and thus the 
unstable interaction between concept/knowledge production and objects of analysis, 
Skinner’s use of Austinian performativity in his historicised approach can be shown to 
mirror significant developments in IPE that deem the very purpose of study as 
something of a critical and transformatory endeavour.  This is Skinner’s 
‘anthropological’ justification for the study of the history of ideas indicated above and is 
linked with the ways in which performativity and contingency are engaged with in IPE.  
Returning to Austin (1975: 144), he suggests that the reference of statements: ‘is limited 
to the known; we cannot quite make the simple statement that the truth of statements 
depends on facts as distinct from knowledge of facts … Reference depends on 
knowledge at the time of utterance’.  This position can be directly compared to that of 
Kurt Burch (1997: 23) who is keen to stress: ‘concepts, the units of language, [are] basic 
ontological elements’.  On this basis, he draws attention to the importance of intellectual 
history for IPE because ‘[c]onceptual histories of significant concepts – constitutive 
principles of society – illuminate changing limits and understandings’ (Burch 1997: 23 
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emphasis added). 
 
The suggestion made here is that the study of the history of political economy can be 
viewed as essentially a creative and critical endeavour.  In other words, a thick form of 
historicisation that casts light on conceptual/disciplinary developments might be 
conceived of as a route to a critical IPE in the sense of Skinner’s ‘anthropological’ 
justification for studying historical text.  Certainly, this is a notion picked up by Michel 
Callon (1998a: 51): 
 
The objective [of scholarly endeavour] may be to explore the diversity of 
calculative agencies, forms and distributions, and hence of organized markets.  
The market is no longer that cold, implacable and impersonal monster which 
imposes its laws and procedures while extending them ever further.  It is a many-
sided, diversified, evolving device which the social sciences as well as the actors 
themselves contribute to reconfigure. 
 
Indeed for Callon (2007: 350) the notion of performativity actually suggests the opening 
up of alternatives: ‘[s]aying that the economy is performed by economics (at large) 
means implicitly highlighting the existence of a plurality of possible organizations of 
economic activity and of several programs that can be conceived of and tested, that is, 
(co)performed’.  He adds that the notion of ‘performation’ in this regard ‘leads to that of 
experimentation’ (Callon 2007: 350).  This is crucial for Callon (cited in Barry and 
Slater 2002: 290) as he claims that since the fall of the Berlin Wall there is no longer 
strict opposition between market economies and bureaucratically planned economies.  
Rather ‘[s]ocial actors are now aware of the fact that the notion of the market is a very 
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large, ambiguous, polyvalent notion and that it’s possible to shape the market, and to 
change its roots and its institutions’ (Callon cited in Barry and Slater 2002: 290).  For 
Callon, then, this presents an opportunity to re-politicise ‘the economy’. 
 
Ironically, though, it has been suggested that Callon’s ‘strong focus on seeing markets in 
relation to science can … give a very technocratic reading of some of the social 
processes around the market … [and] can point away from politics’ (Barry and Slater 
2002: 286).  Indeed, as Trevor Barnes (2008: 1444) points out, Callon’s work on market 
performativity has been criticised for ‘upholding the status quo’ because his work ‘offers 
no critique of markets’.  However, Barnes (2008: 1444) argues that contrary to this: 
‘[p]erformativity opens up novel possibilities … [t]here are no absolutes, inviolable 
strictures, or crushing necessities that produce markets of only one form’.  He argues 
that to suggest Callon’s work is apolitical is to ignore the way in which it actually opens 
up ‘spaces of alternative market experimentation … which are quite different from those 
offered by neoclassicism’ (Barnes 2008: 1444).  In Callon’s (2007: 342) terms: ‘We no 
longer have to choose between interpreting the world and transforming it … Our work, 
together with the actors, is to multiply possible worlds through collective 
experimentations and performations’. 
 
Austinian performativity, then, central to both Skinner’s historicisation and the study of 
those performative aspects of political economy as found in Callon, reveals the 
anthropological justification and potential transformatory purposes of IPE scholarship.  
This is summed up well by William Tabb (1999: 30): 
 
Story telling needs to be taken seriously.  It is the way core “truths” are conveyed 
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and whilst it seems the softer side of economics, it is present in the most 
formalistic models which are, after all, only another rhetorical vehicle to convey 
values and conclusions.  Many of these stories seem convincing only because we 
do not bother to scrutinize them closely.  To take history, real history, seriously is 
the undoing of economics, and the starting point of political economy. 
 
This critical line of thinking about the performative aspects of ‘core truths’ – and 
possible ways to counter them by identifying those instances in which political space has 
been closed down – can again be said to mirror important contemporary moves in IPE 
and related research agendas on finance.  Addressing understandings of liquidity in the 
global financial crisis (GFC), for instance, Paul Langley (2010: 73) has suggested that 
‘questions about performativity and the materialisation of markets are necessarily 
questions about the operation and limits of normalising financial power’.  Langley 
(2010: 84) shows how ‘given that the performativity of liquidity in sub-prime assets 
affirmed and exemplified wider norms which were present throughout contemporary 
finance, “illiquidity” quickly became a performative utterance that enacted what it 
named both in sub-prime asset markets and beyond’.  This allows him to conclude that: 
 
talk of liquidity came to define the limits of what was deemed politically possible 
as the crisis began to unfold.  Representations of the crisis in sub-prime and 
beyond as caused by ‘illiquidity’ served to hold out the imaginary of liquidity as 
the ideal-type end point to be achieved through crisis management, a state to 
which markets must be returned: liquid markets good, illiquid markets bad.  The 
crisis was rendered as a governable object, and particular responses were 
licensed and legitimated.  Political space for disagreement about the place of 
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securitisation techniques in the provision of mortgage finance, for example, was 
closed down in favour of interventions that attempted to get securitisation 
working again (Langley 2010: 86). 
 
Representations of crisis are thus increasingly recognised as pivotal in determining the 
closing down or opening up of political ‘space’ for intervention.  Indeed for James 
Brassett et al. (2009: 379), the government bail-outs in response to the GFC ‘reflect not 
only a particular understanding of what has gone wrong and how it can be put right, but 
also a particular commentary on the political interests that were embedded in the status 
quo ante and that will receive privileged treatment in any attempt to restore that status 
quo’.  Likewise, Andrew Gamble (2009: 141) suggests that it ‘matters which explanation 
of the crisis becomes dominant, because that will shape the political response … 
Interpretations of the crisis become part of the politics of the crisis’. 
 
In this way, recent interventions in IPE have cast critical scrutiny on performative 
representations of the GFC (e.g. Brassett and Clarke 2012) – particularly ‘rational’ and 
‘scientific’ representations – and in so doing have re-politicised those aspects of 
economic ‘story telling’ previously deemed apolitical.  IPE scholars have thus engaged 
with questions of legitimacy and legitimation surrounding crisis which, in the process of 
bringing into doubt ostensibly apolitical narratives, is ultimately part of the opening up 
of political space in which alternative representations might be conceived.  Although 
discussed in only an indicative sense here, such interventions might be said to show how 
understandings of the potential performativity of political economy are increasingly 
becoming central to IPE scholarship, especially those which seek to challenge common 
sense understandings of the world economy and in turn reveal the opening up of political 
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alternatives.  This transformatory endeavour is thus part of IPE scholarship that could 
further engage with Skinner’s pragmatic historiography. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
It is noteworthy that in my attempt to map historicised approaches to IPE the vast 
majority of calls for ‘thicker’ historicisation in the field tend to be written between 1990-
2000, while those ‘thinner’ variants of contextualism seem to be much longer lasting in 
their reach.  What can account for this seeming loss of interest in thicker historicised 
approaches?  Why are IPE scholars interested in methodological questions not seeking to 
move these debates forward today?  Of course, there are notable exceptions in which the 
historicisation imperative has been recognised more recently (e.g. Clift and Rosamond 
2009; Watson 2005a; 2012), but for those who argue that thick historicisation should act 
as an ongoing part of IPE research this lack of attention is intensely disappointing.  From 
this perspective, the conversation and debate that surrounds the history of IPE as a 
discipline – including contestation over the history of its central concepts and the 
construction of its theoretical lineages – is itself foundational to what it means to be 
doing IPE, especially in light of recognition of the performative aspects of political 
economy. 
 
That I wish to call attention to the robustness of thicker forms of historicisation such as 
Skinner’s is in part reflective of the present situation in which a great deal of attention is 
directed towards understanding the GFC.  As I have indicated, recent trends in the IPE 
literature and related work on finance seem to be particularly ripe for accommodating a 
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pragmatic historiographical approach as they seek to interrogate those performative 
aspects of political economy both in terms of surveying its cultural aspects and using it 
to recover ‘political space’.  Much of this work, at least reflected in that which I have 
presented here, engages with the constitution of financial subjects and the construction 
of representations of financial crisis.  In one sense, therefore, thicker historicised 
approaches could contribute to how this work attempts to escape the impossible binary 
choice between being for or against ‘the market’.  If all market societies are recognised 
as in some sense historically contingent, the performative aspects of political economy – 
the very way in which calculative agencies are formed and narratives of crisis are 
constructed – can increasingly become both the starting point and the driver of IPE 
research. 
 
These elements of the literature reflect what I have called throughout ‘pragmatic 
historiography’ and relate to Skinner’s anthropological justification for the study of 
intellectual history.  I have argued for a greater incorporation of this very purpose of 
social study into IPE.  This approach seizes on MacKenzie’s (2006: 275) provocative 
suggestion that once the notion of performativity is accepted, the question irresistibly 
opened up is ‘[w]hat sort of a world do we want to see performed?’.  To accept the 
imperative to historicise, then, is to seek How to Do Things with IPE. 
 
For my part, I find one of the most exciting implications for IPE scholars preparing to 
draw from this line of thought is to utilise a pragmatic historiography in order to restore 
the authorial intent of some of the key texts in the history of political economy.  
Following Skinner, then, I suggest that a return to interpreting texts in context allows for 
a historicised account to be produced and an account that can potentially produce a 
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critical IPE.  This is important in Smith’s case because, as Rosow (1997: 55) argues, 
mainstream IPE tends to interpret liberalism from Smith as something ‘between a 
conservative celebration of a global commercial society and a utilitarian managerialism’.  
The next chapter provides an account of Smith in IPE, identifying some of the ways that 
many interpretations fall foul of Skinnerian interpretive principles, so that his work can 
then be studied as part of a more historicised IPE in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Skinnerian Mythologies in IPE and their Foundation in an Economistic 
Historiography of Adam Smith 
 
Histories of economics are generally written by economists for other economists.  
They use the language and analytical approaches with which they are familiar, 
and in so doing convert past theories into variants of those with which they are 
already familiar … This is very different from the approach of a historian, whose 
reconstruction of past events and arguments presumes that their significance and 
meaning is not immediately accessible to us (Tribe 1999: 615). 
 
For the most part, IPE scholars tend to rely on an overtly economistic historiography of 
Adam Smith.  That is, I show in this chapter, they are inclined to follow in the footsteps 
of Keith Tribe’s economists who write histories of economics for other economists, as 
opposed to using the ‘approach of a historian’ to arrive at an appropriately historicised 
understanding of his work.  In turn, I suggest, this helps explain why IPE scholars 
provide such a poor account of Smith in terms of falling foul of some of Quentin 
Skinner’s most basic principles for interpreting past texts.   
 
To substantiate these claims, in this chapter I begin the process of considering Smith’s 
thought using pragmatic historiography (Chapter 1).  I draw directly from Skinner’s 
principles in order to scrutinise representations of Smith in IPE and illustrate specifically 
in what ways they fail to adhere to such principles and why.  In four parts, based on four 
‘mythologies’ of interpretation Skinner identifies, I offer a typological characterisation 
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of Smith in IPE.  The four mythologies I outline and identify as particularly relevant are, 
in turn: (1) the mythologies of ‘doctrine’ (consisting of two parts), (2) ‘coherence’, (3) 
‘prolepsis’, and (4) ‘parochialism’.  Collectively, they provide basic criteria against 
which I assess the suitability of interpretations of Smith in IPE. 
 
In so doing, I engage with scholars who might be referred to as ‘historians of thought’ 
who include a number of ‘Smith studies’ specialists.  These are scholars who tend to 
work within the disciplinary boundaries of the study of intellectual history, publish 
research in specialised intellectual history outlets, and conceive of scholarly purpose and 
method on very dissimilar terms to how economists writing histories of economics 
might.  Quite simply, historians of thought generally take Tribe’s ‘approach of a 
historian’ to matters of intellectual history, which often aims at and provides more 
appropriately historicised accounts of past texts.  This is certainly the case for many 
Smith studies specialists who, in a number of ways, provide very different accounts of 
his work compared to IPE scholars.  Thus, on one level, I use key contributions to this 
scholarship to show the paucity of IPE understandings of Smith organised around the 
schematic of Skinner’s four mythologies of interpretation.   
 
Furthermore, I suggest, the precise ways in which interpretations of Smith in IPE tend to 
fall foul of these mythologies are highly significant.  I make two key points in this 
respect.  First, I show how in terms of issues of ‘doctrine’ (in relation to the ‘invisible 
hand’ metaphor), ‘prolepsis’, and ‘parochialism’, IPE interpretations of Smith, on the 
whole, can be shown to quite clearly succumb to Skinner’s mythologies.  I demonstrate 
this through comparison with a number of Smith studies interventions that generally 
serve to guard against such mythologies of interpretation.  What is particularly 
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interesting about these three issues, though, is that IPE scholars tend to directly imitate a 
markedly economistic historiography of Smith, almost entirely replicating the 
interpretation of his work to be found in histories of economics written by economists.  
Specifically, with respect to each issue, this means erroneously: construing an ‘invisible 
hand’ doctrine from his text, characterising Smith as the ‘father of economics’, and 
reading concepts such as ‘laissez-faire’ and ‘capitalism’ back into his work.  In following 
an economistic historiography, as opposed to a ‘history of thought’ historiography of 
Smith, IPE interpretations are therefore considerably flawed on these grounds. 
 
However, evidently the study of intellectual history is not a homogenous voice in 
complete agreement on how to interpret past thinkers such as Smith.  Although broadly 
speaking, as will become apparent, there actually may be a degree of agreement on the 
three quite basic aforementioned interpretive issues, in other areas there is much more 
diversity of opinion and controversy within the Smith studies literature itself.  This leads 
me to my second central claim about precisely how IPE representations of Smith tend to 
fall foul of Skinner’s mythologies.  Essentially, it refers to debates, fervently disputed in 
the history of thought historiography of Smith, that can be understood through the 
prisms of a second potential mythology of ‘doctrine’, on the one hand, and a potential 
mythology of ‘coherence’ on the other.  In a sense, the very existence of such debates 
serves as a reminder that historians of thought are of course not immune from lapsing 
into Skinnerian mythologies at times either.  The former relates to whether or not Smith 
belongs to a ‘jurisprudential’ or a ‘civic humanist’ tradition of thought, while the latter 
whether or not Smith’s Wealth of Nations (WN) is ‘consistent’ with his earlier Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (TMS), the so-called ‘Adam Smith Problem’.  Suffice it for now to 
say, what is noticeable here is that IPE scholars have next to nothing to contribute to 
 61 
either of these debates.  In turn, I suggest that this is again significant because on both 
counts it points towards an economistic historiography of Smith in IPE.  Put simply, 
economists who write histories of economics do not to pick up on these debates and as a 
result, through (perhaps inadvertently) imitating this historiography, neither do IPE 
scholars.   
 
Overall, therefore, by indicating the ways in which many interpretations of Smith fall 
foul of some of Skinner’s most basic methodological principles, and why, it is possible 
to shed light on the disciplining effects of IPE as a ‘discipline’.  In Chapter 1, I made the 
case that there are compelling reasons why IPE scholars should take the study of 
intellectual history as a crucial component of what it means to be ‘doing’ IPE in the first 
place.  I underlined the possibility of using pragmatic historiography as a way for 
contemporary IPE scholars to think through and imagine alternatives to the ways in 
which liberal market governance is understood and constituted today.  Put simply, I 
claimed that the study of intellectual history might be used as a means of challenging 
dominant conceptualisations and common sense understandings of today’s social world 
by providing an alternative frame of reference from which to interpret it.  The suspect 
economistic historiography of Smith in IPE is therefore a foundational problem with 
which to engage in order to begin to problematise constructions of IPE liberalism and 
liberal market governance today. 
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2.1 The mythologies of doctrine 
 
The ‘invisible hand’ doctrine 
According to Skinner, the mythology of ‘doctrine’ tends to come in two main forms.  
The first, considered in this section, consists in various ways of assuming that incidental 
remarks found in a text are somehow representative of a writer’s doctrine on one of the 
themes that the reader is expecting to find (Skinner 1969: 12).  In this way, the reader 
has a ‘set’ expectation that a ‘classic’ writer will put forward some coherent doctrine on 
their given subject (Skinner 1969: 7).  This is extremely problematic because a given 
writer might erroneously be ‘discovered’ to have held a view on a subject to which they 
might not have even meant to contribute often due to some chance similarity of 
terminology (Skinner 1969: 7).  In other words, there is a danger of misreading back into 
a past text a coherent account of a doctrine that was no part of the author’s original 
intention, but has come to be associated with them only after they wrote.   
 
This first textual mythology is particularly relevant to those interpretations of Smith that 
assimilate his work to a doctrine of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market.  On these 
readings, Smith is said to believe that whenever individuals are left alone to pursue their 
interests an invisible hand will ensure that they will benefit society as a whole 
(Fleischacker 2004: 138).  The concept is in fact seen by many as foundational to the 
whole discipline of economics (e.g. Samuels et al. 2011).  For example, the Nobel 
Laureate in Economics James Tobin (1996: 205) claims that the invisible hand is ‘one of 
the Great Ideas of intellectual history’ because it explains how ‘market competition 
transmutes selfish and myopic individual actions into the wealth of nations’.  Certainly, 
from the nineteenth-century onwards, the ‘invisible hand’ became synonymous with the 
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‘price mechanism’ in economics (Peil 1999: 157).  As such, quite unambiguously, in an 
economistic historiography of Smith there is an overwhelming tendency to suggest that 
he advocated an invisible hand doctrine; in fact, it is celebrated as one of the central 
achievements of his work. 
 
Similarly, in the IPE literature, there is a tendency to associate Smith with a doctrine of 
the invisible hand in order to explain, in a rather simplistic state-market construction, 
how he was against a role for the state in an economy and for letting market dynamics 
operate in an economy as much as possible.  The invisible hand is here again presumed 
to represent the coordinating logic of the price system.  Typically, Smith is said to have 
argued against the idea of the state having a role to play in economic 
growth/development because ‘the role would be performed much more effectively by 
markets guided by the invisible hand of self-interest’ (Panić 2003: 72).  On this 
reasoning, he is presented as holding a ‘liberal’ position in IPE that essentially suggests 
removing ‘the state’ from ‘the economy’ in order that the free market should be left 
alone to automatically allocate resources to their most efficient use – a ‘depoliticization 
of production and well-being’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2000: 67 emphasis in original). 
 
How does the invisible hand doctrine operate according to this account of Smith in IPE?  
The familiar depiction of the doctrine, shared by mainstream economic interpretations 
and dependent on an economistic historiography of Smith, is the ‘notion that markets 
and the pursuit of self-interest [will] lead, as if by an invisible hand, to economic 
efficiency’ (Stiglitz 2007: xiv).  In fact, this understanding appears, at least in general 
terms, again and again in IPE.  For instance, an invisible hand supposedly: ‘guides the 
economy and promotes the common good’ (Balaam and Veseth 2008: 39), ‘translates 
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individual pursuit of self-interest into optimal public benefit’ (Steger 2002: 9), ‘turns 
self-seeking individual behaviour into socially beneficial outcomes’ (Ravenhill 2005: 
19-20), leads ‘self-interested individuals to produce socially useful goods and services in 
the most efficient possible way’ (Rupert and Solomon 2006: 56), steers ‘private self-
interest to the public good’ (Isaak 1995: 99), ‘intervenes between the motives of the 
individual and the “ends” of society as a whole’ (Dunne 2005: 190), guarantees ‘that 
economic choices made by individuals in the pursuit of their personal interests and 
preferences [will] have a beneficial effect for society as a whole’ (Acocella 2005: 10), 
and ‘ensures an efficient and equitable distribution of goods and services across the 
world economy’ (Woods 2001: 285).  Thus, in this widespread doctrinaire reading of 
Smith, the invisible hand metaphor is used repeatedly to make the claim that the ‘self-
interest of one becomes the general interest of all’ (Burchill 2005: 73).   
 
For those who celebrate this account from a ‘liberal’ perspective in IPE, Smith is 
credited with ‘inventing the concept of the self-regulating market’ (Miller 2008: 9) and 
the invisible hand is identified as a ‘metaphor for a coordinating mechanism of the 
activities of individuals who, apart from their own production and consumption, know 
very little of the wider economy’ (Sally 1998: 19).  His invisible hand is essentially 
thought of as a ‘benevolent’ force (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2001: 484), which 
creates ‘an overall benefit to society’ (Hite and Roberts 2007: 5).  In this line of thinking, 
in making the suggestion that ‘the “invisible hand” of the market naturally ensures that 
the pursuit of self-interest, in and of itself, will lead to the public good’, Smith is 
credited with founding a ‘new line of IPE theory’ (Crane and Amawi 1997: 6).   
 
While a handful of IPE scholars recognise that Smith’s use of the term in WN actually 
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refers to a ‘preference for domestic over foreign produce’ (Dunn 2009: 28), the metaphor 
is also readily associated with a conception of international trade in which ‘the law of 
supply and demand [can] work unhindered’ (Palan and Cameron 2003: 115).  Smith’s 
defence of international free trade is said to even take on a religious dimension in the 
sense that he offers ‘a theology of the global market’ guided by the invisible hand (Beard 
2007: 21).  Based on this faith in the operation of free markets, it is further suggested 
that the invisible hand by the end of the nineteenth-century had become ‘global’ in reach 
(Hoogvelt 2001: 15).  Likewise, although it is recognised that the concept goes well 
beyond Smith, Kenichi Ohmae’s ‘borderless world’ is also associated with the workings 
of an invisible hand on a global scale (Schrecker 1997: 2).  These interpretations of the 
doctrine of the invisible hand at the international level certainly point to how it has 
become a ‘powerful and enduring metaphor’ for IPE scholars (Dunn 2009: 14).  
 
The lasting significance of the invisible hand metaphor is also evident in the work of 
those scholars who are more critical of Smith’s ostensible ‘doctrine’ in defence of the 
price mechanism.  Certainly his invisible hand is said to occupy ‘an important position’ 
to Marx ‘among others’ (Dasgupta 1998: 50).  From this more critical perspective, the 
invisible hand is understood as a convenient way of abstracting away from ‘asymmetric 
social relations’ (Agathangelou 2004: 83), it is almost ridiculed as a ‘magic unseen hand’ 
(Prestowitz 2005: 210), and takes on a somewhat more sinister tone, often directly 
misquoted, in the form of a ‘hidden hand’ for others (Balaam and Veseth 2008: 12; 
Pettman 1996: 11; Woo-Cumings 2003: 215).  Elements of these critiques of the doctrine 
also take further dimensions, discussed below, when the invisible hand metaphor is 
associated with later developments in economic thought that came after Smith’s time, 
such as general equilibrium theory (Boyer 1996: 86; Foster 2001: 113), ‘First Welfare 
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Theorem’ (Carter 1997: 123), and ‘utilitarian’ outcomes (Lipschutz 2005: 45; Kline 
2005: 40).  
 
However, in stark contrast to this reading of Smith in IPE, many scholars working in the 
specialist Smith studies literature tend to represent voices that might challenge this 
canonical and ultimately misleading understanding of his work.  From within the Smith 
studies literature, a strict invisible hand interpretation of Smith is actually viewed on the 
whole with equal wonder and disdain.  Perhaps most forcefully, Emma Rothschild 
(2001: 116) has suggested that ‘Smith did not especially esteem the invisible hand’ and 
thus it is best interpreted as a ‘mildly ironic joke’.  Remarkably, for Smith scholars at 
least, he only used the term three times in the entirety of his published output and none 
of these usages point towards the construction of a coherent ‘doctrine’.  In brief, 
Rothschild (2001: 116) shows how his first use in History of Astronomy is clearly 
sardonic as Smith is highlighting the naivety of polytheistic societies.  The second use, 
in TMS, describes the way in which rich proprietors who by employing a great number 
of poor workers to produce luxury commodities to some extent and in a particular sense 
advance a larger interest than their own.  The third and final use, in WN, concerns the 
issue of international trade where Smith argues that if restrictions are removed, 
merchants tend to prefer to support domestic industries, in the interest of their ‘own 
security’ (Rothschild 2001: 117).  Nathan Rosenberg (1979: 24) calls this final use 
‘unfortunate’ because of the way in which ‘it has been so totally misinterpreted’.  
Likewise, Samuel Fleischacker (2004: 139) stresses that Smith’s use of the term here is 
in the making of a relatively small point that merchants will tend to base their trade in 
home ports: he does not claim that an invisible hand always guides individual economic 
decisions toward the ‘good’ of society. 
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Interestingly, while agreeing with Rothschild that the focus on the invisible hand is 
significantly overplayed, Matthew Watson (2005a) has a somewhat different 
interpretation of Smith’s distinct use of the term in TMS.  For him, rather than 
suggesting that in some way the landowning classes inadvertently promote the interests 
of the landless labourers, Smith is actually appealing to the invisible hand as something 
‘akin to a trick in nature … which overrides the price system’ and prevents the former 
from consuming ‘the vast majority of the earth’s natural resources … because their 
consumption is limited by a finite ability to consume’ (2005a: 174-175).  Significantly, 
for Watson (2005a: 175), this means that despite their desire to revel in and means to 
satisfy ‘gratuitous displays of opulence’, put simply, ‘the landowning classes can eat 
only what they are capable of eating’.  This interpretation – exceptional in the light of 
the vast majority of readings in IPE – supports the important point that, for Smith, ‘the 
mere existence of a price system to guide exchange relations does not necessarily lead to 
socialization into purely self-interested forms of behaviour, and neither does it explain 
how market relations are constituted in practice’ (Watson 2005a: 175).  This latter point 
is one to which I return in the next chapter. 
 
Despite such disagreements over precise interpretation, most serious Smith scholars also 
take direct issue with the recasting of a supposed doctrine of an invisible hand to general 
equilibrium theories that were to come after his time.  Donald Winch (1997: 399), for 
example, points to how general equilibrium theorists often erroneously speak of a ‘pure 
theory of the invisible hand’ as a ‘theory that will explain how an anarchistic society 
based on self-interest alone is capable, under fairly restrictive conditions, of achieving 
an optimal allocation of resources judged in terms of Pareto optimality’.  Winch (1997: 
399) disparagingly compares this understanding to a ‘useful mental gymnasium for 
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economists and a self-consistent agenda for dealing with the inevitable impurities of the 
real world’, but in actuality, it was clearly not intended by Smith to represent a 
‘mechanical model of market operation’. 
 
Overall, therefore, the notion that Smith advocated an invisible hand doctrine represents 
a rather simplistic misinterpretation of his work that can be understood in terms of a 
Skinnerian mythology of doctrine.  To read Smith in such a way is to erroneously 
construct a doctrine, which was no part of his intention, on his largely incidental three 
usages of the term ‘invisible hand’.  Drawing from the specialist Smith studies literature 
though, this mythology can be easily discarded because his work tends not to be 
approached in such a doctrinaire manner by historians of thought.  As Alec Macfie 
(1967: 54) argues, Smith’s invisible hand also ‘had a good smack of cynicism in its 
composition’, which indicates how it did not represent a coherent doctrine for Smith, nor 
should such a doctrine be read back into his work.  Somewhat unfortunately IPE 
scholars, from a ‘liberal’ perspective or otherwise, tend to reproduce a flawed doctrinaire 
reading in this regard because they appear to import their understanding directly from an 
economistic historiography of Smith.   
 
The jurisprudential and civic humanist intellectual traditions 
The second form of a potential mythology of doctrine occurs when a writer clearly does 
fail to put forward a coherent doctrine, but then is criticised for their failure to do so 
(Skinner 1969: 12-15).  This essentially involves the reader extrapolating from what a 
writer did say to some speculation about a topic they did not mention, or only wrote 
about in inchoate terms.  As such, by criticising a writer for not putting forward a 
doctrine, the assumption is made that they must have intended to carry out such a task in 
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the first place (Skinner 1969: 15).  This is highly problematic in the light of Skinnerian 
notions of authorial intentionality (Chapter 1): it faults a past writer for not putting 
forward a coherent doctrine, merely based on the assumption that a doctrine should exist 
in their texts in the first place. 
 
Notably, this form of interpretive mythology does not tend to occur in the IPE literature.  
This is perhaps because, as explored in the previous section, many IPE scholars claim 
that Smith did put forward an invisible hand doctrine, so the idea of criticising him for 
failing to articulate a doctrine along the lines Skinner suggests cannot really come about.  
However, whereas on the issue of the invisible hand doctrine historians of thought 
provide something of a useful corrective for IPE readings, this second mythology is 
actually produced within the history of thought historiography of Smith.  Specifically, it 
occurs in some interpretations that aim to situate his work either within the 
‘jurisprudential’ or the ‘civic humanist’ tradition of thought.  Although these readings are 
much more attentive to socio-linguistic context than many other more conventional 
interpretations in IPE, it can be suggested that the attempt to situate Smith’s work either 
entirely in the jurisprudential tradition or entirely in the civic humanist tradition is one 
that ultimately ends up being critical of Smith for not fitting squarely into one or the 
other.  From a Skinnerian perspective, this is something to be avoided. 
 
For the jurisprudential case, there is much evidence to suggest that Smith intended to 
write a third treatise on jurisprudence to complement TMS and WN, but he never 
managed to complete this task before his death (Viner 1989: 144).  In the last paragraph 
of all six editions of TMS (VII.iv.37) he writes: 
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I shall in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general principles 
of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in 
the different ages and periods of society, not only in what concerns justice, but in 
what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law. 
 
Moreover, Smith (Corr. 248) confirms his intention to write ‘a sort of theory and History 
of Law and Government’ in his letter to the Duke of Rochefoucault in which he claims 
that such a work is ‘upon the anvil’.  It is also evidenced in his published work that the 
theme of justice is of upmost importance to Smith.  For instance, he labels justice ‘the 
main pillar that upholds the whole edifice’ of society (TMS II.ii.3.4) and it receives 
detailed treatment in the two sets of students’ notes posthumously published as his 
Lectures on Jurisprudence.   
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, a number of history of thought scholars have sought to 
establish the notion that the theme of justice is the central pillar of Smith’s writings.  
Principally in this regard, Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (1983: 1-6) claim that there 
is one central question about modern ‘commercial society’ that Smith is attempting to 
answer in WN.  In short, this question concerns the seeming paradox between the way in 
which commercial society is more unequal in its distribution of property than any other 
previous stage of society, on the one hand, and the way in which it is still capable of 
satisfying the basic needs of those who labour for wages, on the other.  Hont and 
Ignatieff claim that Smith’s response to this apparent paradox is based on his division of 
labour theory and natural price model which are set out in order to explain the 
compatibility of economic inequality and adequate subsistence for the wage-earner 
within a market system.  On their reading, WN is thus able to find a market mechanism 
 71 
capable of reconciling inequality of property with adequate provision for the excluded 
with a political argument principally framed as an issue of justice and rights.  With 
Smith’s central commitment to justice, societies were to be compared on the basis of 
how securely they ground rights of property and how adequately they meet the rights of 
their labourers.  Thus, for Hont and Ignatieff (1983: 25), Smith explained how by raising 
productivity, commercial society could adequately provide for the needs of wage-earners 
without having to resort to redistributive ‘meddling’ in the property rights of individuals 
– ‘growth in conditions of “natural liberty” would explode the whole antimony between 
needs and rights’.  
 
This location of Smith’s work within the jurisprudential tradition parallels Donald 
Winch’s interpretation.  According to sound historicised principles, Winch (1983: 256) 
suggests that it is necessary to return to Smith’s stated intentions in which he sees his 
‘project’ as a direct contribution to the eighteenth-century science of politics, which 
provides a natural link to his lectures on jurisprudence.  In this sense, Smith’s political 
economy is a branch of a more ambitious inquiry into law and government – the ‘science 
of politics’, the ‘science of jurisprudence’ and the ‘science of the legislator’ (Winch 
1983: 256-257).  On Winch’s reading, Smith’s move is to place political economy within 
a science of law and politics.  As such, he argues that WN can be considered as a treatise 
on natural jurisprudence because it reveals how extensive the realm of justice must 
become in a modern commercial society (Winch 1978: 172-173).  Along similar lines, 
Knud Haakonssen (1981: 2) emphasises a natural jurisprudential reading of Smith which 
suggests that he ‘developed a whole new foundation for a system of natural 
jurisprudence’ in response to Hume’s ‘speculations about justice’.  On this reading, 
Smith shares with the other central Scottish Enlightenment figures a ‘concern with 
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empirical studies of human nature’, which subsequently meant that ‘courses in natural 
jurisprudence became the seedbeds for empirical social science and especially for 
political economy’ (Haakonssen 2003: 217-218). 
 
However, in the contemporary IPE literature, Smith’s jurisprudence is given very little 
attention compared to other features of his work.  One interpretation highlights the way 
in which the laws of justice for Smith were essential to keep in check the ‘predatory 
extremes’ of new economic freedoms (Sally 1998: 26).  Another suggests that justice for 
Smith served to combat those instances in which unhelpful actions such as ‘the search 
for power … get the best of us’ (Martinez 2009: 17).  Yet, as alluded to above, any 
meaningful attempt to appreciate Smith’s jurisprudence is absent in the IPE literature.  
This silence may be a result of the way in which IPE scholars tend to base their 
historiography of Smith on an economistic historiography of him, a point I return to 
below. 
 
The jurisprudential tradition can be contrasted with the civic humanist tradition, which 
has a central commitment to ‘public virtue’ as opposed to justice and rights.  As a 
paradigm, it takes as its starting point the early modern articulation of virtue understood 
as the practice of citizenship in the classical or Greco-Roman sense (Pocock 1983: 235).  
It entails civic equality among those permitted entry and the moral disposition of the self 
towards the maintenance of the public good.  As Hont and Ignatieff (1983: 6) point out, 
within this discourse, inequality is only a problem insofar as the new fortunes created by 
commerce and speculation threaten the ‘balance of the constitution’.  This leads them to 
suggest that Smith’s praise for a loose concept of independence for the individual 
distances him from the civic humanist nostalgia for a classical ideal of citizenship, 
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which was economically dependent on the delegation of productive labour to slaves 
(Hont and Ignatieff 1983: 13).  Edward Harpham (1983: 765) agrees that Smith’s 
 
world view does not work out of the assumptions or the logic of the traditional 
civic humanist language of discourse, nor does it reflect a suspicious outlook 
toward the modern commercial order as is found in the work of most civic 
humanists.   
 
On Harpham’s (1983: 766) reading, Smith discusses a distinctly negative conception of 
liberty in which commerce and manufacture do not create the economic conditions to 
enable citizens to engage politically, but merely free individuals from the dependency of 
the feudal system.  Thus, he suggests that rather than the ‘moderately upbeat and self-
confident tone found in civic humanism’, Smith is writing for the ‘troubled world of 
early liberalism’ (Harpham 1983: 770-771).   
 
However, significantly, other Smith scholars have suggested that he has been too readily 
assimilated with the jurisprudential tradition.  This position is put forward by Leonidas 
Montes (2004: 57), who argues that to read into Smith a level of coherence that firmly 
situates him in the jurisprudential tradition serves to underplay the prominence of the 
notion of ‘self-command’ – a virtue with distinctly civic humanist overtones – found in 
his writing.  Furthermore Montes (2002: 58 emphasis added) suggests that, in actuality, 
the ‘Smithian theory of virtues combines the natural jurisprudential language of rights 
and duties with a humanist tradition of thought’.  This associates Smith with what John 
Pocock (1983: 251 emphasis added) calls the ‘birth of political economy’ understood to 
have come about through ‘the alternative paradigms of civic humanism and natural 
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jurisprudence’ such that it is part of ‘an immensely rich and multi-faceted civil or social 
humanism, intimately related with the civic or military-political humanism which it was 
intended to replace’.  Similarly, Nicholas Phillipson (1983: 195) also identifies a civic 
humanist theme to Smith’s work in the sense that Smith hoped that a class of citizen 
would emerge capable of acquiring political wisdom and exercising it in order to 
preserve the liberties of a free commercial polity.  According to these historians of 
thought, Smith should not be regarded as steadfastly part of the jurisprudential tradition 
because if this notion is accepted, there are certain parts of his work that are 
underplayed.  This is problematic because there is at least some evidence that his work 
contains elements of a civic humanist discourse as well.    
 
As such, reading a strict jurisprudential doctrine into Smith should be avoided.  Indeed, 
perhaps the very way in which Hont and Ignatieff set up Smith’s ‘central paradox’ 
allows them to offer only a problematic situation of him in the jurisprudential tradition.  
On the one hand, they argue that Smith did indeed attach ‘immense positive 
significance’ to the level of material abundance that the modern labourer could achieve 
in a system based on a liberal reward for labour, which is in contrast to civic moralist 
claims about the impact of rising wages upon the morals and industry of the poor (Hont 
and Ignatieff 1983: 8).  Yet, on the other hand, Hont and Ignatieff (1983: 8) also admit 
that Smith believed that ‘material prosperity was purchased, more often than not, at the 
price of a measure of what he himself called “deception”’, which is a line of argument 
again with significant civic humanist undertones.  As such, they acknowledge that it is 
not easy to reconcile Smith’s ‘evident distaste for the vulgar materialism of the “great 
scramble” of commercial society with his clear endorsement of economic growth’ (Hont 
and Ignatieff 1983: 9).   
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Overall, therefore, perhaps the attempt to locate Smith’s work either in the 
jurisprudential or in the civic humanist tradition is to assume that he is operating in 
terms of one single doctrine which is ultimately lacking in his work.  In turn, there is of 
course the danger of then criticising Smith, or at least finding him less interesting or 
useful, for not fitting squarely into one or the other tradition if this attempt is made.  In 
light of Skinner’s second form of the mythology of doctrine, though, there are no 
grounds on which Smith can be criticised for not fitting neatly into either the 
jurisprudential or the civic humanist tradition.   
 
Nevertheless, as with the first form of this mythology, there are some readings of Smith 
from the history of thought literature that appear to stand up to greater scrutiny when 
read through a Skinnerian lens.  Chief amongst them is the work of Jerry Evensky 
(1989: 375) who presents the case that, in his ‘mature’ work, Smith actually spoke in 
‘two languages simultaneously’.  In short, Evensky (1989: 374) suggests that Smith’s 
work contains both elements of jurisprudential and civic humanist discourse because it 
changed over time as his ‘early optimistic confidence … was undermined by his 
growing recognition of the dynamic degenerative impact of factions in commercial 
society’.  That is, although Smith originally used a jurisprudential language to set out his 
account of justice based in an ideal society, a transformation in outlook led Smith 
towards adopting the language of civic humanism at the same time in order to speak to a 
potential natural aristocracy who could be enlisted to provide leadership in the attempt to 
realise this ideal society (Evensky 1989: 374-375).  Part of this change in outlook was 
dependent on the addition of a foundationalist philosophical short-cut into his final 
edition of TMS (1790) as a means of defending the early jurisprudential optimism of the 
first edition (1759), namely the somewhat forced distinction between ‘praise’ and 
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‘praiseworthiness’ that can be found at various points in the last edition (e.g. TMS 
III.ii.1-3).  Nevertheless, there are clearly ways in which Smith’s thought can be located 
within eighteenth-century political discourse without yielding to a mythology of doctrine 
by assuming that his work puts forward a single overriding creed.    
 
Notably though, as with a discussion of his jurisprudence, there tends to be far fewer 
references to Smith’s civic humanist concerns in the IPE literature compared to in the 
history of thought scholarship.  There are a few important exceptions: Mlada 
Bukovansky (2006: 78) points to how Smith engaged in a ‘critical dialogue’ with 
republican strands of thought such that he deployed ‘substantive notions of public good 
drawn from the civic humanist tradition’; and, in an excellent chapter, David Blaney and 
Naeem Inayatullah (2010: 40-41) argue that Smith’s ‘complicated stance’ on and 
concern for moral corruption signals a particular ‘wound within a wealth society’.  These 
readings echo Jerry Muller’s (1995: 99) suggestion that ‘Smith approved of commercial 
society because it fosters self-control’, but at the same time he was concerned that 
‘commercial society requires a degree of self-control that the market by itself cannot 
provide and may even threaten’.  However, aside from in the work of a handful of other 
scholars (e.g. Watson 2012), these interventions that are even aware of the civic 
humanist elements of Smith’s work, let alone engage in the civic humanist-
jurisprudential debate, are extremely rare in IPE.  While on one level it might be 
problematic to engage in such debates about Smith’s work if it ends up producing a 
Skinnerian mythology of doctrine, it is surely more useful to engage with them and run 
the risk of doing so, than not even recognise the civic humanist and jurisprudential 
aspects of Smith’s thought at all, as many IPE interpretations of Smith appear to do. 
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2.2 The mythology of coherence: ‘The Adam Smith Problem’ 
 
Skinner’s (1969: 16-19) second interpretive mythology, that of ‘coherence’, concerns the 
ways in which readers attempt to find in past texts a level of consistency that is 
essentially unfounded.  This flawed procedure attributes coherence to writers based on 
the suggestion that they present a ‘closed system’, even though they may have never 
even attempted to provide such a system (Skinner 1969: 17).  In turn, problematically, 
this may involve discounting the actual stated intentions of a writer and even ignoring 
whole texts that are presumed not to fit in with an overall body of work.  Also, it might 
include readers taking it upon themselves to demonstrate that any contradictions within 
or between texts are not real barriers to a coherent system because there cannot really be 
any genuine contradictions in a single author’s work: the reader just has to search a little 
harder.  At first glance, this mythology of coherence is similar to the above mythology of 
doctrine – and indeed clearly all the interpretive mythologies can overlap and appear at 
the same time – but, rather than the issue of whether or not a writer is putting forward a 
single overarching doctrine, it is much more concerned with issues of ‘coherence’ and 
‘consistency’. 
 
In the Smith studies literature, this particular mythology has had a significant and lasting 
impact in the form of a debate that came to be known as the Adam Smith Problem.  On 
one rather simplistic level, the debate revolves around the proposition that TMS and WN 
fundamentally contradict each other because of the way in which the former seems to 
recommend and endorse ‘benevolence’ while the latter ‘self-interest’ (McLean 2006: 
82).  TMS is said to be aligned with the ‘benevolent’ moralists Francis Hutcheson and 
Anthony Ashley-Cooper Shaftesbury whereas, by contrast, the proper working of the 
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economic order set out in WN is thought to be closer to the ‘egoistic’ ethics of Thomas 
Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville (Viner 1989: 130).  In Jacob Viner’s (1989: 126) terms, 
at least with respect to the character of natural order, there is thus a ‘substantial measure 
of irreconcilable divergence’ between TMS and WN.  He points to the way in which, 
first, a benevolent deity who is author and guide of nature is part of the former book but 
almost entirely missing from the latter; and second, that the novel feature of human 
nature presented in TMS – benevolence – is not relied upon in the proper working of the 
economic order set out in WN (Viner 1989, 126; 130).   
 
Notably, in the IPE literature, the vast majority of interpretations of Smith are derived 
almost exclusively from his WN, while TMS is largely ignored.  This means that the 
question of whether the two texts form a coherent whole is rarely even acknowledged, 
let alone examined.  One exception is Razeen Sally (1998: 75-76; 87) who picks up on 
Viner’s suggestion that Smith ‘alternates between “partial models” applicable to 
different compartments of human action’ and therefore argues that WN and TMS deal 
with what are essentially different ‘spheres’ of the social world, rather than being 
contradictory.  Others recognise how in TMS, Smith ‘avers that the power and wealth 
created by the division of labour is quite “contemptible and trifling”’ such that the text 
presents at least some sort of challenge to the optimism of a wealthy society in WN 
(Blaney and Inayatullah 2010: 37).  Along these lines, it is pointed out that in TMS he 
‘also stressed that in civil society, social propensities constrain egoism and help to avert 
discord’ through a ‘discussion of “fellow feeling”, personal conduct, rules of justice and 
morality’ (Mittelman 1997: 80).   
 
However, despite these notable exceptions amongst others (e.g. Watson 2005a; 2012), 
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TMS is rarely given the same amount of attention as WN in IPE, so any discussion of 
the potential Adam Smith Problem is largely absent.  On the one hand, it is potentially 
beneficial for IPE interpretations of Smith that scholars tend not to fall foul of this 
Skinnerian mythology of coherence: how can they have a misplaced concern for 
consistency between WN and TMS if the latter tends to be entirely overlooked?  
However, on the other hand, much more problematically, IPE scholars tend to ignore 
TMS while, perhaps unknowingly, routinely accepting the interpretation of WN which 
underpins many flawed accounts of one half the Adam Smith Problem.  In other words, 
as discussed above in the section concerning the invisible hand, most IPE scholars 
understand WN to be all about how the ‘self-interest of one becomes the general interest 
of all’ (Burchill 2005: 73).   
 
In a sense then, the way in which TMS is overlooked by the vast majority of IPE 
scholars serves to demonstrate the way in which IPE tends to follow an economistic 
historiography of Smith that emphasises the invisible hand doctrine to the detriment of a 
robust interpretation of Smith’s actual texts.  Even on those occasions when TMS is 
discussed in the IPE literature, the general tone of these discussions tends to echo more 
mainstream economic interpretations in which his ‘other’ (read less important) text is 
referred to occasionally to make the point that Smith was more than just an economist.  
This mirrors, for example, Joseph Stiglitz’s (2007: 189-190) suggestion that in ‘Smithian 
economics, morality played no role’, but at the same time he ‘was intensely concerned 
about moral issues’ in TMS.  Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly, the problem of consistency 
between Smith’s two major published works has not been readily considered by most 
working in the economics mainstream either because TMS is considered to be 
‘psychological’ or ‘ethical’ rather than an ‘economic’ text (Peil 1994: 280-281).  On 
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such readings then, the inconsistencies result in Smith’s first major publication – and the 
one he gained fame for writing during his lifetime – being ignored. 
 
By contrast, the Smith studies literature takes TMS much more seriously and so 
discussions of coherence and consistency often come to centre stage.  In light of ideas 
about the mythology of coherence, though, the problem with the Adam Smith Problem is 
not so much its identification in Smith’s work – for there simply may exist subtle 
differences in various areas of his work which do not in any way undermine his intention 
– but the response of those who then attempt to find coherence, in order to solve the 
contradiction, where perhaps there is none or even where the subject matter itself is 
inherently contradictory in nature.  Indeed there are various accounts in the Smith 
studies literature that have suggested that the Adam Smith Problem is in fact not really a 
contradiction at all.  Most influentially D. D. Raphael and Alec Macfie (1982: 20), the 
editors of the Glasgow edition of TMS, have called it ‘a pseudo-problem based on 
ignorance and misunderstanding’ of the relation between the two books.  Indeed the 
general trend in the literature is now to seek ways of synthesising his work through 
appeal to how TMS provides a moral basis on which to ground the chiefly economic 
ideas contained within WN.  For example, Glenn Morrow (1989: 177) argues that Smith 
does not consider the individual as an absolute and irreducible entity existing prior to 
social existence, as could be interpreted from WN, but as a product of his social 
environment, clearly evidenced in TMS.  In a similar way, Winch (1992: 105) reconciles 
a renowned passage on self-interest with Smith’s concern for sympathy: 
 
We may have no need of the benevolence of the butcher when we appeal to his 
self-interest in selling us meat, but that does not mean we have no imaginative 
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sympathy, no capacity to understand and approve or disapprove of his behaviour.   
 
In all, as Horst Claus Recktenwald (1978: 56) and Jan Peil (1999: 7) have identified, 
viewing his work as a comprehensive whole is one of the key features in the renaissance 
of interest in Smith over the last thirty years.  As a result, recent trends might produce 
readings of Smith that in attempting to solve the Adam Smith Problem actually fall foul 
of the mythology of coherence by reading back into his work a level of consistency that 
might not be supported by his actual texts.   
 
There are, however, other Smith scholars who have suggested that the Adam Smith 
Problem – perhaps in a modified form that moves away from its rather crude 
‘benevolence’ versus ‘self-interest’ exposition – constitutes an important part of Smith’s 
work and as such should not be explained away.  For instance, Laurence Dickey (1986: 
582) argues that the Adam Smith Problem has too readily been dismissed and that this 
dismissal serves to obscure some of the deeper issues it raises.  Similarly, Richard 
Teichgraeber (1981: 111) suggests that the Adam Smith Problem can only be so easily 
rejected if it is understood in its original and somewhat oversimplified form.  He points 
to the work of Joseph Cropsey and Robert Cumming who have considered the problem 
in a ‘revamped form’ in order to describe the ‘very complex task of establishing Smith’s 
intentions as a moral and social theorist’ (Teichgraeber 1981: 111).  Thus, perhaps in 
order to avoid the mythology of coherence in this instance, it is possible to agree with 
Vivienne Brown (1994: 24) who suggests that the identity of each text is not reducible to 
the issue of authorial coherence or consistency; and further, despite very different 
rhetorical styles, it does not need to be.  Rather than ignoring such questions, IPE 
scholars might thus do well to engage with a historiography of Smith that recognises the 
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existence of a potential Adam Smith Problem.  At the very least, this would allow IPE to 
avoid unconsciously replicating the simplistic and erroneous economistic historiography 
of Smith which reduces his thought to the WN side of the debate. 
 
 
2.3 The mythology of prolepsis: Smith as ‘father of economics’ 
 
Skinner’s (1969: 22) third textual mythology, that of ‘prolepsis’, occurs when a reader 
prioritises the ostensible significance of a given text over its actual meaning.  This 
occurs when the reader is more interested in the ‘retrospective significance’ of a given 
work rather than its original meaning for the writer themselves (Skinner 1969: 22).  In 
this way, the historical significance of a work becomes conflated with an account of 
what the writer was doing in writing the text, which often in principle cannot be accurate 
(Skinner 1969: 23).  Of course, a text can only gain accepted historical significance after 
it has been written, which produces considerable interpretive dilemmas when readers 
later attempt to recover the author’s actual intentions in writing their text. 
 
In this sense, the very way in which Smith is widely regarded as the ‘founding father’ of 
economics seems to involve the distorting effect of this form of mythology.  Certainly, in 
both IPE and mainstream economics, Smith is commonly described as the ‘founder’ of 
economics (e.g. Acocella 2005: 10; Brown and Ainley 2009: 154; Miller 2008: 11; 
Rupert and Solomon 2006: 11; Shaw 2000: 231; Stiglitz 2007: 66; Williamson and 
Milner 1991: 19).  In IPE, Robert Gilpin (1987: 26) makes the influential claim:  
 
Liberalism, which emerged from the Enlightenment in the writings of Adam 
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Smith and others, was a reaction to mercantilism and has become embodied in 
orthodox economics.  It assumes that politics and economics exist, at least 
ideally, in separate spheres; it argues that markets – in the interest of efficiency, 
growth, and consumer choice – should be free from political interference.   
 
On this reading, based on an economistic historiography of Smith, his work represents a 
decisive moment at which a ‘scientific’ conception of the self-regulating ‘economic’ 
realm assumed dominance over what had until that time been an exclusively ‘moral’ and 
‘political’ domain (Winch 1978: 7).  In the IPE literature, he is said to have understood 
economic and political matters to be ‘largely separable’ (Steger 2002: 9) because he 
‘clearly believes that economics has a logic distinct from politics and should not be 
unduly hampered by political machinations’ (Crane and Amawi 1997: 7).  Along these 
lines, one interpretation holds that ‘from Smith onward’ there was a split in 
understanding human action between the ‘vertical dimension’ of power and the 
‘horizontal axis’ of ‘well-being, free choice, exchange and equilibrium’ (Nitzan and 
Bichler 2000: 67).  The former referring to the ‘political’, the latter to the ‘economic’ 
realm of social life.  In short, this means that Smith is supposed to represent a 
‘depoliticization of resource allocation and [a] devaluation of place and social solidarity’ 
in society (Agnew 1994: 94).  On this reading, the publication of WN thus marks the all-
important ‘separation between public and private in economic affairs’ (Haufler 2006: 
89).  
 
These readings are noticeably derived from an economistic historiography of Smith.  As 
Jan Peil (1999: ix) suggests, the generally accepted understanding of Smith’s 
‘contribution’ to economic analysis is exemplified by Joseph Schumpeter’s claim that he 
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is best understood as providing a Walrasian general equilibrium theory in nucleo.  In 
other words, from this perspective, ‘[m]uch of the history of neoclassical economics can 
be read as a mediation on Adam Smith’s “invisible hand theorem”’ (Carter 1997: 122).  
WN is thus read as the origin of the ‘ideal of markets of pure and perfect competition’, 
which is later ‘elaborated by Alfred Marshall and generalized by Leon Walras’ (Boyer 
1996: 100).  This interpretation is very much mirrored in the IPE literature.  As a 
supposed forerunner to economic ‘science’, it is emphasised how Smith was ‘concerned 
with the natural laws of wealth’ (Isaak 1995: 117), the ‘laws governing the wealth of 
nations’ (Gilpin 1987: 44), and how he understood economics as an ‘imaginary machine’ 
in the ‘spirit of Newton’ (Gill 1997: 53-54), which can be conceived of as the ‘science’ 
of the wealth of nations (Carlsson et al. 1994: 12).  In this way, the claim is often made 
that WN is ‘the foundation for modern economics’ (Hite and Roberts 2007: 5). 
 
From this perspective, significantly, Smith is also associated with the interrelated ideas 
of the self-interested individual and of the price mechanism that coordinates the actions 
of these individuals in accordance with public interest (Peil 1999: 37).  In both IPE and 
mainstream economics, Smith is often said to have put forward the ‘famous “economic 
man” dictum’ (Miller 2008: 20).  On this reading, he had a ‘thin’ ethical notion of the 
self ‘as a short-term interest maximizer’ (Isaak 1995: 99) and he ‘embraced … self-
interest and greed’ (Martinez 2009: 4).  Associated claims are typically that Smith 
thought that human beings ‘are by nature economic animals’ (Gilpin 1987: 27) and that 
‘the objective of economic activity is consumption’ (Prestowitz 2005: 177).  Although 
his conception of the individual is discussed more fully in the next chapter, in IPE Smith 
is very much associated with a homo economicus understanding of man against which a 
number of critical IPE scholars position themselves, particularly from a Gramscian 
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perspective (e.g. Beiler and Morton 2006: 164).  Ironically, of course, the ‘economic 
man’ construction is actually one of J. S. Mill’s and is unrelated to Smith because it post-
dated him by the best part of one hundred years (Morgan 2006: 5).   
 
Nevertheless, further illustrative of a economistic historiography of Smith, George 
Stigler (cited in Force 2003: 1) characterises WN as ‘a stupendous palace erected upon 
the granite of self-interest’.  Stigler (1976: 1201 emphasis added) claims: 
 
Smith had one overwhelmingly important triumph: he put into the center of 
economics the systematic analysis of the behavior of individuals pursuing their 
self-interest under conditions of competition.  This theory was the crown jewel of 
The Wealth of Nations, and it became, and remains to this day, the foundation of 
the theory of the allocation of resources.  The proposition that resources seek 
their most profitable uses, so that in equilibrium the rates of return to a resource 
in various uses will be equal, is still the most important substantive proposition in 
all of economics.  
 
In a similar reading, Samuel Hollander (cited in Recktenwald 1978: 62) suggests that 
‘[t]he whole Walrasian, Marshallian, and Hicksian price theory ... is clearly implicit in 
Adam Smith’s concept of natural price’.  For him, Smith showed how the price 
mechanism can be relied upon to clear product and factor markets, which leads him to 
believe it is justified to use ‘the current state of knowledge regarding the general 
equilibrium process’ in a study of Smith’s work (Hollander 1973: 13).  Likewise this 
economistic position is also reflected in Maurice Dobb’s (1937: 5) suggestion that 
Smith’s theory of value was of utmost importance because of its role as a unifying 
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quantitative principle that enabled the production of postulates in terms of the general 
equilibrium of an economic system.  Such readings are representative of an economistic 
historiography of Smith that, on the whole, seems to suggest that there are few problems 
involved in reading modern economic analysis into his work. 
 
However, problematically from the perspective of a Skinnerian mythology of prolepsis, 
many of these economistic interpretations of Smith rely on a focus on the first part of 
WN to the detriment of the rest of his work (Coats 1975: 221).  Indeed, the most 
prominent nineteenth-century revisionist of Smith’s work, J. R. McCulloch, as an 
admirer of ‘economic science’ in the modern sense is said to have ‘boiled Smith’s life 
work down to Book One of The Wealth of Nations’ (Fitzgibbons 1995: 149-150).  
Stemming from this account, the economistic historiography of Smith thus has an 
extremely selective focus on his arguments about natural liberty, self-interest and the 
beneficial outcomes of market forces; which necessarily excludes the ethics, moral 
psychology, jurisprudence, rhetoric, and belles lettres contained within his work as a 
whole (Griswold 1999: 9; Tribe 1999: 609-610). 
 
With the concept of a mythology of prolepsis in mind then, the economistic 
historiography of Smith that understandings him as the forerunner to general equilibrium 
theory and the application of a utility maximisation postulate are reflective of a flawed 
usage of his work that is at least in part predetermined or ‘set’ by an expectation that 
such themes can be read into his work.  In actuality, it relies on a narrow interpretation 
of Smith as the founding father of economics, which can be usefully remedied through 
recourse to the history of thought historiography of Smith.   
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For instance, Donald Winch (1992: 92) correctly identifies the way in which 
increasingly since the nineteenth-century a number of influential schools of thought in 
social science have shared the belief that the advancement of economics as a science 
requires the separation of its subject matter from moral considerations.  Yet, crucially, to 
read this separation in Smith is deeply problematic in Skinnerian terms because it 
involves a process of extrapolation from Smith’s actual texts and even contradicts his 
intentions in writing them (Macfie 1967: 13).  As Stephen Rosow (1997: 45) argues, the 
separation of the economy from its embeddedness in social and political practice was a 
‘foreign thought to Adam Smith and his contemporaries’.  Indeed, an economistic 
depiction of Smith does not adequately characterise the larger social and political 
dimensions of his enquiry (Winch 1978: 70).  Put simply, Smith does not apply a 
universal ‘economic’ approach as sub-rational instincts play a crucial part in both his 
WN and TMS; self-interest is not always motivated by economic ends because, for 
example, honour, vanity, social esteem, love of ease and love of domination can play a 
part in forming an individual’s action (Winch 1978: 167).  Also, Smith was aware that a 
simple economistic model of interaction is lacking because it does not take into account: 
the way (mis)perceptions are formed, social setting, interdependence between 
individuals and groups, and unintended consequences (Winch 1978: 167).   
 
Moreover, in his consideration of his philosophy of science, Fleischacker (2004: 33) 
suggests that Smith was not presenting principles that he expected to hold as economic 
‘facts’ available to every generation in history.  As such, this implies that those who use 
Smith’s principles to explain every economic phenomenon today are betraying their 
master’s methodological legacy rather than preserving it (Fleischacker 2004: 33).  
Likewise, Anthony Endres (1991: 94) argues that given the concepts that Smith sets out 
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in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, the chapter on ‘bounties’ in WN ‘is best 
viewed as a disciplined exercise in advocacy rather than as a crude polemic or an 
illustration of applied economic analysis or “science”’.  As Pierre Force (2003: 101) 
suggests, ‘attempts to translate the language of economic science and rational choice 
theory into the language of early modern moral philosophy (and vice versa) should be 
carried out with caution’.  For him, as will become clear in the next chapter, it is 
important to stress that concepts such as ‘self-interest’ and ‘utility-maximizing 
behaviour’ are two very different things (Force 2003: 101).   
 
Interestingly, some areas of the IPE literature are rather more robust in this area than 
others, at least in terms of not separating the economic and the political in Smith.  They 
thus avoid falling foul of a mythology of prolepsis.  For instance, the claim is made that 
Smith would have been ‘surprised’ at the differentiation of the social sciences into 
separate spheres of study (Brown and Ainley 2009: 18).  As Andrew Gamble (1983: 66) 
points out, for Smith, ‘the purpose of political economy was to provide guidance to the 
statesman’, which in turn is picked up in the suggestion that for Smith ‘the economy was 
eminently political and politics was obviously tied to economic phenomena’ (Frieden 
and Lake 2000: 3).  In this sense, ‘political economy was a “branch of the science of a 
statesman or legislator” and a guide to the prudent management of the national 
economy’ (Gilpin 2001: 25).  Smith is also understood to have recognised ‘the 
interconnections of the political and the economic inherent within a conception of 
capital as a set of social relations of production’ (Clift and Rosamond 2009: 99) and thus 
is part of a tradition that highlights the ‘importance of treating markets as arenas of 
governance and decision-making arenas in their own right’ (Baker 2005: 104-105).  
Moreover, there is a degree of recognition that Smith understood political economy to be 
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‘closely linked to the study of moral philosophy’ (Cohen 2008: 17) – the practical aspect 
of the study of moral philosophy’ (Mittelman and Pasha 1997: 16) – and that he places 
his work ‘within a moral and historical context’ (Crane and Amawi 1997: 7).  He is also 
recognised to be concerned with theorising the ‘moral sentiments of economic actors’ 
(Santiso 2003: 2) and the philosophical quandary of the ‘relationship between individual 
self-interest and the collective needs of the community’ (Underhill 2000: 17).  Indeed 
this is often accepted as part of his ‘ultimate concern’ for ‘fostering human dignity and 
the ethical life’ (Murphy and Tooze 1991: 27). 
 
Overall, read through the lens of a concern with issues related to a potential mythology 
of prolepsis, the historiography of Smith in IPE is somewhat complex.  On the one hand, 
there are a number of interpretations that follow an economistic historiography of his 
work by understanding him as the father of economics, which often includes situating a 
‘break’ between the economic and the political in his work, and attributing the economic 
man construction to Smith.  Such readings clearly fall foul of a mythology of prolepsis 
that can be countered through appeal to a history of thought historiography of Smith.  
Indeed it is pointed out that ‘the view held by most serious Smith scholars [is] that Smith 
was not an incipient neoclassical economist’ (Fitzgibbons 1995: 171 emphasis in 
original).  Athol Fitzgibbons (1995: 152) in fact suggests that the ‘libertarian reduction’ 
of Smith’s work constitutes a move equivalent to attributing Darwin with a theory of 
evolution that stops at the amoeba.  Similarly, Vivienne Brown (1994: 22) uses the 
Baktinian notion of ‘canonisation’ to criticise economistic readings of Smith that reduce 
the ‘dialogic complexity of the past to a single voice for consumption in the present’.   
 
Nevertheless, on the other hand, other more subtle interpretations of Smith in IPE 
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recognise that he does not separate the economic from the political and the ethical in his 
work.  Notably, such contributions follow more closely a history of thought 
historiography of Smith.  This tendency might be attributed to how the discipline of IPE 
tends to see itself working at the intersection of the political and the economic (e.g. 
Strange 1994), and so it suits IPE scholars to claim that Smith was undertaking a similar 
scholarly endeavour by invoking the authority of his name.  However, this position sits 
rather uncomfortably alongside how IPE tends to follow an economistic historiography 
of Smith when it attempts to interpret other more specific aspects of his work. 
 
 
2.4 The mythology of parochialism: ‘Laissez-faire’ and ‘capitalism’ 
 
Finally, Skinner’s (1969: 24) mythology of ‘parochialism’ relates to interpretive attempts 
to understand an unfamiliar conceptual scheme found in a past text in terms that are 
more familiar to the current day.  Such attempts are potentially problematic because they 
present the distinct possibility of ‘misdescribing’ the sense and intended reference of a 
text through a suspect process of ‘historical foreshortening’ (Skinner 1969: 24).  As 
such, even when attention is seemingly focused entirely on a text itself, the ‘very 
familiarity of the concepts that the historian uses may mask some essential 
inapplicability to the historical material’ (Skinner 1969: 28).  On the one hand, to an 
extent, the very process of interpreting past texts necessarily involves the 
reconceptualising of themes and concepts into terms and categories that are more 
familiar today.  On the other hand, though, it is possible to identify a number of readings 
of Smith’s texts that clearly approach them in such a way as to significantly underplay, 
or simply ignore, the historicised meanings of the concepts he used.  In tending to follow 
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this latter route, the economistic historiography of Smith in IPE appears to fall foul of 
this mythology. 
 
First and foremost, this is evidenced in many interpretations of Smith that directly 
‘translate’ his work into contemporary political concepts and terminology.  Evidently, as 
Fleischacker (2004: 19) points out, it is indeed possible to use Smith’s work to support 
views of government from both the political left and right in terms of wealth 
redistribution, but even though both are plausible, they require considerable 
extrapolation from his actual work.  This is because, for one thing, Smith was writing at 
a time when production was above all the central concern of political economy, not the 
issue of distribution, which later assumed such pivotal importance (Fleischacker 2004: 
19).  As such, it is imperative to be aware of context when attempting to view Smith’s 
‘individualism’ in a modern sense (Clark 1989: 54).  Indeed even Hollander (1987: 3-4), 
a historian of thought who tends to use a distinctly economistic historiography of Smith, 
claims that Smith represents one of ‘the masters’ whose work has been misused by 
politicians and ‘others with an axe to grind’ for their own ends and indeed ‘possibly 
without having read them’.  He claims that Smith’s work contains sustained arguments 
for a moderate kind of interventionism, harsh criticisms of capitalist institutions, and, 
equally plausibly, the roots of early British socialism (Hollander 1987: 4).  Hollander 
(1987: 4) thus finds it entirely inappropriate that conservatives ‘sporting Adam Smith 
neckties’ frequently cite Smith as the champion of an extreme form of ‘laissez faire’. 
 
It is in this attribution of a laissez faire policy prescription to Smith that is most 
problematic in terms of falling foul of a interpretive mythology of prolepsis.  Yet, more 
often than not, in IPE Smith is quite simply the ‘alleged father of laissez faire’ (Diaz-
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Alejandro 1978: 92).  On many accounts, Smith is said to have ‘of course, generally 
advocated laissez-faire policies’ (Balaam and Veseth 2008: 104 emphasis added).  
‘Laissez faire’ – as both a policy prescription (e.g. Cohen 1974: 23; Mittelman 1997: 80; 
O’Brien and Williams 2007: 83; Pettman 1996: 196; Steger 2002: 10; Swift 1993: 67; 
Versluysen 1981: 242) and as a normative or ideological liberal argument for free trade 
(e.g. Aggarwal 1985: 10; Isaak 1995: 4-5; Lal 2006: 48; Miller 2008: 245; Sally 1998: 
17) – is in fact widely understood to be central to his work.  These IPE readings echo 
Paul Samuelson’s (1969: 4) economistic interpretation in which Smith is said to ‘extol 
the role of laissez-faire’. 
 
Nevertheless, some accounts in IPE do recognise that there were ‘many qualifications’ to 
his supposed laissez faire policy advocacy and point out that it was a term ‘he did not 
coin’ (Martinez 2009: 11).  This latter point is of fundamental concern because Smith did 
not ever use the phrase even though it was popularised in 1750s France and thus could 
have been employed systematically by him if it was part of his intention to do so.  
Others, such as Jakob Vestergaard (2009: 185), go further by correctly highlighting: 
 
Recent work in the history of economic thought has challenged the widespread 
notion that Adam Smith may be considered the founding father of laissez-faire 
liberalism … Smith’s views on the proper role of government in a market society 
have been severely misrepresented, it seems.   
 
He suggests that ‘[f]rom the perspective of this body of research [history of thought 
Smith studies], it would be a gross mistake to extrapolate from Adam Smith’s critique of 
mercantilism to a general “anti-government” or laissez-faire stance’ (Vestergaard 2009: 
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186).  Thus, despite the vast majority of IPE scholars routinely associating Smith with a 
laissez faire policy position, there are a few other significant contributions to IPE (e.g. 
Watson 2005a) that do not fall foul of this mythology by picking up on a more accurate 
history of thought historiography of Smith. 
 
As opposed concepts he did not use, such as laissez faire, it can still be difficult to 
appropriately interpret some of the specific concepts Smith did in fact use without 
succumbing to a mythology of parochialism.  Of particular concern here is his use of the 
phrase ‘the system of natural liberty’.  Notably, writing in the mid-to-late eighteenth-
century, Smith did not refer to a system of free enterprise as ‘capitalism’, but as ‘the 
system of natural liberty’ in which ‘things were left to follow their natural course, where 
there was perfect liberty’ (Smith cited in Cropsey 1975: 148).  As Winch (1978: 142) 
argues, although this point is often ignored, the rapid translation of Smith’s use of the 
term ‘commercial society’ into ‘capitalism’ is flawed for the simple reason that the latter 
term was not available to him.  Crucially, the relationship between capital and wage 
labour was not central to Smith’s society, which means that the relationship between the 
two was merely one of a whole range of market relationships (Winch 1978: 142).  Nor, 
incidentally, is Smith’s ‘system of natural liberty’ interchangeable with the term ‘free 
trade’ because the former term has ‘jurisprudential’ connotations that the latter does not 
(Fitzgibbons 1995: 172).  Smith’s criticisms of the prevailing economic order, 
mercantilism, were that it did not work in accordance with the principles of natural 
liberty, not based on some ultimate evaluation of an idealised structure such as the 
perfect-competition paradigm (Buchanan 1979: 120).  
 
In the IPE literature, however, there tends to be a straightforward link made between 
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Smith’s work and capitalism.  Typically, Smith is understood as ‘the first to develop a 
comprehensive portrait of capitalism’ (Balaam and Veseth 2008: 40) and to have 
provided the ‘era’s best description of what was the emerging capitalist system’ (Hite 
and Roberts 2007: 4-5).  On such readings, his work: explains how capitalism ‘creates 
the wealth of nations’ (Bonefeld 2006: 45), describes how ‘capitalism and markets came 
into existence’ (Harrod 2006: 32-33), and on the whole ‘celebrated’ capitalism (Walker 
2010: 231).  For Smith’s critics, Mark Martinez’s (2009: 8-9 emphasis added) comments 
on the association between his work and capitalism are typical: 
 
Adam Smith, the intellectual godfather of capitalism, argued that greedy people 
in competitive environments could become good and even lead moral lives.  
Smith argued that, freed from abusive feudal authority and stifling traditions, 
greed in the pursuit of profit could be transformed into a quest to please and 
serve others.  Simply put, customers would not return to a merchant if they were 
treated rudely or received a shoddy product.  Merchants would be forced to 
produce quality goods and treat people well if they wanted to succeed.  Hard 
work and moral lives would be the end result, and society would be the 
beneficiary.  Freedom and the pursuit of profit would replace feudal customs and 
traditions that obligated subservience and duty.  And, ‘like an invisible hand,’ the 
moral and material needs of society would be met.  
 
Together with the other simplistic treatments of the relationship between Smith and 
‘capitalism’, this attribution of a ‘consumer is king’ in a capitalist economy idea to 
Smith (Balaam and Veseth 2008: 42) clearly falls foul of a Skinnerian mythology of 
parochialism.  Put simply, it can be shown through recourse to a history of thought 
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historiography of Smith that he did not provide an ‘ideology’ of capitalism as some in 
IPE claim (e.g. Panić 2003: 14-15).   
 
Notably, as a useful corrective, Gavin Kennedy’s (2005: ix) central argument is that 
Smith wrote for his times, when religious superstition dominated the beliefs and 
attitudes of individuals to a degree not easily comprehended today.  Moreover, Edward 
Harpham (1983: 766) suggests that in order to grasp the political significance of the 
historical arguments that Smith develops, it is necessary to situate them within his 
broader economic arguments and his specific critique of the mercantile system.  In this 
endeavour, moreover, scholars must be wary of transposing nineteenth-century 
analytical meanings onto the less familiar eighteenth-century concepts that make up 
Smith’s work (Winch 1978: 142).  In fact, Winch (1978: 165) successfully demonstrates 
that applying what are basically nineteenth-century perspectives to what is 
‘quintessentially’ a work of the eighteenth-century not only introduces artificialities but 
also obscures some of the essential features of Smith’s work.  Reading Smith’s texts 
through the lenses of a ‘laissez faire’ policy position and an ideology of ‘capitalism’ 
poses exactly these sorts of problems.  Overall, therefore, rather than blindly following 
an economistic historiography of Smith that does not attend to issues of historicised 
meaning, IPE scholars would do well to look to this history of thought literature – and 
his texts themselves – in order to provide their own more robust historiography of Smith. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
Against the idea of atomistic individuals acting like calculating machines driven 
by price signals, more recent readings typically place an emphasis on 
understanding behaviour in relation to its concrete socio-historical context.  This 
means that in the new readings of Smith’s economic analysis, individuals are still 
considered as economic agents, but their agency is no longer interpreted as 
atomistic, mechanistic and rationalistic.  Instead, recent scholarship on Smith 
pays far greater attention to the ways in which his individuals act according to 
prevailing social values and rules (Peil 1999: 9). 
 
Jan Peil summarises superbly the way in which recent specialist work on Smith has 
shaped current understandings of him as a thinker.  By contrast, in the main, IPE 
scholars do not even get close to a historicised interpretation of his texts, which, in turn, 
among other things means they tend to fail to adequately understand Smith’s ‘individual’ 
in the way Peil describes.  In this chapter, I have used some key interpretive mythologies 
identified by Quentin Skinner to map out representations of Smith in IPE and expose 
some of the widespread problems of interpretation surrounding his work.  
 
I showed how in terms of issues of ‘doctrine’ (in relation to the ‘invisible hand’ 
metaphor), ‘prolepsis’, and ‘parochialism’, IPE interpretations of Smith, on the whole, 
can be shown to quite clearly succumb to Skinner’s mythologies.  Indeed, this is exposed 
to be the case to a significant degree when compared to the work of Smith scholars.  
Specifically, by construing an ‘invisible hand’ doctrine from his text, characterising 
Smith as the ‘father of economics’, and reading concepts such as ‘laissez-faire’ and 
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‘capitalism’ back into his work, the paucity of the vast majority of interpretations of 
Smith is striking.  Moreover, of perhaps even greater significance, in succumbing to 
such interpretive mythologies on these issues, IPE scholars tend to directly imitate a 
markedly economistic historiography of Smith, almost entirely replicating the 
interpretation of his work to be found in histories of economics written by economists as 
Tribe would have it.  In following an economistic historiography of Smith, as opposed to 
a history of thought historiography of Smith, IPE interpretations are therefore 
considerably flawed on these grounds. 
 
Furthermore, I illustrated that there are instructive interpretive debates about Smith in 
the history of thought literature that are simply, for the most part, not even noticed as 
issues to be debated in IPE.  The disputes over whether Smith should be located within 
the jurisprudential or the civic humanist tradition, and whether or not there exists an 
‘Adam Smith Problem’ are in some ways foundational to the history of thought 
historiography of Smith.  On the one hand, I suggested, these disputes may at times 
lapse into mythologies of doctrine and coherence, which is problematic from a 
Skinnerian perspective.  However, on the other hand, what is noticeable is that IPE 
scholars have next to nothing to contribute to either of these debates because they simply 
to not really come up for scrutiny in IPE.  Again, on both counts, I argue that this points 
towards an economistic historiography of Smith in IPE.   
 
Overall, therefore, IPE scholars are followers rather than leaders on matters of Smith 
historiography.  This is unfortunate in itself in light of my claims about the benefits of a 
thick historicised approach to IPE (Chapter 1).  It is also calamitous in the sense that IPE 
tends to produce erroneous interpretations of Smith’s texts largely because it imports its 
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flawed historiography of Smith from economics.  In the next chapter, I continue to flesh 
out my concern for pragmatic historiography in order to provide a more successful 
account of Smith, in particular in relation to his concept of the individual and his 
understanding of market-oriented behaviour.  That IPE holds such a suspect economistic 
historiography of Smith surely makes this task all the more pressing. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 99 
CHAPTER 3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Smithian Individual and the Concept of Sympathy 
 
Retrospection, literally the act of looking back, is an intellectual exercise that is 
in some sense similar to Smith’s sympathy.  For Smith, sympathy is not simply 
fellow feeling, as it demands a process of assessing circumstances (Montes 2004: 
2). 
 
Leonidas Montes draws an interesting parallel between the task of the historian of 
economic thought, who might seek to interpret meaning and understand intention in past 
texts, and Smith’s concept of sympathy because they both potentially involve an 
imaginative change of place and situation.  In this chapter, I make the case that Smith’s 
sympathy should be understood centrally as an imaginative procedure, through which 
people come to assess the actions, circumstance, and suffering of others and themselves.  
This understanding of sympathy, I suggest, offers a route to bringing questions of ethics 
and politics right back to the heart of discussions of liberal market governance in IPE. 
 
That I wish to reconstruct an account of the sympathy procedure is based on my explicit 
intention to provide a more historicised account of Smith for IPE.  As I explored in the 
previous chapter, the historiography of Smith in IPE tends to be very much derived from 
an economistic historiography of Smith.  This is a fundamental dilemma, for ‘critical 
IPE’ at least, given that in so many other ways it seeks to differentiate itself from 
economics.  Thus, through appeal to a more robust ‘history of thought historiography’ of 
his work, which is more attentive to Skinner’s methodological rules, in this chapter I 
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present the core of my reconstruction of Smith to help to address this predicament.  I 
present this case, so that it in next chapter I can demonstrate how Smith’s sympathy 
procedure, seemingly almost completely overlooked by IPE scholars, can provide a 
complex and compelling perspective for IPE while still remaining attentive to the 
historicised meaning of his work. 
 
In this latter regard, there are a number of factors that condition my interest in producing 
an account of Smith’s understanding of the individual and his concept of sympathy.  In 
the last chapter, I discussed some of the key Skinnerian ‘mythologies’ that surround his 
work: the mythologies of doctrine, coherence, prolepsis, and parochialism.  In turn, a 
consideration of these ideas showed that: Smith did not advocate a singular doctrine; it is 
necessary to move away from crude solutions to problems of consistency in his work; 
economistic readings of his specific ideas are to be avoided; and it is important to pay 
close attention to the linguistic context in which Smith wrote so as to avoid erroneously 
reading present-day theories and concepts back into his work.   
 
I suggest that collectively these points help to produce a more methodologically robust 
(in Skinnerian terms at least) interpretation of Smith.  In this chapter, however, I 
construct a reading of Smith that might be said to be more ontologically robust in that it 
more closely maps onto his intentions in writing his work.  In particular, I am primarily 
concerned with Smith’s conception of the individual, so although I use the Skinnerian 
principles outlined in the last chapter, I move away from dealing with issues of doctrine, 
coherence, prolepsis, and parochialism towards a more focused attempt at understanding 
his conception of the individual and his concept of sympathy in context.  I thus embark 
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on a careful direct examination of Smith’s texts suitably located in their socio-linguistic 
context.  
 
The chapter proceeds in three stages.  I first consider both Smith’s eighteenth-century 
context and his possible intellectual influences.  I look to answer questions such as: how 
did the context in which Smith wrote help to produce the meaning/significance of his 
ideas?  Which other moral philosophers was Smith engaged with in writing his political 
economy as moral philosophy?  This is essentially a Skinnerian attempt to locate Smith 
in his socio-linguistic context in order to gain a deeper understanding of his thought.  
Second, I consider some aspects of Smith’s work that might help shed light on his 
intervention into debates of his time.  In this section, I review both Smith’s ‘intentions’ 
and his ‘politics’, again understood in relation to his immediate socio-linguistic context.   
 
Finally, drawing on the contextual claims made in the first two sections, I give a more 
detailed account of Smith’s central concept of sympathy.  My attempt to give a thorough 
reading of Smith’s sympathy is based on my contention that it is vital to understanding 
his conception of the individual in which the economic cannot be divorced from the 
ethico-political.  I will further develop this idea in the next chapter as it provides a key 
way of conceiving of the individual in a distinctly contrasting way to the economistic 
understandings of market-oriented behaviour that prevail in many liberal perspectives 
today.  In essence, I contend that Smith’s sympathy procedure illustrates how ethics and 
politics might come to be interactively formed at the level of the individual, which in 
turn shows how the economic cannot truly be divorced from the ethico-political as 
contemporary liberal perspectives often hold. 
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I thus make some foundational claims about the relationship between Smith’s individual 
and the economistic understandings of market-oriented behaviour of today.  This is 
because a consideration of his thought in its social and linguistic context immediately 
brings forth some key ideas to consider on this point that are worthy of comment.  There 
is a preliminary point that makes this task especially important.  In the last chapter, I 
highlighted some of the problems related to a mythology of prolepsis (in the sense that 
Smith has often been erroneously read as the father of liberal economics as a political 
economy perspective on the social world); yet, in addition to this, I suggest in this 
chapter that Smith actually provides a very different understanding of market-oriented 
behaviour to that of contemporary liberal perspectives, even those that claim to be based 
on his work.  His concept of sympathy, properly historicised, provides a useful lens 
through which to examine economistic perspectives on market governance today.  
 
 
3.1 Smith’s individual in context 
 
Eighteenth-century commercial society 
Perhaps the most significant aspect to note of Smith’s time was its pre-industrial 
character.  It is easy to fall foul of a Skinnerian mythology of parochialism and overlook 
the fact that the supposed ‘father of capitalism’, when he was writing in the mid-to-late 
eighteenth-century, was living in and writing about a world that was only just starting to 
assume those features that would later be designated as ‘capitalist’.  Indeed it has been 
suggested that it was only in the last decade of the eighteenth-century or so that existing 
forms of economy and society in lowland Scotland started to break up under the changes 
brought about by industrial capitalism (Teichgraeber 1986: xvii).  In Smith’s (WN I.iv.1) 
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own terms, the ‘commercial society’ of his time is to be thought of as an outgrowth of an 
advancing level of the division of labour, not necessarily a particular mode of industrial 
production: 
 
When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a very 
small part of a man’s wants which the produce of his own labour can supply.  He 
supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the 
produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for 
such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he has occasion for.  Every 
man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the 
society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society.  
 
Thus, crucially, Smith’s ‘commercial society’ does not necessarily designate a society 
based on industrial capitalist relations of production and exchange.   
 
Yet, despite this fact, many commentators have pointed out that Smith does not seem to 
anticipate how radically economy and society would be transformed after the onset of 
the industrial revolution.  Along these lines, for example, Athol Fitzgibbons (1995: 11) 
points out that despite all its institutional detail, WN ‘did not mention power-driven 
methods of production, and it made almost no reference to the cotton industry, which 
was about to become the leading edge of British industrial growth’.  In fact Charles 
Kindleberger (1976: 1-6) makes the convincing case that as a ‘literary economist’, Smith 
did not have a thorough understanding of the industrial revolution, the onset of which 
many date to be contemporaneous with his writing of the WN, because he primarily 
drew his examples from books published in the first quarter of the eighteenth-century.  
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As such, ‘Smith’s discussion of the allocation, distribution, and the division of labour 
through the market’, he continues, ‘was largely related to what is now called “proto-
industrialization”, rather than the industrialization into large factories of the industrial 
revolution’ (Kindleberger 1976: 24).  Conceivably, then, the pre-industrial and pre-
capitalist nature of Smith’s time might for some present a key limiting factor on the 
extent to which it is possible to invoke his ideas in any meaningful sense in the 
industrial, or post-industrial, world of today.   
 
Nevertheless, from a pragmatic historiographical perspective (Chapter 1), the very 
notion that his ideas are in some sense ‘of another time’ and can only be understood 
through undertaking a historicised process of interpretation allows them to hold a certain 
promise.  They constitute different frames of understanding market-oriented behaviour 
compared to what would follow and thus an alternative mode of thought compared to the 
capitalist, and later economistic, individual.  Indeed, along these lines, Mary Morgan 
(2006: 2) argues that Smith’s ‘portrait’ of market-oriented behaviour acts ‘as a foil to 
give a sharper focus to the model man constructions that come in later economics’.   
 
In this regard, Smith’s insights might be particularly notable given that he was writing at 
exactly the time of the onset of important world-historical developments that he was one 
of the first to identify as the transition from a feudal to a commercial society.  As Jan 
Peil (1999: 49) suggests, the ‘commercialization and liberalization of society’ were 
leading moral philosophers of the time to alter their inquires in order to discuss moral 
problems from something of a ‘new economic point of view’ because it was now 
possible to give accounts of everyday people ‘successfully making an independent living 
outside the traditional constraints of the feudal hierarchy’.  This was in fact part of a new 
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focus on the ‘existence of increasingly institutionalised commercial relations … deemed 
to be symbolic of an economy capable of producing surplus’, which were understood ‘to 
require new political and moral structures in order to contain likely flashpoints’ (Watson 
2012: 10).  Within such structures, eighteenth-century moral philosophers tended to be 
interested in how ‘economic agents were required to embody new subjectivities, 
donning masks of politeness to guard against unseemly struggles over surplus and their 
associated ideologies of possessive individualism’ (Watson 2012: 10).    
 
The evolving nature of inquiries undertaken by moral philosophers at this time could be 
located within debates, discussed in the previous chapter, about whether Smith fits into a 
‘jurisprudential’ or a ‘civic humanist’ tradition.  Without attempting to locate Smith 
solely within one of these supposedly coherent traditions, I would merely make the 
comment that although he had a central concern for questions of justice as well, Smith 
pays close attention to questions about commercial society that seem to have distinctly 
civic humanist undertones.  Such questions were not new to Smith’s time, but they did 
take on new weight and meaning, especially with regard to the constitution of individual 
moral behaviour.  In particular, debates about the social desirability of wealth and 
commercial values were becoming highly relevant in eighteenth-century Britain because 
of the changes arising out of sustained economic growth that served to threaten 
traditional British social norms and culture (Fitzgibbons 1995: 12). 
 
In fact, Smith (TMS I.iii.3.1) sought to directly contribute to this conversation when he 
considered the double-edged nature of the admiration of the rich:  
 
 106 
This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and 
to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though 
necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order 
of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the 
corruption of our moral sentiments. 
 
Thus it is possible to suggest that, especially given the prominence of the concept of 
‘self-command’ in his work, the debates surrounding civic humanism in the latter half of 
the eighteenth-century were a powerful influence on Smith’s thought (Montes 2004: 57).  
At the very least, it means that Smith’s conception of the individual is likely to contain a 
specific concern for the cultivation of behaviour between people and groups that 
conforms to civil society.  Indeed, this process of cultivation is closely linked to his 
concept of sympathy as a generator of standards of interpersonal ethics at the individual 
level discussed below.  Moreover, such a conception is in direct contrast to the asocial 
individual of economistic understandings both of his work, often derived from an 
erroneous ‘economistic historiography’ (Chapter 2), and of liberal perspectives on 
market governance today. 
 
Hutcheson, Hume, and the Scottish Enlightenment 
Smith’s understanding of the individual was in many ways directly influenced by his 
immediate predecessors and by a number of other eminent moral philosophers writing at 
a similar time to him.  Notably, Francis Hutcheson plays an important role in the 
development of certain ideas that helped to set the terms of debate for moral 
philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment.  Principally Hutcheson’s notion of ‘moral 
sense’, which held that moral judgements were not primarily matters of reason or self-
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love as commonly supposed, was a key concept on which Smith and others could 
develop their views about individual moral behaviour (Teichgraeber 1986: 29-30).  
Richard Teichgraeber (1986: 36) compares Hutcheson’s moral sense argument to the 
idea that ‘moral judgements are products of a human faculty distinct from reason and 
analogous to the ordinary five senses’ such that people are ‘moved by certain feelings 
that in turn prompt judgements of approval or disapproval’.  Rather than in some way 
consciously deciding to approve or disapprove, for Hutcheson (2002: 175-176 emphasis 
in original), such moral judgements are the result of an instinctive sense: 
 
If one asks ‘how do we know that our Affections are right when they are kind?’  
What does the Word [right] mean?  Does it mean what we approve?  This we 
know by Consciousness of our Sense.  Again, how do we know that our Sense is 
right, or that we approve our Approbation?  … To answer this, we must first 
know that the same Constitution of our Sense shall always remain: And again, 
that we have applyed our selves carefully to consider the natural Tendency of our 
Actions.   
 
Hutcheson was himself perhaps indebted to John Locke for the way in which he adapted 
his understanding of the workings of the five senses to the human world.  As Locke had 
put forward the view that knowledge of the external natural world must have its origins 
in the working of our five senses, Hutcheson suggested that much the same was true of 
our moral senses.  He attempted to demonstrate that judgements regarding appropriate 
behaviour must also derive from the operation of a ‘sense’ that ‘instinctively comes into 
play when we observe the conduct of others’ (Teichgraeber 1986: 40).  Thus Hutcheson 
in many ways allowed Smith to move away from a ‘predetermined ideal vision’ of 
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appropriate individual behaviour towards a conception of what Teichgraeber (1986: 47) 
calls an ‘internal process’.  Certainly, this is supported in Smith’s (TMS VII.iii.3.6) 
claim: 
 
That faculty, which Mr. Locke calls reflection, and from which he derived the 
simple ideas of the different passions and emotions of the human mind, was, 
according to Dr. Hutcheson, a direct internal sense.  That faculty again by which 
we perceived the beauty or deformity, the virtue or vice of those different 
passions and emotions, was a reflex, internal sense. 
 
This had clear ramifications for Smith as will become apparent in my discussion of 
Smith’s internal device the ‘impartial spectator’ below.  Suffice it for now to say, if it is 
possible to identify an important conversation that Smith contributed to in response to 
lines of argument about moral sense, Hutcheson helped him to move away from those 
values and concepts articulated by natural law theorists towards a distinctly different 
interest in the role of sentiments, passions, and feelings in human conduct.  Such an 
interest is again in evident contrast to the almost un-feeling, un-sentimental as it were, 
economistic understanding of the individual in contemporary liberalism in which 
sentiments and passions, especially those of ethico-political nature, are expunged from 
rational economic man.   
 
In addition to Smith’s engagement with Hutcheson’s moral sense theory, David Hume 
represents a central Scottish Enlightenment figure who built on Hutcheson’s ideas and 
was in conversation with Smith on significant points.  As Teichgraeber (1986: 89) 
explains, Hume’s theory of justice can be ‘understood as an explanation of Hutcheson’s 
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account of non-rational psychology of moral judgement [turned] into a broader theory of 
social and political relationships among men’.  For Hume, building on Hutcheson, moral 
judgements could not be reduced to either self-love or reason, as moral judgement was 
more the outcome of certain sentiments that were distinct from both.  As Hume (1751: 8 
emphasis in original) writes:  
 
We shall consider the Matter as an Object of Experience.  We shall call every 
Quality or Action of the Mind, virtuous, which is attended with the general 
Approbation of Mankind: And we shall denominate vicious, every Quality, which 
is the Object of general Blame or Censure. 
 
Hume thus constructed a critical response to a key premise in existing natural law 
philosophy: rather than obligations directed by ‘right reason’, ethical and legal codes 
must be explained in terms of elementary passions and instincts (Teichgraeber 1986: 
101).    
 
On the one hand, there are important points of agreement between Hume and Smith.  As 
a ‘progressive’ philosopher in the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment sense, 
Hume saw a historic opportunity to establish society on ‘science’ as opposed to religious 
superstition.  In this light, Hume can be viewed as a thinker who contributed to a gradual 
move away from the idealist philosophy of the Greeks towards humanism and an image 
of society that ‘by rejecting religious superstition, would be enriched by trade and 
informed by science’ (Fitzgibbons 1995: 27).  Along these lines, it would appear that 
Smith followed Hume to the extent that he recognised the promise of Britain moving 
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away from ‘its medieval mire of backwardness and superstition’ (Fitzgibbons 1995: 29).  
For instance, Smith (TMS III.6.1) writes: 
 
Religion affords such strong motives to the practice of virtue, and guards us by 
such powerful restraints from the temptations of vice, that many have been led to 
suppose, that religious principles were the sole laudable motives of action … It 
may be a question, however, in what cases our actions ought to arise chiefly or 
entirely from a sense of duty, or from a regard to general rules; and in what cases 
some other sentiment or affection ought to concur, and have a principal 
influence. 
 
However, on the other hand, Smith disagreed with Hume’s view that this new society 
emerging in eighteenth-century Britain had to start from a sceptical rejection of all 
values.  Athol Fitzgibbons (1995: 15) argues that as ‘Hume’s scepticism effectively 
undercut the traditional rationalization for a moral and political élite, it further implied 
that there was no ultimate justification for any social rules at all’.  Smith countered this 
‘nihilistic version of liberal society’ by constructing arguments that rejected extreme 
scepticism (Fitzgibbons 1995: 15).  Essentially, Smith made the case that if Hume’s 
theory of morals and psychology involved reducing everything to ‘feelings and 
sensations’ then it is possible to turn science against Hume by suggesting that these very 
feelings and sensations themselves have to be explained (Fitzgibbons 1995: 93).   
 
Smith’s concept of sympathy is precisely a device for explaining these sensations.  
Indeed, although he held that imagined experience cannot be the same as that of 
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immediate experience, he suggests that it is possible to gain some kind of insight into the 
feelings and sensations of others through an imaginative procedure: 
 
Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our 
senses will never inform us of what he suffers.  They never did, and never can, 
carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can 
form any conception of what are his sensations.  Neither can that faculty help us 
to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we 
were in his case.  It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, 
which our imaginations copy.  By the imagination we place ourselves in his 
situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it 
were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and 
thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though 
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them (TMS I.i.1.2). 
 
It is possible to suggest that given that Smith’s sympathy is based on ideas about the 
operation of moral insight, there is a fundamental difference between Smith and Hume 
because the latter, for the large part, rejected the notion that there could even be moral 
insights of this kind (Fitzgibbons 1995: 21).   
 
Consequently, the radical separation between Hume and Smith has implications for the 
latter’s understanding of the individual.  Indeed Fitzgibbons (1995: 28-29) argues that 
‘Smith rejected every one of Hume’s major philosophical propositions, including utility, 
scepticism, the relativity of values, radical individualism, and the rigorous distinction 
between positive and normative ideas’.  Notably, Smith fervently rejected the ‘rational 
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utility maximiser’ who was Hume’s ‘alternative ideal to the ancient philosopher who 
had perceived the higher world through contemplation and the mind’ (Fitzgibbons 1995: 
52).  Smith rejected a theory of utility on a number of grounds.  For a start, as has been 
noted, he opposed the nihilism of Hume that such a theory seemed to imply; his 
understanding of the individual did not divorce the economic from the ethico-political.   
 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly for Smith, a theory of utility could not even 
provide a proper explanation of individual behaviour or sensations themselves.  In 
Smith’s eyes, although there may be a certain level of admiration attached to the 
apparent convenience of utility in terms of means fitting ends, there is no suggestion that 
it can be regarded as part of an explanation of behaviour and action.  Indeed there are 
comments made by Smith (TMS I.i.4.4) to suggest that the idea of utility is not much 
more than a post-hoc rationalisation of action: for instance, he calls such explanations 
‘plainly an after-thought’.  Referring to Hume directly, Smith (TMS IV.2.3) also writes:  
 
The same ingenious and agreeable author who first explained why utility pleases, 
has been so struck with this view of things, as to resolve our whole approbation 
of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from the 
appearance of utility.  No qualities of the mind, he observes, are approved of as 
virtuous, but such as are useful or agreeable either to the person himself or to 
others; and no qualities are disapproved of as vicious but such as have a contrary 
tendency … But still I affirm, that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness 
which is either the first or principal source of our approbation and 
disapprobation.  These sentiments are no doubt enhanced and enlivened by the 
perception of the beauty or deformity which results from this utility or 
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hurtfulness. But still, I say, they are originally and essentially different from this 
perception. 
 
In all, the intellectual relationship between Smith and Hume is complex with regards to 
their understanding of the individual.  There are clear points of agreement: both thinkers 
wrote in conversation with Hutcheson’s ideas about moral sense in order to move away 
from the idealist philosophy of the Greeks, and natural law philosophy, towards a 
humanism based on understanding feelings and sensations.  However, a key point of 
divergence turns on their response to this move.  For Hume, it led to scepticism and the 
adoption of a theory of utility.  For Smith, by contrast, there was still a role for moral 
insight, which required an understanding of moral judgement that went beyond the 
misleading concept of utility.  As such, I again note the stark contrast between the 
position that Smith took in conversation with his contemporaries and the importance that 
would later be attached to the concept of utility, albeit in a distinctly modified form, in 
later economistic understandings of market-oriented behaviour, and often erroneously 
imputed onto Smith himself.      
 
Rousseau, Mandeville, and self-love 
Alongside utility, contemporary economistic conceptions of the individual typically rely 
on some understanding of an individual’s pursuit of ‘self-interest’, narrowly understood.  
Concerning this subject, it is extremely telling to examine the relationship between 
Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Following Pierre Force (2003: 1), it is also important 
to note that the specific term ‘self-interest’ occurs only once in WN.  Incidentally, even 
this one single usage seems to be rather different to the common perception of what self-
interest means in Smith’s supposed ‘system’.  It appears in the context of a discussion 
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about education where Smith points to the problem of clergy members not being 
responsive to their students’ needs.  He writes: ‘In the church of Rome, the industry and 
zeal of the inferior clergy is kept more alive by the powerful motive of self-interest, than 
perhaps in any established protestant church’ (WN V.i.g.2).  Thus, this single use in WN 
does not really have anything to say about economic coordination and certainly does not 
suggest that the self-interest of one leads to the good of all. 
 
Rather than the term self-interest, in TMS as well, Smith makes much more use of the 
term ‘self-love’.  Crucially, for Force (2003: 1-2), self-love should be understood both as 
a term used by moral philosophers throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
carrying with it a specific tradition of thought and as the ‘translation of a technical term 
used by Renaissance humanists, philuatia’.  Thus, the meaning of self-love needs to be 
negotiated in the context of its philosophical lineage rather than simply translated into 
ideas about self-interest.  Interestingly rather than amour-propre, the French translation, 
Smith’s use of the term self-love appears to carry a meaning which is closer to 
Rousseau’s amour de soi: an instinct for self-preservation and immediate gratification in 
the Stoic sense, which in itself is ‘neither vicious nor virtuous’ (Force 2003: 42).  In this 
way, Smith’s (TMS II.ii.2.1) understanding of self-love refers to a basic care of oneself, 
which is not at odds with broader societal norms and values:   
 
Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own 
care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit 
and right that it should be so.  Every man, therefore, is much more deeply 
interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any 
other man … But though the ruin of our neighbour may affect us much less than 
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a very small misfortune of our own, we must not ruin him to prevent that small 
misfortune, nor even to prevent our own ruin.  We must, here, as in all other 
cases, view ourselves not so much according to that light in which we may 
naturally appear to ourselves, as according to that in which we naturally appear 
to others. 
 
In this Stoical sense, as opposed to a seemingly ruthless selfish or purely self-interested 
action, the understanding of self-love as a primary concern for oneself sheds a rather 
different light on Smith’s oft-cited, and almost always misinvoked, passage about the 
butcher, the brewer, and the baker.  In fact, the earlier part of the paragraph containing 
this line has one of his few mentions of self-love in the WN (as much of the discussion 
of self-love occurs in TMS).  It reveals that even though an individual’s most basic 
concern may simply be care for oneself, Smith’s (WN I.ii.2 emphasis added) stress on 
the interdependence and cooperative nature of people in society is still notable:  
 
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and is in vain 
for him to expect it from their benevolence only.  He will be more likely to 
prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for 
their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them … Give me that 
which I want, and you shall have this which you want. 
 
Samuel Fleischacker (2004: 91 emphasis in original) argues that the point of the butcher-
brewer-baker passage is that the butcher’s customer can appeal to someone else’s needs 
and thus, regardless of whether or not the butcher is self-interested, ‘the argument 
depends on the butcher’s customer being able to perceive, and address himself to, other 
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people’s interests’.  In this sense, rather than ‘an almost Ayn Randian exaltation of self-
love’, the passage emphasises the capacity to be ‘other-directed’ (Fleischacker 2004: 91 
emphasis in original).   
 
Stephen McKenna (2006: 134) also notes the other-directed intentions of the passage by 
drawing attention to the way in which immediately before and after in the text Smith is 
not discussing the subject of benevolence per se, but ‘discussing the centrality of 
persuasion as a means of achieving the cooperation necessary in a civil society’.  In 
support of this more linguistic reading of the passage he refers to how in his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence Smith argues that mankind’s commercial disposition is in fact founded on 
‘the natural inclination every one has to persuade’ (Smith cited in McKenna 2006: 134).  
On such an account, the idea that someone is ‘more likely to prevail if he can interest 
their self-love in his favour’ is understood through the prism of communicative action 
rather than physical action.  Either way, the passage should clearly be understood as 
making reference to ‘other-directed’ intentions. 
 
Moreover, as Fleischacker (2004: 90) further points out, in the butcher-brewer-baker 
passage, Smith would surely have used a less obvious example if he were attempting to 
show that people are always motivated by self-interest.  Smith could, for example, have 
used Mandeville’s suggestion that charitable actions are really motivated by self-interest, 
but because he does not want to advance this Mandevillian thesis he appeals to one of 
the paradigmatic ways in which most people already expect self-interest – or perhaps 
more accurately in Smith’s terms, self-love – to work (Fleischacker 2004: 90).   
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Nevertheless, others have sought to suggest that Smith worked with a 
‘compartmentalised’ understanding of human life such that people can occupy different 
roles in different areas of life (e.g. Otteson 2002: 193).  On this reading, the butcher-
brewer-baker passage in WN is an instance of Smith working on an assumption of self-
interest as the source of motivation, but in an arena of ‘specifically economic relations’ 
rather than implying that ‘all interactions between people should be predicated on self-
interest’ (Otteson 2002: 193).  While this interpretation serves to avoid a simplistic 
reduction of the account of motivation in such passages to pure self-interest, I suggest 
that read alongside Smith’s account of self-love and in the context of his response to 
Mandeville, a rather different understanding can be discerned which does not 
‘compartmentalise’ in this way.   
 
In fact a notable point of convergence between Smith and Rousseau is that they both felt 
compelled to write in response to Mandeville’s work on what might be termed ‘the 
interest doctrine’, or alternatively ‘the selfish hypothesis’, which was also associated 
with the Epicurean/Augustinian tradition (Force 2003: 43).  Mandeville’s (1732: 39) 
distinctly self-interested understanding of human nature might be summed up in his 
statement that: 
 
Man is so Selfish a Creature, that, whilst he is at Liberty, the greatest Part of his 
Time will always be bestow’d upon himself … It is obvious likewise, that he 
neither loves nor esteems any Thing so well as he does his own Individual; and 
that there is Nothing, which he has so constantly before his Eyes, as his own dear 
Self. 
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The key idea of the interest doctrine was that self-interest could act as a general 
explanatory principle for all human behaviour and action.  Yet although Smith and 
Rousseau essentially disagree with the interest doctrine, rather than simple censure, they 
argue ad hominem by agreeing with Mandeville as a starting point in order to refute him 
(Force 2003: 43).  On the one hand, their response to Mandeville consists in 
acknowledging that the description of human behaviour in the interest doctrine appears 
in many ways to be accurate.  Smith (TMS VII.ii.4.6) writes:  
 
Though the notions of this author [Mandeville] are in almost every respect 
erroneous, there are, however, some appearances in human nature, which, when 
viewed in a certain manner, seem at first sight to favour them. 
 
To be sure, Smith and Rousseau agree with Mandeville (1988: 64) to the extent that ‘the 
true Object of Pride or Vain-glory is the Opinion of others’ and this concern for the 
opinion of others drives most of what people do in society.  
 
On the other hand, though, both Smith and Rousseau are highly suspicious of a theory of 
behaviour such as the interest doctrine that at least appears to claim to explain all human 
action (Force 2003: 261; Otteson 2002: 193).  Indeed Smith (TMS VII.ii.4.12) is deeply 
critical of Mandeville on this point:  
 
It is the great fallacy of Dr. Mandeville’s book to represent every passion as 
wholly vicious, which is so in any degree and in any direction.  It is thus that he 
treats every thing as vanity which has any reference, either to what are, or to 
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what ought to be the sentiments of others: and it is by means of this sophistry, 
that he establishes his favourite conclusion, that private vices are public benefits.  
 
By way of response, both Smith’s and Rousseau’s reply to Mandeville is at once 
psychological and historical.  For Rousseau, people in a commercial society tend to be 
driven by amour-propre, ‘a passion that has little to do with natural selfishness, and 
much to do with reason, reflection, and our ability to identify with the feelings of others’ 
(Force 2003: 261).  For Smith, in commercial society vanity takes centre stage, ‘a 
passion that does not originate in self-love (in the Stoic sense of concern for one’s 
preservation) but rather in sympathy and the desire for sympathy’ (Force 2003: 261).  
Thus for Smith and Rousseau, people in commercial society do not continually pursue 
the satisfaction of material wants as ends in themselves as the interest doctrine might 
suggest.  Rather, individuals are seemingly driven by amour-propre or vanity, as they 
increasingly become predominant in commercial society, to ‘seek wealth and material 
goods only as a means towards an infinitely more elusive goal: praise and approbation 
from others’ (Force 2003: 45).   
 
Indeed Smith (TMS III.4.7) views the constant drive to impress upon the opinion of 
others in the following way: 
 
Our continual observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form 
to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be 
done or to be avoided.  Some of their actions shock all our natural sentiments.  
We hear every body about us express the like detestation against them.  This still 
further confirms, and even exasperates our natural sense of their deformity.  It 
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satisfies us that we view them in the proper light, when we see other people view 
them in the same light … Other actions, on the contrary, call forth our 
approbation, and we hear every body around us express the same favourable 
opinion concerning them.  Every body is eager to honour and reward them.  They 
excite all those sentiments for which we have by nature the strongest desire; the 
love, the gratitude, the admiration of mankind.  We become ambitious of 
performing the like; and thus naturally lay down to ourselves a rule of another 
kind, that every opportunity of acting in this manner is carefully to be sought 
after. 
 
A crucial part of Smith’s response to Mandeville therefore shows remarkable similarities 
to that of Rousseau, rightfully understood as one of the fiercest critics of commercial 
society.  In fact, Smith provides a laudatory account of Rousseau’s work in his ‘Letter to 
The Edinburgh Review’ which reveals something of the proximity of their perspectives.  
In his review, Smith actually gives Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality as an example of 
one of the reasons why the coverage of the periodical should be extended to include 
more works from the Continent (Rasmussen 2008: 59-60).  Smith (1980b: 250) writes: 
 
Whoever reads this last work [Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality] with 
attention, will observe, that the second volume of the Fable of the Bees has given 
occasion to the system of Mr. Rousseau, in whom however the principles of the 
English author are softened, improved, and embellished, and stript of all that 
tendency to corruption and licentiousness which has disgraced them in their 
original author.   
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The notable implication of this proximity for an understanding of Smith’s individual is 
that, as with Rousseau, he clearly rejected the interest doctrine as holding any significant 
promise in terms of understanding individual behaviour and action.  Likewise, as with 
Rousseau, Smith saw the historically conditioned nature of behaviour in his argument 
that it is essentially the development of ‘vanity’ as a driving motive, rather than naturally 
ingrained self-interest, which influences people in commercial society.  As Force (2003: 
47) surmises: 
 
When authors like Hirschman or Sen propose to discard the theoretical 
parsimony advocated by their fellow economists, they follow the path opened by 
Rousseau and Smith, who both believed that the ‘selfish hypothesis’ was too 
clever to be truth, and proposed systems based on principles other than self-
interest.  On the other hand, we have seen that Rousseau and Smith shared 
another belief: although it is true that the ‘selfish hypothesis’ cannot explain 
human nature, human behavior in civilized society can be described in very large 
part as a search for wealth and material goods.  In other words, the ultimate goal 
of economic activity is something symbolic and intangible: approbation from 
others.  At the same time, for historical reasons, the search for praise and 
approbation now manifests itself almost exclusively as a search for wealth. 
 
This picks up on the way in which both Smith and Rousseau understood economic 
agency to be a ‘historicised phenomenon’ (Watson 2012: 16).  In both of their accounts, 
the ‘individual does not reflect any transcendent behavioural principle when making 
economic decisions, but instead allows the cultural norms of the surrounding society to 
influence choices about appropriate conduct.  The interaction between the individual and 
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a structured system of manners is therefore inescapable, because such systems become 
the backdrop at any given moment to all ideas about proper and improper action’ 
(Watson 2012: 16).  Significantly, any degree of recognition on Smith’s behalf of the 
historically and socially conditioned nature of economic agency seems to be in direct 
contrast to those later economistic understandings of market-oriented behaviour which, 
building on the premises of the interest doctrine, are noticeably ahistorical.  
 
Furthermore, there are also similarities between Rousseau’s analysis of ‘pity’ and 
Smith’s account of sympathy which both take Mandeville’s description of pity as an 
important starting point.  For Rousseau pity ‘is a pre-rational faculty, made weaker by 
the full use of human reason’ (Force 2003: 27).  Building on Mandeville, François de La 
Rochefoucauld, and Shaftesbury, the key ‘innovation’ that Rousseau made was to base 
pity on his concept of ‘identification’: the process by which people put themselves 
imaginatively ‘in the place of the person who is suffering’ (Force 2003: 25; 31).  
Rousseau (1997: 153) writes: 
 
[B]enevolence and friendship, properly understood, are the products of a steady 
pity focused on a particular object … commiseration is nothing but a sentiment 
that puts us in the place of him who suffers … Indeed commiseration will be all 
the more energetic in proportion as the Onlooking animal identifies more 
intimately with the suffering animal. 
 
As will become clear, there are striking similarities between Rousseau’s ‘identification’ 
and Smith’s sympathy.  Yet, at this point, it is worth considering one of Smith’s key 
statements regarding his thoughts on sympathy and self-love as it reveals something of 
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the nature of his rejection of Mandeville and his proximity to Rousseau.  Smith (TMS 
VII.iii.1.4 emphasis added) writes: 
 
Sympathy, however, cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle.  
When I sympathize with your sorrow or your indignation, it may be pretended, 
indeed, that my emotion is founded in self-love, because it arises from bringing 
your case home to myself, from putting myself in your situation, and thence 
conceiving what I should feel in the like circumstances.  But though sympathy is 
very properly said to arise from an imaginary change of situations with the 
person principally concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to 
happen to me in my own person and character, but in that of the person with 
whom I sympathize.  When I condole with you for the loss of your only son, in 
order to enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a 
character and profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son was 
unfortunately to die: but I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I 
not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters.  
My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my 
own.  It is not, therefore, in the least selfish … That whole account of human 
nature, however, which deduces all sentiments and affections from self-love, 
which has made so much noise in the world, but which, as far as I know, has 
never yet been fully and distinctly explained, seems to me to have arisen from 
some confused misapprehension of the system of sympathy. 
 
In all, as this passage attests, a focus on the relationship between Smith and Rousseau 
highlights their remarkably similar engagement with concepts relating to questions of 
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individual behaviour, action, and suffering.  Their common response to Mandeville and 
their specific interpretation of self-love provides a cutting critique of the interest 
doctrine and those later perspectives that build upon its premises.  As Vivienne Brown 
(1994: 99) points out, Smith uses a distinctly Stoic understanding of self-love in TMS 
which means it is ‘hazardous’ to read it in search of moral categories that can be used as 
validating devices for the economic development of a commercial society.  The irony, of 
course, is that in holding up Smith as its intellectual forebear, the economistic 
understanding of the individual in many contemporary liberal perspectives takes as its 
first principle the interest doctrine, or the ‘selfish hypothesis’, which originated in its 
current form largely in Mandeville, who Smith and Rousseau were in fact adamantly 
refuting in their work.  Certainly, those readings of Smith in IPE which largely depend 
on an economistic historiography of his work (Chapter 2), in making claims like ‘self-
interest leads as if by an invisible hand to the good of society’ are actually exposing a 
doctrine much closer to Mandeville than Smith.  Rather ironically, Smith (TMS III.2.27) 
was incredibly critical of the interest doctrine and, in his terms, considered Mandeville a 
‘splenetic’ philosopher.  
 
 
3.2 Smith’s intervention 
 
Smith’s ‘intentions’ 
According to Fitzgibbons (1995: 193), rather than present an interest-based account of 
liberalism, the primary aim of Smith’s work appears to revolve around offering a new 
moral insight into early liberalism and the notion ‘that a liberal society need not be 
undermined by its own lack of values’.  As such, many have pointed to the ways in 
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which Smith seems to have had the intention of providing liberalism with a ‘workable 
moral foundation’ and not just in his TMS, but in WN as well (Fitzgibbons 1995: v).  
Yet, as mentioned above, the suggestion is often made that Smith must have in some 
sense ‘compartmentalised’ his ‘ethics’ and his ‘economics’ (e.g. Otteson 2002: 193).  On 
this argument, his thoughts on self-love in commercial society and his virtue ethics 
appear to apply to two separate spheres: ‘the sphere of what actually happens and the 
sphere of what should be’ (Fitzgibbons 1995: 3).   
 
However, in response to these accounts, Fitzgibbons (1995: 4 emphasis in original) 
convincingly suggests that ‘the more intriguing possibility is that Smith wanted to 
integrate economics and morals, by developing a philosophy that would harness the 
force of self-love without being dominated by it’.  This line of interpretation would seem 
more historically accurate given the intellectual context in which he was writing as 
outlined above.  As Smith built on the thought of Hutcheson and Hume, he saw himself 
as working within the framework of their ‘highest ambitions’, which were to contribute 
to moral philosophy as broadly conceived in both its classical humanist and natural law 
senses (Teichgraeber 1986: 122).   
 
Crucially, though, it is necessary to proceed with caution when attempting to give a 
complete account of Smith’s overall intentions in writing his work.  Jerry Evensky is 
particularly illuminating on this issue.  In essence, Evensky (1987: 175-176) suggests 
that there are ‘two voices’ in which Smith writes: Smith as moral philosopher on the one 
hand and Smith as historian, contemporary observer, and social critic on the other.  In 
the former, ‘Smith sees the world as the Design of the Deity, a perfectly harmonious 
system reflecting the perfection of its designer’ (Evensky 1987: 176).  In the latter, by 
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contrast, Smith sees the world not in the Design of an ideal vision because ‘human 
frailty leads to distortions in the Deity’s Design’ (Evensky 1987: 176).  For Evensky 
(1987: 184), then, Smith intentionally makes a clear distinction between an ‘ideal world’ 
of the Design and the ‘real world’ for which he offers a ‘practical-prescriptive 
perspective’.  What is particularly worthy of note is that there may be an alteration in 
Smith’s approach concerning this distinction as his thought developed over time.  Indeed 
Evensky (1989: 378) suggests that ‘in Smith’s early work his moral philosophical voice 
represented humankind as evolving in spite of its flaws toward an approximation of an 
ideal society’.  By contrast, in his later work, Smith ‘took on the new role of social 
critic’ as he realised that the power of factions and monopolies were not just historical 
artefacts, but actually continuously detrimental to the progress of commerce (Evensky 
1989: 379).  
 
I do not wish to impose on Smith a level of consistency that is unwarranted, nor do I 
want to suggest that he ought to be criticised if his thoughts altered due to the adoption 
of a different ‘voice’ over time.  Of course to do so would be to fall foul of Skinner’s 
mythology of coherence (Chapter 2) and might involve discounting parts of Smith’s 
work for no good reason.  What is more interesting from the perspective of recovering 
Smith’s understanding of the individual is that if it is possible to identify a shift in his 
thought, or simply the presence of two voices in his work, his conception of the 
individual moral agent might not be completely unified and constant either.  If Smith 
was operating as both a moral philosopher and as a social critic as Evensky suggests, he 
may have included a level of malleability into his conception of the individual which 
depended on historical circumstance, or, in other words, on the particular social rules 
and values of the society to which he referred.  In fact, Smith (TMS III.4.11) writes: 
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When these general rules [formed through attempting to impress upon the 
opinion of others], indeed, have been formed, when they are universally 
acknowledged and established, by the concurring sentiments of mankind, we 
frequently appeal to them as to the standards of judgment, in debating concerning 
the degree of praise or blame that is due to certain actions of a complicated and 
dubious nature.  They are upon these occasions commonly cited as the ultimate 
foundations of what is just and unjust in human conduct; and this circumstance 
seems to have misled several very eminent authors, to draw up their systems in 
such a manner, as if they had supposed that the original judgments of mankind 
with regard to right and wrong, were formed like the decisions of a court of 
judicatory, by considering first the general rule, and then, secondly, whether the 
particular action under consideration fell properly within its comprehension. 
 
This has important implications for considering individual behaviour as the outcome of a 
(sympathetic) procedure that takes place in society, which I later discuss, as opposed to a 
transcendental standard of moral judgement.  As Smith (TMS VII.iv.6) himself writes, 
ethics is ‘a science which … does not admit of the most accurate precision’.  This leads 
Vivienne Brown (1994: 75 emphasis added) to make the interesting point that in TMS 
Smith’s ‘ideal moral agent … is not the unified, integral moral agent such as we see in 
the case of the ideal Stoic man, the “fully furnished and completed being” of the 
monologic hero, but in some respects is a more fractured and struggling moral being’.  
This is a point to which I return for it hints at how Smith’s individual might be 
understood as a site at which judgement and standards of ethics come to be interactively 
formed and contested. 
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Smith’s ‘politics’ 
An attempt to get a firmer grasp of Smith’s intentions does not become that much more 
straightforward by considering his ‘politics’ in the narrow sense of the term.  Yet, as 
Donald Winch’s (1978) Adam Smith’s Politics shows, a consideration of his thought 
along these lines can be very revealing in terms of locating it in its linguistic and 
historical context.  Winch (1978: 141) claims that Smith’s many criticisms of all 
‘interest groups’ in society make it extremely difficult to categorise his politics: he could 
be construed as anything from a ‘nostalgic Tory’ to ‘a pioneer theorist of labour 
exploitation along Marxian lines’.  Indeed, as Fitzgibbons (1995: 70) points out, it is 
possible to identify Smith as a ‘revolutionary’, but the issue with this is that at his time 
‘collectivism was a right-wing doctrine that favoured the social and religious power 
structure, whereas liberalism meant subverting that structure and introducing radical 
social change’.  In any case, for Winch (1978: 142), one must not, as many economists 
and historians of economic thought tend to do, place meanings developed in the 
nineteenth-century and after to the less familiar eighteenth-century concepts that make 
up Smith’s system.   
 
Striking examples of this kind can be discerned in Michael Fry’s (1992) edited 
collection Adam Smith’s Legacy: His Place in the Development of Modern Economics, 
which contains a significant number of Nobel Laureates in Economics reflecting on the 
‘relevance’ of Smith to modern economics to mark the bicentenary of his death.  For 
instance, Paul Samuelson attempts to ‘test’ the ‘findings’ of the classical political 
economists ‘with the aid of modern techniques’ and discovers that Smith emerges with 
‘flying colours’; Richard Stone writes about Smith’s ideas on ‘public economic policy 
and its limits’, claimed to be a ‘subject of self-evident interest even two hundred years 
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later’; and James Tobin sets out ‘to trace the presence or otherwise of the invisible hand 
in modern macroeconomics’ (Fry 1992: xi-xiii).  In light of a Skinnerian perspective 
(Chapter 1), the general tone of this whole collection as a celebration of Smith as the 
founder of modern economics appears to submit to a mythology of prolepsis.  More 
problematically, picking up on Winch’s critique, these contributions tend to fall foul of a 
mythology of parochialism in the sense that they engage in a process of historical 
foreshortening whereby ideas and concepts are deemed applicable to the contemporary 
world at the expense of historicised meaning. 
 
Winch (1978: 23) further identifies the problem that there is apparent ‘underlying 
agreement’ about situating Smith’s politics into arguments about an emerging ‘liberal 
capitalist context’.  This interpretation of Smith’s politics locates him as part of ‘a much 
larger story in which the strength and autonomy of a socio-economic realm variously 
threatens, limits, or deflects the realm of the political’ (Winch 1978: 23).  However, in 
response to this line of thinking, Winch’s (1978: 26) central argument is that Smith’s 
style of political analysis cannot be located within the language and categories of the 
liberal capitalist perspective.  Indeed, on his reading, Smith’s politics is far more 
‘problematic that it has been made to appear’ (Winch 1978: 26).  Most firmly, Winch 
(1978: 180-181) suggests that: 
  
Smith did not advocate the establishment of a particular economic order called 
capitalism; nor did he prize what he set out to analyse, namely commercial 
society, for the sake of its benefits in the form of democratic freedoms.   
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In many ways, perhaps the value of Winch’s work comes from the way in which he 
demonstrates exactly who and what Adam Smith was not.  At the very least, he shows 
that it is possible to read into Smith’s politics elements of a number of political positions 
(Winch 1978: 182).  Yet, in doing so, Winch also serves to distance Smith from those 
interpretations of him which suggest that he was essentially arguing for a capitalist 
system as part of a larger liberal capitalist or bourgeois ‘tradition’ of thought.   
 
On Winch’s (1978: 184) reading, there is a significant gulf between Smith’s intellectual 
enterprise and those who are commonly regarded as his successors: put simply, there is 
not an unbroken tradition of liberalism, or bourgeois ideology, stretching from Locke 
through Smith and Hume to John Stuart Mill and on to present-day economic science.  
What is important for my consideration of Smith’s understanding of the individual in 
this regard is that this distances him from any form of Benthamite utilitarianism.  Such a 
position would ignore Smith’s understanding of the individual and his conception of 
sympathy, which do not divorce the economic from the ethico-political.  This helps to 
indicate what Smith clearly does not stand for, while the final section of this chapter 
presents a more constructive image of his concept of ‘sympathy’. 
 
 
3.3 Smith’s concept of sympathy 
 
Understanding sympathy 
Building on the account of Smith’s linguistic context and his intentions in writing given 
above, I now focus on his understanding of the individual in a more direct sense.  
Principally, the key concept to consider is his notion of sympathy.  In many ways, 
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Smith’s use of the term is a reinterpretation of existing uses by his immediate 
predecessors.  In particular, it relates to a transformation of Hutcheson’s ideas about 
moral sense as a mechanism of approbation and disapprobation to a wider theory 
concerning the individual in society (Peil 1999: 58).  In Hutcheson’s (2002: 178 
emphasis in original) terms: 
 
If any say, ‘this moral Sense is not a Rule:’ What means that Word? It is not a 
strait rigid Body: It is not a general Proposition, shewing what Means are fit to 
obtain an end: It is not a Proposition, asserting, that a Superior will make those 
happy who act one way, and miserable who act the contrary way.  If these be the 
Meanings of Rule, it is no Rule; yet by reflecting upon it our Understanding may 
find out a Rule.  But what Rule of Actions can be formed, without Relation to 
some End proposed?  Or what End can be proposed, without presupposing 
Instincts, Desires, Affections, or a moral Sense, it will not be easy to explain. 
 
In many ways Hutcheson uses a ‘traditional’ conception of sympathy, which is based on 
a medical account in which it is a sort of ‘emotional contagion, whereby the feelings of 
one individual are transmitted to others’ (Force 2003: 31).  By contrast, Smith thought 
that people cannot directly access the feelings of others in this way, so he placed a 
greater emphasis on the role of a ‘mental representation of what others are feeling’ 
(Force 2003: 31).  Thus Smith moved the concept of sympathy away from an almost 
chance ‘contagion’ of feeling, as in Hutcheson, towards a conception of a more active, 
process-driven mechanism involving the mental representation of another’s position and 
circumstance.  As Smith (TMS I.i.1.2 emphasis added) writes, ‘it is by the imagination 
only that we can form any conception of what are [another person’s] sensations’. 
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It has also been suggested that Smith’s use of the concept of sympathy is ‘significantly 
more complex than the analogical inference Hume had posited’ (Teichgraeber 1986: 
135).  Indeed in Hume’s (1751: 144) understanding, sympathy appears to be a more 
straightforward sharing of sentiment: 
 
From this Influence of Cheerfulness, both to communicate itself, and to engage 
Approbation, we may perceive that there are another Set of Virtues, which, 
without any Utility or any Tendency to farther Good, either of the Community or 
of the Possessor, diffuse a Satisfaction on the Beholders, and conciliate 
Friendship and Regard.  Their immediate Sensation, to the Person possessed of 
them, is agreeable.  Others enter into the same Humour, and catch the Sentiment, 
by a Contagion or natural Sympathy: And as we cannot forbear loving whatever 
pleases, a kindly Emotion arises towards the Person who communicates so much 
Delight and Satisfaction. 
 
One way to understand this altering of Hume’s understanding is to consider that rather 
than as the starting point of moral judgement, Smith saw sympathy as ‘its very essence’ 
(Teichgraeber 1986: 135).  For Smith, an expression of sympathy is not only to respond 
to a particular situation (in Hutcheson’s sense) but also, and more significantly, to enter 
a process of judging what passions and feelings ought to be in play in that given 
situation.  What this means, and what is not straightforward to appreciate from a present-
day perspective, is that for Smith sympathy is not limited to pity and compassion for the 
misfortune of others (Peil 1999: 84).  Rather, it has a wider meaning expressing the 
possibility of fellow-feeling with any sentiment (TMS I.i.1.5). 
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In this sense, the contemporary reader might understand Smith’s sympathy as something 
closer to the term ‘empathy’ or Rousseau’s ‘identification’ highlighted above.  As Luc 
Boltanski (2004: 37 emphasis in original) points out:  
 
With this premise Smith places himself in the current of Scottish moral 
philosophy which, in reaction against anthropologies based on selfish interest, 
especially those of Hobbes and Mandeville, and also in seeking to overcome 
interpretations of Lockean sensualism which lead towards sceptical subjectivism, 
makes the ‘moral sense’ (Shaftesbury) a ‘faculty of the human mind’ 
(Hutcheson).  Sympathy is the natural faculty without which an individual could 
not know or be interested in someone else. 
 
In addition, it is also crucial to recognise that Smith’s sympathy does not refer to 
specific ‘motives’ of behaviour or action: the fellow-feeling expressed in the term is of a 
different kind to concepts such as altruism or egoism.  By contrast, it is a great deal 
closer to the ‘intersubjective grounds’ on which assessments of behaviour and action are 
considered in terms of ideas about benevolence, prudence, justice, self-control, and so 
on (Peil 1999: 59).  Indeed the intersubjective nature of sympathy is made clear by 
Smith (TMS II.ii.2.1) when he emphasises the dynamics of the relationship between a 
concern for oneself and a concern for others:  
 
There can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour, there can be no 
incitement to do evil to another, which mankind will go along with, except just 
indignation for evil which that other has done to us.  To disturb his happiness 
merely because it stands in the way of our own, to take from him what is of real 
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use to him merely because it may be of equal or of more use to us, or to indulge, 
in this manner, at the expence of other people, the natural preference which every 
man has for his own happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial 
spectator can go along with.   
 
Thus, from the onset, I note that Smith’s sympathy seems to contain built into it 
recognition of the interactivity between a concern for oneself and a concern for others.  
In other words, Smith views sympathy as a potential principle in people that ‘fosters a 
continuous relationship between spectators and agents, a natural interdependence among 
social beings … [It] not only accounts for moral judgement, but more importantly 
perhaps, it influences human behaviour ex ante’ (Montes 2004: 55).  Another way of 
expressing this is that Smith provides an account of the ‘macro-foundations of 
microeconomics’ (Vaggi 2004: 27).  People tend to be guided and constrained by a 
particular social or macro-structure such that, in certain important ways, ‘rules and 
norms of human conduct derive’ from society (Vaggi 2004: 27).  This relationship might 
be understood as an interactive process between the individual, on the one hand, and 
broader social groups and systems, on the other, in which sympathy comes to generate 
both a matrix of judgement and standards of ethics at the individual level. 
 
The individual in society 
That sympathy can be understood as an interactive process also highlights the way in 
which Smith conceived of the individual not in an atomistic sense, but as an individual 
in society.  According to Andrew Skinner (1996: 59 emphasis added), in TMS, ‘Smith’s 
argument is in large measure designed to explain the manner in which we form 
judgements as to the propriety or merit of actions taken by ourselves or others, and that 
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such judgements always have a “social” reference’.  On Smith’s account, then, ‘man 
experiences himself as an individual in relation to society’ and, at the same time, 
‘society itself is experienced as a whole comprised of social processes which – by means 
of social values and rules – give sense, meaning and guidance to the feelings, thoughts, 
and behaviour and actions of its individual members’ (Peil 1999: 58).  From this 
sympathy perspective, the individual and society in some sense presuppose each other as 
individuals experience and understand themselves only against a background of 
interaction with other people and society more generally (Peil 1999: 64).   
 
However, an important question this begs is where the boundaries of any particular 
society lie: who is to be included and excluded?  For Smith, on the one hand, there is 
clearly a sense that a person’s sympathy can only extend so far because there are certain 
‘distance-decay’ dynamics that limit people’s ability to sympathise with others.  Smith 
writes (TMS III.3.4): 
 
Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, 
was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of 
humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, 
would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity.  He 
would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune 
of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the 
precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which 
could thus be annihilated in a moment.  He would too, perhaps, if he was a man 
of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this 
disaster might produce upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business 
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of the world in general.  And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all 
these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his 
business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and 
tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened.  The most frivolous disaster 
which could befal himself would occasion a more real disturbance.  If he was to 
lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he 
never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a 
hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense multitude 
seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his 
own.   
 
On the other hand, though, as this passage continues, Smith (TMS III.3.4) seems to hold 
out great hope for the ‘impartial spectator’ – a key part of the sympathy procedure 
discussed below – in extending the scope of sympathy: 
 
To prevent, therefore, this paltry misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity 
be willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren, provided he 
had never seen them?  Human nature startles with horror at the thought, and the 
world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as 
could be capable of entertaining it.  But what makes this difference?  When our 
passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our 
active principles should often be so generous and so noble?  When we are always 
so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves, than by whatever 
concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, 
and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests 
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of others? …  It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the 
man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct.  It is he who, whenever 
we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a 
voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are 
but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when 
we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the 
proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration.  It is from him only 
that we learn the real littleness of ourselves, and of whatever relates to ourselves, 
and the natural misrepresentations of self-love can be corrected only by the eye 
of this impartial spectator. 
 
On first glance, there thus appears to be no reason why sympathy is always limited to 
within a particular community for Smith: it could potentially be global in reach.  Yet 
such a suggestion contradicts Russell Nieli’s (1986: 622) ‘spheres of intimacy’ 
argument, which shows, through reference to Smith’s own texts, that the ‘outermost 
circle with which a person is connected, according to Smith, is the sphere of his nation-
state’.  The key part of the passage Nieli refers to is when he writes: 
 
The state or sovereignty in which we have been born and educated, and under the 
protection of which we continue to live, is in ordinary cases, the greatest society 
upon whose happiness or misery, our good or bad conduct can have much 
influence (TMS VI.ii.2.1). 
 
For Nieli (1986: 623), Smith’s position is that it is ‘useless’ for someone to be concerned 
with others outside the nation-state as ‘they are both physically and emotionally at a 
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great distance from one’s own life … and one cannot naturally sympathize with such 
people to the same degree that one can with people within one’s own sphere of action’.  
Nieli (1986: 623) rightly recognises that Smith was writing ‘at a time when 
communications and transportation were considerably different from what they are 
today’ – and it is indeed important not to read him out of context.  However, the real 
crux of the issue appears not to be national borders or identities as such, but the ability to 
have (and comprehend having) an ‘influence’ upon the lives of others. The key 
restriction, then, is always knowing about others’ actions, circumstance, or suffering: 
people are simply more likely to share sympathetic moments with those with whom they 
have more frequent interaction.  Yet arguably this does not necessarily exclude an 
expansion of knowing others because in Smith, as in Hume, ‘distance is overcome by a 
deliberate act of imagination’ (Boltanski 2004: 38).  Indeed, Boltanski (2004: 49) claims 
that it is this very ‘possibility of accounting for a sympathy which can overcome the 
obstacle of distance’ that leads Smith to use his Chinese earthquake example. 
 
Furthermore, according to Boltanski (2004: 37), the imaginative act on behalf of what he 
frequently referred to interchangeably as a ‘bystander’ and ‘spectator’ suggests that:  
  
Smith did not seek to emphasise the tension between a necessarily local face to 
face encounter, as in the figure of compassion, and the conveyance over distance 
of a representation of suffering that is required by a general politics of pity, as if 
the second figure could be directly derived, smoothly and uninterruptedly, by 
extension of the first. 
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Particularly relevant here is the idea that individual behaviour and social processes are 
understood to be governed by meanings and values that are generated and observed by 
people as part of a longing for what Smith terms ‘mutual sympathy’.  In his section ‘Of 
the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy’, Smith (TMS I.i.2.1) writes about this in terms of the 
potential pleasure to be derived from ‘fellowfeeling’, the tendency in people to feel 
pleased when they come to share a particular judgement.  In a sense, then, mutual 
sympathy refers to ‘the metaphor through which Smith expresses his fundamental belief 
that our feelings, thoughts and behaviour are related to an intersubjectively based 
framework of rules and values’ (Peil 1999: 88 emphasis added).  In his own words, 
Smith (TMS II.ii.2.1) is clear about the process through which rules and values are 
socially constructed among individuals in society: 
 
Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, 
naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the 
face, and avow that he acts according to this principle.  He feels that in this 
preference they can never go along with him, and that how natural soever it may 
be to him, it must always appear excessive and extravagant to them.  When he 
views himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he 
sees that to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other 
in it.  If he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into the 
principles of his conduct, which is what of all things he has the greatest desire to 
do, he must, upon this, as upon all other occasions, humble the arrogance of his 
self-love, and bring it down to something which other men can go along with. 
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For Smith, then, ‘[s]ympathy forms the foundation of moral judgement by devising 
criteria of acceptable action after repeated similar observations and after determination 
of community judgement’ (Weinstein 2006: 86).  In this sense, Smith’s sympathy is very 
much ‘dependent on context’ while being both ‘contextual and perspectival’ – it is a 
‘constant balancing act between self-knowledge and knowledge of others’ (Weinstein 
2006: 86).   
 
Moreover, it is possible to suggest that for Smith, given the way in which he understands 
sympathy to operate as part of a process by which individuals judge their own behaviour 
and that of others, the rules and values that govern any particular society are subject to 
contestation and subject to change over time.  If a process of socialisation is taken 
seriously in this way, behaviour is ultimately understood to be changeable according to 
specific historical situation: ‘man is not an invariant element of nature, a stylised “agent” 
with a predetermined and constant behaviour’ (Vaggi 2004: 31).  Along these lines, Peil 
(1999: 63 emphasis in original) suggests that Smith’s understanding of sympathy allows 
for ethico-political concepts such as moral behaviour or social justice to have a meaning 
and content that ‘changes with the ages and periods of society’.  This is also emphasised 
by Vivienne Brown (1994: 37) who suggests that for Smith moral discourse is very 
much part of ‘social discourse’ because ‘it is learnt as part of social life and it partakes 
of the same motivations and forms of persuasion that constitute the socialised 
communication of everyday life’.  Again, this is in stark contrast to the economistic idea 
of behaviour and action as governed by certain fundamental causal laws.  Sympathy 
illustrates how ethics and politics might come to be interactively formed between the 
individual and the broader social system; yet, rather than being fixed, this interaction is 
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an on-going process of generating a matrix of judgement and standards of ethics still 
ultimately negotiated at the individual level.   
 
Sympathy as procedure 
One insightful way to think about Smith’s sympathy along these lines, I suggest, is to 
view it as involving a ‘processual’ conceptualisation of the ethico-political individual 
rather than an understanding of the individual that outlines transcendental or ahistorical 
standards and laws of behaviour.  This is because, as Teichgraeber (1986: 131) points 
out, Smith views moral judgements as essentially ‘comparisons between, on the one 
hand, particular feelings of people whose conduct we observe, and, on the other, our 
own sympathetic responses as spectators of their conduct’.  This is related to how he 
frequently speaks of the sympathetic process of entering into a position of an ‘impartial 
spectator’ in order to be able to form an opinion on the situation of others.  Smith (TMS 
I.i.5.4) writes:  
 
The insolence and brutality of anger, in the same manner, when we indulge its 
fury without check or restraint, is, of all objects, the most detestable.  But we 
admire that noble and generous resentment which governs its pursuit of the 
greatest injuries, not by the rage which they are apt to excite in the breast of the 
sufferer, but by the indignation which they naturally call forth in that of the 
impartial spectator; which allows no word, no gesture, to escape it beyond what 
this more equitable sentiment would dictate; which never, even in thought, 
attempts any greater vengeance, nor desires to inflict any greater punishment, 
than what every indifferent person would rejoice to see executed. 
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For Smith (TMS III.3.1), then, the procedural mechanism for making these judgements 
comes through a sympathy procedure; the interaction between the individual and broader 
social systems as interpersonal ethics come to be negotiated: 
 
But though the approbation of his own conscience can scarce, upon some 
extraordinary occasions, content the weakness of man; though the testimony of 
the supposed impartial spectator, of the great inmate of the breast, cannot always 
alone support him; yet the influence and authority of this principle is, upon all 
occasions, very great; and it is only by consulting this judge within, that we can 
ever see what relates to ourselves in its proper shape and dimensions; or that we 
can ever make any proper comparison between our own interests and those of 
other people.  
 
It is possible to take Smith’s sympathy in various directions.  Interestingly, in his recent 
The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen (2009b: 70) invokes Smith’s reasoning here involving 
the impartial spectator because he claims it allows for ‘incompleteness in social 
assessment’ while ‘still providing guidance in important problems of social justice’.  
This is part of Sen’s (2009b: 70) suggestion that in contemporary questions of justice it 
is more important to find ways of ‘dealing with comparative assessment’ rather than 
identifying ‘transcendental solutions’.  There is certainly some merit in interpreting 
Smith’s sympathy as part of an active process of comparison.  Indeed, following Brown 
(1994: 25 emphasis added), it is possible to claim that for Smith there is an emphasis on 
‘seeing, observing, [and] watching from appropriate viewpoints’ as these all ‘constitute 
the essence of an active process of moral judgment in which the moral agent is 
absorbed’.  The active mental process that Smith (TMS III.3.3) describes is as follows: 
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Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we must 
change our position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet 
from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with 
the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who 
judges with impartiality between us.  
 
For Smith, then, this active process in which individuals in society take part is one in 
which imagination plays a central role.  Indeed it has been suggested that the ‘capacity 
of imagining oneself in the position of someone else, changing places and personhood, 
constitutes the main pillar of Smith’s moral philosophy’ (Montes 2004: 51).  Smith 
(TMS I.i.1.4) writes: 
 
In every passion of which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of the by-
stander always correspond to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he 
imagines should be the sentiments of the sufferer. 
 
Thus Smith (TMS I.i.4.6) is very clear that sympathy is ‘founded’ on an ‘imaginary 
change of situation’, a theme to which I return below.  As D. D. Raphael (2007: 13) has 
it: 
 
An explicit exercise of the imagination is certainly part of Smith’s account of 
moral judgement.  In that context imagining oneself in someone else’s place is 
more pervasive than the actual experience of sympathy. 
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Indeed Raphael (2007: 15 emphasis in original) further suggests that for Smith 
imagination plays ‘an elaborate double role’: 
 
[W]e have to imagine what spectators would feel if they imagined themselves in 
our situation; and, while sympathy, or the lack of it, comes into the picture in 
characterizing the feeling of the spectators, that feeling is an imagined feeling; 
and indeed, in the end, spectators in the real world are replaced by an imagined 
impartial spectator conjured up ‘in the breast’. 
 
One consequence that might stem from this understanding of sympathy involving a 
process of imagining situation and circumstance is that the matrix of judgement and 
standards of ethics that are produced at the individual level contain within them a certain 
level of continuous contestability.  In fact, Smith (TMS I.i.4.7) makes clear that there is 
always likely to be a level of variation in what might be thought of as the ‘outcome’ of 
the sympathetic process: 
 
What they [the spectator] feel, will, indeed, always be, in some respects, different 
from what he [the person principally concerned] feels, and compassion can never 
be exactly the same with original sorrow; because the secret consciousness that 
the change of situations, from which the sympathetic sentiment arises, is but 
imaginary, not only lowers it in degree, but, in some measure, varies it in kind, 
and gives it a quite different modification.  These two sentiments, however, may, 
it is evident, have such a correspondence with one another, as is sufficient for the 
harmony of society.  Though they will never be unisons, they may be concords, 
and this is all that is wanted or required. 
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To understand certain norms, values, passions and so on, then, as the outcome of a 
sympathy procedure is thus to accept the possibility of many potential variations in 
human behaviour (Vaggi 2004: 30).  Charles Griswold’s (1999: 165) point that Smith 
was ‘consciously nonfoundationalist’ in his approach to moral sentiments is illuminating 
here: Smith provides what is a situational account of the formation of ethical judgement.  
Another insightful way of expressing this is the notion that Smith held ‘an essential 
attachment to conventionalist ontology: individuals discover their sense of who they are 
and of who they should aim to be through being called to pass judgement on the 
propriety of other people’s conduct’ (Watson 2012: 19 emphasis added). 
 
In summary, it is possible to suggest that Smith’s understanding of sympathy as 
constituting an active process of both conceptualising and assessing individual 
behaviour, action, and suffering contains within it a certain level of contestability.  It 
relates to other people’s opinion, to the social construction of rules and values in society; 
and is part of an active process of judgement and comparison.  Thus, I argue, Smith’s 
conception of sympathy allows for an understanding of the individual as a site at which 
ethico-political questions come to be resolved (at least temporarily) as part of the 
interactive generation of a matrix of judgement and standards of ethics.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have constructed a reading of Smith’s individual and his concept of 
sympathy that remains attentive to his intentions in writing his work.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to show how, properly historicised, Smith’s sympathy provides a very 
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telling way of pointing to the flaws in the economistic understanding of market-oriented 
behaviour that prevails in many contemporary liberal perspectives.  Sympathy gives a 
complex and compelling account of how ethics and politics might come to be 
interactively formed at the level of the individual, which ultimately shows how the 
economic cannot truly be divorced from the ethico-political as contemporary liberal 
perspectives often hold, as I come to show below. 
 
In my consideration of Smith’s thought in its social and linguistic context a number of 
points have been highlighted.  First, I considered his thought in relation to his social 
context and the thought of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries.  Given the 
developments that Smith witnessed at the onset of the transition from feudalism to a 
commercial society, there is a noticeable concern in his work for civic humanist 
questions.  In this sense, Smith is understood to have had a concern for individual 
behaviour as it is cultivated by civil society, which is in direct contrast to the asocial and 
ahistorical individual of economistic understandings.   
 
Part of Smith’s response to these questions was to engage with Hutcheson’s ideas about 
‘moral sense’.  This led him towards an interest in the role of sentiments, passions and 
feelings in human conduct, which again contrasts to the socially atomistic economistic 
individual.  Hume also moved towards sentiments, passions, and feelings in response to 
Hutcheson, but Smith differed from him by rejecting Hume’s scepticism and his use of 
the concept of utility, which proved central to the later development of economistic 
understandings in the nineteenth-century.  For Smith, sentiments and feelings 
themselves had to be explained, which influenced his development of the sympathy 
procedure.  Moreover, there are significant aspects of the relationship between Smith 
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and Rousseau that shed light on Smith’s thought.  Essentially, they both felt compelled 
to respond to Mandeville’s ‘selfish hypothesis’, which led them to use a particular 
understanding of the term ‘self-love’ and develop the very similar concepts of ‘amour-
propre’ and ‘vanity’ to explain behavioural tendencies in commercial society.  What is 
more, the latter explanation was recognition of the historically conditioned nature of the 
rules and values that prevail in any given society, again in contrast to the ahistorical 
causal laws of economistic understandings.   
 
In the second section, I explored how Smith’s arguments might be further considered as 
a contribution to existing debates.  I first considered his possible intentions in writing his 
texts.  These were thought to be multiple and may have operated on a number of levels 
including the use of different ‘voices’.  As such, I suggested that it is possible that Smith 
had a conception of the individual that was not necessarily unified, constant, and 
absolute.  This is in direct contrast to the atomistic and uniform economistic individual.  
Second, I considered some possible interpretations of Smith’s politics, which showed 
that he could not be located within arguments about a liberal capitalist or bourgeois 
‘tradition’ of thought.  This distances Smith’s individual from Benthamite utilitarianism 
on which economistic understandings later developed. 
 
In the final section, drawing on the conceptual claims made in the first two sections, I 
gave a more detailed account of Smith’s central concept of ‘sympathy’, which I find to 
be central to his understanding of the individual.  I suggested that Smith’s sympathy 
constitutes an active process of both conceptualising and assessing individual behaviour 
which contains within it a certain level of continuous contestability.  It is close to 
Rousseau’s identification and is essentially other-regarding and self-regarding at the 
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same time: it describes the interactivity between an individual and a system in terms of 
questions of politics and ethics.  The sympathy procedure in this sense is not simply an 
‘other-directed’ ontology, for it maintains a constant balancing act and negotiation 
between the individual principally concerned and broader societal norms and values that 
are potentially encountered and internalised.  From Smith’s sympathy perspective, then, 
individuals are understood as individuals in society, in which they construct, contest, and 
share rules and values.  I will further develop this conception in the next chapter in 
relation to present-day understandings of the liberal individual, but I conclude that it 
provides a promising way of conceiving the market-oriented behaviour in a distinctly 
contrasting way to the economistic understandings that prevail in liberal perspectives on 
market governance.  Sympathy illustrates how ethics and politics might come to be 
interactively formed at the individual level, which in turn shows how the economic 
cannot truly be divorced from the ethico-political as contemporary liberal perspectives 
often hold. 
 
In a sense, to even be able to make this claim about Smith and his sympathy procedure, I 
had to move away from much of the historiography on Smith in IPE given that, for the 
most part, it is derived from an ‘economistic historiography’ of his work.  I have 
appealed to more accurate ‘history of thought historiography’ of his work, which is more 
attentive to Skinner’s methodological rules, to reconstruct and draw attention to the 
importance of his sympathy procedure in particular.  One potential danger here is that by 
focussing principally on an account of Smith’s sympathy procedure, I may inadvertently 
follow some Smith studies scholars (e.g. Macfie 1967; Raphael and Macfie 1982) who 
appear to fall foul of Skinner’s mythologies of doctrine and coherence (Chapter 2) by 
suggesting that his concept of sympathy holds the ‘real’ essence of the entirety of his 
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work, to the expense of certain aspects of WN for example.   However, my claim is 
more modest.  Rather than attempting to provide a doctrinal account of his entire oeuvre, 
or a definitive ‘solution’ to the Adam Smith Problem, I merely wish to present an 
account of his engagement with questions about individual agency at this stage and, on 
this subject, when suitably historicised in its socio-linguistic context, the sympathy 
procedure is clearly fundamental.   
 
The account presented here will be used in the following chapter as the basis on which 
to engage in a dialogic conversation between Smith’s ‘sympathetic liberalism’ and the 
‘economistic liberalism’ of market governance today.  The former takes seriously 
ethico-political contestation over market-oriented behaviour while the latter tends to 
(re)produce instrumentally rational forms of economic agency.  The contrast between 
the two allows IPE scholars to start to understand and intervene in the economistic 
implications of contemporary liberal market governance associated with the global 
financial crisis today. 
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CHAPTER 4 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Sympathetic Liberalism and Economistic Liberalism: A Dialogic Conversation on 
the Global Financial Crisis 
 
In this previous chapter, I constructed a reading of Smith’s individual and his concept of 
sympathy that attempts to be attentive to his intentions in writing his work.  Smith’s 
concern for how individual behaviour is cultivated in society, his eighteenth-century 
Scottish Enlightenment interest in the role of sentiments in human conduct and, above 
all, his sympathy procedure were highlighted as central aspects of his political economy 
as moral philosophy.  I suggest that these features are pivotal in achieving a successful 
historicised account of his work.  What is more, these features also present a two-fold 
challenge for contemporary IPE.  First, they present a ‘Smith’ that is in large part foreign 
to the canonical understanding of his work as it comes to form the liberal tradition of 
IPE.  These aspects of his moral philosophy thus present a more ontologically robust 
depiction of Smith compared to the interpretations that fall foul of Skinnerian 
mythologies (Chapter 2). 
 
Second, they present for IPE a platform of critique for aspects of contemporary 
liberalism and, in particular, the economistic liberal individual.  That is, Smith’s 
liberalism and his sympathy procedure might be understood as an alternative frame of 
reference from and with which to engage the ‘liberal tradition’.  In this chapter, I take on 
the task of exploring the ways in which a more robust account of Smith’s liberalism 
might be used in such a manner.  In this sense I mobilise the idea of using pragmatic 
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historiography, explored alongside Quentin Skinner’s notion of an anthropological 
justification for the study of the history of ideas (Chapter 1), in order to critically engage 
with aspects of contemporary liberalism through the lens of a Smithian political 
economy.   
 
To organise this dialogic conversation – in a further attempt to sustain a historicised 
engagement – I take inspiration directly from Smith by arranging the discussion around 
the themes he uses right at the beginning of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS).  
Although I make use of other areas of his work as well (including The Wealth of Nations 
(WN)), this is the most important point at which Smith sets out his concept of sympathy 
(Otteson 2002: 13).  Certainly, given my claim in the previous chapter that the 
cultivation of behaviour, the role of sentiments, and the sympathy procedure are central 
to a historicised account of Smith, these sections of TMS are an important starting point 
for engaging with his work.  Part I is entitled ‘Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of 
Three Sections’ and Section I of that Part is entitled ‘Of the Sense of Propriety’.  The 
section is then divided into five chapters and I use the themes of the first three (the other 
two largely expand on these) to arrange this chapter.  The first is ‘Of Sympathy’, the 
second is ‘Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy’, and the third is ‘Of the Manner In 
Which We Judge of the Propriety Or Impropriety of the Affections of Other Men, By 
Their Concord Or Dissonance With Our Own’.  Thus, somewhat abbreviated for my 
purposes here, I use the themes of (1) sympathy, (2) mutual sympathy, and (3) the 
sympathy procedure to organise discussion in this chapter. 
 
In the first section, I focus directly on what Smith’s sympathy implies for an 
understanding of the individual.  By ‘the individual’, I refer to the individual subject, 
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understood in broad terms as both a (cultural) ‘product’ of a particular society (Best 
2005) and as an ‘analytical subject’ of a perspective of thought (economistic liberalism, 
in this instance).  A sympathy perspective, as an approach to understanding the 
individual, gives a complex account of how ethics and politics might come to be 
interactively formed at the level of the individual.  By contrast, I show that the 
individual of economistic liberalism tends to take the form of the embodiment of 
instrumental rationality par excellence: homo economicus.  In the context of the global 
financial crisis (GFC) as a problem of contemporary liberal governance, I use a 
discussion of government programmes of ‘asset-based welfare’ to illustrate this 
difference and indicate the potential crisis of ethics at the heart of economistic liberalism 
that will be further explored in the final two chapters. 
 
In the second section, I focus on Smith’s notion of mutual sympathy.  A sympathy 
perspective is not simply an ‘other-directed’ ontology, for it maintains a constant 
balancing act and negotiation between the individual principally concerned and broader 
societal norms and values that are potentially encountered and internalised.  From a 
sympathy perspective, then, individuals are understood as individuals in society, in 
which they construct, share, and contest rules and values.  By contrast, the individual of 
economistic liberalism, tending to take the form of homo economicus, ultimately 
resolves political economy problems by individualising them at the expense of 
contestable interpersonal ethics.  In the context of the GFC as a problem of 
contemporary liberal governance, I use a discussion of ‘credit risk’, broadly understood, 
to illustrate this claim and again indicate the potential crisis of ethics at the heart of 
economistic liberalism to be explored. 
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In the third and final section, I focus on the on-going contestability of the sympathy 
procedure.  I suggest that Smith’s sympathy constitutes an active procedure of both 
conceptualising and assessing individual behaviour that contains within it a certain level 
of contestability.  By contrast, the individual of economistic liberalism ultimately 
depoliticises political economy, or at least attempts to, by denying contestable ethics at 
the individual level.  In the context of the GFC as a problem of contemporary liberal 
governance, I use a discussion of ‘personal debt’ to illustrate this claim and indicate the 
potential crisis of ethics at the heart of economistic liberalism. 
 
In all three parts of the discussion I utilise aspects of the political economy of finance – 
asset-based welfare, credit risk, and personal debt – as a means of interrogating the 
ethics of economistic liberalism in conversation with Smith’s sympathetic liberalism.  
By engaging with these themes in the context of the GFC it is important to note that I do 
not expect to ‘find’ straightforward ‘answers’ in the work of Smith.  As has been 
stressed throughout this thesis, his political economy is ‘of another time’ in the sense 
that it is simply not possible to make a direct translation of Smith’s ideas to 
contemporary questions.  Rather, I use his sympathetic liberalism – properly historicised 
and celebrated as ‘of another time’ – to reflect on certain contemporary issues in order 
to provide an alternative platform from which to understand the very way that 
economistic liberalism works to construct the individual of the market form and to shape 
market-oriented behaviour.  Yet, given that all three issues relate to how individual 
behaviour is cultivated in society, the role of sentiments in human conduct, and the 
potential for liberal ethics, then they are areas of interest at least similar in intent to the 
type of inquiry with which Smith was concerned when he explored the cultivation of 
standards of behaviour in eighteenth-century society.  In this sense, I illustrate how 
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sympathetic liberalism might operate in discussions of contemporary finance in IPE by 
presenting a conversation between it and economistic liberalism using issues 
surrounding the GFC as illustrative cases.   
 
I argue throughout that the economism of contemporary liberalism can be more fully 
understood through the lens of Smith’s sympathetic liberalism.  Moreover, the way in 
which Smith saw the ethico-political constitution of the individual as a foundational 
element of the study of man and society helps explain the crisis of ethics in 
contemporary liberalism at the heart of the GFC.  What is the crisis of ethics?  Put 
simply, the individual of economistic liberalism is severely flawed.  It does not allow for 
contestable ethics at the level of the individual and the consequences of this can be 
traced through the GFC as a problem of liberal governance.  It posits an economistic 
individual in whom all questions of ethics have already been resolved or assumed away.  
To act rationally, after all, one needs an end, a good, one is choosing the most efficient 
means to attain.  Yet, seemingly with an almost all-consuming focus on economising, 
the economistic individual does not need to confront questions of ethics because the 
ends to which they strive are already predetermined.   
 
In this chapter, I introduce the argument – to be interrogated further in the next two 
chapters – that in the context of the GFC the consequences of this fundamental problem 
are visible when government programmes promoting asset-based welfare go 
unquestioned, when risk management is normalised to the everyday, and when creditor-
debtor relations are depoliticised.  All three of these sites of finance, I suggest, shed light 
on the crisis of ethics in economistic liberalism.  Drawing inspiration from Smith’s 
sympathetic liberalism, IPE can find a more complex account of the individual that, at 
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the very least, provides a platform for engagement with this potential crisis of ethics.  To 
take account of sympathy is but one means of problematising how ethics and politics 
might come to be formed and contested at the individual level.  Deployed as a frame of 
reference to examine economistic liberal market governance, Smith’s sympathy 
perspective provides an account that ultimately shows how the economic cannot truly be 
divorced from the ethico-political as economistic liberalism appears to hold.  The 
dialogic conversation undertaken in this chapter thus provides an analysis of the 
underpinnings of a sympathy perspective that relates them to three principal sites of 
finance – asset-based systems of welfare, credit risk, and personal debt – which feature 
right at the heart of the GFC.  These sites of finance can then be interrogated through the 
use of a sympathy perspective at the ‘regulatory’ and the ‘everyday’ levels of finance in 
Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
 
4.1 ‘Of sympathy’   
 
The sympathetic versus economistic individual: A (further) crisis of homo economicus? 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in 
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing 
it.  Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery 
of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively 
manner.  That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of 
fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all 
the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the 
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virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite 
sensibility.  The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of 
society, is not altogether without it (TMS I.i.1.1). 
 
Alongside a gibe at the crass ‘interest doctrine’ of Bernard Mandeville (out of which 
arguably economistic liberalism finds its origin), in the opening to TMS Smith presents 
the essence of his sympathy perspective.  The capacity for imagination is central to his 
account of moral sentiments:   
 
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no 
idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we 
ourselves should feel in the like situation (TMS I.i.1.2). 
 
On this premise, Smith introduces his account of sympathy, which subtly shifts its 
meaning away from existing use: 
 
Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with 
the sorrow of others.  Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the 
same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote 
our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever (TMS I.i.1.5). 
 
This is Smith’s introduction to the concept of sympathy that, building on the previous 
chapter, I suggest provides a complex and compelling account of how ethics and politics 
might come to be interactively formed and contested at the individual level.   
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How does this provide a frame of reference with which to engage economistic 
liberalism?  As the foreword to the Stiglitz Report (UN 2010) attests, many of the 
classical political economists did not assume away the contestability of the individual 
subject.  For them, people are not the ‘socially atomistic construct’ who figures in 
economistic approaches to the study of the world economy.  Rather, they supposed, 
individual economic action cannot be distinguished from the broader ethico-political 
roles that people play and the broader ethico-political institutions prevalent in the social 
world.  The Stiglitz Report (UN 2010: xxviii) is right to emphasise this point because it 
is important in explaining the crisis of ethics at the heart of the financial crisis: 
 
As the greatest economic philosophers – whose number surely includes Aquinas, 
Smith, Marx, and Keynes – have all recognized, homo economicus, the 
acquisitive, emotionally cardboard, and socially atomistic construct of academic 
economics is a reductio ad absurdum.  They did not merely assume that the 
ethical vocation of human beings should inform their economic decisions and 
institutions; they insisted on it, and in ways that today are far out of fashion but 
are also therefore far more necessary today.  It is difficult to read this Report and 
not come to the conclusion that the Commission members share this perspective. 
 
In a sense, this aspect of the Stiglitz Report is indicative of the way in which there is at 
least a questioning of homo economicus from within some areas of the academic 
economics profession, particularly from more ‘heterodox’ economists.  Another example 
might be Paul Ormerod (1994: 35), who suggests that a great merit of a socially-situated 
approach is that by emphasising the ‘benefits of co-operative behaviour’ and ‘the 
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fundamental interdependence and interconnectedness of human actions’ it provides a 
‘sharp contrast to the individualistic behavioural model of orthodox economics’.   
 
In recent years, related to this sense of disgruntlement from within the economics 
profession, there has been significant growth in the field of behavioural economics, and 
the related area of behavioural finance, which also provides a sharp critique of homo 
economicus (Akerlof and Shiller 2009).  Self-styled behavioural economists deliberately 
set out to provide explanations of economic phenomena that take account of the role of 
such things as sentiment, emotion, and ‘the social’ in their analysis.  In his book on the 
GFC, The Subprime Solution, Robert Shiller (2008: 118-119) claims: 
 
[T]he human sciences – psychology, sociology, anthropology, and neurobiology 
– are increasing our understanding of the mind by leaps and bounds, and this 
knowledge is now being applied to finance and economics.  We have a much 
better grasp of how and why people make economic errors, and of how we can 
restructure institutions to help avoid these errors. 
 
While in general potentially a useful development for academic economics, and in many 
ways not necessarily a homogeneous movement, the behavioural turn is to my mind 
something of a red herring.  For a start, the notion of taking sentiments and emotion 
seriously is extremely useful, but to treat them as ‘factors’ among competing influences 
on economic behaviour does not get to the crux of the issue of the cultural 
(re)production of standards of market-oriented behaviour.  Smith’s sympathy 
perspective certainly allows for sentiments, emotion, and ‘the social’ to run a little 
deeper into the very constitution of the individual than behavioural analysis seems to 
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allow.  What is more, most significantly, notice how Shiller talks about grasping how 
and why people make economic ‘errors’ and how institutions might ‘help’ correct for 
them.  This is a worldview that is trapped by its other: how to explain why people do not 
conform to homo economicus in a world in which economic ends are still already 
defined and so it is possible to ‘help’ people act more rationally (for their own good).  
Putting aside the inherent paternalism of such an approach, there might be reasons why 
Shiller does not talk of how advances in understandings of deliberative politics or ethics 
might be brought into economics; trapped by the need to confront instrumental 
rationality, it does not allow for ethico-political contestation at the level of the 
individual.  In a sense, then, a behavioural economics perspective is just as wedded to 
assumptions of instrumental rationality as the economistic liberalism that the Stiglitz 
Report criticises: contestable ethics and politics at the individual level are ignored, 
denied, or assumed away. 
 
However, this is not to suggest that the issues with which behavioural economics and 
especially behavioural finance engage are not significant.  Particularly in light of the 
bursting of the subprime housing bubble at the onset of the GFC, much attention has 
been given to such ideas as ‘irrational exuberance’ and ‘animal spirits’.  The ways in 
which people see, observe, and base their actions on others is rightly seen as central to 
market-oriented behaviour (an insight going back to John Maynard Keynes).  Yet, in 
contrast to economistic and behavioural perspectives, Smith’s sympathy perspective 
provides an account of how market-oriented behaviour is made possible that does not 
assume away contestable ethics and politics. 
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The real crux of the issue here is sympathy as an imaginative act.  How might norms of 
appropriate standards of behaviour come to be formed, learned and internalised?  Smith 
writes: 
 
Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally 
concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in 
the breast of every attentive spectator.  Our joy for the deliverance of those 
heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us, is as sincere as our grief for their 
distress, and our fellow-feeling with their misery is not more real than that with 
their happiness (TMS I.i.1.4 emphasis added). 
 
Some Smith scholars have called this a ‘spectator theory’ of morality (Haakonssen 2003: 
217; Raphael 2007: 31), yet the most important notion introduced by this ‘attentive 
spectator’ is the capacity to imagine and mentally reconstruct the situation of another 
person in order to engage with questions of interpersonal ethics (Fleischacker and 
Brown 2010: 5).   
 
Crucially, at this point, I want to claim that this spectator theory, or sympathy 
perspective, is not just used by Smith in his moral philosophy, but in his political 
economy as well (Lamb 1974).  As has been stressed in this thesis, the latter is actually 
part of the former for Smith; but even so, the idea of constructing and assessing 
standards of appropriate behaviour can be found at significant points in WN as well as 
TMS.  I am not making the claim that sympathy provides a ‘solution’ to the Adam Smith 
Problem (Chapter 2), but merely that sympathy-type dynamics have a role to play in WN 
that should not be overlooked because it helps form an understanding of sympathy in the 
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construction of market-oriented behaviour (Macfie 1967: 75).  For instance, a concern 
for the opinion of others is to be found in a discussion of different appropriate rates of 
profit: 
 
When a person employs only his own stock in trade, there is no trust; and the 
credit which he may get from other people, depends, not upon the nature of his 
trade, but upon their opinion of his fortune, probity, and prudence.  The different 
rates of profit, therefore, in the different branches of trade, cannot arise from the 
different degrees of trust reposed in the traders (WN I.x.b.20). 
 
Likewise, in a discussion of the legitimate gains to be had from various employment: 
 
There are some very agreeable and beautiful talents of which the possession 
commands a certain sort of admiration; but of which the exercise for the sake of 
gain is considered, whether from reason or prejudice, as a sort of publick 
prostitution.  The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of those who exercise them 
in this manner, must be sufficient, not only to pay for the time, labour, and 
expence of acquiring the talents, but for the discredit which attends the 
employment of them as the means of subsistence. The exorbitant rewards of 
players, opera-singers, opera-dancers, &c. are founded upon those two 
principles; the rarity and beauty of the talents, and the discredit of employing 
them in this manner.  It seems absurd at first sight that we should despise their 
persons, and yet reward their talents with the most profuse liberality.  While we 
do the one, however, we must of necessity do the other.  Should the publick 
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opinion or prejudice ever alter with regard to such occupations, their pecuniary 
recompence would quickly diminish (WN I.x.b.25). 
 
Some scholars suggest that WN ‘presupposes the framework of justice’ set out in TMS 
(O’Brien 2004: 37 emphasis in original), but I would take a more thoroughgoing stance 
and point to the centrality of the sympathy procedure as an account of the process 
through which institutions and norms of interpersonal ethics are internalised at the 
individual level (Teichgraeber 1986: 47).  From such as perspective, to follow a 
Smithian approach to political economy, then, is to recognise that the ‘conditions under 
which market institutions will prove operable are not economic conditions at all, but 
relate to the constitution of the individual as a moral being’ (Watson 2005b: 144).  
 
How is this to be done?  Arguably, in contrast to economistic liberalism, it is a question 
of starting from the position of contestable ethics at the individual level.  For Smith, as 
imaginative sympathy is always potentially incomplete and provisional, so too is the 
construction of standards of market-oriented behaviour.  A moment of sympathy, 
 
does not hold universally, or with regard to every passion.  There are some 
passions of which the expressions excite no sort of sympathy, but before we are 
acquainted with what gave occasion to them, serve rather to disgust and provoke 
us against them. The furious behaviour of an angry man is more likely to 
exasperate us against himself than against his enemies.  As we are unacquainted 
with his provocation, we cannot bring his case home to ourselves, nor conceive 
any thing like the passions which it excites (TMS I.i.1.7). 
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For Smith, then, to exercise a capacity for sympathy is to imagine both intent and 
circumstance as part of an often imprecise balancing act (Montes 2004: 48): 
 
Even our sympathy with the grief or joy of another, before we are informed of 
the cause of either, is always extremely imperfect.  General lamentations, which 
express nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a curiosity to inquire 
into his situation, along with some disposition to sympathize with him, than any 
actual sympathy that is very sensible.  Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so 
much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it. 
We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be 
altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion 
arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the 
reality (TMS I.i.1.9-10). 
 
Drawing these points together, I argue that to utilise a sympathy perspective it is 
necessary to confront contestable ethics at the level of the individual.  From such a 
perspective, IPE might become ‘the study of individual action within the context of 
institutionalized economic norms’ with the important recognition that ‘[s]ome 
individuals may internalize those norms to the point at which they are subject to routine 
reproduction within their conduct, while others will attempt to operate outside them 
having first accepted the legitimacy of alternative bases of behaviour’ (Watson 2005a: 
5).  The crucial point is that, contra assumptions of instrumental rationality, market-
oriented behaviour is understood to be both the outcome of and inherently involved with 
contestable interpersonal ethics at the individual level.  In the context of the GFC as a 
problem of contemporary liberal governance, I use a discussion of recent government 
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programmes of asset-based welfare to illustrate the difference between Smith’s 
sympathetic liberalism, which allows for contestable interpersonal ethics, and 
economistic liberalism, which does not.  In the final analysis, the engagement indicates a 
crisis of ethics at the heart of economistic liberalism.  
 
‘Asset-based welfare’ as a feature/crisis of liberal market governance 
To pin down exactly what is meant by ‘financialisation’ is no easy task, yet the concept 
is useful for understanding dynamics of change in Anglo-America over the last 20 years 
or so.  Shaun French et al. (2011: 2) provide an insightful bifurcation of the concept.  On 
the one hand, they point to how financialisation is used, in basic terms, as a descriptor of 
a ‘transformation in economy and society, whereby the financial sector and financial 
markets come to occupy a dominant or quasi-dominant position’.  This first form 
mobilises the epochal idea of emergent ‘finance-led economic systems’ in countries such 
as the US and the UK.  On the other hand, they point to how financialisation is also used 
in a ‘narrower sense to describe the processes and effects of the growing power of 
financial values and technologies on corporations, individuals and households’.  Clearly 
related, this second form thus emphasises how discourses, interests, and expectations 
come to be realigned by the increasing influence of financial values and logics.  For my 
discussion of the character of the economistic individual in the context of the GFC, it is 
this second and narrower sense in which financialisation becomes important because it 
captures something of ‘the growing reliance, directly or indirectly, on capital markets, 
securitized products and contracts, and institutions allied to a transaction-driven mode of 
financial activity’ (French et al. 2011: 10).  Another term used for this second form is 
‘coupon pool capitalism’, which exists ‘where the financial markets are no longer simple 
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intermediaries between household savers and investing firms but act dynamically to 
shape the behaviour of both firms and households’ (Froud et al. 2002: 120). 
 
An important part of the financialisation story is thus the (partial) restructuring of the 
Western state towards a greater reliance on asset-based systems of welfare.  It relates to 
how governments use policy mechanisms to reconfigure notions of personal financial 
responsibility and involves the wider restructuring of the welfare state, as responsibility 
for basic welfare is shifted from the collective to the individual (Langley 2007a: 112).  
As Alan Finlayson (2009: 411) puts it: 
 
In the UK, asset-based welfare policies are part of a broader strategy for altering 
aspirations by inculcating financial literacy and shifting attitudes towards money 
from an old-fashioned focus on wages, cost and short-term expenditure towards a 
new-economy focus on wealth and assets, savings and investments for the long 
term.  This involves the transfer of knowledge and skills but also of a certain 
kind of ethos or orientation towards finance and towards the self. 
 
The individualisation of responsibility for welfare is not simply an ‘ideological shift’ 
over the last 30 years or so, but something more culturally profound: as Finlayson notes, 
it relates to a reconfigured ethos towards finance and the self.  In fact, the restructuring 
of the UK and other Western states along asset-based welfare model lines is intimately 
related to how economistic liberalism comes to inform government attempts to promote 
market-oriented behaviour.  This is because the shift from the collective to the individual 
relies on certain notions of personal financial responsibility that are deeply ingrained 
with assumptions about autonomous and instrumentally rational individuals.  Such 
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attempts at reconfiguration of ethos are of course based on dominant ideas about how 
people ought to behave and see themselves in relation to wider society.  Along these 
lines, Matthew Watson (2009b: 199) has shown how the move towards an asset-based 
system of welfare in Britain assumes ‘autonomous selves’ based on a particular 
construction of duty in which the individual is required to internalise nothing more than 
‘a technical understanding of norms of justice laid down by the broader body of law’.  
Essentially, then, contestable interpersonal ethics are denied by the model citizen of 
asset-based welfare systems.  The autonomous financialised selves of such a system are 
not expected in anyway to mentally reconstruct the situation of others through an 
imaginative sympathetic act, they merely pursue their own (ostensive) financial gain 
through investment in housing, for example, as an asset to bring themselves personal 
financial security.  Presumably, there simply are none of Smith’s ‘attentive’ spectators in 
such a financialised society.  
 
In this regard recent work in IPE has highlighted the importance of the performance of 
financial subject positions.  In Paul Langley’s (2006: 922) terms, this refers to those 
‘subjects who, self-consciously and responsibly, further their own security and freedom 
through the market in general and through the financial markets in particular’.  Notably, 
it has been claimed, new ‘technologies such as the securitization of mortgages, the shift 
from defined benefit to defined contribution occupational pension schemes, and the rise 
of personal pensions have helped bring forth new, investor subjectivities and financially 
self-disciplined subjects’ (French et al. 2011: 7).  Such research points to the ways in 
which the subprime era involved the cultural production of ever greater numbers of 
financial subjects given the spread of such products as interest-only adjustable-rate 
mortgages that ‘enabled the inclusion of borrowers as agents within the mortgage and 
 167 
housing markets’ (Langley 2008a: 479).  In the (contingent) context of a rising property 
market, this ‘inclusion’ seemed all the more necessary given that gaining ‘a foot on the 
property ladder’ was part of the widespread cultural performance of finance (Langley 
2008a: 479).  Western governments were quite happy to allow and even promote asset 
price inflation in housing as it satisfied an attendant homeowner ideology (Hay 2009; 
Ronald 2008).   
 
Arguably, then, in the promotion of asset-based welfare (especially owning one’s home 
as a primary asset) particular character traits are legitimised and incentivised to the 
exclusion of others.  The shifting ethos towards the self involves internalising financial 
values and logics to successfully perform a financial subject position.  State restructuring 
along these lines thus involves reconfiguring notions of responsibility more firmly 
towards ‘autonomous’ individual selves who act ‘rationally’ in the face of the demands 
of model financial citizenship.  In this regard, whether in the area of retirement savings, 
personal investment, or homeownership, what unites the appropriate character traits of a 
‘good’ financial citizen is an economistic emphasis on market-oriented behaviour 
displaying instrumental rationality.  Whereas Smith’s sympathy perspective provides an 
account of how market-oriented behaviour is made possible that does not assume away 
contestable ethics and politics, this outlook almost welcomes homo economicus as a 
legitimate blueprint for behaviour.  In a sense, then, citizenship under asset-based 
systems of welfare is predefined and absolute: there can be no ethico-political 
contestation through the capacity to perform a sympathetic imaginative act. 
 
However, in the GFC, this aspect of financialisation was seemingly also the most 
threatened.  After all, it was the US subprime mortgage sector in which the crisis 
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originated; a site of finance deeply intertwined with the dream of homeownership 
(Nesvetailova 2010: 86).  Therefore, in certain respects, the GFC can be read as bringing 
asset-based welfare and the financial subject at least potentially into doubt.  In 
Finlayson’s (2009: 416) terms, the subprime crisis ‘deals a blow’ to the whole ethos that 
the UK government sought to instil in the nation.  How could excesses occur if people 
were acting as good financial citizens?  Were people not acting responsibly?   
 
Interestingly, the behavioural finance literature (e.g. Akerlof and Shiller 2009) that has 
blossomed in response to the crisis reaffirms an economistic mode of reasoning: people 
need to be better financial subjects, they need to act more like good economistic 
individuals, understand risks better, not take on such unsustainable levels of debt, and so 
on.  Notably, the bottom line is that financialisation is essentially a good thing, so rather 
than question securitisation, the task is to make it work better.  As Shiller (2008: 119-
120 emphasis in original) claims: ‘We have a comparable opportunity today with the 
advent of behavioral economics and behavioral finance, which have the potential to 
facilitate exciting advances in financial engineering’.  There is thus continued faith in 
the ‘improvement’ of individual behaviour to make it conform to economistic lines: 
Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), after all, is about ‘nudging’ people in the ‘right’ 
direction. 
 
Read through the lens of Smith’s sympathetic liberalism, the major flaw of the 
economistic individual contained within financialisation tendencies, and in the 
financialised behavioural response to the GFC, is that it attempts to exclude contestable 
interpersonal ethics at the level of the individual.  In the process of inducing autonomous 
individuals through asset-based systems of welfare, ‘[w]hat gets lost … are the multiple 
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projections of self and other which for Smith worked together in an iterative process that 
produced the ability to exercise real fellow-feeling’ (Watson 2009b: 208).  Certainly, 
there is a paternalistic aspect to such systems given that they are ‘about being told what 
to do and following that advice accordingly, not learning what to do through the agential 
self-actuation of the relational self’ (Watson 2009b: 205).  This means that whereas 
Smith’s sympathy perspective provides an account of how market-oriented behaviour is 
made possible that does not assume away contestable ethics and politics, asset-based 
systems of welfare tend to deny or ignore the capacity people have to negotiate 
interpersonal ethics through engaging in an imaginative act. 
 
However, even though the economistic ethos of asset-based welfare systems can be 
understood to deny contestable interpersonal ethics in this way, it does not mean that 
market-oriented behaviour as it is actually experienced is always completely and 
successfully constituted in financialised terms.  Indeed performances of the financial 
subject are best understood not as complete or final, but as the performance of one 
uncertain subjectivity among others: always-already revisable and open to contestation 
and subversion through political action.  So, for example, Langley (2006: 921) rightly 
notes that the ‘individualisation of responsibility in Anglo-American pensions remains 
uncertain, an ambition rather than an achievement’.  Notably, the notion of uncertainty is 
important here, because it is actually something of a counterpoint to the 
uncontestabablity of economistic constructions of market-oriented behaviour.  In this 
sense, it parallels Langley’s (2007b: 85) claim that: 
 
Drawing attention to the contradictions present in the assembly of investor 
subjects is particularly important if we are to go beyond policy evaluation and 
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technical solutions, and begin to genuinely repoliticize the financialization of 
Anglo-American capitalism.  Neoliberal programs currently serve to silence 
political debate by presenting future economic security as a technical problem to 
be solved by the individual who calculates, embraces, and bears financial market 
risk through their investment practices. 
 
This theme of repoliticising financialisation is one I return to (Chapter 6) because it 
picks up on the idea of ongoing contestable ethics at the individual level, as a sympathy 
perspective more adequately recognises. 
 
Overall, asset-based systems of welfare represent an aspect of financialisation that can 
be read as an attempt to exclude interpersonal ethics from economic behaviour by 
inducing an economistic and autonomous individual detached from the rest of society.  
That the model financial citizen is made up by many of the character traits of homo 
economicus is no coincidence because, as I explore in the following chapter, it is 
economistic perspectives, behavioural or otherwise, that largely provide the blueprint for 
regulatory forms of governance.  In a sense, then, the shift to asset-based welfare in 
Anglo-America embodies the ethos of economistic liberalism.  Yet in the context of the 
GFC, Smith’s sympathetic liberalism indicates how this economism is ultimately 
flawed.  To take Smith’s ideas about imaginative sympathetic acts seriously is to 
recognise that questions of interpersonal ethics are not predetermined as the economistic 
ethos of asset-based welfare appears to presume.  In Chapters 5 and 6, I return to the 
theme of asset-based welfare at the levels of regulatory and everyday finance 
respectively, in order to further explore this potential crisis of ethics at the heart of 
economistic liberalism. 
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4.2 ‘Of the pleasure of mutual sympathy’ 
 
Constitutive interpersonal ethics: A reassertion of the social?  
The last section was concerned with what a sympathy perspective means for 
understanding the individual and the performance of individual subject positions.  I now 
turn to Smith’s notion of mutual sympathy to explore more precisely the mechanism 
through which such a perspective accounts for the formation of interpersonal ethics.  At 
one level, mutual sympathy points to the importance of shared norms and 
understandings, which have to be formed and experienced in society (Macfie 1967: 83; 
Skinner 1996: 59).  Smith (TMS I.i.2.1) explains the experience of fellow-feeling in 
another attack on the interest doctrine: 
 
But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, 
nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all 
the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the 
appearance of the contrary.  Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments 
from certain refinements of self-love, think themselves at no loss to account, 
according to their own principles, both for this pleasure and this pain.  Man, say 
they, conscious of his own weakness, and of the need which he has for the 
assistance of others, rejoices whenever he observes that they adopt his own 
passions, because he is then assured of that assistance; and grieves whenever he 
observes the contrary, because he is then assured of their opposition.  But both 
the pleasure and the pain are always felt so instantaneously, and often upon such 
frivolous occasions, that it seems evident that neither of them can be derived 
from any such self-interested consideration.  A man is mortified when, after 
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having endeavoured to divert the company, he looks round and sees that nobody 
laughs at his jests but himself.  On the contrary, the mirth of the company is 
highly agreeable to him, and he regards this correspondence of their sentiments 
with his own as the greatest applause. 
 
For Smith (TMS I.i.2.2), then, people derive pleasure from the ‘correspondence of the 
sentiments of others with our own’.  This possible process of constructing interpersonal 
ethics tends to be denied in an economistic approach.  Ormerod (1994: 34) explains how 
‘to an economist, just as to Mrs Thatcher, there is no such thing as society, only the 
individuals who constitute it’, but this was quite ‘alien’ to Smith because he believed 
that ‘the restraint of public morality on individual behaviour was innate’.  He also notes:   
 
In sharp contrast [to Smith’s moral framework], modern economics views the 
economy as something which can be analysed in isolation.  There are few greater 
insults in an orthodox economist’s vocabulary than to describe someone as a 
sociologist.  The institutional setting, the historical experience and the overall 
framework of behaviour are ruthlessly excluded from contemporary economic 
theory (Ormerod 1994: 14).   
 
In many respects, economic sociology has come to represent a direct critique of 
mainstream academic economics, especially its foundations built on a narrow utilitarian 
conception of instrumentally rational behaviour (Hirsch et al. 1990).  From the 
perspective of economic sociology, economics can only ever offer a partial account of 
how ‘the economy’ works because it is unable to explain the interactive relationship 
between and mutually constituted nature of economy and society (Swedberg et al. 
 173 
1990).  Indeed it is commonly said that ‘[w]hat unites [economic sociology’s] leading 
exponents like Weber and Durkheim is a refusal to accept an economistic view of 
society founded exclusively on the assertion of economic interests and the struggle to 
realise economic wants’ (Holton 1992: 181).  Incidentally, in the process of providing a 
cutting critique of narrow utilitarian conceptions of economic behaviour, economic 
sociology tends to construct the work of Smith as its ‘other’; as the archetypal and 
foundational work of a scholar of the mainstream economics paradigm (e.g. Block 1990; 
Holton 1992).  In this sense, it is guilty of following some of the economistic 
historiography of Smith that is found in IPE and elsewhere.  
 
Nevertheless, the way in which economic sociology provides a critique of economistic 
liberalism by insisting on a more socially-determined account of individual economic 
behaviour in many ways parallels Smith’s emphasis on people’s capacity for mutual 
sympathy taking place within society.  After all, for Smith, such a capacity develops in 
society as people come into social contact with the moral standards that are embodied in 
current social institutions (Macfie 1967: 95).  Interestingly, Smith (TMS I.i.4.9) suggests 
that ‘the effect of sympathy is instantaneous’ between people who know each other’s 
circumstances well, there is expected to be ‘less sympathy’ between common 
acquaintances, and ‘still less sympathy’ between an ‘assembly of strangers’.  Yet, even 
among strangers, the presence of other people allows for the sympathy procedure to 
operate through imagining appropriate behaviour in any particular circumstance (TMS 
I.i.4.9).  In Smith’s account then, experience of life in society both allows for and 
improves the capacity for imaginative sympathy.  In his own terms, he later refers to this 
as society as something of a ‘mirror’ that allows the individual to view ‘the propriety 
and impropriety of his own passions; the beauty and deformity of his own mind’ (TMS 
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III.i.3).  In WN as well, he alludes to how ‘observation’ and ‘censure’ by others in 
society acts as an important conditioning influence on conduct (WN II.iii.40). 
 
An important point, though, is that Smith’s sympathy is not just about a straightforward 
notion of people being sociable or feeling compassion for those less well-off (Wilson 
1976: 93).  In fact, Thomas Wilson (1976: 94) makes the point that rather than ‘opposite 
poles’, sympathy can be the ‘basis for individualism’.  Smith’s position in this regard is 
quite clearly expressed: 
 
Every man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended to his 
own care; and every man is certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler to take 
care of himself than of any other person.  Every man feels his own pleasures and 
his own pains more sensibly than those of other people.  The former are the 
original sensations; the latter the reflected or sympathetic images of those 
sensations.  The former may be said to be the substance; the latter the shadow 
(TMS VI.ii.1.1). 
 
In a sense, then, sympathy is about balance, contestation, and moments of mutual 
sympathy.  For Smith, the person principally concerned, ‘the sufferer’ in other words, is 
aware that an ‘imaginary change of situation’ does not allow for a complete appreciation 
of their suffering to the same ‘degree of passion’ (TMS I.i.4.7).  Yet, because the 
sufferer desires ‘a more complete sympathy’, that is they want the observer to 
understand and in some sense share their suffering, they may attempt to moderate or 
‘flatten’ their emotions by ‘lowering [their] passion to that pitch … spectators are 
capable of going along with’ (TMS I.i.4.7).  This related point about understanding how 
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moments of mutual sympathy are arrived at again indicates how sympathy is very much 
a question of ‘balance’ or a process of negotiating appropriate forms of sentiment and 
behaviour (Weinstein 2006: 86).  
 
Rather than as an other-directed ontology, or the more obvious point that individuals 
form understandings of appropriate behaviour by living in society, sympathy might be 
thought of in terms of the ‘society in the individual’.  Clearly, though, Smith is not 
merely referring to a respect for public opinion (Wilson 1976: 74).  More fundamentally, 
as referred to in the previous chapter, the individual and society in some sense 
presuppose each other from a sympathy perspective (Peil 1999: 58).  What is more, 
individual selfhood and social processes are understood to be governed by meanings and 
values which are generated and observed by people as part of a longing for mutual 
sympathy:  
 
As the person who is principally interested in any event is pleased with our 
sympathy, and hurt by the want of it, so we, too, seem to be pleased when we are 
able to sympathize with him, and to be hurt when we are unable to do so.  We 
run not only to congratulate the successful, but to condole with the afflicted; and 
the pleasure which we find in the conversation of one whom in all the passions of 
his heart we can entirely sympathize with, seems to do more than compensate the 
painfulness of that sorrow with which the view of his situation affects us (TMS 
I.i.2.6). 
 
Mutual sympathy is here a metaphor for an ‘intersubjectively based framework of rules 
and values’ (Peil 1999: 88).  Sympathy works in a similar way in WN as well by giving 
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people a capacity to think in terms outside of the self (Lamb 1974: 678-679).  For 
instance, in his discussion of basic standards of living in a society: 
 
Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people to be 
regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency to the society?  The answer 
seems at first sight abundantly plain.  Servants, labourers and workmen of 
different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society.  But 
what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an 
inconveniency to the whole.  No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of 
which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable.  It is but 
equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the 
people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be 
themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged (WN I.viii.36). 
 
Likewise, Smith discusses the way in which someone in the public eye must be attentive 
to society’s mores and values: 
 
A man of rank and fortune is by his station the distinguished member of a great 
society, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby oblige him to 
attend to every part of it himself.  His authority and consideration depend very 
much upon the respect which this society bears to him.  He dare not do any thing 
which would disgrace or discredit him in it, and he is obliged to a very strict 
observation of that species of morals, whether liberal or austere, which the 
general consent of this society prescribes to persons of his rank and fortune (WN 
V.i.g.12). 
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Drawing these points together, I argue that the concept of mutual sympathy presents a 
very different picture of interpersonal ethics compared to economistic liberalism.  As 
economic sociologists point out well, the latter tends to build from the assumption of 
narrow utilitarian understandings of instrumental rationality, which ultimately means 
that political economy problems are solved by individualising them and denying society.  
From a sympathy perspective, though, the most pressing problem with this is that the 
denial of society serves to erroneously deny contestable interpersonal ethics.  In the 
context of the GFC, a consideration of how notions of ‘credit risk’, broadly understood, 
come to be constructed and legitimised in society presents a telling example of how a 
sympathy perspective sheds light on the potential crisis of ethics at the heart of 
economistic perspectives.     
 
‘Credit risk’ as a feature/crisis of liberal market governance 
There is no single thing called ‘risk’.  For instance in the realm of finance, credit, 
liquidity, and market risks are conceptually distinct.  More deeply, the characteristic of 
different levels of ‘risk’ does not really refer to features inherent in a financial asset 
itself because much depends on who is holding that asset and their capacity to ‘manage’ 
or ‘cope’ with it (Warwick Commission 2009: 16).  In this sense, risk itself depends on 
the behaviour of holders of risk, which is arguably an inherently interpersonal matter.  
Tony Porter (2005: 185) notes that political conflict can be associated with financial risk 
practices ‘in the degree to which they create individual responsibility for one’s 
problems, transforming earlier patterns of mutual obligation into a cold statistical 
socialization of risks … For some this brings an exhilarating sense of freedom, while for 
others it can bring a terrible burden of dealing with hardships alone, without the help of 
others’.  
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How financial risk is understood, managed, and coped with has to be negotiated in 
society and thus might be thought of as subject to ethico-political contestation.  As 
Ulrich Beck (1992: 23) insists, the inescapability of interpretation makes risk more 
broadly infinitely malleable and ‘open to social definition and construction’.  According 
to this socio-cultural understanding of risk, it is ‘manufactured, not only through the 
application of technologies, but also in the making of sense and by the technological 
sensibility of a potential harm, danger or threat’ (Adam and van Loon 2000: 2).  What is 
more, this understanding of risk as ‘necessarily constructed’ makes the politics of ‘risk 
definition’ extremely important (Adam and van Loon 2000: 2-4).  So, while the 
application of particular forms of expertise and knowledge (often sophisticated 
mathematical modelling) may furnish certain risk management practices with 
legitimacy, it is important to pay close attention to the contested nature of who is 
defining what as risk and how.  In other words, according to work in the socio-cultural 
study of risk at least, ‘disembodied information [is] a farce’; rather, ‘knowledge is 
principally embodied, contextual and positional’ and ‘taking up a position and to be 
positioned is inevitably a question of ethics’ (Adam and van Loon 2000: 4).  Crucially, 
Smith’s notion of mutual sympathy might also draw attention to the contestable place of 
risk in society by providing an account of the mechanism through which ethico-political 
norms of and attitudes towards constructions such as risk are negotiated in society. 
 
However, by contrast, mainstream economistic approaches to understanding risk, and in 
particular credit risk in the subprime era, appear to deny this negotiated aspect of risk by 
relying upon – and having extreme faith in – ostensibly disembodied, objective, and 
scientistic representations of risk.  Recent research in IPE and related subjects has 
sought to investigate this by exploring how credit risk has become something which can 
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be seemingly successfully managed using securitisation and risk management 
techniques.  For instance, Langley (2008a: 472) argues that ‘what matters are the ways 
in which the assembly of the socio-technical agency of sub-prime lending ensured that it 
came to appear as a legitimate part of the contemporary financial markets, that is, as 
calculative and scientific’.  He suggests that certain ‘tools and devices’, such as credit 
scoring and risk-based pricing, ‘created the capacity to act and gave meaning to action in 
sub-prime networks, whereby profitable lending appeared as rational and scientific’ 
(Langley 2008a: 474).  Moreover, Langley (2008a: 475) points out that ‘[o]nce 
borrowers were sorted and stratified into risk cohorts through the calculations of credit 
scoring, the charging of relatively high rates of interest in sub-prime lending was de-
politicized and became very difficult to question’.   
 
In a sense, then, recent theories of – and faith in – techniques of credit risk management 
are based on an approach to risk that at least attempts to depoliticise risk by propagating 
a ‘science’ of risk management.  Certainly, in the main, this was the widespread 
approach to risk that developed in the boom period in the run-up to the GFC.  Banks, 
financial institutions, and credit rating agencies believed that existing levels of expertise 
and knowledge had translated the fundamental ambivalence and indeterminacy of risk 
into statements of certainty and quantifiable probabilities.  This led to new levels of 
‘financial engineering’ to manufacture products such as mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS), which became a multitrillion-dollar market on Wall Street (Williams 2010: 91).   
 
In important ways, credit risk mismanagement practices were thus central to the GFC.  
As Anastasia Nesvetailova (2010: 18) points out, ‘[m]ost observers concur that the 
major factor in the global credit crisis was the progressive underestimation, or 
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misunderstanding, of risk by financial agents, based in turn on the general sense of 
stability, economic prosperity and optimistic forecasts that pervaded North Atlantic 
economies and financial markets’.  This of course relates to the well-known story of the 
place of US subprime lending in the GFC (Lanchester 2010).  In his book on the fall of 
Lehman Brothers, Uncontrolled Risk, Mark T. Williams (2010: 102) writes: 
 
Though there is no standard definition of subprime loans, they are generally 
understood to be the riskiest of consumer loans.  Subprime loans had always 
been a niche market relegated to a handful of specialty lenders who were willing 
to assume the greater likelihood of credit default.  In the early 1990s, this was a 
small market segment making up less than 5 percent of home loans.  By the end 
of the decade, securitization, government financial support, and a seal of 
approval from the credit rating agencies had magically legitimized investment in 
subprime mortgages.  Unfortunately, there was only one problem: investment 
banks had not fulfilled their important market role of effectively pricing and 
managing risk.  Product innovation and the race for profit had trumped strong 
risk management. In this atmosphere, at least initially, credit risk was allowed to 
grow and go little noticed. 
 
From a mutual sympathy perspective, which recognises the place of societal 
construction and contestation of interpersonal ethics, the important point is that the 
‘atmosphere’ to which Williams refers is fundamentally ethico-political.  The creation 
and management of credit risk are endeavours that cannot be premised on merely a 
society of autonomous individuals because it relates to something which by its very 
nature is a social construction negotiated within society.  In his book, Subprime Nation, 
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Herman Schwartz (2009: 201) thus rightly draws attention to the political context of US 
subprime lending: 
 
Politically, this crisis marks the high tide of the neoliberal erosion of the 
institutional structure of the Bretton Woods-era Keynesian welfare state in the 
United States.  Neoliberal deregulation came late to housing.  Until the 1990s, 
housing finance had effectively been nationalized and regulated via the effective 
monopoly that the GSEs [Government Sponsored Enterprises] Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac had over mortgage securitization.  During the long 1990s, private 
MBS securitization and the creation of nonvanilla MBSs undermined the GSE 
monopoly and accentuated the risks of borrowing for homeowners and lending 
for the beneficial owners of MBSs.  Housing-related risk was desocialized, 
particularly after 2002, when nonagency MBSs began gaining significant market 
share.  The George W. Bush administration (2000-2008) abetted this expansion 
of private-sector market share by relaxing regulatory standards and suggesting 
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac reduce their presence in the market. 
 
The politics of credit risk management are thus central to an understanding of the GFC.  
Whereas an economistic approach to risk management might make claims to scientistic 
and objective status, a socio-cultural or mutual sympathy perspective recognises that risk 
is created as well as managed.  What is more, the process of creation is understood as an 
imaginative act that involves contestation of ethics, perhaps similar to Smith’s sympathy 
procedure.  For Smith, ‘[s]ympathy forms the foundation of moral judgement by 
devising criteria of acceptable action after repeated similar observations and after 
determination of community judgement’ (Weinstein 2006: 86).  In this sense, Smith’s 
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sympathy is very much ‘dependent on context’ while being both ‘contextual and 
perspectival’ – it is a ‘constant balancing act between self-knowledge and knowledge of 
others’ (Weinstein 2006: 86).  Mutual sympathy thus more fully problematises where the 
construction and contestation of risk takes place. 
 
Read through the lens of Smith’s sympathetic liberalism, the major flaw contained 
within an economistic understanding of credit risk is that it attempts to exclude 
contestable interpersonal ethics at the level of the individual.  It is only through an 
account of financial market agency that allows for contestable interpersonal ethics, such 
as in Smithian mutual sympathy, that the subprime debacle can be properly understood.  
It makes very little sense to deny society, especially in this instance, because what 
counts as acceptable risk-taking as a societal norm is crucial to understanding how 
people view themselves, others, and how they act accordingly.  So, for instance, the 
dream of homeownership has to exist as a cultural product in society in order for 
governments to legitimately promote or allow for schemes to increase homeownership, 
such as subprime lending.  A sympathy perspective recognises that contest, whereas 
notions of an economistic individual cannot grasp a contestation of ethics. 
 
Overall, widespread practices of credit risk management in the run-up to the GFC appear 
to be based on scientistic understandings of risk, which tend to deny the constructed and 
contestable place of risk in society.  The GFC, by placing such practices as subprime 
lending under close scrutiny, can be read as a moment in which risk is re-politicised, or 
at least recognised as a social construct.  What a sympathy perspective adds to this 
conversation is an account of how moments of mutual sympathy represent the 
negotiation of ethico-political standards and how norms come to be formed and 
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contested in society.  In a sense then, rather than attempting to negate or eliminate all 
practices of risk management, a sympathy perspective might merely involve re-
politicising the place of risk in society.  Subprime lending may not be problematic in and 
of itself, but if homeownership is to be promoted by programmes of government, then it 
must be recognised as open to ethico-political contestation at the individual level.  Yet in 
the context of the GFC, read through the lens of Smith’s sympathetic liberalism, 
economistic risk management practices appear to deny this contestation.  In Chapters 5 
and 6, I return to the theme of credit risk at the levels of regulatory and everyday finance 
respectively, in order to further substantiate this claim about the potential crisis of ethics 
at the heart of economistic liberalism. 
 
 
4.3 ‘Of the manner in which we judge…’ 
 
Contestable interpersonal ethics: Towards a re-politicisation of political economy? 
In the first section of this chapter, I presented an account of how Smith’s sympathy 
perspective provides a lens through which to understand the individual that differs 
greatly from the economistic individual.  The former allows for contestable interpersonal 
ethics at the level of the individual, while the latter does not.  In the second section, 
building on this claim, I suggested that Smith’s notion of mutual sympathy provides a 
compelling account of how interpersonal ethics might be formed and contested within 
society, which contrasts with the seeming denial of society in perspectives of the 
economistic mould.  The former understands ethico-political norms to be constructed in 
society, while the latter appears to reject this very process of construction through 
scientistic appeals to objective and disembodied claims to truth.  In this final section, I 
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show how the sympathy procedure, understood by Smith as something of a continual 
process, draws attention to ongoing contestable interpersonal ethics. 
 
Smith introduces the section on ‘the manner in which we judge’ by indicating how 
people come to approve or disapprove: 
 
When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect 
concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear 
to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, 
when, upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide 
with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and 
unsuitable to the causes which excite them (TMS I.i.3.1). 
 
For Smith, the sympathy procedure involves a very active mental process of ethico-
political judgement (Bagolini 1975: 104):   
 
To approve of another man’s opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt 
them is to approve of them.  If the same arguments which convince you convince 
me likewise, I necessarily approve of your conviction; and if they do not, I 
necessarily disapprove of it: neither can I possibly conceive that I should do the 
one without the other.  To approve or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of 
others is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more than to observe their 
agreement or disagreement with our own.  But this is equally the case with 
regard to our approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments or passions of 
others (TMS I.i.3.2).  
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Essentially, Smith presents an account of the interactive formation of ethical standards 
through people’s capacity to perform imaginative acts (Boltanski 2004: 38).  In his 
account, it is through a process of imaginative reconstruction and learning from ‘our 
preceding experience of what our sentiments would commonly correspond with’ that 
such standards are negotiated (TMS I.i.3.4).  This process of negotiation involves an 
imaginative internalisation of another’s position so that it might be judged against 
existing understanding (Teichgraeber 1986: 131): 
 
When we judge in this manner of any affection, as proportioned or 
disproportioned to the cause which excites it, it is scarce possible that we should 
make use of any other rule or canon but the correspondent affection in ourselves.  
If, upon bringing the case home to our own breast, we find that the sentiments 
which it gives occasion to, coincide and tally with our own, we necessarily 
approve of them as proportioned and suitable to their objects; if otherwise, we 
necessarily disapprove of them, as extravagant and out of proportion.  Every 
faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in 
another.  I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason 
by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love.  I 
neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them (TMS I.i.3.9-
10). 
 
Later in TMS, Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ construction becomes central to his account 
of how an individual might negotiate and construct their own ethico-political stance 
(Raphael 1975).  In Smith’s terms, ‘[w]e endeavour to examine our own conduct as we 
imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it’ (TMS III.1.2).  
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Crucially, it is here that he sets out the role of self-tutoring the imagination in his moral 
system: 
 
We begin, upon this account, to examine our own passions and conduct, and to 
consider how these must appear to them, by considering how they would appear 
to us if in their situation.  We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own 
behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce 
upon us.  This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with 
the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct (TMS 
III.1.5). 
 
The self-tutoring element of the imagination is important to Smith because of how he 
believes in a progressive element to learning standards of appropriate behaviour.  As D. 
D. Raphael (2007: 34-35) puts it, for Smith,  
 
the approval and disapproval of oneself that we call conscience is an effect of 
judgements made by spectators.  Each of us judges others as a spectator.  Each of 
us finds spectators judging him.  We then come to judge our own conduct by 
imagining whether an impartial spectator would approve or disapprove of it.  
 
In other words, one must learn how to be a spectator of others before being able to 
develop the capacities of an impartial spectator.  Raphael (2007: 36) makes the further 
point that ‘conscience’ for Smith is not purely ‘a reflection of actual social attitudes’ 
because the impartial spectator, ‘the man within’, may judge differently from the actual 
spectator, ‘the man without’, and so the ‘voice of conscience reflects what I imagine that 
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I, with all my knowledge of the situation, would feel if I were a spectator instead of an 
agent’.  This leads to his argument that Smith’s impartial spectator ‘is disinterested, but 
neither omniscient nor omnipercipient, and he is certainly not dispassionate’ (Raphael 
2007: 44).  In many ways this parallels Stephen McKenna’s (2006: 139) suggestion that 
‘Smith’s impartial spectator concept is less a metaphysics of conscience or a moral 
epistemology than it is a description of a kind of perpetually situated practice’. 
 
Returning to the beginning of TMS, this theme is actually related to how Smith 
understands the imaginative internalisation of another’s position to be always in a sense 
incomplete:  
 
After all this, however, the emotions of the spectator will still be very apt to fall 
short of the violence of what is felt by the sufferer.  Mankind, though naturally 
sympathetic, never conceive, for what has befallen another, that degree of 
passion which naturally animates the person principally concerned.  That 
imaginary change of situation, upon which their sympathy is founded, is but 
momentary.  The thought of their own safety, the thought that they themselves 
are not really the sufferers, continually intrudes itself upon them; and though it 
does not hinder them from conceiving a passion somewhat analogous to what is 
felt by the sufferer, hinders them from conceiving any thing that approaches to 
the same degree of violence (TMS I.i.4.7). 
 
In other words, as Andrew Skinner (1996: 60) explains, in a sense ‘accuracy of 
judgement’ will always be ‘a function of the information available’ such that the 
correspondence of feeling ‘can never be complete’.  Nevertheless, despite being 
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incomplete, the imaginative act is still successful enough to allow interpersonal ethics to 
be formed in society (TMS I.i.4.7). 
 
To summarise, Smith’s account of the sympathy procedure contains a number of related 
aspects.  First, ‘the manner in which we judge’ is an active mental procedure.  ‘Situation, 
impartiality, and information’ are elements that integrate to the form ‘moral-evaluative 
process’ of the sympathetic act (Bagolini 1975: 105).  Second, as a process of 
negotiating standards of interpersonal ethics, it involves an imaginative internalisation 
of another’s situation so that it might be judged against existing understanding (Montes 
2004: 51).  Third, this imaginative internalisation of another’s position is always 
incomplete, yet it is sufficient for the formation of standards of interpersonal ethics 
(TMS I.i.4.7).  In all, these aspects of the sympathy procedure might be thought of as 
pointing towards constantly contestable interpersonal ethics at the individual level: on 
this account, there is no ‘single encompassing description of human behaviour’ (Vaggi 
2004: 31).  This echoes Alec Macfie’s (1967: 57 emphasis added) suggestion that 
Smith’s social rules reflect ‘the constant criticism of the “impartial spectator” and the 
constant pressure of “propriety”’.  
  
Therefore as opposed to a static or predetermined standard of model individual 
behaviour alluded to above in economistic accounts of instrumental rationality, a 
sympathy perspective thus allows for interpersonal ethics to be formed and negotiated in 
particular ways at specific moments in time and space.  In a sense then, for Smith, 
standards of appropriate behaviour develop over time as societies change and as such are 
relative to them, at least in the sense that the content of notions of impartiality and 
interpretations of ‘fair play’ depend on the socio-historical situation of the individual 
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concerned (Macfie 1967: 83-84).  At certain times, particular configurations of 
appropriate standards of ethico-political behaviour will be formed and legitimated by 
feelings of mutual sympathy, but this does not rule out indeterminable contestation over 
appropriate standards of ethico-political behaviour.  This picks up on McKenna’s (2006: 
139) point that: 
 
As Smith describes moral development, virtue is possible as an unintended 
consequence of rhetorical practice.  This consequence is not merely random or 
fortuitous, but comes out of the nature of communication: humans cannot 
communicate intentions or sentiments directly to one another and so avail 
themselves of adaptations of language to speaker, audience, subject, and context 
to do this.  Smith thus rejects the either/or fallacy of a choice between 
foundational knowledge (or transcendent criteria) on the one hand or pure 
contingency of value on the other as a basis for morality. 
 
On the one hand, given its allowance for historical, spatial, and cultural specificity, 
Smith’s sympathy perspective might be viewed as an imprecise and even confused 
understanding of interpersonal ethics for political economy.  Especially in light of more 
rigid assumptions of instrumental rationality, to insist on contestable interpersonal ethics 
might appear ineffectual.  However, more plausibly, on the other hand, Smith’s 
sympathy perspective might instead be celebrated as re-politicising political economy by 
fundamentally opening up contestable interpersonal ethics at the site of the individual.  
In this view, the ‘individual is not a purely passive actor’, as it might be in an 
economistic approach, because market-oriented behaviour is understood to evolve from 
‘the existing social and institutional framework’ (Vaggi 2004: 36).  Rather than assume 
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away or deny ethico-political contestation, the sympathy procedure invites IPE to 
grapple with the constitution of market-oriented behaviour as a foundational problem of 
political economy.   
 
In important ways, then, Smith’s sympathy procedure leaves open some primary 
questions of political economy.  Most forcefully, the formation and reproduction of 
market-oriented behaviour is left open to ethico-political contestation depending on 
historical circumstance and prevailing custom.  For instance, in WN, as just one example 
of how this might be understood, Smith himself gives an account of how the problematic 
political economy question of the distinction between needs and wants is ultimately only 
resolvable based on circumstance and custom:  
 
By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably 
necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders 
it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without.  A linen 
shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life.  The Greeks and 
Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen.  But in the 
present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer 
would be ashamed to appear in publick without a linen shirt, the want of which 
would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is 
presumed, no body can well fall into without extreme bad conduct.  Custom, in 
the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England …  
Under necessaries therefore, I comprehend, not only those things which nature, 
but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary 
to the lowest rank of people.  All other things, I call luxuries; without meaning 
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by this appellation, to throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate 
use of them.  Beer and ale, for example, in Great Britain, and wine, even in the 
wine countries, I call luxuries.  A man of any rank may, without any reproach, 
abstain totally from tasting such liquors.  Nature does not render them necessary 
for the support of life; and custom no where renders it indecent to live without 
them (WN V.ii.k.3). 
 
Overall, therefore, without dwelling on the contemporary relevance of this particular 
discussion more pertinent to Smith’s time, it is possible to see how a sympathy 
perspective that takes seriously the ongoing contestation of interpersonal ethics begins to 
open up extremely important questions for political economy that are otherwise closed 
down in economistic approaches.  To take seriously the idea that the ethico-political 
constitution of market-oriented behaviour can be understood as open, reflexive, and yet 
to be decided, might serve to re-politicise problems of liberal market governance that are 
restricted under economistic liberalism by the denial of contestable ethics at the 
individual level.  In the context of the GFC as a problem of contemporary liberal 
governance, I now use a discussion of ‘personal debt’ to illustrate this claim and indicate 
the potential crisis of ethics at the heart of economistic liberalism. 
 
‘Personal debt’ as a feature/crisis of liberal market governance 
Closely related to the issues of financialisation in general, and asset-based welfare and 
credit risk in particular, is the conundrum of how to understand and cope with personal 
debt.  As indicated above, financialisation has received a great deal of attention in IPE 
and related literatures and, increasingly, it is recognised as a pervasive social process 
that extends beyond a series of relations that merely link individuals directly to capital 
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markets (French et al. 2011).  In fact, Johnna Montgomerie (2009: 10) suggests that 
more deeply in the run-up to the GFC there was ‘a consensus among policy makers that 
debt was a virtue, rather than a vice, for the economy as rational individuals, guided by 
their own preferences, responded to economic stimuli and in doing so created wealth and 
economic expansion’.  She further argues that financialisation is ‘unique’ in a sense 
because it ‘incorporated ongoing processes of socioeconomic transformation through 
households’ use of unsecured debt’ (Montgomerie 2009: 15).  Moreover, ‘everyday 
actions ultimately legitimised financialisation as a broader process of economic 
expansion despite deepening inequality and the intensifying financial insecurity 
experienced by middle-income households’ (Montgomerie 2009: 15).  In many ways, 
then, personal debt plays a significant role in debates on the constitution of market-
oriented behaviour. 
 
In the subprime era, arguably financialisation facilitated and even promoted the 
expansion of personal debt.  Based on the explicit assumption that acquiring debt 
allowed households to benefit from rising asset prices in stock and property markets, 
practices of financialisation certainly went largely unquestioned in economistic 
approaches to liberal market governance.  For instance, subprime mortgages themselves 
‘made sense only in an economic environment in which housing prices kept going up, 
enabling their mortgagers to refinance into a conforming mortgage at lower interest 
rates’ (Schwartz 2009: 225).  The problem, as Montgomerie (2009) alludes to, is that the 
prevailing view of debt as entirely virtuous if it facilitates access and even contributes to 
the gains of economic expansion, was based on an economistic interpretation of 
instrumentally rational individuals responding appropriately to external economic 
stimuli.  In such a scenario, ethico-political questions related to such things as excess, 
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sustainability, or suffering do not really enter the picture because people are assumed to 
be acting perfectly properly, with both creditors and debtors alike proceeding as good 
financial citizens helping to contribute to economic expansion.  Within such a 
framework, it appears that the sort of constant contestation over interpersonal ethics that 
a sympathy perspective might point towards is ignored.  
 
Such problems are further compounded by the fact that ‘[r]isk-based pricing not only 
found form in the assembly of agency in sub-prime lending … but simultaneously 
extended the agglomeration of borrowers and would-be borrowers as a governable 
population of mass financial consumers’ (Langley 2008a: 475).  Again, as with 
government programmes that promote a move towards asset-based welfare, this 
assembly of economistic agency involves shifting attitudes towards finance and the self.  
In particular, during ‘the consumer credit boom … prudence and thrift are displaced by 
new moral and calculative self-disciplines of responsibly and entrepreneurially meeting, 
managing and manipulating ever-increasing outstanding obligations’ (Langley 2008b: 
135).  Through economistic liberal market governance, then, there is seemingly at least 
an attempt to depoliticise personal debt by inducing market-oriented selfhood which 
accepts debt as perfectly legitimate and actually part of the rational exercising of good 
financial citizenship.  
 
In many ways, recent interest in cultural political economy is extremely useful in this 
regard as it provides the kinds of insights about the cultivation of market-oriented 
behaviour in which Smith was interested.  Langley (2008a: 489) argues that ‘while not 
identifying an unscrupulous or “bad” collective interest to be clearly and unambiguously 
opposed, cultural economy nonetheless opens up political space in sub-prime lending’. 
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Most significantly, such lines of thinking re-politicise debt as a problem of liberal 
market governance in a similar way to how a sympathy perspective might.  For instance, 
Langley (2008b: 143-144) also rightly notes: 
 
The contradictions of financialized and transformed consumer credit networks 
are also experienced, lived and negotiated by borrowers.  The performance of the 
subject position of the responsible and entrepreneurial borrower is necessarily 
partial and incomplete, and is especially problematic for those on low incomes.  
Representations of borrowers as disconnected figures that are disembedded from 
all other social relations cannot be maintained. 
 
In this sense, as Danny Schechter (2007: xxvii) points out, the so-called 
‘democratization of credit’ has actually led to ‘the democratization of dependency’.  
Relatedly, Montgomerie (2006: 112) points out that the ‘precipitous rise in Anglo-
American household indebtedness in the mid-1990s was an inadvertent outcome of the 
concomitant process of wage stagnation and financial services liberalization’.  
Households became more dependent on debt because of political strategies to pursue 
‘non-inflationary growth policy’, which involved significant government commitments 
to price stability rather than full employment, and the ‘structural transformation of 
labour and financial services markets’ (Montgomerie 2006: 112).  In other words, for 
Montgomerie (2006: 120), ‘rising household debt levels should be considered a product 
of the historical continuity between the growing demand for credit by households and 
the increased supply of credit by banks’.  In the context of the ostensible financialisation 
of society, such arguments draw attention to the structurally unequal nature of creditor-
debtor relations which might be entirely overlooked by economistic perspectives.  In 
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contrast to an understanding of behaviour as instrumentally rational, which is unable to 
even engage with ethico-political contestation about the appropriate place of personal 
debt in society, a Smithian sympathy perspective at the very least problematises creditor-
debtor relations by recognising them as part of contestable interpersonal ethics. 
 
Interestingly, in her book Payback, Margaret Atwood (2008: 2) has written about debt as 
‘an imaginative construct’ that in many ways parallels how a sympathy perspective 
might recognise the complex nature and ongoing contestability of creditor-debtor 
relations.  Smith’s sympathy procedure, after all, is about the imaginative internalisation 
of another’s position in order to negotiate standards of interpersonal ethics (Teichgraeber 
1986: 131).  As part of this process, ideas about the role of debt in society thus might be 
problematised and recognised as inherently political, rather than assumed away as 
normal.  Atwood (2008: 50-51 emphasis in original) writes: 
 
Borrowing and lending would seem to exist in a shadowland – neither ‘taking’ 
nor ‘trading’ – changing their natures depending on the final outcome.  They’re 
like those riddles in fairy tales: Come to me neither naked nor clothed, neither on 
the road not off it, neither walking nor riding.  A borrowed object or sum is 
neither taken nor is it traded.  It exists in a shadowland between the two: if the 
interest exacted for a loan is of a loan-shark magnitude, the transaction verges on 
theft from the debtor; if the object or sum is never returned, it also verges on 
theft, this time from the creditor.  Thus it’s ‘taking,’ not ‘trading.’  But if the 
object is borrowed and then returned with a reasonable amount of interest, it’s 
clearly trading.  Hostage-taking is the same kind of shadowland transaction: part 
theft or taking, part trade. 
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In sum, drawing these points together, a consideration of personal debt can be used to 
illustrate important differences between an economistic and a sympathetic approach to 
liberal market governance.  The former tends to deny contestable interpersonal ethics 
which means that issues such as personal debt are ostensibly depoliticised.  The latter 
insists on the ongoing contestability of the constitution of market-oriented behaviour 
such that creditor-debtor relations are understood as inherently ethico-political.  So 
while in the run up to the GFC financialisation and debt were largely seen as 
unproblematic in economistic liberal approaches, a sympathy perspective that mirrors 
interest in cultural political economy at the very least problematises and re-politicises 
financialisation in general and creditor-debtor relations in particular.   
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
I have covered a lot of ground in this chapter.  My central purpose was to mobilise the 
idea of pragmatic historiography (Chapter 1) by using a Smithian sympathy perspective 
to critically engage in a dialogic conversation with certain aspects of contemporary 
economistic liberalism.  This task will only be fully completed in the final two chapters 
which further analyse economistic liberalism at the regulatory and everyday levels of 
finance respectively.  Yet, in this chapter I introduced the conceptual building blocks on 
which this more empirically-focussed engagement will take place.  Taking direct 
inspiration from Smith’s texts so as to maintain a historicised reading, I introduced an 
outline of his sympathy perspective built up in three stages: sympathy, mutual sympathy, 
and the sympathy procedure.  Each of these, I suggest, correspond to three foundational 
features of contemporary liberal market governance that can be explored as potential 
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sites of a crisis at the heart of economistic liberalism: asset-based welfare, credit risk, 
and personal debt.  In the following two chapters, I use these sites of crisis as the central 
themes on which to engage economistic liberalism in the context of the GFC in order to 
illustrate the use of a sympathy perspective. 
 
In the first section introducing sympathy, I made the basic point that whereas 
economistic liberalism tends to build from assumptions about instrumentally rational 
behaviour, a sympathy perspective conceives market-oriented behaviour to be both the 
outcome of and inherently involved with contestable interpersonal ethics at the 
individual level.  Then, I made the argument that asset-based systems of welfare 
represent a central aspect of financialisation tendencies in the GFC that can be 
understood as an attempt to exclude interpersonal ethics from economic behaviour by 
inducing an economistic and autonomous individual detached from the rest of society.  
Smith’s sympathetic liberalism indicates how this economism is ultimately flawed 
because to deny contestable ethics at the individual level is to deny people the ability to 
realise market-oriented forms of behaviour in the first place. 
 
In the second section, I argued that the concept of mutual sympathy presents a very 
different depiction of interpersonal ethics compared to economistic liberalism.  The 
latter tends to build from the assumption of narrow utilitarian understandings of 
instrumental rationality, which ultimately means that political economy problems are 
solved by individualising them and denying society.  From a sympathy perspective, 
though, the major conceptual problem with this denial of society is that it erroneously 
serves to deny contestable interpersonal ethics as well.  Then I suggested that 
widespread practices of credit risk management in the run-up to the GFC appear to be 
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based on scientistic understandings of risk, which tend to contradict the constructed and 
contestable place of risk in society.  What a sympathy perspective adds to this 
conversation, by contrast, is an account of how moments of mutual sympathy represent 
the negotiation of ethico-political standards and how such norms of risk come to be 
formed and contested in society.   
 
Finally, in the third section, I illustrated how a sympathy perspective that takes seriously 
the ongoing contestation of interpersonal ethics begins to open up extremely important 
questions for political economy that are otherwise closed down in economistic 
approaches.  I argued that to take full account of the idea that the ethico-political 
constitution of market-oriented behaviour is open, reflexive, and yet to be decided, 
might serve to re-politicise certain problems of liberal market governance that are 
restricted under economistic liberalism.  Furthermore, I suggested that by attempting to 
deny contestable interpersonal ethics, economistic liberalism tends to depoliticise 
creditor-debtor relations whereas a sympathy perspective would insist that, as with all 
formations of market-oriented behaviour, they are inherently ethico-political and 
continually contestable. 
 
Overall, this chapter can be read as an application of Smithian sympathetic liberalism in 
order to provide an illustrative conceptual critique of economistic liberalism.  In many 
ways, at the conceptual level, what I have referred to as ‘economistic liberalism’ is 
essentially tied to, but is not a synonym for, mainstream academic economics and 
attendant approaches in IPE that tend to be categorised as part of the ‘liberal tradition’ of 
political economy.  A conceptual critique of economistic liberalism of this sort in 
relation to the GFC is of significance for a number of reasons.  For a start, it has been 
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suggested that ‘the global meltdown … is a crisis of economics as a profession as much 
as it is the crisis of finance’ (Nesvetailova 2010: 170).  Indeed, even the University of 
Chicago professor and conservative author Richard Posner (2009: 260 emphasis added) 
has suggested that ‘[e]xcessive deregulation of the financial industry was a government 
failure abetted by the political and ideological commitments of mainstream economists’.  
  
Yet, moving beyond this, I want to make the case that the GFC provides an illustration 
of how there is a crisis of ethics at the very heart of economistic liberalism as it comes to 
be embodied in liberal market governance.  In the next two chapters, then, I demonstrate 
the potential of what might be called a ‘sympathy perspective’ by applying it to the 
issues of asset-based welfare, credit risk, and personal debt in order to substantiate this 
claim about the crisis of ethics.   At these three sites of finance, it can be shown that the 
economistic approach to liberal market governance tends to deny the contestable place 
of interpersonal ethics at the individual level.  By contrast, a Smithian sympathy 
perspective developed from a historicised account of his work (Chapter 3), at the very 
least, problematises and opens up contestable ethico-political space at these important 
sites of finance intimately involved with the GFC. 
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CHAPTER 5 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Regulatory Financial Market Agency and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
In the same year that America declared its independence, Adam Smith published 
his famous treatise, The Wealth of Nations, in which he argued that the pursuit of 
self-interest would lead to the general well-being of society.  A hundred and 
seventy-five years later, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, using the Walrasian 
model, explained what was required for Smith’s insight to be correct (Stiglitz 
2010b: 241). 
 
As Chairman of the United Nation’s (2010) The Stiglitz Report: Reforming the 
International Monetary and Financial Systems in the Wake of the Global Crisis, Joseph 
Stiglitz is a global leader in financial market governance.  Given my interest in engaging 
economistic liberalism in a dialogic conversation with Smith’s sympathetic liberalism 
outlined in the previous chapter, it is of particular significance how someone in Stiglitz’s 
position interprets Smith because, as I have argued, the contest over historiographical 
issues can perform a significant role in the very construction of contemporary debates 
themselves.  Plainly, though, as the above quotation reveals, Stiglitz appears to fall foul 
of at least one of Skinner’s basic mythologies of interpretation.  In addition to the 
‘misdescription’ of meaning in the claim that ‘the pursuit of self-interest would lead to 
the general well-being of society’, surely it is to submit to a mythology of parochialism 
to claim that later economists were able to prove that Smith was ‘correct’ through the 
use of a subsequent, and distinctly different, ‘Walrasian model’ (Watson 2005b)?  This 
problem of ‘historical foreshortening’ is seemingly not discerned by economistic 
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interpretations such as Stiglitz’s, even though it is highly imprudent to even attempt to 
employ Smith’s ideas without seeking to provide a historicised account.  In this chapter, 
by contrast, I want to build on my historicised account of Smith constructed in Chapters 
3 and 4 to further my analysis of economistic liberalism at the regulatory level of 
finance.  
 
In the previous chapter I mobilised the idea of pragmatic historiography by using a 
Smithian sympathy perspective to critically engage in a dialogic conversation with 
certain aspects of contemporary economistic liberalism.  Taking direct inspiration from 
Smith’s texts, I introduced an outline of his sympathy perspective built up in three 
stages: sympathy, mutual sympathy, and the sympathy process.  Each of these, I 
suggested, correspond to three foundational (and interrelated) features of contemporary 
liberal market governance that can be explored as potential sites of a crisis at the heart of 
economistic liberalism: asset-based welfare, credit risk, and personal debt.  In this 
chapter, I use these sites of finance as the central themes in regulatory discourse on 
which to engage economistic liberalism in the context of the GFC in order to illustrate 
the use of a sympathy perspective. 
 
In the first section, I expand on the argument that asset-based systems of welfare 
represent a central aspect of financialisation tendencies involved in the GFC that can be 
understood as an attempt to exclude interpersonal ethics from market-oriented behaviour 
by inducing an economistic and autonomous individual detached from the rest of 
society.  Smith’s sympathetic liberalism indicates how this economism is ultimately 
flawed because to deny contestable ethics at the individual level is to deny people the 
ability to realise market-oriented forms of behaviour in the first place.  Specifically, I 
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illustrate how asset-based systems of welfare, advocated by regulatory institutions even 
in their assessments of the GFC, are based on assumptions of instrumentally rational 
behaviour that serves to deny contestable interpersonal ethics.  Instrumentally rational 
behaviour is promoted at the regulatory level as asset-based welfare is left unquestioned 
and the consequences of this are revealed in the contradictory attempts to assign 
responsibility for the GFC in these assessments. 
 
In the second section, I expand on the suggestion that widespread practices of credit risk 
management in the run-up to and during the GFC appear to be based on scientistic 
understandings of risk, which tend to contradict the constructed and contestable place of 
risk in society.  What a sympathy perspective adds to this conversation is an account of 
how moments of mutual sympathy represent the negotiation of ethico-political standards 
and how such norms of risk come to be formed and contested in society.  Specifically, I 
illustrate how techniques of credit risk management, advocated by regulatory institutions 
both before and during the crisis, are based on assumptions of instrumentally rational 
behaviour that essentially exclude contestable interpersonal ethics by individualising 
risk.  Instrumentally rational behaviour is promoted at the regulatory level as risk 
management is normalised in society and the consequences of this are revealed in the 
flawed scientistic approaches to understanding the crisis. 
 
Finally, in the third section, I expand on the argument that by attempting to deny 
contestable interpersonal ethics, economistic liberalism tends to depoliticise creditor-
debtor relations whereas a sympathy perspective would insist that, as with all formations 
of market-oriented behaviour, they are inherently ethico-political and continually 
contestable.  Specifically, I illustrate how the ways in which regulatory institutions treat 
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issues of personal debt both before and during the crisis, are based on assumptions of 
instrumentally rational behaviour that essentially exclude contestable interpersonal 
ethics in credit-debt relations.  Instrumentally rational behaviour is promoted at the 
regulatory level as debt is depoliticised and the consequences of this are revealed in how 
taking on personal debt to maintain or improve standards of living is understood as 
appropriate behaviour before and in response to the crisis. 
 
This chapter takes its cue from the suggestion that the GFC is not merely a moment of 
instability in an otherwise well-ordered and successful political settlement for finance, 
but is more of a signifier event drawing attention to the deeper changes and potential 
contradictions related to ongoing processes of financialisation (Brassett et al. 2010).  
One such probable site of contradiction might be the construction of financial market 
agency that is contained within regulatory accounts of and responses to the crisis.  As 
Andrew Gamble (2010: 6) suggests, ‘[a]lmost everyone agrees now that there was over-
borrowing and under-saving both in the public and private sectors, and that the markets 
ran ahead much too far and too fast’.  However, he continues, a ‘growing literature 
analyses how national economies have become increasingly reliant on policies that 
promote financialisation and on the provision of cheap credit.  Re-regulating the 
financial markets in the wake of the crash may not be easy to accomplish if it is seen as 
substantially weakening one of the main contributors to the growth and prosperity of the 
last two decades’ (Gamble 2010: 7).  Put another way, the GFC presents an interesting 
conundrum at the regulatory level: on the one hand, over-borrowing and under-regulated 
markets come up for potential blame for the crisis – in part the problematic summoning 
of overly-financialised individuals – while, on the other hand, re-regulating national 
economies in response to the crisis might involve challenging some of the very 
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fundamental tenets of financialisation, which is problematic in a context in which 
market-oriented behaviour is increasingly understood and constituted in financialised 
terms. 
 
In this chapter, I demonstrate how a sympathy perspective indicates some of the 
problems of continuing to treat financial market agency in economistic terms.  At the 
three sites of finance explored at the regulatory level, the GFC is understood as a crisis 
based on the denial of contestable ethics at the individual level.  When asset-based 
welfare goes unquestioned, when risk management is normalised to the everyday, and 
when creditor-debt relations are depoliticised, an economistic approach to financial 
market agency can be demonstrated to be reproduced, even though it is ultimately 
flawed on its own terms.  By contrast, a Smithian sympathy perspective, at the very 
least, problematises and opens up contestable ethico-political space at these important 
sites of finance intimately involved with the GFC. 
 
 
5.1 The regulatory governance of asset-based welfare  
 
In this section, I show how in the regulatory governance of asset-based welfare there is 
an attempt to exclude interpersonal ethics from market-oriented behaviour.  In other 
words, I illustrate how asset-based systems of welfare, advocated by regulatory 
institutions even in their assessment of and response to the GFC, are based on 
assumptions of instrumentally rational behaviour that serve to deny contestable 
interpersonal ethics.  Such behaviour is promoted at the regulatory level as asset-based 
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welfare is left unquestioned and the consequences of this are revealed in the 
contradictory attempts to assign responsibility for the GFC. 
 
A central feature of asset-based systems of welfare is at the heart of the GFC: 
homeownership.  As with many previous booms and busts, US house price gyrations are 
understood to have inflicted significant costs on the world economy (IMF 2011a: 112).  
The way in which declining US house prices led to the ‘subprime crisis’, through the 
ensuing ‘credit crunch’, to the full-blown world recession is part of the well-known story 
of the GFC (Gamble 2009).  Certainly, the regulatory discourse picks up on the pivotal 
place of homeownership – or more accurately attempts at homeownership – in the crisis. 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) (2011: 6) notes how ‘familiar market 
mechanisms were … transformed’ as investors around the world sought to purchase 
securities built on US real estate: ‘seemingly one of the safest bets in the world’.  But as 
weak origination standards contributed to rising delinquencies in the US subprime 
market, the asset-backed security collaterised debt obligation (ABS CDO) market seized 
up when credit rating agencies announced widespread downgrades of subprime 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in July 2007, and the problems in the 
credit markets spilled over into short-term money markets as banks became concerned 
about the adequacy of their capital and the size of their balance sheets (BIS 2008a: 12).  
The securitisation of ‘poorly underwritten’ residential mortgages, particularly US 
subprime loans, eventually transmitted significant losses to the banking, securities, and 
insurance sectors globally (FSB 2011: 6).  
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Financial responsibility and the character of subprime 
The FCIC (2011: xxiii) stresses that the crisis cannot be put down to the actions of ‘a 
few bad actors’.  Yet, at the same time, it also points out that ‘the breadth of this crisis 
does not mean that “everyone is at fault”’ (FCIC 2011: xxiii).  Who then bears 
responsibility for the GFC?  On the one hand, the FCIC (2011: 125 emphasis added) 
describes how lending standards ‘collapsed’ because of a ‘significant failure of 
accountability and responsibility throughout each level of the lending system’.  In this 
sense, the notion of ‘subprime’ refers to something much wider than a particular 
borrower group: it represents ‘an unprecedented, broad-based erosion of credit 
standards’ (Zandi 2009: 33).  Yet, on the other hand, the question of who is creditworthy 
and who is uncreditworthy when it comes to acquiring a residential mortgage is one that 
figures right at the heart of the subprime crisis.  In the regulatory discourse, there is 
certainly an emphasis placed on the character of the subprime borrower.  As is well-
known, they are understood to typically have one of more of the following 
characteristics: ‘weak credit histories that include payment delinquencies and 
bankruptcies; reduced repayment capacity as measured by credit scores or debt-to-
income ratios; or incomplete credit histories’ (IMF 2007b: 7fn).  
 
Given these characteristics, the regulatory discourse tends to openly suggest that the 
extension of mortgage credit to those who were in some sense ‘unworthy’ was a major 
contributing factor to the undermining of an otherwise successful securitisation model.  
For instance, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2008a: 12) points to the 
‘extremely weak’ underwriting standards for subprime mortgages which contained 
‘multiple layers of risk’ including ‘less creditworthy borrowers, high cumulative loan-to-
value ratios, and limited or no verification of the borrower’s income’.  This of course is 
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part of the ‘predatory lending’ phenomenon widely recognised as a foundational feature 
of the subprime debacle (e.g. Nesvetailova 2010: 111; Stiglitz 2010b: 175; Zandi 2009: 
97).  The FCIC (2011: xxiii) also notes the fundamental problem of weak origination 
standards:  ‘Many mortgage lenders set the bar so low that lenders simply took eager 
borrowers’ qualifications on faith, often with a willful disregard for a borrower’s ability 
to pay’.  It reports how in the first half of 2005 nearly one-quarter of all mortgages made 
were interest-only loans, and that for the year as a whole, 68% of ‘option ARM 
[adjustable-rate mortgage]’ loans originated by Countrywide and Washington Mutual 
(both later bailed-out by the US Government) had ‘low’ or no-documentation 
requirements (FCIC 2011: xxiii).  Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(2008a: 5fn) states that in early 2008, the increasing rate of US foreclosures appeared to 
be ‘a function of fraud, speculation, over-extension by borrowers, and the effects of 
weak underwriting standards’.  It states that ‘highly-leveraged nonprime lending’ was 
driven by a combination of low interest rates and rapidly rising house prices, which 
‘masked the plummeting lending standards, since the overstretched borrowers found it 
easy to refinance or sell the house at a profit’ (IMF 2009b: 92). 
 
Moreover, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2011: 6) suggests that the surge in 
mortgage lending and house price growth experienced in the US – and the UK as well – 
involved more emphasis being placed on property valuations rather than assessments of 
a borrower’s capacity to repay.  These countries also witnessed the development of new 
‘riskier products that made use of more relaxed product terms, liberal underwriting and 
increased lending to higher-risk borrowers’ (FSB 2011: 6).  In response, the FSB (2011: 
4) recommends more thorough verification processes regarding a borrower’s ability to 
repay.  Therefore it welcomes the stringent lending requirements that the US Dodd-
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Frank Act 2010 imposes on lending, including the instruction that ‘[c]reditors are 
required to make a reasonable and good faith determination, based on verified and 
documented information, that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay a 
residential mortgage loan’ (FSB 2011: 15).  The FSB (2011: 21-22) also champions the 
use of a loan-to-value cap on mortgage lending because ‘[m]eaningful initial down 
payment requirements help to validate borrower capacity as well as ensure necessary 
commitment to the obligation’.  Furthermore, it suggests that future house price 
appreciation ought not to be considered in the evaluation of a borrower’s ability to repay 
a mortgage loan (FSB 2011: 23). 
 
What was governments’ role in producing these weaker lending standards?  The FCIC 
(2011: xxvii) reports that successive US governments set ‘aggressive homeownership 
goals with the desire to extend credit to families previously denied access to the 
financial markets’.  However, it continues, ‘the government failed to ensure that the 
philosophy of opportunity was being matched by the practical realities on the ground’ 
because the Federal Reserve and other regulators did not rein in ‘irresponsible lending’ 
(FCIC 2011: xxvii).  Therefore, the FCIC (2011: xxvii) suggests that ‘the talk of 
opportunity was tragically at odds with the reality of a financial disaster in the making’. 
 
In terms of government participation in the US housing market, tax breaks and subsidies 
are widely recognised to have promoted homeownership, which in turn are thought to 
have encouraged higher levels of household debt, a relaxation of lending standards, and 
upward pressure on property prices (FCIC 2011: 424; IMF 20011a: 130; 143; OECD 
2009: 49).  The government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were a 
key part of this government promotion of homeownership as they played a central role 
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in providing liquidity to the mortgage market and leading the securitisation process 
(IMF 2008b: 34).  The Community Reinvestment Act 1979 is also singled out because it 
encouraged lending in low-income neighbourhoods which in turn ‘promoted the 
purchase of more and bigger homes than would otherwise have been possible, 
exacerbating leverage and the severity of boom-and-bust dynamics’ (IMF 2011a: 130).  
Crucially, the FCIC (2011: 230) notes that community lending commitments not 
required by the Act were ‘clearly used by lending institutions for public relations 
purposes’.  
 
Perhaps because of their understanding of the perfectibility of the securitisation model, a 
great deal of the regulatory discourse refers to the distorted ‘incentives’ that led lenders 
to extend mortgages to those who ought not to have had access.  Specifically, the 
suggestion is frequently made that the source of these perverse incentives was strong 
investor demand.  For instance, the BIS (2008a: 7) suggests that origination standards in 
newly securitised asset classes were ‘driven by the requirements of investors as much as 
by the credit views of the firms that originate the credits’: demand from investors for 
ABS CDO tranches therefore in some ways ‘drove’ the growth in the US subprime 
market.  As such, lenders ‘had weak incentives to maintain underwriting standards given 
the strong investor demand for subprime risk’ (BIS 2008a: 12; BIS 2005: 55).  The 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) (2008: 8) concurs that high investor demand for 
securitised products ‘weakened the incentives of underwriters and sponsors to maintain 
adequate underwriting standards’.  It notes that lax loan underwriting included 
unverified borrower information and clear indications of fraud (FSF 2008: 36).  
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Reading across the regulatory account of the GFC, it is possible to discern a notable 
level of agreement over the fundamental problem of the character of the subprime 
borrower.  Specifically, the subprime borrower displays the character traits that are 
potentially threatening to the securitisation model if credit is extended to them on too 
lenient terms.  In the build up to the GFC, ‘they’ were extended access to 
homeownership based on the promise of asset-based welfare with ultimately disastrous 
consequences.  As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke lamented to the FCIC 
(2011: 423), at one point ‘both lenders and borrowers became convinced that house 
prices would only go up’.  This led to house price rises becoming a ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecy’ because borrowers were granted loans on the ‘expectation that accumulating 
home equity would soon allow refinancing into more sustainable mortgages’ (Bernanke 
cited in FCIC 2011: 423). 
 
Incidentally, a few years earlier, Bernanke himself gave a rather different account of this 
suggestion that borrowers were at fault for expecting house prices to continue on an 
upward trend.  In May 2007, only a matter of months before the housing market 
nosedived, Bernanke (2007) attempted to reassure US homeowners that there were no 
dangers visible to existing prices and that potential homeowners should actually assume 
the continued one-way trajectory of prices: 
 
All that said, given the fundamental factors in place that should support the 
demand for housing, we believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector 
on the broader housing market will likely be limited, and we do not expect 
significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to 
the financial system.  The vast majority of mortgages, including even subprime 
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mortgages, continue to perform well.  Past gains in house prices have left most 
homeowners with significant amounts of home equity, and growth in jobs and 
incomes should help keep the financial obligations of most households 
manageable. 
 
Thus while lenders, regulators, and governments are identified as at least complicit in 
the subprime debacle, it is the subprime borrower who is ultimately subject to a large 
degree of ‘blame’.  In a sense, the behaviour of the subprime borrower is therefore 
highlighted as at least one significant cause of the GFC.  This is the case even though for 
the most part the idea of a subprime borrower did not really have a defined collective 
personality – at least not one that existed in much of the mainstream commentary 
coming by market watchers – until the collapse came.   The FCIC (2011: 7) reports that 
‘[m]any people chose poorly’, sometimes living ‘beyond their means’ and chose non-
traditional mortgages ‘because that was the only way they could get a foothold’ in areas 
with high property prices.  Some of these choices are said to be the result of certain 
inadequacies on behalf of borrowers – for instance, if they did not understand the terms 
of their mortgage or did not appreciate the risks attached to declining house values 
(FCIC 2011: 424). 
 
A paper in a US Federal Reserve discussion series corroborates this line of argument by 
pointing to the role of ‘borrower confusion’ and how ‘a sizable number of adjustable-
rate borrowers … do not know the terms of their contracts’ (Bucks and Pence 2006: 2).  
Notably, the authors suggest that ‘households with low income and less education are 
less likely to know their mortgage terms’ (Bucks and Pence 2006: 3).  The Federal 
Reserve also expresses concern that many subprime borrowers ‘may not fully 
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understand the risks and consequences’ of obtaining certain kinds of mortgages (Board 
of Governors 2007: 2).  In all, the regulatory depiction of the flawed subprime borrower 
can be summed up by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD) (2009: 64 emphasis added) suggestion that:  
 
Financial risks have been increasingly transferred to individuals in recent 
decades. Not only do defined-contribution pension plans transfer longevity and 
investment risks to individuals, but the crisis has exposed an array of 
vulnerabilities where poorly-prepared households endangered their own 
financial security by purchasing inappropriate products.  
 
From a sympathy perspective, it is possible to note how this economistic treatment of 
responsibility for welfare or ‘financial security’ is expressed in distinctly individualised 
terms.  Rather than understanding market-oriented behaviour as constituted by 
contestation over interpersonal ethics, the regulatory discourse tends to be deeply 
economistic in its outlook by reinforcing standards of instrumentally rational behaviour.  
The highly ethico-political contention that people should take complete personal 
responsibility for their own welfare and security is therefore left unquestioned.  The 
notion that a credit-debt relation is inherently unequal and therefore an ethico-political 
question is entirely overlooked.  By contrast, as explored in the previous chapter, 
Smith’s conception of the sympathy procedure differs markedly from what is being 
suggested here in financialised terms.  The crucial point is that, contra assumptions of 
instrumental rationality, by taking Smith’s sympathy seriously, market-oriented 
behaviour is understood to be both the outcome of and inherently involved with 
contestable interpersonal ethics at the individual level.   
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Financial ‘education’ and the reinforcement of asset-based welfare 
The potential crisis of ethics is revealed more fully in the regulatory attempt to ‘educate’ 
people out of the subprime debacle.  In response to the identified problem of subprime 
borrower ‘confusion’ and ‘poor’ decision-making, there is an emphasis in the regulatory 
discourse on ‘educating’ people to act more rationally in their financial affairs to help 
prevent future crises and to ‘better equip individuals to deal with a more complex world’ 
(OECD 2009: 64).  Most explicitly, the OECD (2009: 65 emphasis added) suggests that 
it is ‘important that [government] policies are accompanied by education that promotes 
rational household decision making, in order to avoid future crises’.  Stressing the 
benefits of this ‘education’, it also notes how this ‘rational’ behaviour serves to 
legitimate government responses themselves: ‘Effective financial education and 
awareness campaigns help individuals to understand financial risks and products and 
thus take decisions better adapted to their personal circumstances.  They also help them 
understand the need for policy action and reform’ (OECD 2009: 65).  What is more, the 
OECD (2009: 65) points out that: ‘Informed (or financially literate) consumers also 
contribute to more efficient, transparent and competitive practices by financial 
institutions.  Better educated citizens can also help in monitoring markets, and thus 
complement prudential supervision’. 
 
This revolves around a discourse of an active, responsible, and well-informed financial 
consumer who is able (unlike the subprime borrower) to behave in an economically 
sound way that serves to sustain the asset-based model of welfare.  In fact, the FCIC 
(2011: 90) explains how ‘borrowers are the first defense against abusive lending’: 
summoning up the idea of a well-informed financial individual able to act in a perfectly 
instrumentally rational way in order to secure/make the market.  ‘By shopping around’, 
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the FCIC (2011: 90) continues, such individuals will ensure that a lender will offer them 
the most suitable type of loan; rather than produce a situation as occurred in the GFC in 
which ‘many borrowers [did] not understand the most basic aspects of their mortgage’.  
In support of this argument, it reports that at least 38% of borrowers with ARMs in the 
subprime era did not understand how much their interest rates could reset at one time, 
and more than half underestimated how high their rates could rise (FCIC 2011: 90).  
This emphasis on model financial consumer action is also expressed by the Independent 
Commission on Banking (ICB) (2011b: 153 emphasis added) which argues: 
 
In banking markets as elsewhere, what matters is not competition in the abstract 
but competition to provide what customers want – effective competition.  In 
markets that work well, suppliers compete vigorously with each other, and with 
the real threat of entry by other firms, to provide a choice of products to well-
informed customers.  Moreover, this happens without damaging side effects on 
others.  Customers, though individually small, enjoy the power of informed 
choice. 
 
What is more, the identified need to educate citizens to act as better financial consumers 
relates to other areas of asset-based systems of welfare (Froud et al. 2006).  For instance, 
the OECD (2009: 97) also notes the importance of strengthening ‘financial education 
programs for pensions’.  It continues:  
 
The rapid growth of defined contribution plans in many countries means that 
individuals face more of the risk in, and assume more of the responsibility for, 
assuring their own long-term financial well-being.  They are likely to make better 
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decisions, and contribute to better overall functioning of financial markets, if 
they are well educated and informed about issues relating to management of 
personal finances (OECD 2009: 97). 
 
An emphasis on financial ‘education’ arguably serves to reinforce shifts towards asset-
based systems of welfare in financialised economies (Finlayson 2009).  This is important 
in light of a sympathy perspective because it shows that such an economistic approach 
works to the exclusion of contestable individual ethics: there is such a thing as a good 
financial consumer, and ethico-political contestation at the individual level is not needed 
to derive what it is. 
 
Moreover, quite remarkably given the extent to which it recognises some of the possible 
consequences involved in light of the crisis, the regulatory discourse still tends to 
reinforce asset-based systems of welfare in an almost unquestioned manner.  On the one 
hand, the regulatory account of the GFC acknowledges the huge problem of risk 
shouldered by the individual – seemingly at least in part outside an individual’s own 
control – in asset-based systems of welfare.  For instance, the IMF (2007a: 5) points out 
that weaker mortgage collateral is partly associated with adverse employment and 
income trends; that tighter credit conditions fall most heavily on ‘more marginally 
creditworthy borrowers’ (2007b: 5); that the fall in property and asset prices was the 
primary reason why 2008 US household net worth fell for the first time since 2003 
(2008b: 11); and that the deteriorating economy and massive job losses resulting from 
the crisis substantially increased levels of household debt (2009a: 66).  Indeed the FCIC 
(2011: 391) reports that of the $17 trillion lost from 2007 to the first quarter of 2009 in 
US household net wealth, about $5.6 trillion was the result of declining house prices and 
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much of the remainder due to the decline in value of financial assets (a staggering 
amount given that US GDP in 2008 was $14.4 trillion). 
 
However, on the other hand, the regulatory discourse tends to hold an enduring belief in 
the promise of the processes of securitisation that support asset-based welfare. The 
extension of homeownership and other financial assets to those who might otherwise not 
have access to them (itself a promotion of the financial individual) is still one of the 
major perceived benefits of securitisation.  The Stiglitz Report (UN 2010: 65), for 
instance, suggests that government financial policy-making needs to continue to promote 
securitisation to provide for ‘mortgages that help individuals manage the risks of home 
ownership better, student loans with lower transaction costs, banking the un-banked, or 
insuring the uninsured’.  In this manner, the US Federal Reserve (Board of Governors 
2007: 11) points out that subprime lending is not necessarily predatory in nature and the 
IMF (2010b: 21) expresses concern that high unemployment, waning consumer 
confidence, and tighter underwriting standards could have the undesirable impact of 
discouraging new entrants into the property market.  In terms of pensions, the IMF 
(2009b: 74) also seems to suggest that the ‘increasing transfer of portfolio risk to 
households through defined-contribution schemes’ should be welcomed because it 
fosters ‘an increase in savings in order to achieve a target minimum income in 
retirement’.  On a similar note, the OECD (2009: 92) celebrates the fact that younger 
workers with defined contribution plans may ‘suffer less damage’ than older workers or 
retirees because they ‘have many years to wait for recovery, and most of their 
contributions to the plans lie in the future’.   
 
 217 
The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) follows a similar line of thinking by 
expressing, at least in part, the continued promise of asset-based welfare.  It suggests 
that, in both the UK and the US, ‘rapid growth in mortgage credit was seen as driving a 
democratisation of home ownership’ (FSA 2009: 108 emphasis added).  Moreover, the 
FSA (2009: 14) points out that simple forms of securitised credit have existed for 
‘almost as long as modern banking’.  It also recounts how since the creation of Fannie 
Mae in the 1930s, securitised credit has played a major role in US mortgage lending and 
this position steadily increased until the explosive growth in both scale and complexity 
in the mid-1990s (FSA 2009: 14).  Even if not explicitly articulated, there is a definite 
sense presented that asset-based welfare, here in the case of homeownership, is an 
undisputable good. 
 
Of course in important ways, the regulatory discourse does not enunciate straightforward 
and unanimous support for asset-based welfare.  For instance, the IMF (2011a: 124) 
notes that there is some recognition of renewed interest in ‘alternative mortgage 
products’ such as shared equity models because they ‘encourage better risk 
management’.  Likewise, it suggests that some countries ‘might want to reconsider their 
policies’ in regard to promoting homeownership by recognising that rental housing 
could be a ‘better option for low-income households’ and introducing a more level tax 
treatment of rental compared to owner-occupied housing to help reduce ‘the current bias 
toward homeownership’ (IMF 2011a: 143).  Yet arguably, with these types of caveat 
aside, the regulatory discourse on the whole tends to reinforce existing understandings as 
to the appropriateness of asset-based welfare, particularly with regard to 
homeownership. 
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Overall, therefore, in the regulatory discourse on the GFC it is possible to identify a 
distinct sense in which asset-based systems of welfare continue to be promoted as an 
appropriate model for a financialised economy.  Even in light of the recognised 
disastrous consequences of extending credit and the dream of homeownership to those 
who display the ‘flawed’ characteristics of the subprime borrower, the regulatory 
discourse still articulates a deep-seated support for asset-based welfare.  Particularly in 
the area of financial ‘education’, this can be shown to contain entrenched assumptions 
about instrumentally rational behaviour.  In fact, the governance of asset-based welfare 
certainly continues to endorse an economistic and autonomous individual detached from 
the rest of society who is responsible for securing their future wellbeing through the 
financial markets and asset price inflation (Langley 2006).   
 
From a sympathy perspective, which by contrast might attempt to open up the 
contestable nature of financial market agency in this regard, the regulatory discourse 
here appears to close down contestation over interpersonal ethics by fostering an 
economistic conception of market-oriented behaviour.  Even after a degree of 
responsibility is put at the doorstep of the irrational subprime borrower and their 
problematic inclusion in such systems, asset-based welfare is left almost completely 
unquestioned.  The notion that a borrower might be in a vulnerable position compared to 
a lender is entirely overlooked.  As explored in the previous chapter, Smith’s conception 
of sympathy gives a more complex account of how ethics and politics might come to be 
interactively formed at the level of the individual.  For Smith (TMS I.i.1.9-10), after all, 
to exercise a capacity for sympathy, which is inherently involved in all market-oriented 
forms of behaviour, is to imagine both intent and circumstance as part of an often 
imprecise balancing act (Montes 2004).  This provides a means of understanding 
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market-based behaviour that avoids the economistic implications of the regulatory 
discourse which here can be shown to close down contestation over interpersonal ethics. 
 
 
5.2 The regulatory governance of credit risk 
 
In this section, I show how in the regulatory governance of credit risk there is again an 
attempt to exclude interpersonal ethics from economic behaviour.  Specifically, I 
illustrate how techniques of credit risk management, advocated by regulatory institutions 
both before and during the crisis, are based on assumptions of instrumentally rational 
behaviour that essentially excludes contestable interpersonal ethics by individualising 
risk.  Instrumentally rational behaviour is promoted at the regulatory level as risk 
management is normalised in society and the consequences of this are revealed in the 
flawed scientistic approaches to understanding the place of risk in the crisis. 
 
The IMF (2011a: 10) reports that: 
 
At the heart of the global financial crisis was an abrupt rediscovery of credit risk.  
Following a period of almost indiscriminate availability of cheap credit, lenders 
suddenly took a fresh look at borrowers’ capacity to repay debt and found 
reasons for concern.  Focused initially on problems in the U.S. subprime 
mortgage sector, the reassessment of credit risk broadened over time, affecting 
households, nonfinancial corporations, banks, and sovereigns across much of the 
industrialized world.   
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Even though the ‘growth and prosperity of recent years gave ample illustration of the 
benefits of financial innovation’, the IMF (2008a: xii) further notes that the GFC has 
‘also shown that there are costs’: ‘Credit risk transfer products – innovations that were 
meant to disperse risk broadly – were not always used to move risk to those best able to 
bear it’.  Mark Zandi (2009: 2-3 emphasis in original) describes the condition at the 
heart of the crisis: ‘At every point in the financial system, there was a belief that 
someone – someone else – would catch mistakes and preserve the integrity of the 
process’.  Moreover, there is a sense in which the GFC actually followed a recognised 
pattern of crisis: ‘the mechanism that leads to the crisis is always the same: a positive 
shock generates a wave of optimism which feeds into lower risk aversion, greater 
leverage and higher asset prices which then feed back into even more optimism, 
leverage and higher asset prices’ (UNCTAD 2009: 20).  Despite a general recognition of 
crisis dynamics based on extant understandings of risk management, in the regulatory 
discourse on the GFC there is arguably a reproduction of scientistic treatments of risk 
and a continuation of trends that tend to normalise the place of risk in society to the 
exclusion of contestable ethics. 
 
The normalisation of credit risk management and structured finance  
A number of IMF reports give an interesting account of how credit risk management 
appears to be increasingly ‘normalised’ as part of the regulatory discourse surrounding 
the GFC.  That is to say, the reports indicate how risk management seems to be an ever-
more pervasive activity in contemporary financialised societies and fundamental to how 
financial market agency is constituted.  This appears to be the case even during the 
height of the crisis and remains largely unquestioned in the IMF’s response.  For 
instance, in 2006, the IMF (2006: 48) welcomed financial innovation because it 
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contributes to growth in household credit.  Indeed it celebrates how ‘[n]ew consumer 
lending technologies permit lenders to reach more consumers, better assess market and 
lending risks, price loans more accurately, and reduce the cost of lending’ (IMF 2006: 
48).  Then in 2007, as the credit crunch started in earnest, the IMF (2007b: 74) opined 
that: 
 
One should not lose sight of the improvements in risk measurement and control 
over the last decade and the positive role of these improvements in reducing the 
likelihood of idiosyncratic failure from uninformed risk-taking.  These advances 
should induce greater risk sensitivity on the part of financial institutions, leading 
to early unwinding of unanticipated exposures and better risk control.   
 
Although at this time it also suggested that ‘it is important not to place undue confidence 
in all aspects of firms’ risk management systems’ (IMF 2007b: 74), the IMF (2008a: 81) 
still reported in 2008 that structured products retain their utility if they can be 
‘standardised’ in some way in order to facilitate ‘the development of liquid secondary 
markets’.  It reports: ‘structured finance will recover, but … the products will likely be 
more standardized and transparent to both investors and regulators’ (IMF 2008a: 54).  
By 2009, the IMF (2009b: 77) submits that ‘[m]obilizing illiquid assets and transferring 
credit risk away from the banking system to a more diversified set of holders continues 
to be an important objective of securitization’.  That is, even after the observable impact 
of structured finance at the height of the crisis in 2008, there is a firm belief held by the 
IMF (2009b: 77) that ‘structuring technology in which different tranches are sold to 
various investors’ helps to ‘more finely tailor the distribution of risks and returns to 
potential end investors’.  Further indicative of this outlook it suggests: 
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Securitization technologies have also been instrumental in supporting a stable 
supply of housing funding and consumer credit in many emerging market 
countries. Several governments have pursued and continue to pursue 
securitization as a way to fund agency programs aimed at overcoming credit 
constraints for housing and consumer finance. In particular, mortgage 
securitization has removed constraints on domestic fixed-income markets by 
accommodating a growing investor base, particularly pension and insurance fund 
investors with the need for long-term, highly-rated local currency bond 
investments priced to a more liquid yield curve (IMF 2009b: 79).   
 
In 2010, the position appears to remain largely the same: ‘Starting securitization on a 
safer basis is … essential to support credit, particularly for households and small and 
medium-size enterprises’ (IMF 2010a: xii).  In 2011, again securitisation is understood 
as perfectly suitable for creating ‘a strong housing finance system’ as long as countries 
‘go back to basics’ by ‘ensuring safe loan origination and encouraging simple and 
transparent mortgage contracts’ (IMF 2011a: xii).  
 
Other areas of the regulatory discourse on the GFC appear to reinforce this 
normalisation of credit risk management in general, and structured finance in particular, 
in the constitution of financial market agency.  For instance, the UK’s ICB (2011a: 7) 
argues that, ‘[f]or the most part, retail customers have no effective alternatives to their 
banks for vital financial services; hence the imperative to avert disruption to the system 
for their continuous provision’.  It notes how important it is that ‘ordinary depositors are 
protected’ (ICB 2011b: 8) and suggests that one of the great merits of a ring-fencing of 
retail from commercial banking is that it would ‘isolate those banking activities where 
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continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to a bank’s customers’ (ICB 
2011b: 11).  At first sight, these references to ‘ordinary’ depositors may seem far 
removed from the risk management techniques involved with structured finance, until 
the ICB makes clear that such activities could seemingly sit quite comfortably inside the 
retail ring-fence.  It writes: 
 
The fourth principle would not prevent a banking group from offering a ‘one-
stop shop’ for customers who required services both from the ring-fenced bank 
and the rest of the group.  One entity could sell products as an agent for other 
entities in the group.  For example, the ring-fenced bank could sell to its 
customers complex risk management products originated in the non-ring-fenced 
bank (ICB 2011b: 68 emphasis added). 
 
This position chimes with the FSA’s (2009: 43) position that a ‘future system for credit 
intermediation will and should involve a combination of traditional on-balance sheet 
mechanisms and securitisation’.   
 
Overall, the regulatory discourse tends to echo the FSF’s (2009: 15) outlook that while 
regulators will need to develop greater supervisory responsiveness to risk assessments, 
there is no urgent need to jettison or even roll-back on recent evolution and innovation in 
structured financial products and markets.  As revealed in the G20 (2009: 3) London 
Summit statement, the promotion of ‘standardisation’ and ‘resilience’ appears to be the 
length to which reform is acknowledged to be required: not a questioning of extant 
credit risk management or a halting of the normalisation of associated structured finance 
techniques.  The general stance is summed up well by the FCIC’s (2011: 425) statement:  
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Some argue that the conversion of a bundle of simple mortgages to a mortgage- 
backed security, and then to a collateralized debt obligation, was a problem.  
They argue that complex financial derivatives caused the crisis.  We conclude 
that the details of this engineering are incidental to understanding the essential 
causes of the crisis.  If the system works properly, reconfiguring streams of 
mortgage payments has little effect.  The total amount of risk in a mortgage is 
unchanged if the pieces are put together in a different way. 
 
From a sympathy perspective, it is highly problematic that the regulatory discourse here 
appears to normalise the place of credit risk management and structured finance in 
Anglo-American societies.  Even in the face of widely recognised forms of credit 
mismanagement in the build up to GFC (Nesvetailova 2010; Zandi 2009), current 
approaches to and techniques of risk management appear to have avoided full scrutiny 
from within the regulatory discourse.  This might be because it continues to embody an 
economistic understanding of credit risk, which seemingly operates to exclude 
contestable interpersonal ethics at the level of the individual.  By contrast, Smith’s 
conception of mutual sympathy might draw attention to the way in which notions of 
‘risk’ are constructed and contested within society as a matter of interpersonal ethics 
related to the inherently unequal nature of a credit-debt relation.  The ‘constant 
balancing act’ (Weinstein 2006: 86) involved in the sympathy procedure thus more fully 
problematises the place of risk in society.  Read through the lens of Smith’s sympathetic 
liberalism, the major flaw contained within an economistic understanding of credit risk 
is that it attempts to exclude contestable interpersonal ethics at the level of the 
individual.   
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Scientistic risk management and the promise of structured finance 
On what basis is the belief in structured finance maintained?  Although it is recognised 
that the GFC ‘represents the first significant test of several categories of innovative 
financial instruments’ (IMF 2007b: 1), there appears to be continued admiration within 
the regulatory discourse as to the benefits of extant risk management practices and the 
promise of structured finance based on a scientistic understanding of risk.  One might 
suppose that faith in recent financial innovations in general and the securitisation model 
in particular would have been questioned in regulatory discourse in light of the subprime 
crisis.  As Julie Froud and Sukhdev Johal (2008: 107 emphasis added) suggest, ‘much to 
the surprise of many whom had previously considered that the growth and reach of 
finance was a manifestation of its ability to manage risk, the global credit crunch that 
began in mid-2007 provides a reminder that finance is unstable and that uncertainty has 
not been eliminated by more complex financial innovations and models’.   
 
However, by contrast, the regulatory discourse on the crisis seemingly contains little by 
way of a fundamental questioning of the ‘science’ of risk management.  The FSF (2008: 
9) provides an early response to the crisis which maintains great confidence in a key 
plank of recent securitisation trends, the originate-to-distribute model:  
 
When accompanied by adequate risk management and incentives, the OTD 
[originate-to-distribute] model offers a number of benefits to loan originators, 
investors and borrowers.  Originators can benefit from greater capital efficiency, 
enhanced funding availability, and lower earnings volatility since the OTD model 
disperses credit and interest rate risks to the capital markets.  Investors can 
benefit from a greater choice of investments, allowing them to diversify and to 
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match their investment profile more closely to their risk preferences.  Borrowers 
can benefit from expanded credit availability and product choice, as well as lower 
borrowing costs. 
 
The FSF is thus still highly supportive of the OTD model and, in its eyes, the response to 
the crisis then becomes a question of how to ensure that the individuals and firms 
involved in securitisation can make the model work better.  Originators, investors, and 
borrowers just need to become better skilled at risk management.  As it points out, ‘some 
firms seem to have handled … challenges better than others.  This suggests that it is not 
the OTD model or securitisation per se that are problematic.  Rather, these problems, 
and the underlying weaknesses that gave rise to them, show that the underpinnings of the 
OTD model need to be strengthened.’ (FSF 2008: 10 emphasis added).  Although this is 
the response of the FSF which was disbanded and replaced by the FSB (2009: 11), the 
latter still holds essentially the same position in this regard: quite simply, it states that 
the ‘revival of securitisation markets is needed in many countries to support the 
provision of credit to the real economy’. 
 
The FSA (2009: 43 emphasis added) echoes the sustained belief in recent securitisation 
practices:  
 
The challenge is to design regulatory responses which will produce a safer 
version of the securitised credit model – less complex, more transparent to end 
investors, with less packaging and trading of securitised credit through multiple 
balance sheets, more true distribution to end investors and more real risk 
diversification.  
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Interestingly, rather than cast doubt on the securitisation model itself, regulatory 
responses tend to explicitly attach blame to the inadequate risk management practices of 
individuals and firms.  So, the narrative goes, it was a failure on behalf of market 
participants ‘to understand and manage’ some of the new risks associated with CRT and 
securitisation that contributed to the market turmoil (BIS 2008: 1).  Examples of this 
kind of blame game targeted at the failings of market participants abound in regulatory 
discourse.  The FSF (2008: 5; 7 emphasis added) reports how ‘banks, investors and 
CRAs [credit rating agencies] misjudged the level of risks’ involved in the US subprime 
mortgage market and that ‘benign macroeconomic conditions gave rise to complacency 
among many market participants and led to an erosion of sound practices in important 
financial market segments’.   
 
Crucially, I suggest, the explanation of the crisis actually starts to sound like a pointed 
attack on market participants for not living up to the standard of an ‘optimal’ market 
participant in risk management (G20 2008: 1).  Doubt is cast on the actual ability of 
market participants to perform their proper role as optimal risk managers: 
 
Some firms retained large exposures to super-senior tranches of CDOs that far 
exceeded the firms’ understanding of the risks inherent in such instruments, and 
failed to take appropriate steps to control or mitigate those risks. When the 
turbulence started, firms and investors misjudged or were unable to rapidly 
assess their exposures (FSF 2008: 7 emphasis added). 
 
Thus, for the FSF (2008: 8; 20), investors were at fault for being unwilling (even those 
with the ‘capacity’ to undertake their own credit analysis, ‘did not sufficiently examine 
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the assets underlying structured investments’) and unable (they ‘seem to have had  
insufficient understanding of the risks of structured products in which they invested’) to 
appropriately measure and manage credit risk. 
 
The BIS (2008a: 13 emphasis added) concurs that ‘[s]ome investors appear to have 
entered the CRT market despite lacking the capacity to independently evaluate the risks 
of complex CRT products’, which essentially meant that they were over-reliant on the 
CRAs.  Moreover, blame is again attached to market participants because, although the 
CRAs clarified that their ratings are ‘not intended to capture the risk of a decline in 
market value or liquidity, nor should it be considered an investment recommendation … 
some investors do not seem to understand this point or simply ignore it’ (BIS 2008a: 13 
emphasis added).  As such, ‘many market participants appeared not fully to appreciate 
how one type of risk (eg liquidity) can quickly evolve into another type (eg market and 
credit risk) in CRT’ (BIS 2008a: 24).   
 
Likewise, the Senior Supervisors Group (SSG) (2009: 4) also seems to maintain ultimate 
faith in pre-crisis risk management practices provided that market participants weed out 
that which prevents securitisation living up to its promise.  Specifically, it points to 
market participant level problems including ‘the unwillingness or inability of boards of 
directors and senior managers to articulate, measure, and adhere to a level of risk 
acceptable to the firm’ and ‘arrangements that favored risk takers at the expense of 
independent risk managers and control personnel’ (SSG 2009: 4 emphasis added).  In 
the case of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the FSA (2011: 21) reports that both its 
supervisory approach and the bank’s strategy ‘underestimated how bad losses associated 
with structured credit might be’.  The problem was, it continues, that there was ‘a 
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consensus, among practitioners and policy-makers, which confidently asserted that 
financial innovation and complexity had made the financial system more stable’ (FSA 
2011: 29).  
 
Notably, before the GFC proper, the BIS (2005: 3) recognised that ‘the most important 
credit risk management issue’ associated with credit risk transfer activity is ‘the 
assessment of default correlation across different reference entities’.  ‘Correlation’, it 
suggests, ‘is critical to evaluating the risk of a portfolio of credit default swaps or the 
risk associated with CDO tranches’ (BIS 2005: 3).  Yet the BIS (2005: 14) understood 
the tranching of risk associated with synthetic CDOs to be ‘appealing because it allows 
the credit risk associated with a pool of exposures to be divided up and allocated to 
parties based on their underlying risk preferences’.  It later explains in a 2008 report 
how: 
 
CDOs are designed to diversify risk. The laws of probability imply that the 
average credit performance of a pool of similar assets will be less volatile and 
more predictable than the performance of a typical asset in the pool.  Indeed, if 
the pool consists of a large number of relatively small assets, uncertainty in the 
pool-wide credit loss rate will arise almost entirely from correlations in default 
losses across assets.  In this setting, idiosyncratic risk is diversified away.  Only 
systematic risk factors that influence many assets at once are likely to influence 
pool-wide credit losses (BIS 2008a: 49).   
 
Somewhat calamitously, such a view allowed market participants to understand the poor 
performance of subprime loans as a ‘low-probability economic event’ (BIS 2008b: 5).   
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However in contradiction of this outlook, the problem was, the FSA (2009: 22 emphasis 
added) reports: 
 
The very complexity of the mathematics used to measure and manage risk, 
moreover, made it increasingly difficult for top management and boards to assess 
and exercise judgement over the risks being taken.  Mathematical sophistication 
ended up not containing risk, but providing false assurance that other prima facie 
indicators of increasing risk (e.g. rapid credit extension and balance sheet 
growth) could be safely ignored. 
 
On a similar note, the FCIC (2011: xix emphasis added) suggests that ‘[f]inancial 
institutions and credit rating agencies embraced mathematical models as reliable 
predictors of risks, replacing judgment in too many instances.  Too often, risk 
management became risk justification’.  Likewise, the FSF (2008: 34) also points to how 
many investors erroneously ‘took CRAs’ ratings opinion of structured credit products as 
a seal of approval and looked no further’ without recognising how ‘structured finance 
ratings differ from traditional corporate debt ratings in that they are model-based and to 
a larger degree assumption-driven’.  Nevertheless, this is not a questioning of the 
securitisation processes per se, just the flawed market participants using such processes 
inappropriately. 
 
In sum, a striking feature of the regulatory discourse on the GFC is that there is little 
sense of a fundamental questioning of the securitisation model.  Essentially, 
explanations of the crisis tend to point blame at the specific (in)action of market 
participants rather than criticise features of securitisation, such as the OTD model or 
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CRT more broadly.  Interestingly, such an understanding of the crisis contains 
remarkable implications for the constitution of financial market agency contained within 
the regulatory discourse on the GFC.  That is to say, in pointing blame at market 
participants for not living up to the crowning promise of the model, the regulatory 
discourse appears to be indicating that individuals and firms ought to better perform the 
roles that securitisation dictates for them.  So, in order to avoid future financial crises, 
market participants should become more willing and more able to carry out the kind of 
risk management practices that the securitisation model requires in order for it to operate 
‘properly’.  In terms of financial market agency, this essentially suggests that people 
ought to become better and more efficient risk managing machines.  The notion that 
there might ethico-political contestation over a credit-debt relation is therefore entirely 
overlooked.  Put simply, in the regulatory discourse surrounding the GFC, there is 
nothing wrong with the securitisation model – so the task then becomes making market 
participants more capable of performing the subject position of optimal risk manager.   
 
In certain ways, the articulation of this form of financial market agency might be 
successful, and an appropriate response to the GFC.  Yet, alongside the ostensible 
promotion of optimal risk managers, much of the regulatory discourse also points to the 
significance of information problems in the practices associated with securitisation.  
Crucially, such problems might hinder the success of the market participant as optimal 
risk manager and, in the very same regulatory discourse, show some of the limitations 
and contradictions that come with a scientistic understanding of risk management.  In 
fact, the Stiglitz Report (UN 2010: 90) states that securitisation ‘opened up new 
information asymmetries’ and the models used to assess risk ‘overestimated the benefits 
of risk diversification and underestimated the costs of the information asymmetries and 
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herd behavior by investors’.  This echoes the concern mentioned by the BIS (2008: 27) 
which states that some products, such as ABS CDOs, may contain little or no ‘credit 
message’ because market pricing cannot operate properly in the face of an opaque 
dispersal of underlying credit risk.  It also chimes with the SSG’s (2009: ii) view that 
‘inadequate and often fragmented technological infrastructures … hindered effective risk 
identification and measurement’ in the build up to the crisis. 
 
Overall, reading across the regulatory discourse on the GFC, the governance of credit 
risk appears to contain a rather problematic articulation of individual market agency as 
optimal risk management.  This is because, on the one hand, the regulatory response 
seems to continue its strong support for securitisation and belief in the benefits of the 
science of risk management.  It is in this sense that the regulatory discourse calls forth 
financial market agency in the form of the ultra-able risk manager.  Yet, on the other 
hand, in these very same regulatory responses, among other limitations to complete 
success, significant problems associated with access to information and information 
asymmetries are highlighted.  On one level, then, financial market agency as optimal risk 
management is brought into doubt by the contradictory articulation of the market 
participant as necessarily limited in their access to information, or their ability to deal 
with immeasurable uncertainty. 
 
Furthermore, significantly, the regulatory discourse holds on to a belief in the benefits of 
the securitisation model such that it still places confidence in the perfectibility of risk 
management.  In this sense, it is possible to suggest that the regulatory discourse appears 
to be dominated by a shared understanding as to the appropriateness of promoting 
financial market agency as optimal risk management.  This prevailing view of the 
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perfectibility of the science of risk management is sustained by a narrow scientistic 
understanding which accepts a legitimate focus on risk rather than immeasurable 
uncertainty (Blyth 2002), even though the promotion of individuals and firms as optimal 
risk managers is shot through with contradiction based on such uncertainty.  Whereas a 
sympathy perspective might call into question the place of risk in society by recognising 
it as a negotiated construct formulated as part of contestation over mutual sympathy 
(explored in the previous chapter), an economistic governance of credit risk relies on a 
scientistic and disembodied understanding of risk.  This is perhaps why the regulatory 
discourse appears to foster optimal risk managers in order to perfect risk management, 
rather than fundamentally problematise contemporary risk management practices such as 
securitisation.  In all, faith in the science of credit risk management remains strong in the 
regulatory discourse.  Yet, more generally concerning risk, there is continued belief in 
the promise of structured finance: the task is to just make the scientistic systems work 
more efficiently.  Notably, this becomes embodied in constructs like ‘Early Warning 
Exercises’ that seek to identify the build up of macroeconomic and financial risks and 
the actions needed to address them (G20 2009: 1). 
 
Read through the lens of Smith’s sympathetic liberalism, the major flaw contained 
within this economistic understanding of credit risk is that it attempts to exclude 
contestable interpersonal ethics at the level of the individual.  For Smith, ‘the manner in 
which we judge’ is an imaginative mental procedure and a process of negotiating and 
internalising standards of interpersonal ethics.  In one sense, therefore, it is possible to 
contrast the ultra-able modern risk manager with the eighteenth-century Smithian 
subject.  The former demonstrates ability through the development of their calculative 
rationalities, whereas the latter does so through the development of their moral faculties 
 234 
and their impartial spectator.  The former is conceived in terms of the ability to embody 
a position of perfect calculation in terms of how to act in market-oriented behaviour, 
whereas the latter while engaging in market-oriented behaviour, recognises it as 
negotiated and constructed through ongoing contestation over interpersonal ethics.  In 
other words, as opposed to a static or predetermined standard of model individual 
behaviour alluded to above in economistic accounts of instrumental rationality, a 
sympathy perspective thus allows for interpersonal ethics to be formed and negotiated in 
particular ways at specific moments in time and space.  This can be seen as a way of 
politicising risk and risk management by more fully problematising how the construction 
and contestation of risk takes place in society.  
 
 
5.3 The regulatory governance of personal debt 
 
In this final section, I show how in the regulatory governance of personal debt there is 
again an attempt to exclude interpersonal ethics from market-oriented behaviour.  
Specifically, I illustrate how the ways in which regulatory institutions treat issues of 
personal debt – both before and during the crisis – are based on assumptions of 
instrumentally rational behaviour that essentially excludes contestable interpersonal 
ethics in creditor-debtor relations.  Instrumentally rational behaviour is promoted at the 
regulatory level as personal debt is depoliticised and the consequences of this are 
revealed in how the amassing of debt is understood as entirely appropriate in order to 
maintain living standards before and during the crisis (Montgomerie 2009). 
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There is little doubt about the tremendous growth in levels of debt in Anglo-American 
economies in the subprime era.  The ICB (2011b: 50) reports that between 1998 and 
2008, sterling loans made by UK banks to households and private non-financial 
companies relative to GDP rose 50% and 60% respectively, while loans to financial 
companies grew by over 200%.  As the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (2009: 5) suggests, ‘stocks led households in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom to borrow and consume far beyond the real incomes 
that they could realistically expect, given the productivity growth of the real economy 
and the dismal trends in personal income distribution’.  Despite a general recognition of 
crisis dynamics based on the problem of too much debt in financialised societies, in the 
regulatory discourse on the GFC there is arguably a depoliticisation of the place of debt 
in society to the exclusion of contestable interpersonal ethics.  The notion that a credit-
debt relation is inherently unequal and therefore an ethico-political question is 
disregarded. 
 
Standards of appropriate financial market agency 
On the one hand, the regulatory discourse clearly recognises that the enormous build up 
of debt in the subprime era was highly problematic because when ‘credit quality 
deterioration’ occurred and exposed the risky nature of some credit, even ‘previously 
credit worthy customers’ were affected (FSA 2009: 35).  Yet more profusely, on the 
other hand, in the regulatory discourse there is a sense in which the taking on of 
relatively high levels of personal debt remains to be seen as an entirely appropriate form 
of behaviour in order to secure a certain standard of living.  For instance, the FCIC 
(2011: 83 emphasis added) remarks: 
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Increased access to credit meant a more stable, secure life for those who 
managed their finances prudently.  It meant families could borrow during 
temporary income drops, pay for unexpected expenses, or buy major appliances 
and cars.  It allowed other families to borrow and spend beyond their means.  
Most of all, it meant a shot at homeownership, with all its benefits; and for some, 
an opportunity to speculate in the real estate market. 
  
This outlook appears to echo a 2006 IMF (2006: 46 emphasis added) report which 
suggests that: 
 
Better access to credit reduces household consumption volatility, improves 
investment opportunities, eases the constraints on small and family businesses, 
and diversifies household and financial sector assets.  The welfare gains from 
such expansion can be sizable, making further growth of household credit 
desirable.  
 
The rationale behind this thinking appears to be that ‘[g]reater access to a varied range 
of household credit products improves the consumption and investment opportunities for 
households and enables better diversification of household wealth’ (IMF 2006: 47).  
This is based on the ‘life cycle income hypothesis’ which states that ‘the availability of 
credit allows households to overcome liquidity constraints and permits consumption to 
be smoothed over periods of high and low income’ (Ando and Modigliani cited in IMF 
2006: 47).   
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The extension of household credit should therefore be celebrated, according to some of 
the regulatory discourse, especially if it ‘frees household equity tied in housing and other 
consumer durables’ that can then be reinvested (IMF 2006: 47).  Quite simply, good 
‘access to loans is advantageous to borrowers – and to the economy in general – because 
capital is able to circulate, and be used in an efficient manner’ (ICB 2011a: 16).  Indeed 
something of the ‘normalisation’ of finance in general and of credit-debt relations in 
particular is articulated by the UNCTAD (2009: 11 emphasis added): 
 
The financial sector acts as the central nervous system of modern market 
economies.  It distributes liquidity and mobilizes the capital necessary to finance 
large investment projects; it allocates funds to the most dynamic sectors of the 
economy; it provides households with the necessary funds to smooth 
consumption over time; and, through its payment system, it allows managing the 
complex web of economic relationships that are necessary for economies 
characterized by a high degree of division and specialization of labour. 
 
Picking up on the notion of the ‘normalisation’ of asset-based welfare outlined above, 
there is also a normalisation of the use of credit in the regulatory discourse with claims 
made about the importance of protecting banking services against disruption in order 
that financial services to customers are constantly maintained (ICB 2011b: 36-37).  In 
fact, the ICB (2011a: 97) objects to the ‘social costs’ of a narrow banking model because 
the prevention of deposit-taking banks from lending to individuals and businesses 
‘destroys the synergies of such financial intermediation’.  It sees this as undesirable 
because it might result in ‘increasing lending rates and credit rationing’ (ICB 2011a: 97).  
The ICB (2011b: 7) also expresses the need to ensure that the banking system can fulfil 
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its central role in ‘efficiently channelling savings to productive investments’ and 
‘managing financial risk’.  It continues: 
 
The most visible function that banks undertake is to receive deposits from savers, 
including the general public.  Households in the UK are the ultimate holders of 
wealth in the UK, yet they are not well placed to look after that wealth safely 
themselves and use it effectively.  Furthermore, money that is not engaged in 
productive activity will devalue over time as a consequence of inflation.  
Interest-bearing deposit facilities therefore act to store value (ICB 2011a: 16). 
 
Moreover, in perhaps another indicative step towards normalising household debt, the 
IMF (2006: 70) suggests: 
 
The regulation of household credit does not entail a fundamentally different 
approach from that for other credits, and the standard prudential apparatus – risk-
weighting, capital adequacy, classification, and provisioning – should suffice. 
Household credit is also somewhat easier to evaluate and classify than corporate 
credit. 
 
Arguably, the very processes of debt evaluation and classification serve to normalise the 
use of personal debt within a financialised economy.  The IMF (2006: 61) reports that 
household debt is generally considered ‘sustainable’ if a borrower has ‘positive net 
worth’ and ‘can service debt at contractual terms’.  The characteristics of a borrower 
which determine such factors include ‘future income; savings, interest, and exchange 
rates; access to refinancing; and whether loans are used purely for consumption, durable 
 239 
assets (such as housing), or productivity-enhancing investments (e.g., education)’ (IMF 
2006: 61).  One problem noted in the assessment of credit histories is the difficulty of 
distinguishing between a ‘life event’ (understood as incidents such as ‘divorce, illness or 
involuntary redundancy’), on the one hand, and a borrower using credit to maintain an 
‘unaffordable lifestyle’, on the other (FSB 2011: 18).  Seemingly quite controversial and 
contestable questions, the FSB (2011: 18) suggests that although an automated 
underwriting process might not pick this up, an ‘expert risk assessment’ is presumed to 
be capable.  Notably, though, the FSB (2011: 34) maintains that debt service ‘metrics’ 
can still appropriately assess affordability in order to ensure that the amount of 
discretionary income a borrower has is ‘sufficient to maintain an adequate standard of 
living’. 
 
Furthermore, as detailed above, the regulatory response to the crisis points to the well-
known ‘problem’ of extending credit to borrowers who, in other circumstances not in the 
subprime era, would not have been granted mortgage credit.  Some of the blame for this 
excessive risk-taking in the form of over-risky lending is attached to strong investor 
demand and the excessive compensation structures of the period.  Yet, one of the most 
significant aspects of the regulatory representations of the GFC is that they appear to 
suggest that there is a way of distinguishing between those who deserve to be extended 
credit and those who do not.  Seemingly, the creditworthy and the uncreditworthy can 
and should be clearly demarcated in a properly functioning financial system.  So the 
interesting question then becomes, who are those creditworthy individuals?  Who 
represents the model citizen of a credit-based, but not overly indebted, financialised 
economy? 
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One possible answer is contained within the regulatory discourse in the form of those 
groups who are presented as the ‘victims’ of the crisis: they are those who have 
successfully performed the subject position of the financially responsible individual.  
Incidentally, from a Smithian sympathy perspective, it is not really possible to attribute 
the personality of ‘innocent victim’ to a whole group of people in this way.  This is 
because under the terms of a sympathy procedure, which emphasises the moral learning 
required for an individual to partake in market-oriented behavuour, the constitution of 
ethico-political categories such as ‘blame’ and ‘victimhood’ are involved with 
contestation over appropriate forms of market-oriented behaviour at the individual level.  
So, if anything, to attribute these categories to groups in this way might close down 
contestation over appropriate standards of market-oriented behaviour rather than 
adequately problematise such standards as a response to the GFC.  
 
Nevertheless, it is quite remarkable just how explicitly the regulatory discourse puts 
forward certain people and groups as the innocent victims of the subprime crisis.  The 
promotion of particular constructions of financial market agency might be unintentional, 
but a clear indication is given as to who is considered to be the ‘prime’ financially 
responsible individual who is suffering because of the subprime debacle.  On this issue, 
the Stiglitz Report is particularly noteworthy.  It refers to the need for continued efforts 
to identify those ‘institutional innovations that might contribute to improvements in the 
well-being of ordinary citizens and to the functioning of the global economic system’ 
(UN 2010: 198).   Who are these ‘ordinary citizens’ to be protected?  There are in fact 
numerous passages throughout the report that appear to indicate the character traits of 
these deserving groups.  It notes how the crisis ‘has shown how the failures of the 
financial system have imposed costs on others, such as taxpayers, homeowners, and 
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workers, who were not directly party to the excessive risk-taking’ (UN 2010: 68 
emphasis added).  Then, again, it reports that the ‘failure of the financial system to 
perform its core functions has imposed huge costs on society – on the economy, on 
taxpayers, on homeowners, on workers, on retirees, on virtually everyone … Well-
functioning globalization might have protected them’ (UN 2010: 197 emphasis added).   
 
Moreover, the Stiglitz Report (UN 2010: 59) suggests that ‘[w]hile “blame” should rest 
on the financial sector, government failed to protect the market from itself and to protect 
society from the kinds of excesses that have repeatedly imposed high costs on taxpayers, 
workers, homeowners, and retirees’.  When considering some of the immediate effects 
of policy responses to the crisis, the latter group come up for special mention as ‘the 
unprecedented lowering of interest rates may have been the correct macroeconomic 
response to the crisis, but it has produced a sharp reduction in the incomes of retirees 
who did not gamble on risky securities and invested prudently in short- or medium-term 
government securities’ and ‘who are likely to see their hard-earned pension funds 
disappear’ (UN 2010: 13; 106 emphasis added). 
 
Overall, therefore, it is possible to discern in some of the regulatory discourse on the 
GFC a characterisation of the financially responsible individual who constitutes the 
‘prime’ (as opposed to the subprime) individual.  Essentially, they are depicted as a 
taxpayer, employed, a homeowner, and with a pension fund (and they are thus not in 
receipt of benefits, unemployed, unmortgaged, or without financial assets).  In this 
manner, the regulatory discourse ostensibly promotes a financialised individual who in 
many ways lives up to the financially responsible individual who acted prudently in the 
subprime era and ended up as a ‘victim’.   Seemingly a financialised individual is thus 
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fostered both before the GFC (as part of asset-based welfare agendas) and as part of the 
regulatory response to the GFC (as part of the process of attributing blame for the crisis 
which is clearly not focussed on the financialised individual but more likely directed at 
the subprime borrower).  This is a fundamental point to which I return in the next 
chapter to consider whether the everyday GFC discourse offers any challenges to this 
enduring aspect of financialisation. 
 
Moreover, although the disastrous consequences of extending credit (to the subprime 
borrower) might be quite clear in the regulatory discourse, it is telling that the 
construction of financial market agency in terms of a financialised individual is still very 
much promoted.  In this sense, there is very little shift in outlook on appropriate 
standards of behaviour from before the GFC.  The sphere of sympathy in which there is 
a shared understanding about appropriate standards of ‘good’ financial behaviour is thus 
limited to the financialised individual: the regulatory discourse extends its condolences 
to people who display the character traits of instrumental rationality by appropriately 
assuming personal responsibility for their wellbeing and attempt to secure it through 
systems of credit and debt.  This arguably leaves little room for contestable interpersonal 
ethics at the level of the individual and a recognition of the ethico-political nature of 
creditor-debt relations given that they are inherently unequal. 
 
The depoliticisation of creditor-debtor relations 
The regulatory discourse on the GFC gives a clear sense that financial and banking 
services are central to the maintenance of a modern advanced economy.  For instance, 
the BIS (2011: 1) argues that a ‘strong and resilient banking system is the foundation for 
sustainable economic growth, as banks are at the centre of the credit intermediation 
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process between savers and investors’.  Similarly, the FSA (2009: 47) reports that the 
relative importance of financial services tends to increase as incomes grow because the 
wealthier people become, ‘the more life cycle consumption smoothing occurs, and the 
more diverse they become in their preferences for consumption at different points in 
their life’.  In turn, it suggests, this leads to an increase in demand for both savings and 
borrowing products (FSA 2009: 47). 
 
A pertinent issue in this regard though, especially in light of the GFC, is that if the place 
of financial services is recognised as increasingly important to an advanced financialised 
economy, then the highly politicised nature of creditor-debtor relations underneath the 
financial services industry is potentially overlooked (Langley 2009).  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, from a sympathy perspective such relations are part of contestable 
interpersonal ethics; after all, in basic terms, they are inherently unequal and have to be 
negotiated given that creditors own (financial) assets that debtors desire and do not.  Yet, 
on the whole, the regulatory discourse on the GFC tends to deny the politicised nature of 
credit-debt relations by treating all instances of market-oriented behaviour as merely the 
expression of supposedly innate instrumental rationality, whichever side of the 
relationship an individual happens to be situated.  In the recognition and reinforcement 
of the centrality of financial services to Anglo-American economies, therefore, the 
regulatory discourse may erroneously serve to deny the politics of debt because to foster 
instrumental rationality is to exclude the ongoing contestable ethics of financial market 
agency as revealed in a sympathy perspective. 
 
In the first instance, there is a definite sense in the regulatory discourse that the 
ostensibly vital services provided by banks and other financial institutions ought not to 
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be threatened by such potential dangers as over-regulation or government interference.  
For instance, the ICB (2011b: 44) stresses the ‘core economic function’ of banks and so 
wants to avoid the ‘high’ economic costs of imposing too many restrictions on their 
activities.   Perhaps for this reason, rather than call for more onerous regulation, as in 
much of the discussion on international banking reform, it places a good degree of 
confidence in capital buffers being a suitable response to prevent (or cushion the impact 
of) further crises.  The ICB (2011b: 163) writes: 
 
A theme emphasised throughout this report has been that making banks better 
able to absorb losses, and easier to resolve if they still get into trouble, will help 
curb incentives for excessive risk taking in the first place.  This was manifestly 
not the case in the run-up to the crisis.  
 
When it does make slightly more onerous demands on banks for reform, such as the 
ring-fencing of retail operations, the ICB is still cautious about not taking this reform too 
far.  Notably, both secured and unsecured lending is still allowed within the ring-fence 
proposal, including mortgage lending and credit cards (ICB 2011b: 54).  What is more, 
the ICB (2011b: 18 emphasis added) openly admits on its terms ‘banking reform’: 
 
In many respects …  would be restorative of what went before in the recent past 
– better-capitalised, less leveraged banking more focused on the needs of savers 
and borrowers in the domestic economy.  Banks are at the heart of the financial 
system and hence of the market economy.   
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Other regulatory institutions appear guarded in making burdensome claims on banks and 
other financial institutions based on their supposed importance to a properly functioning 
economy.  On the one hand, the FSB (2009: 1) claims in 2009 that: 
 
In recent months, expectations have taken hold in some parts of the private 
financial sector that the financial and regulatory system will remain little 
changed from its pre-crisis contours.  These expectations – that business will be 
able to go on just as before – need to be dispelled. 
 
Yet, on the other hand, its recommendations for reform in light of the GFC do not stray 
very far away from a ‘business as usual’ scenario.  For instance, the FSB (2011: 29) 
recommends a ‘principles-based framework’ rather than set international standards 
because it claims that households across jurisdictions will face ‘different degrees of 
idiosyncratic risk’ based on different systems of welfare, healthcare, and employment 
protection.  It therefore advocates that national regulators monitor lending standards 
‘across a range of dimensions’ that take account of particular ‘national circumstances’ 
regarding lenders’ funding patterns, housing supply flexibility, household ‘resilience’, 
and access to welfare (FSB 2011: 29).  Indeed the FSB’s overall message seems to be 
one of very mild reform, rather than a thorough questioning of the place of debt in 
Anglo-American society.  It suggests: 
 
Innovation in the mortgage market to increase affordability for borrowers will 
likely continue but the layering of risks should be avoided.  In particular, 
practices that combine aggressive underwriting parameters with aggressive 
mortgage products should be discouraged: for example, low-doc loans coupled 
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with teaser rate or interest-only products, or loans with high LTV [loan-to-value] 
ratios that include negative amortisation (FSB 2011: 20). 
 
In a sense, then, the regulatory discourse on the GFC is about removing the ‘aggressive’ 
edge to lending, not altering in any significant way the financial systems through which 
credit and debt are allocated.   
 
This position seems to be similar to the IMF’s (2006: 68) suggestion that there are ‘no 
easily identifiable global “best practice” parameters with respect to prudential regulation 
of household credit’ so national regulators, although they may look to international 
benchmarks for guidance, should design ‘country-specific rules’ on issues like loan-to-
value ratios.  Along similar lines, rather than perhaps a downsizing of the place of banks 
in society, the BIS (2011: 5) speaks of making them ‘more resilient’ to procyclical 
dynamics and helping them serve as a ‘shock absorber’.  Principally in this respect it 
merely recommends increasing capital buffers (BIS 2011: 7). 
 
Moreover, there are other aspects of the regulatory discourse on the GFC that appear to 
reinforce existing creditor-debtor relations and further deny ethico-political contestation 
over appropriate forms of financial market agency.  For instance, on the one hand, the 
IMF (2009a: 27) recognises that the economic ‘stress’ put on ‘household balance sheets 
and debt servicing’ at the start of the crisis meant that US households ‘borrowed more 
heavily on credit cards and other forms of consumer credit as other credit channels 
began to close’.  Indeed, at times it expresses a significant degree of concern: 
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Subprime mortgages are especially exposed to … payment shocks, since a 
disproportionate share originated as ARMs.  Once faced with payment shock, 
borrowers with limited built-up equity may be unable to avoid default by 
extracting that equity to meet monthly payments.  Similarly, they may be unable 
to pay off a mortgage by selling their home, particularly in an environment of 
weak home price appreciation (IMF 2007a: 6). 
 
Yet, on the other hand, the IMF is careful not to speak too harshly of existing creditor-
debtor relations in its reform recommendations.  Indeed the IMF (2008a: 38) actually 
expresses concern that the US moratorium on interest rate resets for subprime borrowers, 
which seeks to limit foreclosures, might ‘redistribute the cost from borrowers to lenders, 
servicers, and investors’.  It also notes that responsive measures to the GFC will need to 
be ‘weighed carefully’ to ensure that a balance is struck between legitimate issues of 
consumer protection and the ‘protection of legal contracts that underpin modern finance, 
as some of these measures may undermine existing contracts’ (IMF 2008a: 38).  Finally, 
the IMF (2010b: 21) also expresses surprise at the rise in ‘strategic defaults’ in which 
borrowers were up-to-date on their mortgage loan payments, but chose to default 
because they were in negative equity.  As such action became ‘more socially 
acceptable’, it laments, lenders were ‘ill-prepared for this risk, which is not well 
captured in most risk models and provisioning rules’ (IMF 2010b: 23).  
 
Perhaps in an attempt to ‘correct’ for such financially deviant behaviour, the IMF (2006: 
62) expresses admiration for the way in which in some countries the collection of 
household debt is linked to payroll deductions.  It views this as useful because it serves 
to ‘inculcate a habit of prompt debt service’ and also ‘adjust consumption to post-debt 
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service disposable income, thereby enabling lenders to offer more household credit’ 
(IMF 2006: 62).  In another similar move with paternalistic undertones, the FSB (2011: 
36) recommends that regulators should allow lenders to ‘consider combining easier 
terms in some dimensions with repayment arrangements that encourage extra principal 
repayments so as to encourage borrowers to build up equity more quickly than would 
normally be required’.   
 
Overall, drawing these points together, I argue that in the regulatory governance of 
personal debt there is again an attempt to exclude interpersonal ethics from market-
oriented behaviour.  The ways in which the regulatory discourse of the GFC serves to 
reinforce the dominant position of financial and banking services in Anglo-America is 
complicit in the exclusion of contestable ethics in terms of creditor-debtor relations 
(discussed in the previous chapter).  In fact, a sizeable extension of credit in society even 
to simply maintain existing living standards is on the whole viewed as quite appropriate 
for a modern advanced economy.   In turn, the regulatory discourse works to give a clear 
indication of the model citizen of such an economy: they are the people who are 
identified as innocent ‘victims’ of the crisis and essentially embody the characteristics of 
the financialised individual.  The protection of ‘normal’ financial and banking services 
for these model citizens also serves to normalise creditor-debtor relations to the 
exclusion of any meaningful discussion of fundamental banking reform in response to 
the GFC.  This is especially problematic in the face of the idea that a credit-debt relation 
is inherently unequal.  From a sympathy perspective, the regulatory governance of 
personal debt appears to rely heavily on a flawed economistic treatment of market-
oriented behaviour, which might be improved by, at the very least, re-politicising 
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questions of personal debt so as not to deny the contestable nature of the ethics of 
financial market agency. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
I began this chapter by reflecting on the way in which Stiglitz, a global leader in 
financial market governance, appears to fall foul of at least one of Skinner’s basic 
mythologies in his interpretation of Smith.  Based on my contention that 
historiographical matters can perform a significant role in the very construction of 
contemporary issues themselves, it is notable that Stiglitz’s economistic outlook on the 
GFC, in this chapter represented in his UN Report, mirrors a distinctly economistic 
interpretation of the work of Smith.  By contrast, in this chapter I built on my 
historicised account of Smith constructed in previous chapters to analyse the place of 
economistic approaches to liberal market governance at the regulatory level of finance.  
I have shown how a sympathy perspective, built up from an historicised account of 
Smith, might indicate some of the problems of continuing to treat financial market 
agency in economistic terms. 
 
Specifically, at the three sites of finance explored at the regulatory level, the GFC has 
been explained as a crisis based on the denial of contestable ethics at the individual 
level.  In the first section, I illustrated how asset-based systems of welfare enjoy a 
largely unquestioned position in the regulatory discourse.  Even with the issues of access 
to homeownership and financial security falling right at the heart of the financial crisis, 
the regulatory discourse on the GFC tends to reinforce and rearticulate the need for 
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asset-based welfare.  In the second section, I argued that credit risk management 
practices remain largely unchallenged in the regulatory discourse.  If anything, along 
with the securitisation model, they are further normalised based on a continued faith in 
the ‘science’ and perfectibility of risk management.  In the final section, I suggested that 
the regulatory view of personal debt appears to continue to depoliticise creditor-debtor 
relations by insisting on the normalisation of financial services in an advanced economy 
and works to articulate model financialised citizens.  Again, despite the possible 
challenge to such an outlook posed by the GFC, a denial of the ethico-political 
contestability of debt appears to remain. 
 
What unites the crisis of ethics at each of these sites of finance is that on the whole the 
regulatory account of and response to the GFC relies on an economistic understanding of 
financial market agency that attempts to exclude contestable ethics at the individual 
level.  Asset-based systems of welfare are based on societies made up of instrumentally 
rational individuals acting autonomously to secure their wellbeing through financial 
markets (Langley 2006); extant risk management practices rely on assumptions about 
the individualisation of disembodied risk in society again dependent on instrumentally 
rational and autonomous individuals (Adam and van Loon 2000); and contemporary 
treatments of issues of debt depoliticise the creditor-debtor relation by assuming that all 
market-oriented behaviour is instrumentally rational on either side (Montgomerie 2009).  
By contrast, a Smithian sympathy perspective, at the very least, problematises and opens 
up contestable ethico-political space at these important sites of regulatory finance 
intimately involved with the GFC.  An important point I return to in the conclusion is 
that market-oriented behaviour necessarily contains and is constituted by contestable 
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ethics at the individual level.  From a sympathy perspective, then, the economistic 
treatments of the GFC contained within the regulatory discourse are ultimately flawed. 
 
Furthemore, in one rare but extremely insightful comment, the president and CEO of the 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC), John Taylor, sums up 
impeccably the lingering problem for the regulatory account of the GFC to the FCIC 
(2011: 404 emphasis added): 
 
a few hundred thousand people, even a million people going into foreclosure, 
you can kind of blame and say, ‘Well they should have known better.’  But 15 
[or] 16 million American families can’t all be wrong.  They can’t all be greedy 
and they can’t all be stupid. 
 
In many ways, this intervention highlights the problem of assuming away ethico-
political contestation at the individual level: it is simply unacceptable to explain the 
problem of subprime borrowing as one caused by all subprime borrowers acting in a 
‘greedy’ or ‘stupid’ way.  In this chapter, I have demonstrated how a sympathy 
perspective indicates some of the many problems of continuing to treat financial market 
agency in economistic terms.  When asset-based welfare goes unquestioned, when risk 
management is normalised to the everyday, and when creditor-debt relations are 
depoliticised, an economistic approach to financial market agency can be demonstrated 
to be reproduced, even though it is ultimately flawed on its own terms.  In the next and 
final chapter, I explore the extent to which the everyday discourse on the GFC – 
represented by interventions from organisations such as the NCRC – provides a 
challenge to the regulatory level of finance more congruent with a Smithian sympathy 
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perspective by problematising and opening up contestable ethico-political space at these 
important sites of finance. 
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CHAPTER 6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Everyday Financial Market Agency and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Adam Smith, wrongly cited as the father of free-market economics, constantly 
cautioned against the unregulated power of big business, warning that unchecked 
‘trade or manufacture’ would engage in ‘conspiracy against the public or in some 
other contrivance to raise prices’, since business interest ‘is always in some 
respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public’ (Smith cited in 
The Occupied Times 2012a: 12).  
 
It is quite remarkable that members of the Occupy movement claim Smith’s name for 
their cause in protest against economic and political elites.  Here, Smith is appealed to in 
fairly historicised terms: that is, not as ‘the father of free-market economics’ (as an 
economistic reading of Smith might have it), but as a thinker concerned about how 
monopolistic business practices can be harmful to wider society (as a more historicised 
reading might have it).  Notably, the occupiers’ appeal is almost diametrically opposed 
to Joseph Stiglitz’s interpretation of Smith.  For instance, he makes the claim that 
‘Smith, the founder of modern economics, was a strong champion of both free markets 
and free trade’ (Stiglitz 2006: 66 emphasis added).  In a sense, then, the competing 
interpretations here in a fascinating way mirror the competing and drastically different 
responses to the global financial crisis (GFC): for while Stiglitz is very much embedded 
in the regulatory level of financial governance discussed in the previous chapter, the 
occupiers who claim Smith’s name in The Occupied Times of London have an ostensibly 
radical and anti-elite driven agenda which is deliberately positioned in opposition to this 
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very same regulatory level of finance.  Thus, again, I note the importance of Smith’s 
ideas – and the contest over Smith’s ideas – to regulatory and everyday discourses of the 
GFC.   
 
That which is interesting from the perspective of this thesis is whether it is possible to 
identify within the everyday GFC discourse, such as in interventions by members of the 
Occupy movement, possibilities for understanding and responding to the crisis in 
distinctly deeper and more thoroughgoing Smithian terms.  Building on an interest in a 
sympathy perspective, is it possible to identify elements of the everyday discourse that 
successfully challenge the regulatory representation of and response to the GFC?  In the 
previous chapter I showed how a sympathy perspective, developed from a historicised 
reading of Smith in earlier chapters, indicates some of the problems of treating financial 
market agency in economistic terms.  At three sites of finance explored at the regulatory 
level, the GFC is understood as a crisis partly based on the denial of contestable ethics at 
the individual level.  When asset-based welfare goes unquestioned, when risk 
management is normalised to the everyday, and when creditor-debt relations are 
depoliticised, an economistic approach to financial market agency is (re)produced, even 
though it is ultimately flawed on its own terms.  By contrast a Smithian sympathy 
perspective, at the very least, might problematise and open up contestable ethico-
political space at these important regulatory sites of finance intimately involved with the 
GFC.  So, the question then becomes, does the everyday GFC discourse offer alternative 
representations and/or interventions along more sympathetic lines? 
 
I employ the term ‘everyday’ in this chapter to refer to the ‘non-elite’ in opposition to 
the ‘regulatory’ level discussed in the previous chapter.  In part, this draws upon John 
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Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke’s influential division of IPE.  They suggest that 
‘everyday’ actions are defined as:  
 
acts by those who are subordinate within a broader power relationship but, 
whether through negotiation, resistance or non-resistance, either incrementally or 
suddenly, shape, constitute and transform the political and economic 
environment around and beyond them (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007: 15-16).  
 
In outlining the everyday approach, Seabrooke (2007: 83) further suggests that everyday 
political economy actions are those associated with questioning the legitimacy of 
government policies, complaining in public or private about how the economy should 
work, and a general sense that government tends to intervene in the economy on behalf 
of the narrow interests of rentiers rather than the broader population.  The structures of 
the world economy at the ‘macro-level’ often constrain choices, but the everyday IPE 
approach attempts to highlight the ways in which ‘everyday actors also have agency in 
transforming the world economy through the contestation of policies and institutions’ 
(Seabrooke 2007: 84).   
 
Especially viewed in the light of the advocacy and campaign groups that Seabrooke 
(2007: 95) uses to illustrate his approach, I think it is certainly fair to consider the 
Occupy movement a form of ‘everyday’ agency.  It certainly seems to fit earlier 
discussions of ‘global civil society’ understood by many as a key source of ethical 
agency (e.g. Cox 1999; De Goede 2005b; Gill 2000b; Kaldor 2003; Scholte 2004).  In 
one important statement, London occupiers claim that they are ‘part of a global 
movement against corporate greed and unregulated banking systems, subverting 
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hierarchies and creating a space where people are encouraged to join’ (The Occupied 
Times 2011a: 1).  It is also claimed that the Occupy movement is ‘a soulful expression of 
a moral outrage at the ugly corporate greed that pushes our society and world to the 
brink of catastrophe’ (The Occupied Wall Street [OWS] Journal 2011c: 1).  In their 
‘Declaration of the Occupation of New York City’ occupiers state ‘[w]e come to you at 
a time when corporations, which place profit over people, self-interest over justice, and 
oppression over equality, run our governments’ (Occupy Wall Street [OWS] 2011a).  
They claim they are allied to ‘all people who feel wronged by the corporate forces of the 
world’ (OWS 2011a) and they ‘protest the blatant injustices of our times perpetuated by 
the economic and political elites’ (OWS 2011b).   
 
Incidentally, a common refrain in retort to the Occupy movement revolves around the 
idea that ‘it lacks focus’, fails to articulate a ‘unified, coherent program’, and does not 
put forward a ‘single set of grievances or demands’ (The Occupied Times 2011b: 6; 
Jickling and Hoskins 2011: i; 1).  However, despite being also largely beside the point, 
this criticism is flawed on a number of accounts.  For a start, among numerous other 
examples, the very first page of the very first edition of The OWS Journal (2011a: 1) 
lists some of the sophisticated ideas put forward by occupiers generated through 
consensus decision making.  Somewhat ironically, London occupiers even managed to 
get an op-ed piece published in The Financial Times (Occupy London 2012) with a 
statement of their proposals by claiming that they were drawing on Friedrich Hayek’s 
observation that ‘distributed intelligence in a voluntary co-operative is a hallmark of real 
economy’.  What is more, ‘Occupy the SEC’ is a group within the OWS movement that 
has submitted a 325-page letter to the regulatory agencies involved in considering the 
proposed ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US.  They do not claim to represent the viewpoints of 
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OWS as a whole, but such activities surely mark a substantial achievement by those who 
self-identify as part of the Occupy movement (Occupy the SEC 2012: 1 fn1).   
 
The point I wish to make here is that the Occupy movement is fully worthy of 
consideration as a voice of everyday resistance or non-elite politics.  When considered 
alongside (more traditionally-structured) Anglo-American activist movements and 
groups who have formulated substantial accounts of the GFC, such as, among others, the 
New Economics Foundation (NEF), the National Community Reinvestment Coalition 
(NCRC), the Put People First (PPF) coalition of NGOs, and Wall Street Watch, together 
with more critical academic studies by the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural 
Change (CRESC) and Democratic Audit, it is possible to piece together a sketch of the 
everyday GFC discourse.  Paralleling the previous chapter, then, I present an alternative 
representation of and response to the crisis investigated at the same three sites of finance 
explored at the regulatory level. 
 
In the first section, I survey the place of asset-based systems of welfare in the everyday 
politics of the GFC.  Essentially, I assess the extent to which everyday representations of 
and responses to the GFC articulate a challenge to such systems.  In the previous 
chapter, I illustrated how asset-based welfare enjoys a largely unquestioned position in 
the regulatory discourse.  Even in the face of issues of access to homeownership and 
financial security falling right at the heart of the financial crisis, the regulatory GFC 
discourse still tends to rearticulate and reinforce the need for asset-based welfare.  What 
is more, I showed that the regulatory discourse can be understood as an attempt to 
exclude interpersonal ethics from market-oriented behaviour by inducing an economistic 
and autonomous individual detached from the rest of society.  In this chapter, then, I 
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look to the everyday politics of the GFC for articulations that open up ethico-political 
questions at the level of the individual in a way that echoes a Smithian sympathy 
perspective. 
 
In the second section, I investigate the issue of credit risk management in light of the 
everyday politics of the GFC.   In the previous chapter, I argued that credit risk 
management practices remain largely unchallenged in the regulatory discourse.  If 
anything, along with the securitisation model, they are further normalised based on a 
continued faith in the ‘science’ and perfectibility of risk management.  I showed how the 
regulatory discourse tends to construct scientistic understandings of risk that contradict 
the contestable place of risk in society.  In this chapter, I assess the extent to which the 
everyday politics of the GFC presents an alternative account of risk.  I ask if such 
representations are more congruent with a Smithian sympathy perspective that accounts 
for how norms of risk come to be formed and contested in society through moments of 
mutual sympathy as part of the negotiation of ethico-political standards.  Whereas the 
regulatory discourse tends to advocate techniques of credit risk management based on 
assumptions of instrumentally rational behaviour, I look to the everyday politics of GFC 
for challenges to the normalisation of risk management in society. 
 
Finally, in the third section, I examine treatments of personal debt in the everyday 
politics of the GFC.  In the previous chapter, I suggested that the regulatory view of 
personal debt appears to continue to depoliticise creditor-debtor relations by insisting on 
the normalisation of financial services in an advanced economy and working to 
articulate model financialised citizens.  Again, despite the possible challenge to such an 
outlook posed by the GFC, a denial of the ethico-political contestability of debt appears 
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to endure.  Looking to a Smithian sympathy perspective, I explore the extent to which 
everyday representations of and responses to the GFC offer a reimagining of issues of 
credit and debt.  I ask whether this discourse provides a challenge to the depoliticisation 
of debt and whether it offers a fuller recognition of the contestable interpersonal ethics 
that make up credit-debt relations according to a sympathy perspective. 
 
If the everyday GFC discourse does indeed offer up alternatives to the economistic 
liberal outlook in terms of ethico-political contestation at the level of the individual, this 
would surely be something of a significant success for those who seek to challenge 
existing regulatory financial market governance.  Members of the Occupy movement, 
for instance, consciously position themselves as part of an attempt to reimagine and seek 
alternatives to the elitist and, in their eyes at least, failed ‘system’ of regulatory financial 
governance (The Occupied Times 2011a: 2; 2012b: 11).  The fact that they occupy 
financial space as part of an intentional performative act, which seeks to repoliticise 
finance by subverting the spaces it fills, draws attention to this line of challenging 
existing structures of finance.  Offering alternatives to an economistic liberal outlook 
thus might offer them, and others who provide exacting critiques of Anglo-American 
regulatory financial governance of the last 30 years or so, a substantial way to make the 
claim that the GFC was a crisis of ethics that calls for a radical rethinking of finance.  
This is based on my notion that, from a Smithian sympathy perspective at least, a denial 
of contestable ethics at the individual level is a crisis of ethics.  The question for this 
chapter, then, is whether or not the everyday GFC discourse contains a substantial 
challenge to the economistic liberalism embodied at the regulatory level of financial 
governance. 
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6.1 The everyday politics of asset-based welfare 
 
The roots of the subprime financial shock begin in the American psyche and run 
through the typical household’s balance sheet.  Most of us define financial 
success by the size and quality of our home.  The pecuniary and psychological 
benefits we attach to home ownership are unique; no other country values hearth 
and home more highly.  Most of us spend far more on housing than we do on 
anything else, and American wealth is critically linked to the home – a house is 
the typical family’s largest asset, and the mortgage is the largest liability (Zandi 
2009: 49).  
 
In this section, I illustrate the ways in which the everyday GFC discourse offers a 
challenge to the kind of ‘homeowner ideology’ based on a system of asset-based welfare 
to which Mark Zandi alludes.  In the previous chapter, I argued that asset-based welfare 
enjoys a largely unquestioned position in the regulatory discourse.  In turn, I suggested, 
this has the effect of potentially excluding interpersonal ethics from market-oriented 
behaviour by inducing an economistic and autonomous individual detached from the rest 
of society.  Might the everyday GFC discourse avoid such an economistic treatment of 
market-oriented behaviour, which from a sympathy perspective is deeply flawed because 
it excludes contestable interpersonal ethics?  Does the everyday politics of the GFC then 
open up ethico-political questions at the level of the individual in a way that echoes a 
Smithian sympathetic understanding of market-oriented behaviour? 
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Financial responsibility and challenges to asset-based welfare  
In the everyday GFC discourse there is a sustained critique of the housing finance 
systems found in Anglo-America often expressed in terms of condemnation of the place 
of financiers in those systems.  A somewhat typical denunciation of financiers in general 
is that ‘[t]hey have taken our houses through an illegal foreclosure process, despite not 
having the original mortgage’ (OWS 2011a emphasis added).  Indeed occupiers 
frequently condemn the place of mortgage-related debt and speak of attempting to 
‘reclaim our mortgaged future’ (OWS 2011b emphasis added).  This line of criticism is 
echoed by the advocacy project Wall Street Watch (2009: 14 emphasis added) in their 
account of the GFC: 
 
They engaged in unconscionable predatory lending that offered huge profits for a 
time, but led to dire consequences when the loans proved unpayable.  And they 
created, maintained and justified a housing bubble, the bursting of which has 
thrown the United States and the world into a deep recession. 
 
The direct vilification of financiers sits alongside a critique of the homeowner ideology 
also identified as playing a fundamental role in the subprime debacle (Langley 2008a: 
479; Nesvetailova 2010: 86).  For Wall Street Watch (2009: 65):  
 
There were reasons why [former Chair of the Federal Reserve Alan] Greenspan 
and other top officials did not act to pop the bubble.  They advanced expanded 
home ownership as an ideological goal.  While this objective is broadly shared 
across the political spectrum, the Bush administration and Greenspan’s 
ideological commitment to the goal biased them to embrace growing home 
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buying uncritically – without regard to whether new buyers could afford the 
homes they were buying, or the loans they were getting. 
 
It further suggests that ‘Wall Street grew rich on mortgage-related securities and exotic 
financial instruments’ and ‘people borrowed en masse against the rising value of their 
homes to spend more and keep the economy functioning’ (Wall Street Watch 2009: 66).   
 
Notably, though, in direct contrast to the regulatory discourse, in the everyday discourse 
there is much less blame attached to the ‘subprime’ borrower, much less emphasis put 
on the ‘flawed’ characteristics that the subprime borrower displayed in the period 
preceding the crisis and how they might be financially ‘educated’ out of displaying such 
characteristics again.  Instead, attention tends to be focused on financiers, as well as on 
the governments and regulatory bodies that promote systems of asset-based welfare 
(Finlayson 2009).  For instance in the pages of Tidal (2011: 17 emphasis added), a 
publication of the Occupy movement, there is an account of how borrowers were in a 
sense cheated by a homeowner ideology, with the argument made that ‘[s]uburban 
sprawl and home ownership have deceived us into debt and a twisted sense of control, 
success, and identity’.  Moreover in another instance of blaming mortgage lenders, but 
not mortgage borrowers, the NCRC (2008: 3) reports that significant numbers of 
adjustable-rate mortgage borrowers were defaulting even before the first interest rate 
adjustment on their loans, which clearly points towards ‘unsatisfactory underwriting 
practices’.  In a further attribution of blame, it also documents that nearly 35% of 
subprime loans were issued to borrowers who could have qualified for fixed rate ‘prime’ 
loans (NCRC 2010c: 3). 
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Similarly, in the UK, the ills of asset-based welfare also seem to get attached to the 
financial sector itself, rather than borrowers specifically (unlike with the ‘problem’ of 
the subprime borrower identified in the last chapter).  For instance, CRESC (2009: 64) 
suggests that ‘[i]ndiscriminate lending for consumers loaded revolving debt onto the 
household balance sheet and caused the housing bubble’.  In turn, it notes that the debt 
burden was pushed up for new entrants and low income households who spent 40% of 
disposable income on mortgages, while those already ‘on the [property] ladder’ were 
encouraged to withdraw equity to fuel further consumption (CRESC 2009: 64).  For 
CRESC (2009: 68), then, the GFC represents a ‘social turning point’, a ‘change in the 
economic conjuncture’, and something of a direct challenge to the asset-based welfare 
model.  It suggests: 
 
The crisis finally discredited the social promise that the mass of the population 
could find security through property because funded saving and/or home 
ownership would provide ordinary wage earners with security in old age.  The 
stock market crash in 2000 and the subsequent closure of defined benefit 
schemes had dramatised the limited long term benefits of holding ordinary 
shares; and the subsequent years showed that employers would not honour social 
obligations which had any economic cost. The housing market crash after 2007 
showed that sustained gains in house prices would not compensate for non-
existent pensions (CRESC 2009: 68 emphasis added). 
 
Echoing Wall Street Watch and members of the Occupy movement, CRESC (2009: 40) 
is of the opinion that ‘[t]wenty years of innovation in wholesale finance did very little 
for anybody outside finance, except for those who wanted to trade assets and through 
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luck or judgement took their money off the table before the asset price bubble popped’.  
Ben Dyson et al. (2011: 21) seemingly concur, as they report that in the UK the house 
price boom and excessive lending ‘more than doubled the cost of housing relative to 
income’: a huge problem in terms of affordability which ultimately means that 
households have to pay much more, via mortgage interest, to the banking sector. 
 
Given these complaints, it is perhaps unsurprising that the everyday discourse contains 
significant direct (performative) challenges to asset-based welfare more broadly.  In 
direct defiance of property as financial asset, occupiers claim: 
 
The space we are occupying in the heart of London has huge financial value, but 
we’ve shown that it has a value to people beyond money.  Most property, space 
and buildings have become merely ‘assets’, acquired for their value or used for 
the production of wealth.  Occupy is reinstating some of the human value back 
into buildings and spaces by making them democratic, inclusive political spaces 
(The Occupied Times 2012a: 4).   
 
The challenge to asset-based welfare is articulated by the Occupy movement in a 
number of ways.  For instance, one contributor calls for ‘networked community based 
investment in housing’ (Cook 2012) and it is suggested that the Occupy movement 
should move from its outside occupations to indoor spaces ‘such as foreclosed houses 
and abandoned buildings’ because this ‘politicizes individual struggles’ (Tidal 2011: 10) 
– a direct performative act of subversion.  The call for networked, collective action also 
echoes PPF’s (2009a: 5) suggestion that it is necessary to ‘work towards universal 
achievement of the human right to adequate housing’.  It argues that the role of private 
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finance and reduced social provision in housing markets has prompted ‘insecurity and 
indebtedness for low and middle-income earners’ and looks to investment in social 
housing as a remedy (PPF 2009a: 5).  Seemingly, the outcome of sympathetic moral 
structures are here activated to suggest that the ‘right to housing’ ought to be a central 
aspect of the welfare state given that the social provision of housing has dignifying 
effects.   
 
Moreover, one interviewee for occupiers recommends that if someone is in negative 
equity they should ‘stop being a debt slave to [their] banker and default on [their] 
mortgage and become a renter’ (Interview with James G. Rickards in The Occupied 
Times 2011d: 8).  Further, they claim that homeownership ‘is a myth perpetuated by 
bankers who profit from mortgages’ and that renting ‘is a perfectly acceptable economic 
arrangement between those who need housing and those who provide it’ (Interview with 
James G. Rickards in The Occupied Times 2011d: 8).  The NCRC (2010e: 10) also picks 
up on renting as an important alternative to homeownership by welcoming calls in the 
US for ‘right to rent’ arrangements, which allow owner-occupiers to stay in their homes 
even if they are threatened with foreclosure.  These ‘sale-leaseback’ arrangements are 
uncommon in the residential sector, but provide an alternative form of financing if bank 
loans are difficult to obtain (NCRC 2010e: 10).  
 
Alongside a focus on the role of homeowner ideology in the inflation of the subprime 
bubble and the destructive consequences of foreclosure, there are also criticisms made in 
the everyday discourse directly related to other forms of state restructuring towards 
asset-based welfare systems.  Most explicitly, asset-based pension provision is identified 
as a significant problem related to the GFC.  As Wall Street Watch (2009: 6) points out, 
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in the US, even those ‘lucky enough to have had pensions or retirement funds have 
watched helplessly as 25 percent of their value evaporated in 2008’.  Writing in The 
Occupied Times, Owen Jones (2011) claims that in the UK private sector pension 
restructuring is ‘one of the great scandals of our age’.  He reports how for the low-paid, 
only 20% of private sector workers have an employer sponsored pension scheme and 
notes the problem of how this is used by some as justification for reforming public 
sector pensions in a ‘race to the bottom’ (Jones 2011).  More broadly, occupiers 
complain that pensions, alongside other social goods such as health, housing, and 
education, are currently ‘controlled by global banks, markets, tax havens, corporations 
and financial crises’ (Occupy LSX 2011b).  
 
Asset-based systems of welfare are also criticised by CRESC (2009: 8) which suggests 
that at the regulatory level the ‘language of social innovation’ is often used to ‘argue that 
new financial products can address “unmet social needs” such as care in old age’.  It 
claims that this implies ‘more funds routed through the wholesale markets which would 
benefit the senior workforce, but could well increase economic instability without 
solving our social problems’ (CRESC 2009: 8).  For CRESC (2009: 69), pension 
contributions from low-paid individuals often represent a ‘failure’ in terms of not 
building a sufficient personal fund for security through ‘property in coupons’.  It 
contrasts this individualised asset-based welfare system with a more ‘social’ 
arrangement, which might include ‘pooled contributions’ that could be organised along 
more collective lines to build a ‘social fund for infrastructure renewal’ (CRESC 2009: 
69).  In all, CRESC (2009: 68) finds the denial of ‘comfortable retirement in the UK’ 
based on employment history and status ‘entirely unacceptable’.  Again, it appears that 
on this account of the ‘right’ to an adequate pension the outcome of sympathetic moral 
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structures are here activated to stress the need for the social provision of pensions 
because of their dignifying effects. 
 
Likewise, in her contribution to the Occupy literature, Judith Butler (2011) criticises 
‘prevailing attitudes toward health insurance and social security’ in the US that suggest 
that ‘market rationality should decide whose health and life should be protected, and 
whose health and life should not’.  She writes: 
 
For if each of us is responsible only for ourselves, and not for others, and if that 
responsibility is first and foremost a responsibility to become economically self-
sufficient under conditions when self-sufficiency is structurally undermined, then 
we can see that this neo-liberal morality, as it were, demands self-sufficiency as a 
moral ideal at the same time that it works to destroy that very possibility at an 
economic level.  Those who cannot afford to pay into health care constitute but 
one version of population deemed disposable (Butler 2011).  
 
This argument also appears to stress a right to adequate healthcare based on an appeal to 
the outcome of sympathetic moral structures which are activated to stress the need for 
the social provision of healthcare because of its dignifying effects: people cannot be just 
left without healthcare based on individualised market rationale. 
 
Drawing these points together, I suggest that there are clear ways in which the everyday 
GFC discourse offers sharp criticisms of asset-based welfare.  The roles of homeowner 
ideology and state restructuring towards individualised responsibility in particular both 
seem to form central parts of the everyday account of the GFC.  Interestingly, unlike in 
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the regulatory discourse, there is little blame attached to the subprime borrower because 
culpability for the crisis, as might be expected from movements like Occupy, is much 
more directly attributed to financiers and regulators.  In the previous chapter, I argued 
that asset-based systems of welfare enjoy a largely unquestioned position in the 
regulatory discourse, even though they are widely identified as so central to the crisis 
itself.  By contrast, from a sympathy perspective interested in the contestation of 
interpersonal ethics at the individual level, in the everyday GFC discourse there is a 
greater degree of questioning of asset-based welfare, which means there is also 
potentially more space for ethico-political contestation at the individual level.   
 
In turn, this might suggest that the everyday discourse is able to avoid an economistic 
treatment of market-oriented behaviour by bringing into doubt hitherto accepted forms 
of state restructuring in Anglo-America.  Such a position is at least seemingly much 
more congruent with a Smithian sympathetic approach to questions of political 
economy, especially compared to the economistic liberalism of the regulatory GFC 
discourse that tends to encourage the (re)production of atomistic and instrumentally 
rational market-oriented behaviour.  However, it is also important to interrogate the 
limits of this questioning, particularly with regard to how financialisation trends and 
asset-based welfare systems might still be partially reinforced in the everyday discourse 
itself.  What are the limits of the everyday challenge to economistic liberalism? 
 
Financialised citizenship and the reinforcement of asset-based welfare 
It is possible to discern elements of support for asset-based systems of welfare – 
including a nascent homeowner ideology – in parts of the everyday discourse.  As with 
the regulatory discourse, one way in which this is articulated is in the identification of 
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innocent ‘victims’ of the GFC.  Notably, it is the very same groups in society that 
display certain financialised character traits which tend to be identified.  For instance, 
writing in The Occupied Times, Matt Taibbi (2011) argues that the GFC and its response 
from governments represent ‘the biggest heist in the history of robberies’ with 
homeowners, pensioners, taxpayers, and savers all singled out as victims who have been 
‘fleeced’.  Again directing blame at financiers in particular, Wall Street Watch (2009: 9 
emphasis added) claims that ‘the enemies of American consumers, taxpayers and small 
investors live in multimillion-dollar palaces and pull down seven-, eight- or even nine-
figure annual paychecks’.  It claims that ‘consumers are not to blame for this debacle’, 
certainly not those who used credit ‘in an attempt to have a decent quality of life’, and 
US subprime borrowers should not be blamed simply because they faced misleading 
loan conditions (Wall Street Watch 2009: 9 emphasis added).  Likewise, Wall Street 
Watch (2009: 110) argues that ‘the American economy cannot be based on finance and 
the trading of paper’ because rather than increase national wealth, Wall Street ‘siphoned 
profits from the real economy’ and from ‘consumers, workers and investors’ who were 
then ‘asked to foot the bill’ of the GFC.  Thus as with the regulatory GFC discourse, at 
least in part, a particular financialised depiction of citizenship (Langley 2006) appears to 
be articulated by the everyday discourse. 
 
Moreover, the NCRC presents a very interesting intervention with regard to tendencies 
to reinforce financialised citizenship and asset-based welfare.  On the one hand, given 
that it considers itself the ‘nation’s trade association for economic justice whose 
members consist of local community based organizations’ and claims to have since its 
inception in 1990 ‘spearheaded the economic justice movement’, it might be expected 
that its views would depart quite significantly from the regulatory discourse, especially 
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on issues such as subprime lending right at the heart of the GFC (NCRC 2003: 2).  
However, on the other hand, the NCRC (2003: 2) views its ‘mission’ as building ‘wealth 
in traditionally underserved communities’ and bringing low- and moderate-income 
populations ‘into the financial mainstream’.  Seemingly, it is this latter mission that 
tends to take precedence and set the limits of its critique of existing systems of finance.  
This is because in a number of important ways it promotes asset-based welfare in much 
the same way as the regulatory discourse in response to the crisis and in fact reinforces 
something of a homeowner ideology.  
 
As discussed above, despite presenting renting as an alternative to homeownership, the 
NCRC (2010e: 18 emphasis added) also appears to suggest that it is merely a step on the 
way to the ultimate goal of owner-occupation: 
 
For residents not ready for homeownership, whether due to credit or down 
payment deficiencies, and in areas where lenders are tightening home purchase 
loans, lease-to-purchase (or rent-to-own) programs can offer an intermediate step 
in which renters gradually build towards ownership.  By offering a stepping 
stone between renting and buying, a lease-to-purchase (or rent-to-own) option is 
an effective tool to rebuild the homeownership market.  Since families that have 
experienced a foreclosure cannot become owners again for five to seven years 
due to credit score damage, this tool provides an alternative that helps former – 
or new – homeowners build up the credit and capital needed to buy a home. 
 
Such suggestions are part of the NCRC’s overall position on homeownership, which it 
seems to promote almost above all else.  It speaks approvingly of shared equity schemes 
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because they provide an ‘opportunity for wealth building creation [that] can be passed 
on to countless future generations’ (NCRC 2010e: 20 emphasis added).  It welcomes 
‘resident ownership mechanisms’ that provide ‘low- and moderate-income residents 
with opportunities to enhance their financial assets and gain ownership stakes in 
redevelopment initiatives’ (NCRC 2010e: 32 emphasis added).  What is more, the 
NCRC (2011a: 1-3) expresses concern about ‘shutting out future generations of working 
Americans from homeownership’ on a number of counts, including issues of private 
credit provision, debt-to-income ratios, and down payment criteria.   
 
In many ways the NCRC (2011a: 2) appears to prefer an improved system of, but not a 
distinct departure from, relatively easy credit conditions: a move away from the ‘risk 
factors such as no income documentation, prepayment penalties and adjustable rates that 
plagued subprime loans’, yet not a fundamental and thoroughgoing rethink of subprime 
finance.  In fact, it claims that the Community Reinvestment Act ‘ensured that lending 
conducted by banks is safe and sound’ and it speaks highly of the US Government 
Sponsored Enterprises which it claims ‘encouraged the origination of safe and 
sustainable loans’ (NCRC 2010d: 1; 2010c: 3).  Perhaps most revealingly, it suggests 
that ‘[r]esponsible subprime lending has an important role to play in the marketplace’ 
and if a significantly increased level of advice can be offered to customers, it would 
prevent them ‘falling victim to predatory lending’ (NCRC 2008: 30).   
 
This line of thinking actually echoes a number of other interventions in the everyday 
GFC discourse.  One contributor to The Occupied Times appears to suggest that in the 
UK the problem was not subprime lending per se, but the distortion of credit provision 
through criminal practice.  He writes: ‘the single most important factor behind the 
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catastrophic global insolvency of the banking industry’ was a ‘failure to enforce existing 
laws’ because it was the ‘systematic resort to mortgage fraud perpetrated by the financial 
sector’ that caused the massive accumulation of bad debts (Shutt 2011).  Moreover, 
Stiglitz (2012) speaks enthusiastically about homeownership in The Occupied Times 
(perhaps somewhat blurring the lines between the regulatory and the everyday) by 
pointing to the 87% owner-occupation rate in Mauritius that has been achieved without 
fuelling a housing bubble.  
 
Overall, therefore, the everyday GFC discourse articulates a complex and variegated 
attitude with regard to systems of asset-based welfare.  On the one hand, it offers a sharp 
critique of homeowner ideology and state restructuring towards individualised 
responsibility.  As such, it potentially avoids an economistic treatment of market-
oriented behaviour and enunciates representations much more in line with a Smithian 
sympathy perspective than the regulatory discourse.  This is found most forcefully in 
interventions that question an ‘atomistic view of society’ (The Occupied Times 2011b: 
3).  However, on the other hand, there are certain limits to the reimagining of financial 
market agency in which the everyday discourse engages.  In important ways, it still 
displays notable instances where there is a perceived need for asset-based welfare and a 
reproduction of a homeowner ideology.  Even the NEF (2011b: 21 emphasis added), 
otherwise extremely critical of extant financialised citizenship, identifies the ability to 
‘build assets’ and tools and services, such as insurance and pensions, ‘to protect aspects 
of life’ as financial needs that are ‘equally valid for Joe Public and Vulnerable Groups’.   
 
From a Smithian sympathy perspective, ethico-political contestation at the individual 
level is closed down if asset-based welfare and systems of individualised financial 
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responsibility go unquestioned.  This is what makes it so remarkable that even in the 
face of issues of access to homeownership and financial security falling right at the heart 
of the financial crisis, asset-based welfare systems still seem to be (re)produced certainly 
at the regulatory level and, at least in part, at the everyday level.  Outside a financialised 
society, it might be possible for the sympathy procedure to be unhindered by the ethos of 
individualised financial responsibility such that more collective forms of welfare 
provision become important to meet the demands of the outcome of negotiation of 
interpersonal ethics between people, as some of the everyday interventions imply.  
Within parts of the everyday discourse, though, it appears as though a commitment to 
asset-based welfare still produces a somewhat financialised outcome for any 
sympathetic reimagining of finance. 
 
However, it is important to note the argument I wish to make here is not that there is 
anything necessarily ‘wrong’ with the promotion of homeownership by associations 
such as NCRC, nor indeed with asset-based welfare more broadly, especially perhaps 
when the very explicit intention is to further the position of low-income groups.  Rather, 
the point is to dig a little deeper to question what ethico-political space is being opened 
up or closed down in this very act of fostering asset-based welfare and financialised 
citizenship.   On the one hand, it might be that the deeply ingrained aspects of 
financialisation in contemporary Anglo-American societies simply limit the possibilities 
of the operation of the sympathy procedure in the current era.  That is, even if everyday 
interventions do provide political space to rethink notions of financial responsibility in 
less individualised terms, they still ask people to perform the imaginative act of 
sympathy in terms which are shot through with ideas that are implicated in a 
financialised society, such as asset-based welfare.   
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Conversely, on the other hand, more empowering for a sympathy perspective, the use of 
sympathy here might actually serve as a form of immanent critique.  That is, given that 
the everyday discourse provides opportunities to rethink finance in less financialised 
terms, while still speaking to ideas such as homeownership that people recognise as so 
central to their lives, it could provide an even more important feature of a counter-
political culture to transcend economistic liberalism.  Thus everyday interventions might 
serve to challenge the economistic understanding of market-oriented behaviour, while 
still speaking to ideas about empowerment in terms of homeownership, pension 
provision, and healthcare.  In a sense, the sympathy procedure here works not to provide 
collective resistance to finance, but subversion (De Goede 2005b).  This is a significant 
point to which I return in the concluding chapter because it speaks directly to the issue 
of how economistic market-oriented behaviour might be challenged under liberal market 
governance. 
 
 
6.2 The everyday politics of credit risk 
 
Market finance became a new form of worship: What would the market think?  
What would the market say?  Without even knowing why, the common person 
was suddenly exhorted to care very deeply about how the market ‘felt’ about 
something.  If the market was upset, something so unspeakably terrible would 
happen! (The Occupied Times 2011b: 3). 
 
This intervention is illustrative of how, in some discussions of the power of financial 
markets, occupiers work to denaturalise the market.  This is actually something that 
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chimes well with Smith’s sympathetic liberalism.  As opposed to being naturally 
occurring between innately instrumentally rational individuals, markets are made as 
people perform the character traits of market-oriented behaviour: there is no such thing 
as ‘the market’ itself saying, doing, or feeling anything from such a perspective (Watson 
2005a: 163).  People embody the roles of market makers when they engage in market-
oriented behaviour, but such behaviour is always contingent, contestable, and involved 
in the negotiation of interpersonal ethics; it is not a uniform and homogenous process 
that results in a dogmatic structured outcome called ‘the market’.  Yet, are there other 
deeper ways in which the everyday discourse offers distinctly Smithian insights into the 
ethics of financial market agency?  Are there forms of resistance to liberal financial 
market governance that serve to open up ethico-political contestability about the place of 
risk in society? 
 
In this section, I argue that the everyday discourse offers significant forms of resistance 
to current risk management practices and structured finance.  In the previous chapter, I 
discussed how credit risk management practices remain largely unchallenged in the 
regulatory discourse.  If anything, along with the securitisation model, they are further 
normalised based on a continued faith in the ‘science’ and perfectibility of risk 
management.  Whereas such a position serves to deny the contestable place of risk in 
society, I suggest that in the everyday discourse certain challenges to the normalisation 
of risk management are articulated which are more congruent with a Smithian sympathy 
perspective.  While an economistic understanding of the place of credit risk in financial 
markets tends to contradict contestable interpersonal ethics, the everyday discourse, in 
part, avoids the assumptions of instrumentally rational and uniform behaviour on which 
such a position rests. 
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Resistance to the normalisation of credit risk management and structured finance 
 
There is a shared feeling on the streets around the world that the global economy 
is a Ponzi scheme run by and for Big Finance.  People everywhere are waking up 
to the realisation that there is something fundamentally wrong with a system in 
which speculative financial transactions add up, each day, to $1.3tn (50 times 
more than the sum of all the commercial transactions) (White and Lasn 2011). 
 
In the everyday discourse there are many indictments levelled at finance in general and 
practices associated with risk management systems and structured finance in particular.  
For instance, in the UK, occupiers state ‘[w]e refuse to pay for the banks’ crisis’ and 
therefore ‘do not accept the cuts as either necessary or inevitable’ (Occupy LSX 2011a).    
Occupiers protest that the ‘complex gambling inherent in today’s institutions of high 
finance is also all about using money to beget money’ and that ‘the gamblers risk not 
their own livelihoods but ours’ (The Occupied Times 2011e: 10).  They ask how it is 
acceptable for large financial institutions to benefit from staggering government bailouts 
‘after handing out countless high-risk loans’, while the ‘recipients of these loans have to 
default’ (The OWS Journal 2011a: 2).  Adopting a similar perspective, the NEF (2011b: 
8) claims that the activities that ‘created’ the GFC ‘deliver little social value’ because 
those in the banking sector ‘operated for themselves’.  Specifically, it blames the way in 
which they ‘created a new sectoral business model that fused retail and wholesale 
through securitization and turned banking into a giant “transaction generating machine”’ 
(NEF 2011b: 8; see Froud et al. 2002).  
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Along related lines, another aspect of contemporary finance criticised is the fact that 
while major investment banks used to operate as partnerships, they now tend to utilise a 
public company structure which, as discussed in the regulatory discourse, ‘leads to a 
striking moral hazard in the manner in which these banks conduct trades’ (Occupy the 
SEC 2012: 78).  In essence, the problem is that since traders have no personal liability in 
such a structure, there is ‘little real downside [for them] to incurring monumental losses’ 
(Occupy the SEC 2012: 78).  This of course relates to the widely discussed issue of 
‘moral hazard’ in the crisis (Wade 2008: 32-33).  Speculation using structured financial 
products is effectively encouraged because ‘[p]rovided that no fraud occurs, the worst-
case scenario for a trader who loses millions or billions of dollars of depositor-backed 
money is the loss of a job’ (Occupy the SEC 2012: 78).  ‘In effect’, as Dyson et al. 
(2011: 12) also suggest, this means that ‘while the potential upside of an investment 
goes to the bank and the saver/investor, the potential losses fall upon the taxpayer’.  
 
In the everyday discourse, such appraisals of the banking and financial services sectors 
tend to sit alongside attempts at a fundamental ‘rethink’ of the desired function and 
place of banks and other financial institutions in society.  David Beetham (2011: 7) 
argues, for instance, that the ‘dominance of the financial sector has been detrimental to 
other sectors of the economy, since it has generally been more profitable to invest in 
financial trading than in domestic businesses’.  Likewise the NEF (2010: 14) suggests 
that ‘it stretches credulity to imagine that trading in assets can ever be an engine of 
economic growth as it does not add much to the productive capacity of the economy’.  It 
is in fact a ‘fallacy’, the NEF (2010: 25) claims, to suggest that ‘banks are middlemen 
between depositors and borrowers’ because in actuality while banks do instigate lending, 
‘they are not constrained by deposits’.   
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Notably, this is an element of recent banking practices identified as hugely problematic 
in the everyday discourse based on the argument that when a loan is made, it ‘doesn’t 
actually come from anyone else’s savings’, but rather is a simple process of creating an 
account on a computer system (Interview with Ben Dyson in The Occupied Times 
2011b: 7).  From this perspective, Ben Dyson reports that the creation of ‘brand new 
money’ by banks, shown in Bank of England figures, largely goes towards ‘pushing up 
house prices and speculating on commodities’ (Interview with Ben Dyson in The 
Occupied Times 2011b: 7).  On this issue, the NEF (2010: 25 emphasis in original) 
further explains:  
 
As many have understood, th[e] ability to create lending (i.e. to create credit) has 
both enormous benefits and enormous dangers.  The dangers arise from a conflict 
of interest between the owners of the banking system and the economy as a 
whole.  Nothing is closer to alchemy than the creation of credit.  With very little 
effort and cost, banks can create a huge amount of lending which generates 
interest income and profit.  There will always be a temptation to over-lend: to 
lend beyond borrowers’ ability to repay from future earnings or the banks’ 
liquidity and capital resources.  It is a powerful temptation: the major crises of 
economic history have at root cause over-lending.  
 
By way of response, Dyson et al. (2011: 9 emphasis in original) look to a ‘full-reserve’ 
system, in which banks ‘would continue to play an allocatory and maturity 
transformation role but as genuine intermediaries that transfer existing purchasing 
power, not as credit creating entities that expand the money supply’.  This criticism is 
part of NEF’s (2010: 6) general argument that the ‘economic history of the world 
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indicates that crisis after crisis arises from financial failures’ and that these failures 
‘follow from one simple cause: the over-extension of credit’.   
 
Concerning over-lending, CRESC (2009: 44) agrees that the banking sector made ‘easy 
loans for non-productive purposes’ on residential and commercial property or to other 
financial firms ‘because property and finance were the only sectors which had an 
insatiable demand for loans’.  It argues that central banks and regulatory agencies in the 
UK and the US were ‘as culpable as everybody else’ because their ‘experts and 
technocrats had accepted the wholesale bankers’ story about the benefits of financial 
innovation, credited Black-Scholes algebra with a heroic role and misrepresented 
derivatives as a “marketisation of risk” which made the financial system more robust’ 
(CRESC 2009: 19; for a critique see De Goede 2001).  Remarkably in this regard, as the 
NEF reports, the current Chair of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, boasted in 2006 
that the ‘management of market risk and credit risk has become increasingly 
sophisticated … Banking organizations of all sizes have made substantial strides over 
the past two decades in their ability to measure and manage risks’ (Ben Bernanke cited 
in NEF 2010: 6).  In stark contrast, CRESC (2009: 54) actually calls the idea that 
‘traders at a node in a complex circuit can calculate the risks of what they do’ a 
‘fundamental misapprehension’.  In its view, risk calculation is much more inexact, 
uncertain, and characterised by a ‘system which is smart at the links and dumb through 
the chains’ (CRESC 2009: 54).  Along similar lines, Wall Street Watch (2009: 40) 
claims that the GFC has, quite simply, ‘exposed how poorly the sellers and the buyers 
understood the value of the derivatives they were trading’.   
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That there was a fundamental mismanagement of risk in the subprime era (Nesvetailova 
2010), according to the everyday discourse at least, did not inhibit financiers from 
making significant use of structured finance.  The NCRC (2011b: 2) reports that many 
US lenders operated ‘almost without regard to risk’ because when they made loans it 
was solely ‘to sell the loan to other market players’.  Taibbi (2011) seems to suggest that 
the financial system was much healthier 20 years ago when ‘banks didn’t make risky 
loans because they worried about collecting on them’, as opposed to more recently when 
‘the loans were designed to be sold off as soon as the ink was dry’.  Wall Street Watch 
(2009: 74) complains that acquirers of a mortgage did not have ‘any duty to investigate 
the terms of the loan and [were] effectively immunized … from liability for the initial 
loan’.  All these ideas seem to point towards agreement with the NEF’s (2011b: 4) 
lament that surely a ‘criterion’ of ‘good banking’ is that financiers ‘take responsibility 
for what they do’. 
 
In some of its recommendations for reform and response, the everyday discourse 
contains further significant damning assessments of extant credit risk management 
practices and the use of structured finance.  The NCRC (2011a: 1), for instance, notes 
that if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were abolished and large private banks assumed the 
functions of securitising and guaranteeing mortgages, it would be ‘like the fox running 
the hen house’ because it was exactly ‘the securitization practices of Wall Street banks 
financing toxic mortgages that was a major factor plunging this country into the current 
foreclosure crisis’.  Furthermore, Occupy the SEC (2012: 131) claims that credit 
derivatives, which constitute ‘insurance products free from the protections of insurance 
regulation’, and synthetic securities, which ‘derive their value from other assets or 
liabilities’, should be designated as ‘high risk assets’ because of the threats they pose.  
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For such reasons, Max Keiser (a former Wall Street broker, financial analyst, and 
broadcaster interviewed in The Occupied Times) identifies the subprime bubble as one 
‘of swapped and re-swapped risk, floating around above the ‘real world’’, which became 
‘utterly abstracted from the layer of asset-value which actually determines the value of 
the derivatives’ (Max Keiser cited in The Occupied Times 2012c: 9).  In a sense, as the 
NEF (2010: 28) argues, it is ‘highly complex to even ascertain where associated 
securities ended up’ because of opaque structured financial products and more broadly 
because, as the subprime debacle reveals, ‘some assets simply go round and round the 
banking system’.  
 
In terms of ways to address such problems, a number of aspects of the everyday GFC 
discourse look to fundamental reform of the regulation of structured finance.  PPF 
(2009a: 3) calls for greater control of derivatives trading, credit securitisation, and other 
complex financial instruments in a ‘globally coordinated way’.  Specifically, it demands 
rules that ‘discourage or ban short-term, non-productive or damaging investment, while 
promoting longer term socially productive and environmentally sustainable investment’ 
(PPF 2009a: 3).  Likewise, Wall Street Watch (2009: 112) claims financial institutions 
‘should be specifically required to explain why [an] instrument does not worsen 
financial systemic risk, taking into account recent experience where purported 
diversification of risk led to its spread and exponential increase’. In other words, it 
suggests that a ‘precautionary principle’ should be adopted for ‘exotic financial 
instruments’ such that the ‘burden should be placed on those urging the creation or trade 
of exotic financial instruments – existing and those yet to be invented – to show why 
they should be permitted’ (Wall Street Watch 2009: 112).  In addition, one interviewee 
in the Occupy literature suggests banning ‘derivatives and other structured financial 
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products that serve no purpose other than to deceive customers and enrich bankers’ 
(Interview with James G. Rickards in The Occupied Times 2011d: 8).  This chimes with 
the broader demand made by occupiers for ‘[i]ndependent and effective regulation’ that 
works for ‘the good of our society’ given that the GFC shows that ‘[d]angerous and 
highly leveraged trading practices have not been regulated properly’ (Occupy LSX 
2011c).  Similarly, for Occupy the SEC (2012: 220): 
 
Financial innovation goes hand-in-hand with increased concentrations of risk and 
pricing opacity. The banking model has shifted away from ‘old-fashioned’ 
prudential banking of the George Bailey variety, in favor of an ‘originate and 
distribute’ model that revels in risk-taking … From a Pareto-optimal, 
macroeconomic perspective, the markets would actually benefit if the Volcker 
Rule were to reduce ‘financial innovation’ by government-backstopped banking 
entities. 
 
In this spirit, CRESC makes a number of interesting demands for regulatory reform.  
Essentially, it argues for ‘a presumption in favour of simplification’ on the issue of 
derivatives regulation (CRESC 2009: 55).  It notes how financial innovation is 
‘mutable’, so the object of reform should be ‘to simplify wholesale finance’ by 
encouraging ‘short, direct chains’ in finance ‘where the location of risk and the identity 
of the holder is much more knowable’ (CRESC 2009: 55 emphasis added).  This is part 
of CRESC’s (2009: 66) ‘structural circuits explanation of the pre-2007 bubble’, which it 
sees as resisting many of the very definitions of the GFC to be found in regulatory 
discourse.  It claims that the crisis in the financialised economy of the UK needs to be 
fundamentally rethought: 
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Our problem is not a socio-technical problem of wealth management and 
portfolio allocation between classes of coupons in which funded savings or 
insurance premia might be invested according to some financial calculation of 
yield and risk. The UK’s problem is a socio-economic problem about co-
ordinating investment in production and infrastructure with flows of savings so 
as to ensure sustainability and stability by increasing material resources (CRESC 
2009: 66). 
 
Drawing these points together, in many ways CRESC’s arguments point towards 
simplifying securitisation, de-linking chains of finance, and more broadly almost a sense 
of de-financialisation.  Crucially, this position appears to represent and embody a 
number of the interventions in the everyday GFC discourse.  Broadly speaking, such 
ideas certainly speak to the concerns discussed in this section about taking responsibility 
for financial market actions, reducing the powerful place of banks in society, and making 
credit risk more knowable.  This is no panacea, and certainly some everyday voices 
would want to go much further: for instance, proposals for ‘full-reserve’ banking might 
require an even larger ‘rethinking’ of finance.   
 
Yet, collectively, I would argue that the everyday discourse articulates a promising form 
of resistance to economistic treatments of issues of credit risk and structured finance 
along these lines.  Simplification, de-linking, and de-financialisation are certainly 
aspirant themes that are much more congruent with a sympathy perspective than an 
economistic liberal market governance agenda that serves to normalise the place of risk 
and risk management in society.  Specifically, the crucial point here is that 
simplification, de-linking, and de-financialisation in general terms make finance more 
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knowable in the sense of people knowing with whom they are in a market relationship 
when they perform market-oriented behaviour.  Put simply, without knowing about the 
content of this relationship – or at least the possibility of ‘imagining’ that relationship 
because finance is deemed too ‘complex’ to think about such things – then it becomes 
difficult for people to engage in a sympathetic procedure, to activate their impartial 
spectator at all.  Making finance more knowable would thus seem to be a basic demand 
of reorienting finance towards recognising the (contestable) interpersonal relations that 
make up markets according to a sympathy perspective. 
 
Moreover, by challenging the dominant place of ‘risk’ in Anglo-American finance, the 
everyday discourse at the very least opens up ethico-political space in which the desired 
place of ‘risk management’ in society can be contested.  At the individual level, this 
starts to recognise the contestable nature of interpersonal ethics, as a Smithian sympathy 
perspective insists, rather than assuming a society of atomised instrumentally rational 
individuals all working to ‘perfect’ risk management.  What is more, the outcome of 
more space for negotiations over appropriate forms of market-oriented behaviour might 
result in novel ways of rethinking finance, perhaps in terms of finding ways of financial 
market participants exercising more responsibility for their actions.  Certainly, to 
challenge the way in which the powerful place of banks in Anglo-American societies 
allows them to avoid responsibility would appear to be an important outcome of the 
activation of a sympathy procedure in this regard, at least according to the everyday 
discourse.  However, as with asset-based welfare, it is also important to interrogate the 
limits of this questioning of risk, particularly with regard to the extent to which 
securitisation and structured finance can be tamed, regulated, or abolished in a 
financialised economy. 
 285 
Reinforcement of credit risk management practices 
 
To facilitate the allocation and deployment of economic resources, both spatially 
and temporally, to ecological sustainable activities that maximise long-term 
financial and social returns under conditions of uncertainty (NEF 2011b: 2). 
 
This is the NEF’s (2011b: 2) response to the question of ‘what do we expect the 
financial system to deliver?’.  On one level, it appears to be a fairly uncontroversial and 
standard account of what might be expected of an Anglo-American financial system, 
broadly understood.  Yet, on another level, even this short statement is full of allusions 
to a position that, at least in part, serves to reinforce existing approaches to and practices 
of credit risk management.  First, most obviously, as might be expected to some degree, 
if the financial system (here presumably made up of private financial institutions if they 
are maximising financial returns) is still responsible for facilitating the ‘allocation and 
deployment of economic resources’, there is no radical change proposed in terms of 
socialising risk or fostering collectivised sources of credit, for example.  Second, it is 
difficult to envisage a great departure from existing structures of credit allocation if 
banks and other financial institutions are understood to be seeking to ‘maximise’ 
financial returns.  The words ‘long-term’ and ecologically ‘sustainable’ are obviously 
important here, but if this is part of the agreed purpose of a financial system, it still 
appears that ‘financial’ and ‘social’ ‘returns’ are understood to be at least 
complementary, if not equivalent; this is a point which would surely be contested by 
other everyday interventions.  Finally, the phrase ‘under conditions of uncertainty’ might 
provide a significant qualification for the definition.  Put simply it suggests that it is 
expected that an ideal financial system, if operating properly, will be able to successfully 
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measure and manage ‘uncertainty’, or ‘risk’ proper, and will not be operating within or 
producing conditions of ‘Knightian uncertainty’ (Blyth 2002) or even ‘radical 
ambiguity’ (Best 2005).  
 
I highlight these points not necessarily to suggest that the NEF is somehow misguided in 
its understanding of how a financial system might work, but to stress the point that even 
one of the most critical voices in the everyday discourse contains elements of reasoning 
in its position that serve to reinforce existing credit risk management practices.  The 
question then becomes one of how much the everyday discourse as a whole tends to be 
limited in its reimagining of risk. One issue clearly concerns the extent of envisaged 
reform and the degree to which a radical ‘rethinking’ of systems of credit emerges.  As 
noted, the NEF (2010: 72) clearly wishes to revisit the question of the desired ‘function’ 
of banks and other financial firms, but its views of how a financial system needs to 
facilitate exchange, allocate capital, and ‘[r]edistribute and share risk’ do not mark a 
radical departure, at least not in terms of how credit risk is understood and presumed to 
be managed.   
 
Moreover, in its proposals, the NEF (2011a: 16; 2011b: 21) advocates the introduction 
of a ‘Statement of Purpose’ requirement and ‘a social contract element’ for banks and 
banking activities.  This might be a useful and progressive reform in response to the 
GFC, but it is also notable that it depends on a ‘consumer protection’ agenda that does 
not differ that markedly from that which is found in the regulatory discourse.  The NEF 
(2011a: 16 emphasis added) suggests that such measures would ‘allow regulators and 
customers to assess’ the activities of financial institutions.  In a similar suggestion that 
places faith in informed consumers, the NEF (2011b: 18 emphasis added) also calls for 
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the introduction of ‘licensing of financial products that are stress tested and given a kite 
mark like food’.  Notably, Wall Street Watch (2009: 110) also advocates a new 
framework for financial sector regulation organised around a consumer protection 
agenda.  It calls for a new ‘financial consumer protection agency’ to be established and 
suggests giving ‘consumers the tools to organize themselves’ in order to produce 
independent financial consumers associations that could ‘hire their own independent 
representatives to review financial players’ activities, scour their books, and advocate for 
appropriate public policies’ (Wall Street Watch 2009: 113-114).  As such, a consumer 
protection agenda might sit quite comfortably within existing understandings of risk 
(Langley 2008a).  In fact, it could even serve to induce a model form of financialised 
consumer citizen able to behave in an instrumentally rational way to ensure that the 
market provides ‘good’ and ‘safe’ financial products.  That it does fit within such a 
vision might be part of the reason why, as Sarah Anderson (2010: 4) reports, one area in 
which ‘[p]ublic interest advocates overcame intense Wall Street lobbying to win some 
important reforms through the Dodd-Frank legislation’ was in the area of ‘consumer 
protection’. 
 
Overall, the everyday discourse presents an interesting challenge to both existing 
understandings of credit risk management and uses of structured finance.  On the one 
hand, ideas about taking responsibility for financial market actions, reducing the 
powerful place of banks in society, and making credit risk more knowable all work 
against the normalisation of ‘risk’ in Anglo-America.  By problematising risk 
management, the everyday discourse begins to provide a means of recognising the 
contestable nature of interpersonal ethics on which a Smithian sympathy perspective 
insists.  In particular, proposals based on notions of simplification, de-linking, and de-
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financialisation are more congruent with a sympathy perspective, especially compared to 
an economistic liberal market governance that serves to normalise the place of risk and 
risk management in society.  From a Smithian sympathy perspective, ethico-political 
contestation at the individual level is closed down if a scientistic understanding of risk is 
reinforced and an ethic of risk management is normalised in society.  To a large extent, 
the everyday discourse is successful in resisting such tendencies, perhaps because credit 
risk mismanagement played such a central role in the GFC.  At the very least, it presents 
fruitful ideas that are worthy of consideration, especially with regard to proposals for 
making finance more knowable which seems to be desirable and realisable from a 
sympathy perspective.   
 
However, on the other hand, there are clearly limits to the level of resistance that the 
everyday discourse offers.  In this regard, even at the most critical edge of the everyday 
interventions, it is possible to identify the persistence of economistic ways of thinking 
about risk in reform agendas.  This is especially the case when there is a tendency to 
rearticulate the existing architecture of credit allocation systems and posit mild reform 
proposals based on a consumer protection agenda.  Outside a financialised society, it 
might be possible for the sympathy procedure to be less restricted by existing 
understandings of risk in society such that alternative forms of credit provision become 
important to meet the demands of the outcome of negotiation of interpersonal ethics 
between people, as some of the everyday interventions imply.  The basic demand of 
making finance more knowable would certainly seem to be fundamental to reorienting 
finance towards recognising the (contestable) interpersonal relations that make up 
markets according to a sympathy perspective in the first place.  Within parts of the 
everyday discourse, though, it appears as though a commitment to the extant ethos of 
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risk management still produces a somewhat economistic outlook for any sympathetic 
reimagining of finance.   
 
In a sense, though, this might still provide the operation of sympathy working within the 
everyday discourse a way of intervening quite directly into existing understandings of 
finance.  Indeed on a pragmatic note, CRESC (2009: 56) claims it wishes to avoid 
‘Luddism about securitisation of loans’, which is ‘an entirely acceptable practice as long 
as transaction chains are short and transparent’: the point is to moderate in some way the 
‘national supply of feedstock from retail savers and their funds’.  Likewise, Occupy the 
SEC (2012: 85) supports the implementation of the Volcker Rule because it envisions a 
‘shift in banking’ towards a focus on more ‘safe, “plain vanilla,” customer-focused 
transactions’.  Such proposals are not flawless, but they at least speak more directly to 
issues of concern from a sympathy perspective.  I return to them in the concluding 
chapter. 
 
 
6.3 The everyday politics of personal debt 
 
The tuition-fee generation will limp into the world owing tens of thousands of 
pounds.  And they are not alone.  More and more of us – through a combination 
of college loans, credit cards, mortgages and bank loans – are being stealthily 
habituated to debt.  We end up feeling that it’s an inevitable and mundane part of 
life – like blisters and bus stops (The Occupied Times 2011c: 8 emphasis added). 
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In the UK, occupiers protest that ‘[m]any within society are burdened with crippling 
debt’ (Occupy LSX 2011c).  In the US, occupiers claim that their efforts ‘will not stop 
until foreclosures and bank repossessions stop … and families no longer have to plunge 
into bankruptcy to pay medical bills’ (The OWS Journal 2011b: 1). 
 
The way in which occupiers draw attention to and politicise questions of personal debt is 
highly significant from a Smithian sympathy perspective.  Rather than treat issues of 
credit and debt as a necessary and normal part of life, devoid of political content, a 
sympathy perspective might be expected to draw attention to how the negotiation of 
positions of debt is part of the contestable interpersonal ethics of market-oriented 
behaviour.  In the previous chapter, I suggested that the regulatory discourse tends to 
depoliticise creditor-debtor relations by insisting on the normalisation of financial 
services in an advanced economy and working to articulate model financialised citizens.  
In this section, I make the case that the everyday discourse, by contrast, repoliticises 
such questions and in turn offers a fuller recognition of the contestable interpersonal 
ethics that make up credit-debt relations.  
 
 
The (re)politicisation of credit-debt relations 
 
We must forge our own ethics and our own future.  This is an ethic opposed to 
rights and wrongs and fairness.  This is an ethic that says, ‘end all debt,’ and the 
other concrete material conditions of our existence that oppress us.  We must 
stress a revolutionary character (The Occupied Times 2012c: 7).   
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In the everyday discourse, an important way in which issues of credit and debt are 
politicised is through discussions of democracy and finance, broadly understood.  Such 
discussions are clearly more thoroughgoing than notions of the ‘promise’ of ‘financial 
democracy’ put forward by more mainstream commentators (Shiller 2008).  In terms of 
the Occupy movement, occupiers claim to be taking on the ‘global Mubarak’ of 
‘undemocratic global institutions and financialised capitalism’ (The Occupied Times 
2011a: 7).  For some, this effort involves a very direct politicisation of questions relating 
to financial market governance.  As David Wearing (2011) points out, ‘[t]he protesters 
understand that neoliberal capitalism is not ordained by God, but sustained by human 
beings through a series of choices’.  Occupiers have thus ‘taken up the duty abrogated 
by the political class to subject those choices, and that system, to proper critical scrutiny 
and challenge’ (Wearing 2011).  A similar point is made by Michael Richmond (2012), 
who suggests that there ‘are choices to be made in political economy, not that you’d 
know it from most politicians and the media’.  On one level then, the Occupy movement 
is involved in a process of constructing discursive democratic space to treat issues of 
financial market governance, which before the GFC tended to be increasingly 
depoliticised, in much more overtly politicised terms by recognising that there are 
‘choices’ to be made.  This might be viewed in relation to how the production of 
economic and financial knowledge is an important site where power is exercised (De 
Goede 2003). 
 
Prominently, occupiers posit a deeply political critique of the rise of finance in the UK, 
or what some refer to as the financialisation of economy and society (Froud et al. 2002).  
They claim that financialisation ‘did not arise as an aberration of capitalism; it was 
instead a necessary outgrowth’ (The Occupied Times 2011d: 9).  This is based on the 
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idea that there were clear ‘systemic’ pressures leading to the rise of finance from the 
1970s onwards when ‘investment in productive sectors of the economy was becoming 
increasingly difficult to generate a profit from’ and so finance ‘arose precisely to resolve 
the problems of declining manufacturing profits and declining profitable investments’ 
(The Occupied Times 2011d: 9).  Occupiers claim that these original problems ‘have not 
been solved, but only displaced into the financial sector’ (The Occupied Times 2011d: 
9).   
 
Incidentally, CRESC (2009: 21) gives a very similar account of financialisation in the 
UK by suggesting that ‘every UK government since Thatcher in the second half of the 
1980s has presided over an anaemic private sector and needs economic success stories 
so that it can claim to preside over a strong, successful economy, thereby justifying the 
pain of marketisation and growing inequality’.  Since that time, it claims, sectors like 
finance have had ‘an opportunity to tell stories of economic purpose and social 
achievement to politicians and civil servants, who wanted to believe and deferred to 
business success’ (CRESC 2009: 21).  However, CRESC (2009: 8) also reports that the 
financial sector in actuality ‘undermined sustainable growth by inflating asset price 
bubbles rather than underwriting any kind of productive investment’.  Specifically, it 
notes how ‘[p]roductive business investment remained at a steady 10% of GDP between 
1996-2008, but declined sharply from 30% of all bank lending towards 10% as banks 
expanded their lending on property and to other financial institutions’ (CRESC 2009: 8).   
For this reason, CRESC (2009: 8) argues that the UK has ‘an economic co-ordination 
problem’ because the financial sector ‘allocated capital to (leveraged and unsustainable) 
asset price growth and not into productive, socially useful investment that might 
generate the sustainable returns to support debt repayments’. 
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In addition to this account of the rise of finance, the everyday discourse also suggests 
that financialisation brings about significant questions in terms of the size and power of 
banks and other financial institutions in society.  For instance, occupiers protest that 
financial institutions ‘have increased in size to dominate our economy but have not 
become socially accountable in line with their increased power’ (Occupy LSX 2011c).  
The ‘accent of free-market or neoliberal conceptions of capitalism’ is said to have meant 
that ‘social control over banks and corporations became virtually impossible, and we are 
now paying the costs’ (Interview with David Ruccio in The Occupied Times 2012a: 13).  
This echoes PPF’s (2009a: 1) argument that ‘[b]lind faith in the virtues of markets, and 
inadequate public control, regulation and accountability of finance are at the heart of the 
financial crisis’.  Of considerable concern, CRESC (2009: 5) claims that ‘inaction’ on 
behalf of the UK Government actually ‘results from the influence of the “distributive 
coalition” in and around the City of London, which has co-opted the political leadership 
of both major parties’.  In a similar claim, Beetham (2011: 21) reports how the levels of 
lobbying involved in the Independent Commission on Banking’s interim report mean 
that ultimately, rather than providing significant proposals on bank restructuring in the 
UK, it was ‘dismissed as a victory for the banks’.  This actually echoes Paul Volcker’s 
opinion that in the US, his Volcker Rule as it eventually made its way into the Dodd-
Frank bill had been significantly diluted and made much more complex than it needed to 
be.  On the topic, Volcker (cited in Reuters 2011) stated: ‘There is no set of lobbyists in 
the United States bigger, more important and more rewarded than the financial 
lobbyists’.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, major criticisms are also levelled at Anglo-
American systems of credit based on the way in which banks are said to enjoy a ‘virtual 
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monopoly’ in creating the credit supply (NEF 2011b: 14).  Yet this is not just a critique 
based on the problem of the overextension of credit and how it is an easy way of 
profiteering by lending institutions: it is also highlighted as potentially emblematic of a 
highly unequal set of power relations in Anglo-American economies.  This is a 
foundational element of NEF’s (2010: 17) call to review the monetary system ‘that puts 
the power of credit creation almost entirely in the hands of commercial banks’.  As Chris 
Cook (2012) describes, the unequal relation is unmistakeable in such a system because 
as soon as a loan is ‘provided out of thin air by the bank … interest will start to be 
charged’. One interviewee thus claims that occupiers must ‘fight … until fractional 
reserve banking’ is eliminated (Interview with Mike Ruppert in The Occupied Times 
2011f: 8). 
 
In 2010, the Positive Money campaign was launched in an attempt to address the 
perceived problems of fractional reserve banking, which detractors claim ‘underpins the 
global economy’ but is little understood by politicians, the media, and the authorities 
(Dyson et al. 2011: 2-4).  In its place, it is claimed that a system of full-reserve banking 
‘would be more stable and robust’ and in which, in basic terms, ‘the transactional 
function of banking (the payments system) is separated from the lending function’ 
(Dyson et al. 2011: 2-4).  In support of full-reserve banking, Dyson et al. (2011: 23) 
criticise fractional reserve banking very much in terms of the redistributive politics of 
debt: 
 
Because the entire money supply is created as a debt by commercial banks, in 
effect interest must be paid to the banks on every single pound of bank deposits 
that exists in the economy.  A part of this interest is redistributed back to 
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depositors via interest on savings accounts, etc., but by far the bulk of it is 
distributed to the workers of the banks, via salaries and bonuses. 
 
A redistributive effect of this, they claim, is that: 
 
This ships the ‘baseline’ of poverty down to zero or negative, rather than a low 
but positive bank balance.  Because it is those on below-average incomes that 
end up with much of the debt, they end up paying interest to the banking sector, 
in effect meaning that the poor subsidise the middle class or rich (Dyson et al. 
2011: 23). 
 
I do not seek to fully assess the veracity of these claims here, nor the merits or otherwise 
of full-reserve banking.  The point is that this marks a clear example of an attempt to 
repoliticise credit-debt relations in the everyday discourse.  From a sympathy 
perspective, this repoliticisation is important because it makes clear that credit-debt 
relations are between at least two market participants who are involved in an unequal 
relationship.  What is more, usually, the creditor will have ethico-political choice over 
how they act in the marketplace and so their capacity to activate an imaginative 
reconstruction of the situation of a debtor is crucial in coming to their understanding of 
appropriate market-oriented behaviour. 
 
Another similar case of politicising these relations would be Max Keiser’s argument that 
if someone is ‘at the top of the tree’ they ‘can borrow money at close to zero, and in 
some cases below zero percent’ while for ‘everyone else, interest costs are considerably 
higher, reaching annualized rates of over 300% for “payday” loans’ (Interview with Max 
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Keiser in The Occupied Times 2011a: 8).  This is the case even though Wall Street banks 
and top clients who have low borrowing costs ‘have a horrible track record paying back 
their loans’, while for micro-lending shops serving ‘the poorest of the poor’ the rate of 
paying back loans ‘is over 97%’, which he claims is ‘financial apartheid’ (Interview 
with Max Keiser in The Occupied Times 2011a: 8).  In light of the GFC, the 
redistributive politics of debt (Schechter 2007) are brought to the fore here in a way that 
is distinctly lacking in the regulatory discourse. 
 
Other elements of the everyday politics of the GFC also present significant challenges to 
current regulatory understandings of credit and debt (Montgomerie 2009).  For example, 
Sarah Anderson (2010: 8) reports how the Move Your Money Campaign estimates that 
two million people ‘pulled out of big banks’ in the first three months of 2010.  In the 
US, occupiers have also been involved in promoting the relocation of private funds away 
from large financial institutions towards local credit unions (The OWS Journal 2011c: 
3).  In fact, the Credit Union National Association reports that nationwide ‘650,000 
people have joined credit unions and have added $4.5 billion in new savings accounts in 
the past month [October 2011, during OWS]’ (The OWS Journal 2011c: 3).  Given the 
higher level of banking consolidation in the UK compared with the US, there are not as 
many alternatives available to savers, but the NEF (2010: 71) speaks approvingly of the 
existence of ‘deep ethical’ banks such as Triodos, the Co-operative Bank, and some 
credit unions. 
 
However, despite the presence of such campaigns and ‘alternatives’ to mainstream 
financial institutions, other aspects of the everyday discourse suggest that it ‘is difficult 
to develop a radical alternative vision of what finance could and should do’ because this 
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‘requires some fundamental thought about the nature of credit and debt, their function in 
financialized capitalism and their role in the present conjuncture in the UK’ (CRESC 
2009: 60).  In its attempt, though, CRESC (2009: 62 emphasis in original) states: 
 
Our central perception is that, if all debt is a claim on future resources, the 
sustainability of debt is linked to the amount of resources that an economy can 
create, and this resource quantum depends partly on how credit is applied.  
From this point of view, the financial crisis of 2007 was also a crisis of the ‘real 
economy’ because on the one hand the markets were unable to sustain the belief 
that debt would not be repudiated at some point in the future and on the other 
hand the real economy was increasingly unable to generate the resource growth 
required to pay down liabilities (on rising asset prices). 
 
Seemingly CRESC advances a materialistic and production-based conception of value, 
yet its account undeniably serves to repoliticise the place of debt in society.  It points to 
one of the problems of a financialised economy as the simple fact that ‘[a]s debt 
accumulates without any commensurate increase in the economy’s capacity to generate 
material resources, only increasingly unjustified confidence stands in the way of bust’ 
(CRESC 2009: 63).  Crucially, CRESC (2009: 57) recognises that this can be disastrous 
given that in a financialised economy, people are likely to be increasingly dependent on 
banking and finance for ‘welfare critical products’.  The problem is, of course, 
‘revolving loans on plastic cards that consumers cannot repay or savings and pension 
plans that deliver little retirement income are not like a mobile phone device that does 
not work reliably’ (CRESC 2009: 57). 
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Notably, occupiers appear to echo critiques of the place of debt in a financialised 
economy (Montgomerie 2009).  They claim that ‘there is an underlying story at play 
within the kind of debt-oriented transactions engulfing our lives: the extension of the 
role of debt commitments on both the individual and on wider society’ (The Occupied 
Times 2011g: 11).  What is more, occupiers argue, unlike money spent on more 
‘tangible’ goods and services, money spent on debt-related transactions such as 
mortgages, credit cards, and student loans, ‘represents an agreement by the consumer to 
honour these commitments throughout the course of their lives’ (The Occupied Times 
2011g: 11).  In this light, ‘debt can be seen to be a part of the environment of our future’ 
(The Occupied Times 2011g: 11).  Relatedly, the NEF (2011: 21) also politicises such 
claims by making the suggestion that ‘the basic question … of what it costs to live in 
society’ must also be addressed because ‘[i]f people are living on such low income that 
they have to rely on credit to live, there is a broader political and economic failure to do 
with basic levels of poverty to correct’. 
 
Drawing these points together, I argue that the everyday discourse offers sharp criticisms 
of the place of debt in a financialised economy and in many cases serves to repoliticise 
questions of credit and debt.  Specifically the politicised treatment of debt involves, 
among other aspects, drawing attention to: the sizable power of banks and other 
financial institutions in a financialised economy; the redistributive politics of credit-debt 
relations; and something of the underlying material or resource capacity struggles that 
debt might conceal.  These interventions are highly significant from a Smithian 
sympathy perspective because, rather than treat debt as a necessary part of life devoid of 
political content, they serve to highlight how the negotiation of debt is part of the 
contestable interpersonal ethics of market-oriented behaviour.  Whereas the regulatory 
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discourse tends to depoliticise creditor-debtor relations by insisting on the normalisation 
of finance and works to articulate model financialised and even indebted citizens, the 
everyday discourse repoliticises debt and potentially offers a fuller recognition of the 
contestable interpersonal ethics that make up credit-debt relations.   
 
From a sympathy perspective this matters because it allows for the potential imaginative 
reconstruction of another’s position in the credit-debt relationship, which could lead 
people to reorient their market-oriented behaviour, especially on the creditor side, along 
more progressive lines.  For instance, at least according to a number of everyday 
interventions, there is a need to rethink finance because of the way in which taking on 
personal debt merely serves to conceal the disparities of material capabilities that exist in 
Anglo-America.  Allowing for a fuller operation of sympathy might produce further 
challenges to these political dilemmas.  Nevertheless, as with the previous two sections, 
it is necessary to interrogate the limits of this repoliticisation, particularly in relation to 
how the everyday discourse may still serve, perhaps inadvertently, to promote certain 
financialised forms of citizenship and also reinforce structures of creditor-debtor 
relations as they currently stand. 
 
Standards of financial market agency and the reinforcement of credit-debt relations 
 
The starting point has to be that retail banking is a utility because households and 
firms must have access to reasonable payment services, deposit facilities, and 
savings and loans which are as socially and economically necessary as electricity 
supply or telephony (CRESC 2009: 56 emphasis added). 
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This is CRESC’s ‘starting point’ in a search for effective financial regulation in response 
to the GFC.  On the one hand, the general view that retail banking facilities are an 
undemanding ‘utility’ is not particularly contentious.  As the Governor of the Bank of 
England Mervyn King (2009) suggests, utility aspects of banking are ‘quite different in 
nature from some of the riskier financial activities that banks undertake, such as 
proprietary trading’.  Yet, on the other hand, although this might hold true for ‘payment 
services’ and ‘deposit facilities’, as soon as the move is made to ‘savings and loans’ the 
question of whether retail services are ‘as necessary as electricity supply or telephony’ 
starts to become a little more thorny, especially in light of some of the other politicising 
moves made in the everyday discourse.  The problem is that in enunciating saving and 
borrowing as somehow ‘necessary’, credit-debt relations with regard to personal debt 
might start to be depoliticised and rearticulated as a normal feature of everyday life once 
again: merely one of those ‘inevitable and mundane’ parts of life, ‘like blisters and bus 
stops’ (The Occupied Times 2011c: 8 emphasis added). 
 
That CRESC (2009: 39) views retail banking as ‘a worthy utility which provides 
essential services for all households’ does not necessarily undermine its otherwise highly 
politicised critique of the place of debt in a financialised economy, but it does blunt it 
somewhat by serving, in part, to naturalise personal debt.  Other areas of the everyday 
discourse follow a somewhat similar trajectory.  For instance, the NEF (2011b: 2 
emphasis added) bemoans a ‘lack of consumer choice and universal service in high 
street banking’ because ‘as with utility companies, all citizens need a banking service’.  
Moreover the NCRC (2008: 7 emphasis added) claims that ‘responsible high-cost 
lending often serves legitimate credit needs of borrowers with credit imperfections, thus, 
high-cost lending does not always constitute a predatory lending practice’.  While 
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seemingly utterly harmless when framed in terms of progressive politics and concerns 
about marginalised groups, the point is that these standpoints on the ‘necessity’ of access 
to credit, at least in part, serve to dampen the repoliticising of credit-debt relations by 
naturalising the place of debt in everyday life.  
 
Moreover, a significant related limitation to the challenge presented to the 
depoliticisation of debt centres on the implicit endorsement of certain forms of model 
financialised citizenship within the everyday discourse.  In a direct mirroring of the 
regulatory discourse, ‘savers, retirees, annuity and insurance policy holders and others 
living on fixed incomes’ are singled out as innocent victims as they are ‘robbed while the 
financial mavens are properly hedged’ (Interview with James G. Rickards in The 
Occupied Times 2011d: 8).  Moreover, notably, Occupy the SEC (2012: 1-2 emphasis 
added) reports that ‘[l]ike much of the 99%, we have bank deposits and retirement 
accounts that are in need of protection of the Volcker Rule’.  Furthermore, Occupy the 
SEC (2012: 81) offers its support partly because if an ‘expansive’ interpretation of 
proprietary trading is used, this ‘would reduce the risk of bank failure because only the 
most basic, customer-focused trades would make it through the Volcker Rule’s 
gauntlet’.  In turn, this would serve to ‘increase both depositor and investor confidence 
in banking entities, which in turn would increase real liquidity in the banking industry, 
and as a consequence, the overall market for credit’ (Occupy the SEC 2012: 81 emphasis 
added).   
 
Overall, therefore, the everyday discourse articulates a significant, cutting, yet partially 
limited encounter with the politics of personal debt.  On one level, it offers an 
unforgiving repoliticisation of credit-debt relations by drawing attention to, among other 
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things, the sizable power of banks and other financial institutions in a financialised 
economy, the redistributive politics of credit-debt relations, and the underlying material 
or resource capacity struggles that personal debt might conceal.  A typical intervention 
in this regard is made by occupiers who ask, given that ‘housing is increasingly 
unaffordable and the social costs of homelessness are enormous’, why the Bank of 
England does not use ‘quantitative easing’ to fund housebuilding as it does to prop up 
the financial system (Occupy London 2012).  As such, the everyday discourse tends to 
repoliticise issues of debt and potentially offers a fuller recognition of the contestable 
interpersonal ethics that make up credit-debt relations.  In this regard, such interventions 
are highly significant from a Smithian sympathy perspective because, rather than 
treating debt as a necessary and inevitable part of life devoid of political content, they 
serve to highlight how the negotiation of debt is part of the contestable interpersonal 
ethics of market-oriented behaviour.   
 
However, on another level, there are certain limits to this repoliticisation particularly in 
relation to how the everyday discourse may still serve, perhaps inadvertently, to promote 
certain model forms of citizenship and reinforce creditor-debtor relations as they 
currently stand.  In particular, there are elements of the everyday discourse that work to 
normalise the place of personal debt in everyday life through appeal to its ‘necessity’ 
and almost unquestionably ‘legitimate’ place in a financialised economy.  What is more, 
at times, certain forms of model financialised citizenship are endorsed in the everyday 
discourse, which although not on the same scale as in the regulatory discourse, does 
blunt somewhat the otherwise highly charged politicalised critique of credit-debt 
relations.   
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Perhaps the activation of the sympathy procedure outside the confines of existing forms 
of financialisation and widespread uses of debt is to a large extent extremely difficult in 
the present era.  Outside a financialised society, it might be possible for the sympathy 
procedure to escape such boundaries by reimagining finance along more radical lines: a 
full implementation of ‘debt-free’ money as Positive Money advocates might be one 
route forward here.  Within parts of the everyday discourse, though, it appears as though 
an acceptance of the inevitability of debt still produces a somewhat economistic outlook 
for any sympathetic reimagining of finance.  This might seem entirely appropriate given 
a pragmatic acceptance that reform has to start from within financialised capitalism: it is 
unlikely that debt can be removed altogether from society – the point is to repoliticise 
finance in this regard.  Given the partial successes of this politicisation in the everyday 
discourse – actually embodied of course in the Occupy movement itself – I return to the 
foundational issue of contestation over the nature of debt in the concluding chapter. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The problem is not capitalism, the problem is financial rape by bankers.  
Capitalism, the Adam Smith kind, grew out of the Enlightenment which gave 
birth to the ideals shared by all #occupy participants.  Keep in mind that in 1776, 
we have the birth of America, but also the publication of Wealth of Nations 
(Interview with Max Keiser in The Occupied Times 2011a: 8). 
 
I end this chapter in the same way I began it: an appeal to Smith made in the Occupy 
literature.  This time, the invocation appears to fall foul of one of Skinner’s mythologies.  
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For surely it is to submit to a mythology of parochialism to associate Smith with a ‘kind’ 
of ‘capitalism’, even though he was writing in a manifestly pre-capitalist era?  
Nonetheless, the invocation is fascinating given the way in which Max Keiser seemingly 
appeals to a kind of capitalism, before the onset of recent processes associated with 
financialisation 30 years ago or so, that is in some sense less dominated by ‘bankers’: a 
pre-financialised or de-financialised reimagining of economy and society perhaps?  
From the perspective of this thesis, the association of this as one of the ‘ideals’ of 
occupiers with Smith is very thought-provoking because it alludes to exactly the point 
on which I wish to conclude this chapter: the prospects for an everyday politics of 
finance congruent with a Smithian sympathy perspective. 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how the everyday GFC discourse challenges the crisis of 
ethics identified at the three sites of finance explored at the regulatory level in the 
previous chapter.  In the first section, I illustrated how the everyday discourse articulates 
a complex and variegated attitude with regard to systems of asset-based welfare, which 
offers a sharp critique of homeowner ideology and state restructuring towards 
individualised responsibility.  While there are certain limits to the reimagining of 
financial market agency based on notable instances of where there is a need expressed 
for asset-based welfare and a partial reproduction of a homeowner ideology, on the 
whole it avoids an economistic treatment of market-oriented behaviour and enunciates a 
representation much more in line with a Smithian sympathy perspective than the 
regulatory discourse.  Given that it appears to be so fundamental to economistic 
approaches to financial market agency, it is significant that the everyday discourse even 
partially manages to question the place of individualised financial responsibility.  
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In the second section, I argued that the everyday discourse presents an interesting 
challenge to both existing understandings of credit risk management and uses of 
structured finance.  Crucially, ideas about taking responsibility for financial market 
actions, reducing the powerful place of banks in society, and making credit risk more 
‘knowable’ all work against the normalisation of ‘risk’ in Anglo-America.  Even though 
there is a tendency to rearticulate the existing architecture of credit allocation systems 
and posit somewhat mild reform proposals, by problematising risk management the 
everyday discourse begins to provide a means of recognising the contestable nature of 
market-oriented behaviour on which a Smithian sympathy perspective insists.  At the 
very least, it presents fruitful ideas that are worthy of consideration from a sympathy 
perspective, especially with regard to simplification, de-linking, and de-financialisation. 
Such proposals are not flawless; occupiers themselves for instance claim that the ‘upshot 
of the necessary turn to financialisation is that it is simply not possible to turn back the 
clocks and revert to a form of capitalism premised upon manufacturing and a chastened 
financial sector’ (The Occupied Times 2011d: 9).  Nonetheless, they at least speak more 
directly to issues of concern from a sympathy perspective.  In general terms, they make 
finance more knowable in the sense of people knowing with whom they are in a market 
relationship when they perform market-oriented behaviour.  In turn, put simply, this 
makes it more likely that people can perform the imaginative act of sympathy which, 
according to many everyday interventions at least, ought to lead market participants to 
re-orientate their behaviour in ways that ensures they take more responsibility for their 
actions. 
 
In the final section, I suggested that the everyday discourse provides a significant, 
cutting, yet partially limited encounter with the politics of personal debt.  It offers an 
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unforgiving repoliticisation of credit-debt relations by drawing attention to, among other 
things, the sizable power of banks and other financial institutions in a financialised 
economy, the redistributive politics of credit-debt relations, and the underlying material 
or resource capacity struggles that personal debt might conceal.  Such interventions, 
although tempered somewhat at times by tendencies to reinforce the ‘necessity’ of debt 
and certain model forms of financialised citizenship, are highly significant from a 
sympathy perspective.  This is because, rather than treating debt as a necessary and 
inevitable part of life devoid of political content, they serve to highlight how the 
negotiation of debt is part of the contestable interpersonal ethics of market-oriented 
behaviour. 
 
Overall, a sympathy perspective is at least partially embodied in the everyday GFC 
discourse and it offers up fruitful lines of enquiry for efforts to rethink finance along 
Smithian sympathy lines.  Such a task is not too far removed from certain stated 
aspirations associated with the Occupy movement: some speak of ‘changing the 
underlying values that govern our society’ (Klein 2011); others ‘a total rethinking of 
western consumerism that throws into question how we measure progress’ (White and 
Lasn 2011); and yet others still a move to ‘occupy the teaching of economics’ to rubbish 
economic theory that is ‘based on a singular methodology’ and ‘divorced from ethical 
concerns’ (Interview with David Ruccio in The Occupied Times 2012a: 13).  The 
important point is that some of these interventions might work towards a fuller 
recognition of ethico-political contestation at the individual level. 
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CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Rethinking the Ethics of Liberal Market Governance 
 
In this thesis, I have offered an innovative account of Smith’s ‘sympathy procedure’.  By 
way of conclusion, after a restatement of my contribution to literature, I provide an 
overview of what I have accomplished in this thesis in order to make this contribution.  I 
then give an account of why this is significant for IPE and rethinking finance by 
exploring the notion of a ‘sympathetic finance’.  Finally, I briefly indicate some possible 
questions for future research.  
 
My contribution has been to provide IPE with a historicised recovery of Smith’s 
sympathy procedure.  As I have suggested, this is valuable in two distinct ways.  First, it 
attends to the distinctly ‘economistic’ historiography of Smith that dominates the subject 
field by offering a more historiographically robust account of his thought.  As I have 
shown, IPE scholars tend to produce interpretations that quite straightforwardly locate 
him as the founder of the ‘liberal canon’.  In so doing, as Stephen Rosow (1997: 44) 
notes, much of the crucial philosophical and political content of his ideas gets lost, 
appearing in liberal IPE ‘only as an echo’.  What remains of Smith is a distinctly 
reductive account that is seemingly directly imported from the image of him to be found 
in economics: one that is contained, for example, within the interpretations provided by 
many former US Federal Reserve Chairmen, world-leading economists, and Nobel 
Laureates in Economics (e.g. Becker 2011; Greenspan 2008; 2011; Krugman 2010; 
Shiller 2009; Stiglitz 2010a; Taleb 2011; Volcker 2010).  Given that in many other ways 
IPE appears to hold such an oppositional attitude towards economics (e.g. Cox 2000; 
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Gamble 1995; Gill 2000a; Higgott 2002; Murphy and Tooze 1991b; Strange 1994), it is 
deeply problematic that IPE scholars for the most part simply replicate this defective 
image of Smith from economics, rather than develop their own more historiographical 
robust account of his work.  My recovery of the sympathy procedure helps address this 
problem. 
 
Second, my account of Smith’s sympathy procedure presents IPE with a critical lens 
through which to interrogate the ethics of liberal market governance today, one which 
animates an alternative to economistic understandings of market-oriented behaviour.  
This is notable in itself because, as a number of scholars have argued, IPE tends to 
employ rather reductive accounts of economic agency (e.g. Griffin 2007; Murphy and 
Tooze 1991b; Watson 2005a).  As I have shown, a sympathy perspective can be used to 
extend discussions about rethinking finance in light of the GFC.  My presentation of a 
‘dialogic conversation’ between key aspects of Smith’s ‘sympathetic liberalism’ suitably 
historicised, on the one hand, and the ‘economistic liberalism’ of liberal market 
governance, casts critical scrutiny on three sites of Anglo-American finance implicated 
in the crisis.  Put simply, it brings questions of contestable interpersonal ethics right 
back into the heart of discussions of individual subjecthood, which I argue is of 
particular significance in the context of the GFC.  It does so in a way that shares some 
synergies with a Foucauldian inspired IPE (e.g. Aitken 2005; Amoore 2004; Best 2005; 
Langley 2008a; 2008b; Vestergaard 2009), but operates outside of this line of thought 
because, if for no other reason, Michel Foucault’s own genealogy of modern 
neoliberalism imposes upon Smith an economistic image inconsistent with my 
Skinnerian historiographical approach.  Again, this adds novelty to my recovery of a 
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sympathy procedure, which I argue can produce innovative ways of subverting the ethics 
of liberal market governance as currently constituted.   
 
 
A historicised recovery of Smith’s sympathy procedure for IPE 
 
Following Quentin Skinner, a foundational purpose of this thesis was to provide a 
historicised account of Adam Smith as part of a process which serves to reveal the 
essential variety of viable ethico-political commitments in political economy and IPE.  
For Skinner (1969), the fact that past texts are concerned with their own questions, and 
not necessarily a source of direct ‘answers’ to questions of a later era, can serve to 
uncover the multiplicity of such commitments across time and space.  On this account, 
while avoiding complete relativism, the very act of seeking to interpret past text can be 
thought of as an important part of coming to terms with the situated nature of scholarly 
endeavour.  For Skinner (1969: 53 emphasis added) the purpose of intellectual history 
then becomes key to learning ‘self-awareness’.  This I termed ‘pragmatic 
historiography’ (Chapter 1) and suggested it speaks to emergent interest in 
historiographical issues in IPE (e.g. Clift and Rosamond 2009; Watson 2005a; 2012).  
 
In IPE there have in fact been numerous calls to ‘historicise’ the field, with a range of 
arguments mobilised to that end (e.g. Amin and Palan 1996; Amoore et al. 2000; 
Germain 2000; Germain and Kenny 1998; Tooze 1997).  I mapped out the various 
petitions to historicisation in IPE from thinner forms which ‘contextualise’, through 
moderate forms that make claims about the ‘situated’ position of the scholar, to thicker 
forms that celebrate the situated position of claims to knowledge as a way of 
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highlighting the ‘transformatory’ purpose of scholarly endeavour and recognising the 
need for a ‘reflexive’ and ‘critical’ IPE (Chapter 1).  In so doing, I argued that ‘thicker’ 
forms of historicised study appear to be most compelling in light of both recent moves in 
post-positivist social science and longer-term lineages in the study of political economy 
when viewed through a history of ideas lens. 
 
I argued that Skinner’s approach provides an especially persuasive means of 
historicising IPE.  He puts forward the exciting proposition that ‘texts are acts’ (Skinner 
1988b: 279).  This understanding of texts draws on ideas about the performative 
utterance that can be shown to share a pragmatic attitude with research interests in IPE 
developing on the work of J. L. Austin (1975).  Broadly speaking, these approaches are 
increasingly influential in discussions about performative finance, among other areas 
(e.g. Brassett and Clarke 2012; Clarke 2012; Clark et al. 2004; De Goede 2005a; 
Holmes 2009; Langley 2010; MacKenzie 2005; 2006; 2007; Millo and MacKenzie 
2009; Watson 2009a).  While work in the history of political economy and contemporary 
interest in performative finance might at first seem far removed, the idea of the 
performative utterance actually offers significant complementarities.  The loose line of 
pragmatic thought in contemporary IPE coupled with Skinner’s historicised approach, 
provide compelling reasons to consider ‘pragmatic historiography’ a novel and valuable 
approach to IPE (Chapter 1).  In light of mounting recognition of the performative 
aspects of political economy and knowledge about political economy, intervention into 
debates about the history of political economy is itself a crucial part to what it means to 
be doing IPE. 
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This thesis aimed to make one such intervention.  Skinner’s approach directly helps 
locate past texts such as Smith’s in their appropriate socio-linguistic context, while in so 
doing restoring some of the authority of the texts themselves.  This is of critical 
importance because IPE scholars tend to fall foul of some of the most basic Skinnerian 
principles for interpreting text when providing accounts of Smith.  In fact, I argued that 
many of the major problems of interpretation relating to Smith can be understood 
through reference to Skinner’s ideas about different interpretive ‘mythologies’ (Chapter 
2).  IPE interpretations of Smith, in the main, can be shown to quite clearly succumb to 
the Skinnerian mythologies ‘doctrine’ (concerning the ‘invisible hand’), ‘prolepsis’ 
(viewing Smith as the ‘father of economics’), and ‘parochialism’ (reading concepts such 
as ‘laissez-faire’ and ‘capitalism’ back into his work).  I explored this through 
comparison with the work of ‘Smith studies’ scholars operating more firmly in 
intellectual history who generally serve to guard against these particular mythologies of 
interpretation.  I argued that the shortcomings of IPE representations of Smith shows 
how IPE scholars tend to imitate a decidedly ‘economistic’ historiography of Smith, 
almost entirely replicating interpretations of his work to be found in histories of 
economics written by economists (e.g. Fry 1992; Stigler 1976; Tobin 1996). 
 
However, intellectual history Smith scholars are not completely immune from falling 
foul of Skinnerian interpretive mythologies either.  Debates about whether Smith 
belongs to a ‘jurisprudential’ or a ‘civic humanist’ tradition of thought, on the one hand, 
and the Adam Smith Problem, on the other, can produce interpretations of him that 
succumb to a second mythology of ‘doctrine’ and a mythology of ‘coherence’ 
respectively.  What is significant here is that IPE scholars have very little to contribute 
to either of these debates.  Essentially, I argued, this again reveals something of the 
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economistic historiography of Smith in IPE (Chapter 2).  Economists writing histories of 
economics do not in general pick up on debates in the specialist Smith studies literature 
and, as a result, through imitating this historiography, neither do IPE scholars.  At most, 
they pay fleeting attention to his civic humanist concerns, albeit very rarely describing it 
specifically as such, and more often they tend to replicate only one half of the Adam 
Smith Problem by offering selective interpretations drawn from WN.  Therefore, I 
argued, the precise ways that IPE representations of Smith tend to fall foul of Skinner’s 
mythologies point towards the way in which on matters of Smith historiography IPE 
scholars are ‘followers’ rather than ‘leaders’.  This is a fundamental dilemma for those 
interested in a more historiographically-aware IPE and, moreover, given that in a 
number of other ways IPE scholars seek to differentiate themselves from economics, 
especially problematic for a ‘critical IPE’. 
 
In an effort to rectify this deficiency, then, I used a Skinnerian approach to begin to 
provide a more historicised account of Smith for IPE (Chapter 3).  I constructed a 
reading of Smith that might be said to be more robust in that it attempts to pay close 
attention to his intentions in writing his work.  I suggested that a careful examination of 
Smith’s texts, suitably located in their socio-linguistic context, can provide an account of 
his concept of sympathy.  Put briefly, in Smith’s texts, there is a noticeable concern for 
questions about the cultivation of standards of moral behaviour in the emerging 
commercial society of his time (Fitzgibbons 1995; Force 2003; Teichgraeber 1986).  
Along with Hume, Smith responded to Hutcheson’s ideas about ‘moral sense’ by 
pursuing an interest in the role of sentiments, passions, and feelings in human conduct.  
Yet, Smith differed from Hume by rejecting his scepticism and use of the concept of 
utility.  Smith thought that sentiments themselves had to be explained, which certainly 
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influenced the development of his concept of sympathy.  In important ways, Smith can 
here be shown to share a similar response to Mandeville’s ‘selfish hypothesis’ to that of 
Rousseau (Watson 2012).  It is in this immediate socio-linguistic context that Smith’s 
‘intentions’ and his ‘politics’ are best negotiated – not based on the assumption that he is 
a forerunner to Benthamite utilitarianism or Mill’s economic man dictum (Winch 1978). 
 
I argued that this act of recovery of Smith’s texts actually provides IPE with a highly 
illuminating account of his ‘sympathy’ (Chapter 3).  I suggested that Smith’s concept of 
sympathy, suitably historicised, can be understood most appropriately as an imaginative 
procedure through which people come to assess action, circumstance, and suffering in 
terms of both others and themselves (Force 2003; Peil 1999).  As a contestable 
procedure, sympathy is not simply an ‘other-directed’ ontology of the individual.  It 
invokes the idea of a constant balancing act and negotiation between an individual ‘self’ 
principally concerned and broader societal norms and values, the ‘other’.  Smith termed 
the process through which the latter are potentially encountered and internalised the 
activation of an ‘impartial spectator’ (e.g. TMS I.i.5.4).  From Smith’s sympathy 
perspective, then, individuals are understood as individuals in society, in which they 
construct, contest, and share rules and values: there is interactivity between an individual 
and a system in terms of questions of politics and ethics (Vaggi 2004; Weinstein 2006).  
On one level, this account is novel because it represents a crucial aspect of Smith’s 
thought that is currently almost completely overlooked by IPE scholars (although for 
notable exceptions see, for example, Blaney and Inayatullah 2010; Glaze 2008; Sally 
1998) operating with an economistic historiography of his work.   
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On another level, drawing on the idea of using pragmatic historiography in IPE, this 
account of sympathy is novel because it is so fundamentally different from economistic 
understandings of market-oriented behaviour prevalent in liberal market governance 
today.  This opens up a number of exciting lines of enquiry for IPE in terms of essential 
questions about how to conceptualise economic agency as anything other than 
instrumentally rational behaviour (e.g. Griffin 2007; Murphy and Tooze 1991b; Watson 
2005a).  It brings notions of contestable interpersonal ethics right back into the heart of 
discussions of individual subjecthood under liberal market governance.  To be clear, 
though, I firmly did not propose some sort of direct ‘theory building’ or an ‘application’ 
of Smith’s concept of sympathy to today’s social world: to do so would be to submit to 
my own critique of ahistorical IPE.  Rather, more creatively I hope, I proposed a 
‘dialogic conversation’ between Smith’s ‘sympathetic liberalism’ suitably historicised, 
on the one hand, and the ‘economistic liberalism’ of liberal market governance today, on 
the other (Chapter 4).  
 
In an attempt to sustain a historicised engagement, I took direct inspiration from Smith 
by organising this conversation around the themes he uses right at the beginning of TMS 
to introduce his concept of sympathy (TMS I.i.1-3).  I therefore juxtaposed the three 
themes of ‘sympathy’, ‘mutual sympathy’, and the ‘sympathy procedure’ from TMS, 
with three principal sites of finance implicated in the global financial crisis (GFC) 
understood as a problem of liberal market governance: ‘asset-based welfare’, ‘credit 
risk’, and ‘personal debt’ in Anglo-American societies today.  In all three parts of the 
discussion, the aim was to interrogate the ethics of economistic liberalism in 
conversation with Smith’s sympathetic liberalism.  This permitted me to draw attention 
to a potential crisis of ethics in contemporary liberalism at the heart of the GFC (Chapter 
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4).  Put simply, I suggested, economistic liberalism is severely flawed because it does 
not allow for contestable ethics at the level of the individual and the consequences of 
this can be traced through the GFC as a problematic of liberal market governance.  In the 
context of the GFC, the consequences of this problem might be discernible, I argued, 
when government programmes promoting asset-based welfare go unquestioned, when 
risk management is normalised to the everyday, and when creditor-debtor relations are 
depoliticised.   
 
In presenting this dialogic conversation I introduced the conceptual building blocks of a 
sympathy perspective on which a more empirically-focussed engagement could take 
place.  This was first undertaken at the ‘regulatory’ level of global finance (Chapter 5).  
Essentially, by critically analysing the regulatory GFC discourse, I explored the notion 
that at the three sites of finance it can be understood as a crisis based on the denial of 
contestable interpersonal ethics.  I showed how: (1) even though issues of access to 
homeownership and financial security fall right at the heart of the GFC (Finlayson 2009; 
Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009), asset-based systems of welfare remain largely 
unquestioned; (2) despite widespread criticism of securitisation (Gowan 2008; 
Nesvetailova 2010), credit risk management practices remain essentially unchallenged 
and, in fact, are further normalised based on continued faith in the ‘science’ and 
‘perfectibility’ of risk management; and (3) even though the politics of debt are central 
to the crisis (Langley 2009; Schwartz 2009), the regulatory view of personal debt 
continues to depoliticise creditor-debtor relations by insisting on the normalisation of 
financial services and operating to induce model financialised citizens.   
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What is significant here, I argued, is that at each of these sites of finance the regulatory 
account of and response to the GFC relies on an economistic understanding of financial 
market agency that serves to exclude contestable interpersonal ethics (Chapter 5).  In 
short, (1) asset-based systems of welfare are based on societies made up of 
instrumentally rational individuals acting autonomously to secure their wellbeing 
through financial markets (Langley 2006); (2) extant risk management practices rely on 
assumptions about disembodied risk in society again dependent on instrumentally 
rational and autonomous individuals (Adam and van Loon 2000); and (3) regulatory 
treatments of issues of debt depoliticise the creditor-debtor relation by assuming that all 
market-oriented behaviour is pure instrumental rationality (Montgomerie 2009).  
Smith’s sympathetic liberalism indicates how this economistic constitution of financial 
market agency is defective because to deny contestable interpersonal ethics is to deny 
full realisation of market-oriented forms of behaviour.  As with all other formations of 
market-oriented behaviour, a sympathy perspective would insist that financial market 
agency is intrinsically ethico-political.  Therefore, I argued, a Smithian sympathy 
perspective, at the very least, problematises and opens up ethico-political space at these 
important sites of finance intimately involved with the GFC.   
 
I could then pose the question as to whether or not interventions into the ‘everyday’ 
GFC discourse provide a subversion of the regulatory level of finance more congruent 
with a Smithian sympathy perspective by problematising these same sites of finance 
(Chapter 6).  Picking up on interest in IPE on ‘global civil society’ as a key source of 
ethical agency (e.g. Cox 1999; De Goede 2005b; Gill 2000b; Kaldor 2003; Scholte 
2004), it might be anticipated that these interventions serve to contest the regulatory 
representation of and response to the GFC.  What is interesting from the perspective of 
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this thesis is whether such challenges provide possibilities for comprehending and 
responding to the crisis in distinctly deeper and more thoroughgoing Smithian 
sympathetic terms:  (1) I illustrated how some interventions hold an oppositional attitude 
with regard to systems of asset-based welfare, which offers a severe critique of 
homeowner ideology and state restructuring towards notions of individual financial 
responsibility; (2) I showed how features of the everyday discourse present an 
destabilising encounter with the current theory and practice of credit risk management; 
and (3) I demonstrated how key aspects of the everyday discourse provide a remorseless 
repoliticisation of credit-debt relations by providing a critique of the sizable power of 
banks and other financial institutions in a financialised economy, the redistributive 
politics of credit-debt relations, and the underlying material or capacity struggles 
obscured by personal debt.   
 
If the everyday GFC discourse does indeed offer up alternatives in this way, this would 
surely be something of a significant success for those who seek to challenge existing 
forms of regulatory financial market governance (Chapter 6).  In what ways, though, 
might the everyday discourse contain challenges specifically more congruent with a 
sympathy perspective?  How might such interventions help in efforts to ‘rethink’ the 
ethics of global finance, perhaps along more sympathetic lines? 
 
 
Towards a ‘sympathetic finance’ 
 
A restatement of sympathy may prove useful here.  In short, for Smith, sympathy refers 
to a procedure in which ‘self’ engages in an imaginative reconstruction of the situation 
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of ‘other’ in order to internalise ethical judgement of both self and other (Chapter 3).  It 
denotes ‘fellow-feeling’ with the situation of another (TMS I.i.1.5) and suggests a route 
to a conventionalist-relational (non-relativist) interpersonal ethics.  Other routes might 
include Hume’s broadly conventionalist account, but as I have shown Smith did not 
share his views entirely.  For Smith, as a continuous process dependent on the activation 
of an ‘impartial spectator’, sympathy can be both tutored and improved, on the one hand, 
and also corrupted and deactivated, on the other.  The central point for rethinking the 
ethics of global finance is the notion that financial market agency is made up of 
contestable interpersonal ethics, not economistic instrumentally rational and uniform 
behaviour. 
 
From a sympathy perspective, then, the potential ‘crisis of ethics’ of economistic 
liberalism I identified as being at the heart of the GFC relates to the idea that such a 
form of liberalism essentially denies the very existence of contestable interpersonal 
ethics.  The possible tension is that in serving to ignore this feature of market-oriented 
behaviour questions of contestable ethics and politics are suppressed, even though they 
still form a foundational part of the constitution of individual selfhood in a market 
economy.  My suggestion, then, is not that by adopting a sympathy perspective it is 
possible to produce a ‘tension-free’ ethics of finance.  Rather, almost to the contrary, a 
sympathy perspective recognises the very possibility of tensions existing in the ethics of 
finance that need to be negotiated.  The question of whether ‘finance’ itself is always 
crisis/tension-prone is not really at stake here, the point is that economistic forms of 
liberal market governance conceptualise and constitute financial market agency in terms 
that deny contestable interpersonal ethics, in the form of economistic instrumentally 
rational and uniform behaviour. 
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Ironically, of course, ideas about instrumentally rational forms of economic agency are 
often attributed to Smith himself.  Yet these interpretations can only be sustained 
through an economistic historiography of his work (Chapter 2).  The work of Stiglitz 
(2006: 66; 2010) comes to mind here in his attempts to use Smith in response to the 
GFC, while viewing him as ‘the founder of modern economics’.  Notably, as I have 
indicated, occupiers appeal to Smith in almost a diametrically opposed way.  In a sense, 
on this occasion as on so many others, the competing historiographies of Smith in a 
fascinating way mirror the competing and drastically different responses to the GFC.  
This somewhat affirms my contention that historiographical matters in political 
economy can perform a significant role in the very construction and negotiation of 
contemporary issues of IPE. 
 
As opposed to an economistic historiography of his work, though, a more appropriate 
history of thought historiography of Smith produces a very different account that draws 
attention to his sympathy procedure.  The fundamental way in which the challenge 
presented in the everyday GFC discourse is consistent with a sympathy perspective is 
that, at the very least, it opens up space for ethico-political contestation at the level of 
the individual.  It does so by challenging the fundamental tenets of the economistic 
liberalism of regulatory financial market governance, here investigated at the sites of 
asset-based welfare, credit risk management, and ideas about personal debt.  A sympathy 
perspective is at least partially embodied in the everyday GFC discourse in this sense 
and it offers up fruitful lines of enquiry for efforts to rethink finance along the lines of a 
‘sympathetic finance’.   
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The enticing question then becomes what fills this space opened up in a rethinking of the 
ethics of liberal market governance.  First and foremost, I would argue, everyday 
interventions that serve to confront individualised financial responsibility, disembodied 
risk for which no-one assumes responsibility, and the production of financialised 
subjects and the normalised place of debt, at the very least, can conceive of allowing the 
sympathy procedure to operate.  That is, they conceptualise financial market agency in a 
way that allows for people to act as attentive impartial spectators, rather than as 
atomised and unsighted onlookers.  The very sentiment ‘We are the 99 per cent’, for 
instance, invokes an imaginative capacity to relate to others and negotiate standards of 
appropriate ethics (The Occupied Times 2011c: 9).   
 
Drawing from my sketch of everyday interventions, then, I suggest a sympathetic 
finance might involve, but is not limited too, the following features: (1) in terms of 
individual responsibility, fostering a recognition that in market-oriented behaviour it is 
necessary to think ‘outside of the self’ given that financial market agency always has 
consequences for others; (2) in terms of credit risk and structured finance, fostering a 
recognition that risks are always ‘embodied’ risks borne by people who potentially 
suffer (or profit) in an interdependent society; and (3) in terms of personal debt, 
fostering a recognition that creditor-debtor relations are always inherently unequal 
‘positions of power’ and that an imaginative act might be involved in terms of setting the 
appropriate standards for and place of debt in society.  In some of the everyday 
interventions, notions of de-linking, de-financialisation, and making financial chains 
more accountable speak to this theme of a sympathetic finance.  Practically speaking, 
this points to a fundamental overhaul of institutional market design in finance to make it 
more knowable.  Though a huge shift in ethos, simplifying chains in personal banking, 
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for instance, might be as straightforward as breaking up monopolies and cultivating 
more direct forms of savings and loans between people. 
 
Beyond ‘recognition’ and ‘opening up’, what might be the possible content of the 
outcome of the sympathy procedure(s) operating in a more ‘sympathetic finance’?  On 
the one hand, Smith’s conventionalist-relational ethics does not necessarily produce 
straightforward solutions in this regard.  Yet, on the other hand, cautiously adopting a 
sympathy perspective on questions of financial market agency, what might be the most 
likely outcomes for liberal market governance today?  Much of the answer here relates 
to Smith’s sympathy attending to people’s psychological capacities, as well as their 
economic or material needs.  For example, from a sympathy perspective, market-
oriented behaviour is not just about securing ‘enough’ of something, but being able to 
imaginatively reconstruct the situation of another in order to decide upon what ‘enough’ 
is in the first place.   
 
Notably, in this regard, a sympathetic finance does not have to commit to the ideas: (1) 
that given the calamitous outcome of homeowner ideology in the GFC, homeownership 
is necessarily a bad thing; (2) that given the abuses of securitisation in the GFC, 
structured finance should be prohibited completely; or (3) that given the unequal 
positions of power that lie behind all credit-debt relations revealed in the GFC, that all 
debt and usury must be ended.  Everyday interventions do not challenge asset-based 
welfare, structured finance, and personal debt entirely – that is, they still operate within 
certain limits of ‘reimagining’ finance, certain relational boundaries of the sympathy 
procedure – but they do make the more modest attempt to repoliticise these issues and 
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serve to make them a question of ethics.  The point is to escape the confines of market-
oriented behaviour viewed and constituted solely in economistic terms.   
 
In finance, this might most productively be sought in institutional arrangements that 
allow one market participant to know the situation of another.  That way, imaginative 
acts of sympathy can be performed that foster the psychological endeavour that people 
have to undertake in order to produce and make markets sustainable anyway.  Put 
simply, Smith’s sympathy perspective indicates that it is not ingrained into ‘human 
nature’ that people have to act in one particular way in order to make markets, however 
much people are told by economistic forms of liberal market governance that this is the 
case.  Ways of knowing finance then become routes to reform. 
 
I now raise some issues that might be involved in such reform, practically speaking, 
based on this agenda.  First, a challenge to the current regulatory architecture might be 
quite simply driven by continuing efforts to democratise global finance and make it 
more inclusive, which at the very least, would help serve to repoliticise liberal market 
governance.  Notably, as Sarah Anderson (2010: 16) reports, the Stiglitz Commission 
actually proposed the establishment of a ‘UN Global Economic Coordination Council’ 
as a more democratic alternative to the G20.  It has not yet materialised, she notes, but 
groups such as the Jubilee USA Network and the New Rules for Global Finance 
Coalition represent key coalitions that continue to pursue this agenda (Anderson 2010: 
17).   
 
Second, another reform imperative holding synergies with a sympathy perspective might 
be to find ways to simplify finance so that it can be made more knowable.  This of course 
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is no small task, but there are increasingly influential voices in the contemporary politics 
of financial restructuring that offer interesting prospects along these lines.  One might 
be, as my account has shown, the policy-oriented forms of academic analysis that 
organisations like CRESC (2009) produces in its ‘public interest report’.  For his part, 
Paul Volcker’s proposed banking reforms also essentially look to reduce financial 
innovation (at least in government-backed institutions), which might also serve this 
agenda.  Although, as noted, the kinds of resistance that banks and other financial 
institutions are able to mobilise may well curb the impact of such regulatory proposals 
(and clearly they already have according to Volcker (Reuters 2011)).  Again, though, 
despite a degree of inaction at the regulatory level, as Occupy the SEC shows, there are 
(radical) everyday voices demanding more robust and thoroughgoing regulatory reforms 
willing to work within the existing regulatory architecture.  These voices are 
embellished by action groups such as the Move Your Money Campaign (Anderson 
2010), which also might be endorsed from a sympathy perspective given that it serves to 
simplify finance through encouraging people to pull their money from large banks and 
put it into local credit unions and smaller financial institutions.  I offer these thoughts 
only as speculative illustrations, but certainly it is possible to identify existing political 
action that might help to re-orient finance, at least implicitly, along more sympathetic 
lines. 
 
 
Future questions (for a possible sympathetic IPE) 
 
The prospects for a ‘sympathetic finance’ might be extended by carrying out further 
academic research into how ‘simplification’ and ‘de-linking’ imperatives can be 
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introduced in practice.  One aspect of this could be to start by, to borrow a phrase from 
Donald MacKenzie (2005), ‘opening the black boxes of global finance’ to show how 
claims to technical/specialist knowledge might serve to sustain technocratic/elite 
structures of finance.  A sympathetic finance is furthered when these claims are brought 
into doubt so people can see the ethico-political aspects of financial markets themselves, 
can understand how their economic agency is involved in sustaining the structural power 
of markets, and can be provided with the opportunity to exercise their own judgement.  
In brief, further research might therefore ask: how can participation in decision making 
in financial market governance be improved?  How can the entrenched power of large 
financial institutions be reduced to allow for other forms of localised participatory 
finance?  How can financial ‘education’ agendas be shifted from a focus on producing 
financialised citizens to making the structures of finance (and how to change them) more 
knowable?  
 
My presentation of a conversation between Smith’s sympathetic liberalism and 
economistic liberalism read through the GFC could of course be extended to other areas 
of IPE going well beyond finance.  After all, the way in which the sympathy procedure 
helps account for the contestable interpersonal ethics of market-oriented behaviour could 
be investigated in relation to other forms of market-making than in finance.  In trade, 
development, consumption, and so on, how can IPE account for the ways that market-
making acts are more than just mere responses to price signals?  Can the problematic of 
the market economy be shifted from one of an abstract price system to one of the 
formation and contestation of interpersonal relations?   These are questions for future 
work, but tentatively I would suggest that at the regulatory and everyday level they 
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involve similar institutional imperatives to make market relations, and their impact, 
more knowable.   
Finally, further historiographical research in IPE might build on the interests driving this 
thesis.  On the one hand, my focus has been on using a pragmatic historiography in 
relation to the ‘Crisis in the Heartland’ (Gowan 2008) of Anglo-American financial 
capitalism.  This form of study could of course equally be built into approaches that 
scrutinise other areas/aspects of the world economy to allow IPE scholars to ‘stand 
outside’ their current disciplinary structures.  On the other hand, future historiographical 
work could help firm up exactly what a sympathetic IPE might entail.  Indeed there is 
certainly scope for IPE scholars to consider Smith’s work in relation to other thinkers of 
his time, aside from the major Enlightenment figures I focused on in the recovery of his 
work presented here.  The study of more of his intellectual influences, adding more and 
more depth to the Skinnerian endeavour, might provide for an expanded historicised 
account of what his ‘sympathy perspective’ can offer IPE.   
 
This latter point is particularly exciting given that a ‘sympathetic IPE’, as I have shown 
in this thesis in relation to finance, can provide a novel rethinking of market economy 
and society.  In short, it is a rethinking that works to recognise and make known that 
there are decisions to be made in political economy and, therefore, market-oriented 
behaviour is always subject to ethico-political intervention.  As occupiers claim: 
 
The economic and political are dovetailing together once more … we are 
rediscovering the economic sphere as a political project – something that can be 
altered and shaped by our hands (The Occupied Times 2012c: 7 emphasis 
added). 
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I have now come full circle back to the performative utterance and the situated position 
of knowledge about political economy.  As I have argued, a foundational purpose of this 
thesis was to provide a historicised account of Smith as part of a process which serves to 
reveal the essential variety of viable ethico-political commitments in political economy 
and IPE.  Returning to Smith does just that.  Smith demonstrates why the sympathy 
procedure is important for understanding market-oriented behaviour.  The sympathy 
procedure demonstrates why contestable interpersonal ethics are central to the market 
form, in both the abstract and embodied institutional sense.  Ethico-political intervention 
into market-oriented behaviour is not only possible, it is market-oriented behaviour.  
Rather than the natural outgrowth of instrumentally rational behaviour deeply inbuilt in 
human nature, markets are made by people, by us – and, as Adam Smith might help 
remind us, are not the outcome of some unknowable invisible hand. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX ----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A note on CAQDAS 
 
CAQDAS stands for Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software, 
which I have used extensively in preparing Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.  In June 2011, 
I attended a number of specialist training sessions organised by The University of 
Warwick’s IT Services.  These provided me with the necessary skills to operate such 
software in the sorting and analysing of all the ‘regulatory’ and ‘everyday’ documents I 
used in these chapters.  Essentially the software helps systematise data and proved 
particularly useful in handling large amounts of text for my discourse analysis research.  
All of the documents consulted in these chapters are listed in the Bibliography. 
